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This dissertation is a study on international diplomatic negotiation processes and their 
context. Diplomatic negotiation processes are vital instruments in international relations 
between countries and in international organizations. In article 33.1 of Chapter VI of the 
Charter of the United Nations, concerning the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’, negotiation 
is mentioned as the first instrument of seven methods to be used in cases of conflict: 
‘The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice’ (https://treaties.un.org/doc/
publication). Furthermore, in its 83rd plenary meeting on 8 December 1998, the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 53/101 on ‘Principles and Guidelines for 
International Negotiations’ (www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f5254a.html). In the preamble, 
it stresses ‘the important role constructive and effective negotiations can play in attaining 
the purposes of the Charter by contributing to the management of international relations’. 
The resolution provides principles and guidelines, hoping that these will ‘contribute to 
enhancing the predictability of negotiating parties, reducing uncertainty and promoting 
an atmosphere of trust at negotiations’. In its second operative paragraph, it ‘Affirms the 
importance of conducting negotiations in accordance with international law in a manner 
compatible with and conducive to the achievement of the stated objective of negotiations’.
The name ‘diplomatic’ is perhaps not completely accurate – inter-state or ‘inter-nation’ 
might be more precise – but it seems to make good sense to use ‘diplomatic’ as the term 
commonly understood for international negotiations in the public sector, playing a pivotal 
role in peaceful conflict resolution. After all, it had already been said in 1716 (Callières, 
1983: 70) that ‘States reap so many advantages from continual negotiations, when they are 
managed with prudence, that it is not possible to believe it, where one does not know it by 
experience’. This doctoral thesis will use the term international negotiation in the sense of 
diplomatic negotiation – that is, inter-state negotiation processes between sovereign states 
in and outside international organizations, being tied to the intra-state processes in which 
the national positions are determined. As the term ‘international negotiation’ is the most 
common terminology to be used by those who deal with diplomatic negotiation processes, 
the two terms will be used interchangeably. This thesis defines diplomatic negotiation 
as an exchange of concessions and compensations in a framework of international order 
accepted by sovereign entities. Such a peaceful process will only be successful if there is 
enough common ground between the adversaries. Effective diplomatic negotiators will 
diagnose – and if needed create – this common space.
This dissertation has been written in the tradition of Clingendael Institute’s PIN program, 
and after two decades at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
in Laxenburg. According to the PIN tradition, there is no one-way street on negotiation. 
There are, of course, books – often originating in North America – that are a great help 
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to those who want to negotiate successfully. Indeed, these books are a useful tool for 
the international negotiator, but they are one-sided as they tend to explain negotiation 
through inclusive models, thereby excluding other approaches. This is not a problem in 
itself, but they are not very helpful in academia. According to members of the PIN group 
(and this was also my own view long before entering this circle), negotiation is multi-
faceted, situational and contextual. An effective strategy can be disastrous under different 
circumstances. There is not one truth, and even if we find certain trends to be true, there 
are always exceptions. As a trainer in international negotiation processes, I often use the 
‘water metaphor’ that I once found by chance in trying to explain the fluidity of negotiation 
and the need to channel it in a certain direction: without a glass, water cannot be drunk 
and used effectively; spilling it over my hand is of no help. (As a side note, the glass is there 
for the water and not the other way around.) International institutions, themselves created 
through the process of inter-state negotiation, serve the process whereby we need to 
solve problems by peaceful means as an alternative to warfare. Without the riverbed, the 
water will not reach its end stage – the sea – in an effective way.
This line of reasoning has many consequences and poses difficult questions to those 
who study international negotiation processes. After all, if negotiation is determined by 
its own fluidity and environment, how can we understand it? Even more so, how do we 
gain a better insight by applying academic techniques, norms and values? We expect 
‘negotiationologists’ – those who want to understand negotiation through an academic 
lens – to tell us about the processes and their structures in a scientific way, as objectively 
as possible, but they themselves are the subject of their environment. Academics are 
influenced by their own background and experience just as much as practitioners. As 
a constituent part of their culture, academics will – often unconsciously – be biased. 
The approach of an American or European, African or Asian academic will be different, 
and even these categories are not homogeneous. As in any social science, there is the 
problem of objective measurement and although, for example, game theory did contribute 
enormously to the understanding of negotiation as such, it cannot explain all facets 
of the process and the structure. The nucleus of negotiation cannot be grabbed in a 
quantitative way, only in a qualitative manner, but the latter approach is open to subjective 
influences. The ‘solution’ is therefore to look at negotiation processes from many different 
angles, hoping to gain some grip on this phenomenon without becoming too subjective 
and therefore non-academic. We need the academic approach to get a systematic 
understanding of the issue. It is the only viable tool that we have, but it is far from perfect 
under the circumstances of processes being influenced by zillions of variables, including 
those of human nature.
International negotiation can be part of any social science, but in this thesis it is an 
integral element of the political science-oriented study of international relations. It is 
only in recent decades that the discipline of international relations really matured and 
that academics noticed that negotiation might be part and parcel of this branch of the 
social sciences. Notwithstanding the fact that thousands of books and articles have been 
devoted during these decades to international negotiation processes and their impact on 
international relations and thereby on diplomacy, not only in the world of today but also 
in bygone centuries, this should not come as a surprise. Negotiation has been the most 
important tool of diplomacy, and diplomacy itself has been a subject of non-academic 
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study for a long time, but systematic attention to international negotiation processes only 
started to surface in the last 50 years, with a sprint during the last two decades. The focus 
of international relations as an academic field has been on war, and only rather lately 
on peaceful conflict resolution. As far as negotiation as a tool in conflict resolution is 
concerned, this lack of interest can be explained by the relative inadequacy of negotiation 
processes in managing conflicts and crises. Being unprotected by strong international 
regimes and institutions, negotiation was a feeble tool, often overshadowed by the use 
of force instead of words. With the growth of international regimes, negotiation became 
an increasingly viable tool in international relations and slowly gained the academic 
attention that it deserves. After all, if negotiation works well, it is a much more cost-
effective instrument than warfare. Furthermore, as war becomes more costly, there is an 
even greater need to facilitate negotiation processes as its alternative.
In the Netherlands, the study of international negotiation – let alone diplomatic 
negotiation – is an undervalued academic field of research and training in international 
relations, notwithstanding the valuable work of the Dutch scholars I met before, during 
and after the first PIN-conference at IIASA 1989. This work hopes to add to the body of 
knowledge collected by these scholars in providing a better understanding and higher 
appreciation of international/diplomatic negotiation processes as a constituent part of 
the study of international relations. For diplomats and civil servants, just to remain in the 
public domain, negotiation is the way to go from conflict to conflict settlement: to merge 
diverging interests into a common solution in the interests of all parties involved. This 
is, of course, an ideal-type approach to the negotiation process and this dissertation 
will illustrate the obstacles and limitations that will often undermine the effectiveness 
of the negotiation process, to the detriment of the parties involved. Worse, conditions 
might not create the ripeness needed for the process to start, or to come to any kind of 
closure. A change of context will thus often be a prerequisite for meaningful international 
and national negotiation. The question of how to change the context in such a way that 
negotiability will be created is not an issue that this thesis seeks to address, although 
some attention will be paid to it. The process of negotiation is already complex enough to 
be tackled, and this will be done from different angles. This is a question of choice, as the 
number of approaches is as numerous as the perceptions about the definition, nature and 
the essence of the negotiation processes between sovereign states and in international 
organizations. Nevertheless, this treatise hopes to spark interest and deepen insight in 
inter-state negotiation and its value for the global community. It attempts to show the 
contours of international negotiation as a construction supporting international relations 
and the processes within them – a socio-political construct with many architects, and 
indeed a structure of its own within international reality.
This study is titled ‘Diplomatic Negotiation: Essence and Evolution’, as it claims to 
be a monograph on the peaceful management of common and opposing interests and 
values of sovereign states through the process of give and take. The dissertation aims 
to enhance understanding of the significance and the evolution of negotiation as a tool in 
international relations. The focus is on the conditions that account for the effectiveness 
of diplomatic negotiation. What are the obstacles and limitations, on the one hand, and 
what are the opportunities and factors conducive to its success, on the other? As for the 
research method being employed in this study, the tool that was used may be labelled 
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multifaceted qualitative analysis: approaching and discussing diplomatic negotiation 
from different angles and by looking at cases in different centuries on the basis of a 
wide body of cross-national literature, discussions in conferences and in the Processes 
of International Negotiation Program in the last fifteen years, as well as experiences in 
training and lecturing university students and negotiation practitioners on four continents 
during the past 30 years.
Apart from the introduction and conclusion, the study consists of two parts, one with 
four and one with six chapters. The first part is on the body of diplomatic negotiation, 
labelled as its ‘nature’. The second part is about how diplomatic negotiation processes 
have been handled during the past 400 years, labelled as its ‘conduct’. The reason for 
subtitling this doctoral dissertation as ‘Essence and Evolution’ instead of ‘Nature and 
Conduct’ arises from the fact that the notion of evolution is dealt with in the first part of 
the thesis, while not all cases are evolutionary. The last case, on simulation, discusses 
the process of negotiation as a mirror of reality, but it is not about the development of 
diplomatic negotiation over the centuries. Furthermore, each of the historical cases has a 
different angle, and thereby analyzes both the aspects of essence and evolution. Part II on 
‘conduct’ starts with the Peace of Westphalia as the most important diplomatic conference 
in history, and continues to discuss the most relevant conferences in each of the following 
centuries, or at least a selection of them, showing their significance for their time and age. 
By studying these conferences, it is hoped to clarify the role of regimes in the evolution 
of diplomatic negotiation, as this dissertation sees regimes and their different modes as 
a basic reason for its growing effectiveness and importance. Part I on ‘nature’ discusses 
the most important phenomena in diplomatic negotiation, which will return in Part II of 
this study.
The difference between this study and the existing literature is its combination of broad 
contextual and comparative approaches to topics through time, focusing on the diplomatic 
dimension of international negotiation processes. The treatise sees negotiation as a 
situational phenomenon and therefore avoids ‘modelling’ it, as no model can encapsulate 
all psychological, procedural and positional factors determining the flow and the 
outcome of diplomatic negotiation processes. Negotiation is as old as mankind, but this 
study wants to clarify why this method of conflict management and resolution became 
more valuable over the centuries. The basic proposition of this thesis is that substantial 
negotiation processes between sovereign states can only be really effective if distrust can be 
compensated by control through international regimes. Trust has always been a problem in 
negotiation. Although people can create trust between them, states need guarantees for 
the implementation of the contracts between them, otherwise negotiation would be a flat 
instrument in international relations. Diplomacy is in need of negotiation as an instrument 
to substantiate its own effectiveness.
This dissertation is hence a collection of papers interconnected in such a way that 
some kind of edifice can be presented to the reader, not just an ensemble of unrelated 
buildings. Two-thirds of the content of this dissertation was published and peer reviewed 
before 2012, but all of these texts have been thoroughly updated and revised, with some 
partially rewritten or completely restructured. Most of chapters II, III, IV, VI and VII, as 
well as substantial parts of chapters I, V, X and XI, were published before this study was 
started in 2012. Most of chapters VIII, IX and XII, as well as substantial parts of chapters I, 
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V, X and XI, were written specifically for this dissertation. They have in the meantime been 
pre-published in an abridged and restructured mode. A detailed account of the sources 
and the underlying publications can be found in the footnote at the start of each chapter, 
with full reference to the Bibliography.
Chapter I introduces the phenomenon of international negotiation, of which diplomatic 
negotiation is part and parcel. The chapter studies the architecture of international 
negotiations and provides an overview of approaches by some of the important scholars 
in the field. As already mentioned, the first part of this dissertation – on ‘The Nature of 
Diplomatic Negotiation’ – analyzes important aspects of the negotiation processes between 
states, be they outside or inside international organizations. The focus on states has been 
chosen because of their predominance in international relations, notwithstanding the 
role played by other actors like supranational, intergovernmental and public and private 
non-governmental organizations that do not have sovereignty. As John Odell observes, 
‘Negotiation between states remains one of the most central recurring processes of 
international relations’ (Odell, 2009: 273). Likewise, Alisher Faizullaev holds that ‘states 
remain the main actors of international diplomacy. States, not organizations or individuals, 
establish diplomatic relations’ (Faizullaev, 2014: 279). This dissertation deals with the 
problem of what one might describe as ‘organized international anarchy’: cooperation 
between almost completely independent entities in an interdependent world, which 
distinguishes diplomatic negotiation from other negotiation processes. The notion of 
‘organized international anarchy’ is quite similar to the concept of ‘international society’ 
as elaborated by Hedley Bull in his seminal book The Anarchical Society: A Study of World 
Order in World Politics (Bull, 1977). In Bull’s view, diplomatic negotiation is one of the 
institutions creating a modicum of order in the states’ system. Furthermore, in view of 
its focus on diplomatic negotiation rather than on other forms of negotiation, it suited 
this study well that states were actually already on the international scene at the time of 
the negotiations in Westphalia, as demonstrated in the first case study. The Treaty – or 
rather the Treaties – of Westphalia can be regarded as a kind of proto-regional regime, 
but not as the birth of the first international organization, which appeared only in the 
twentieth century (Meerts, 2014c). Chapter II gives a short overview of the development 
of diplomatic negotiation over the centuries and its character. Chapter III looks at the 
connection between the process of diplomatic negotiation and its context. Chapter IV 
deals with entrapment as a special kind of process that is heavily influenced by contextual 
issues. Chapter V analyzes the connection and disconnection between diplomatic 
negotiation and warfare, which are two sides of the same coin, being the main – but very 
different – tools of conflict management and resolution.
As stated above, the second part of this thesis, ‘The Conduct of Diplomatic Negotiation’, 
consists of case studies of diplomatic negotiation. The cases will be studied from different 
perspectives. Chapter VI, on the seventeenth century, looks at the Münster negotiations 
as a process dealing with the past and structuring the future in a predominantly positive 
way. Chapter VII studies the behaviour of diplomatic negotiators during the Utrecht Peace 
Negotiations in the early eighteenth century. It compares their behaviour with negotiation 
behaviour 40 years earlier, as well as with the behaviour of diplomatic negotiators 300 years 
later. Chapter VIII asks questions about the effect of including and excluding parties and 
people from the negotiation process during the Vienna Peace Conference in the early 
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nineteenth century. Chapter IX studies the impact of the reputation and the ego of the 
diplomatic and the political negotiators on six negotiation processes around and during 
warm and cold wars in the twentieth century: at the end of the First World War; before and 
after the Second World War; and during the Cold War. Chapter X observes the European 
Union as a negotiation process within a relatively strong framework, constituting the most 
solid context for diplomatic negotiation in human history so far. Chapter XI does not look 
at the historical, but instead the simulated dimension of diplomatic negotiation. After the 
chapters on the conduct of diplomatic negotiation, chapter XII draws final conclusions 
from the preceding chapters.
The pictures on the cover (de Vries and Hunter, 1963: 86–89) are by Dr Erich Salomon 
(whose father came from Berlin and mother from Rotterdam), a mechanic/lawyer/journalist 
with great insight into people, politics and history, who invented his own technical means 
allowing him to take clandestine pictures. Both photographs were taken at the end of the 
Lausanne Conference on German First World War reparations in 1932. They have been 
chosen as showing the intensity of diplomatic negotiation and ‘picture’ in a way the content 
of this dissertation. The negotiators were unaware of the presence of Dr Salomon, who 
can be regarded as the father of the candid camera. French Prime Minister Briand called 
him ‘le roi des indiscrets’ and another minister remarked that ‘(nowadays) conferences 
can be held without ministers, but not without Dr Salomon’ (de Vries and Hunter, 1963: 
223 and v). The photographs figured in the main lecture hall of Clingendael Institute and 
inspired participants from the course for top-level defence management to simulate it: 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND 
DISQUISITION
International – and thereby diplomatic – negotiation processes can only be well understood 
by approaching them from as many different angles as possible. This introductory chapter 
first discusses the essence and architecture of international negotiation, and then some 
approaches from negotiation literature. The student of international negotiation will 
find remarkable resemblances between them. The majority of negotiation scholars and 
practitioners are analyzing baskets of different inroads to the negotiation processes and all 
these inroads look alike. The difference is their emphasis: many authors take the process 
and its phases as a starting point; others focus first on different factors influencing these 
processes; while some will take the actors in the process as their point of departure. 
Whatever their main focal point is, however, the vast majority of the ‘negotiationologists’ 
will deal with the same elements in the end. For the processes, these will be diagnosing, 
exploring, selecting, deciding and implementing. The main factors analyzed are the 
political and diplomatic context of the negotiation, the nature of and the distance between 
positions and interests, the strategies and tactics employed, the impact of power and 
influence, as well as the shadow of the past and the future. For actors, the authors deal 
with parties such as states and international organizations and their structure, the people 
representing them and the delegations they are managing, their character, experience 
and skill, their societal and professional background, and the question of what extent they 
are included in or excluded from the negotiation process.
This triangle of ‘Actors–Factors–Processes’ is of course incomplete and much more 
complicated in reality. It is but one way to look at all the issues at hand. Another approach 
would structure by asking questions like why, who, how, when and where? This approach 
cuts through the construction of actors, factors and processes. The question here is: what 
are the independent and dependent variables? There is no answer to this, as all elements 
are dependent on each other and it is up to the authors to choose the starting points, 
as independent variables. The problem is that different authors take different starting 
points and there are only subjective ways to separate the independent variables from 
the dependent. The choice is for pragmatic reasons; there is unfortunately no objective 
scientific choice. As negotiation is situational, so is the study of it. A one-dimensional 
approach can be helpful, as long as it is understood as such. We go off-track if we pretend 
that our approach to negotiation is the one and only truth. This study will therefore not 
launch a (new) model to analyze and explain the character and conduct of negotiation, but 
will limit itself to a series of observations and conclusions.
The Preface of this dissertation has already defined diplomatic negotiation. Yet what 
is diplomacy? According to Satow, it ‘is the application of intelligence and tact to the 
conduct of official relations between governments of independent states’ (Satow, 1917: ix), 
while Jönsson and Aggestam try to explain the essence of diplomacy by looking at it from 
different angles, as will be explained in chapter II of this thesis (Jönsson and Aggestam, 
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2009: 33–34). Diplomacy is anyway more than negotiation: ‘Diplomacy serves a large 
variety of functions, and negotiation, albeit important, is only one of them. It is nonetheless 
true that global society today is generating an increasingly large volume of negotiation, 
in part the result of complex interdependence’ (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009: 5). Diplomacy is 
a tool in international governance, while negotiation is an instrument in diplomacy, with 
governance being defined as the ways to manage common affairs in which conflicting or 
diverse interests may be accommodated (Karns and Mingst, 2010: 3–4).
The definition of diplomatic/international negotiation depends on the question of 
which definition is most suitable to describe and analyze the process as an explanation of its 
outcome. Maxim Kaplan (Kaplan, 2010: 13) found 161 different definitions of negotiation. 
In 115 of these, agreement is the issue that these definitions want to clarify, 71 definitions 
stress communication as the main factor to be analyzed, 64 focus on conflicting interests, 
and another 64 perceive negotiation from the point of view of elements such as process 
and behaviour (Kaplan, 2010: 14–15). He sums them up in an annexe (Kaplan, 2010: 
351–375). It is neither possible nor useful, however, to refer to a long list of definitions 
in this dissertation. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, for example, do not attempt to 
define diplomatic negotiation at all. They just try to approach its meaning, by saying 
that ‘While negotiating to further the interests of their particular polities, diplomats 
typically identify the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the avoidance of war as common 
interests’(Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 82). They stress the fact that diplomats are negotiating 
as ‘agents of a principal with ultimate authority’ (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 84). The same 
is true for Machiavelli, who limits himself to the observation that the diplomat must, ‘if 
his instructions require it, engage in formal negotiations, and be especially industrious in 
obtaining information and reporting it home’ (Berridge, 1999: 13).
Henry Kissinger views negotiation thus: ‘In simple terms, negotiation is a process 
of combining conflicting positions into a common position, under a decision rule of 
unanimity, a phenomenon in which the outcome is determined by the process’ (Kissinger, 
1969: 212). This study comments on his definition by saying that it is not so much a 
combination of conflicting positions, but of conflicting needs reflected in conflicting 
positions. Furthermore, the decision rule does not need to be unanimity. Indeed, in most 
cases the decision-making mechanism is through consensus, meaning that not all parties 
fully agree. Some abstain as they do not want to veto the (re)solution. It remains an open 
question whether it is possible to define a process as a negotiation if it does not aim at 
an outcome, but has been used to delude the opponent, or to postpone or even avoid any 
outcomes. This thesis is of the opinion that striving for an outcome is indeed an essential 
element in most negotiation processes, but it regards a ‘smoke-screen’ process to be 
negotiation as well. Although it is undeniably true that fake negotiation processes – as 
navigated by one or more of the parties involved – are not aiming at an agreement, they 
still show nearly all the characteristics that adhere to negotiation and are therefore 
regarded as a negotiation process by this study.
This study, as already stated in the Preface, does not try to determine what negotiation 
is by capturing it in one or more definitions. It tries to enhance our understanding of the 
phenomenon by describing and analyzing as many essential elements as possible, thereby 
limiting itself to negotiations in the diplomatic and political spheres. In that sense, the 
thesis hopes to highlight negotiation’s role in international relations, and in conflicts or 
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ongoing international decision-making in particular. In serious conflictual situations, it 
might be seen as war by peaceful means ; in continuous decision-making as the policy of 
give and take. Between these two extremes there is a grey area of mixture, where either 
the one or the other is the predominant mode of processing.
THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION1
‘Negotiation and conflict management research is thriving, as shown by the success of 
international conferences, the vast number of research and teaching programs held in an 
expanding list of countries, and the quantity and quality of articles, books, dissertations, 
and working papers’ (Colson et al., 2013: xi). New scholarly interest in international 
negotiation processes started after the Second World War (Lewicki et al., 1994: 15–19). 
Before then, one can point to the work of diplomats like Francesco Guicciardini (1483–
1540) (Berridge, 1998), the Archbishop Fénelon (1651–1715) (Koskenniemi, 2011), the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743) (Koskenniemi, 2011), the diplomatic negotiator Francois 
de Callières (Callières, 1983), and at a much later stage Harold Nicolson (Nicolson, 
1963), who have said many things worthy of consideration about the phenomenon of 
negotiations between states. Scientific interest was raised more seriously in the 1960s. 
Academics like Fred Iklé (Iklé, 1964) and Howard Raiffa (Raiffa, 1982) tried to find patterns 
in something as intangible as a process. For this purpose various methods were used, 
from the description of real negotiations to mathematical models in which the factors of 
the negotiation process were objectified. In that way there was common ground between 
the authors for whom negotiation did not take a central role, but who had carried out 
research into facts and factors that played a major role in the negotiation process. It 
relates, for instance, to the power factor (Zartman and Rubin, 2000), the psychological 
factor (Rubin, 1991), and the game theoretical aspects (Axelrod, 1984).
Negotiation is ‘just’ one way – although if it can be applied, it is very cost-effective – to 
create and enhance peace, security and justice. This is especially true if the circumstances 
help to foster sustainability. ‘Negotiators who respect Procedural Justice principles are 
more likely to produce agreements based on equality, and such agreements are more 
durable’ (Albin et al., 2012: 23). Other tools can be facilitation, mediation, arbitration, 
adjudication and warfare, etc. This study limits itself to inter-state negotiation, asking 
questions about negotiation’s nature and utility, and relating it on its fringes to warfare 
and adjudication. Negotiation can be used to avoid wars, and it is nearly always used 
after wars are over. Negotiation can be used to avoid adjudication, but it is always used 
to give rise to adjudication. This means that so-called ‘black letter laws’ are products 
of negotiation processes, especially on the international level. Negotiation is a cost-
effective mechanism aspiring to create peace, creating a secure environment for that 
peace to flourish, and establishing sustainability through the implementation of justice. 
It is, of course, a question of interrelationships. Peace creates favourable conditions for 
This section on ‘Architecture’ is based on Meerts (2008).
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negotiation processes, because security is needed to protect the negotiators – there have 
been times when killing the enemy’s ambassador was seen as a way to show strength – and 
justice secures the implementation of the fruits of the negotiation process.
This part of the introductory chapter looks at a few central issues in negotiating peace, 
namely security and justice. First, the chapter will ask who is dealing with inter-state 
negotiation, who practises the processes, who analyzes processes/positions/people, 
who trains the negotiators, and how? Second, the section will deal with people and their 
positions, asking questions about behaviour and the balance between common and 
diverging interests. Third, the question of processes and the factors influencing those 
processes (power) will be commented upon, but also the use of negotiation as a tool in 
international relations: when does it work, and when not? Fourth, the interrelationships 
of negotiation, adjudication and warfare are brought to the fore. Finally, some concluding 
remarks will be made.
Academics and Practitioners
From an academic point of view, the thinking about – and research in – international 
negotiation processes cannot be described as a separate discipline (Faure, 2003: 11, 203). 
However, multidisciplinary research programmes can be found within the social sciences 
in which an increasing number of political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and also 
mathematicians are already involved. This upward trend is shown in the increasing number 
of books and articles in journals, and the founding of periodicals such as Negotiation 
Journal (Plenum Press) and International Negotiation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers).
We might expect these academics to use their findings to train practitioners, and 
we could expect practitioners to help academics with their research, but strangely 
this is not the case. Practitioners, researchers and trainers do not communicate at the 
same level. Leaving aside the fact that many of the researchers are also lecturers on 
international negotiation at universities, and that they use their discoveries of the ‘secrets’ 
of negotiation to enhance their students’ insight, they are not by definition skilled trainers. 
Teaching is mostly about literature, and although simulation games are used to illustrate 
theory, teaching is still a far cry from real training. Trainers are – if everything is up to 
standard – capable of providing participants with experience in negotiation processes. 
However, contrary to teachers and researchers, trainers are often not aware of the bulk 
of modern literature. They often copy what others copied from someone who once upon 
a time developed a practicum on the basis of academic insights. Yet these trainers can 
be charismatic people, who may not know as much about negotiation as they do about 
private-sector management, but who have the empathy to influence the thinking and 
frame of mind of their course participants. They may radiate strength. Participants will 
often remember their personality many years thereafter, but they will forget what they 
learned about negotiation.
One would expect a ‘natural life cycle’ – that is, practitioners help researchers to 
understand the soul of the negotiation process, while trainers would use the insights 
from research to train effective (future) practitioners. One could expect common 
understanding to grow as the sub-discipline of negotiation processes developed over 
the past twenty years, bringing the three groups together in joint forums. There is indeed 
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some more communality, but on average the cleavages between practitioners, academics 
and trainers have not been bridged.
We must first look at the reasons behind the persons. Many practitioners, especially 
those in the Inter-state Negotiations Arena – first and foremost diplomats – do not really 
believe that negotiation is a science; they perceive it as art. They are not alone on this. To 
many diplomats and other practitioners, it is an art that is inborn and cannot be learned, a 
feeling that is especially true for the old-fashioned diplomats. One might hope for change 
as time goes by, but for the moment these senior diplomats dominate the scene, as they 
hold the most important diplomatic posts. Apart from their perception – and perception 
determines reality – they are often handicapped by not fully understanding their own 
behaviour. They may be effective diplomatic negotiators, but they tend not to be fully 
aware of the ‘why’ questions. What does one do in order to be effective? How do we 
negotiate? They are so deep in their routine that they do not have the insight of efficacy 
traits in their own dealings with other states. It is a little like an excellent car driver, who 
is so good because he does not need to bother about the technicalities of driving; he has 
his routine, and can therefore develop a helicopter view. The mind and eyes concentrate 
on the environment and not so much on the mechanics. In itself this is good, and the most 
effective negotiators have a grip on both process and context, but this does not mean that 
they really understand what they are doing in order to be effective. They often negotiate 
on automatic pilot.
Practitioners – in particular ambassadors of the older generation – often have a certain 
disdain for academic negotiation research and education. They do not really believe in 
training as a tool to become a better negotiator. Many practitioners do not want to lose 
time by conferring with academics on the issue of international negotiation processes. 
Moreover, they do not want negotiation ‘experts’ to have a look in their kitchen, first 
because this might harm their country’s national interests (the secrecy of the negotiation 
in order to keep some room for manoeuvre), and second, because they might lose face if 
consultants observe that mistakes are made and opportunities are lost. Negotiators often 
show their emotions, they have non-verbal leaks (such as unconscious body language), 
and they do not want this to be revealed to the outside world.
More serious is the second ‘reality dilemma’ (Klabbers, 1988), in that practitioners 
do not allow researchers (and trainers) to observe real-time negotiations. Negotiation 
‘experts’ are sometimes invited to witness bilateral negotiations, but closed sessions 
are the rule, especially in multilateral inter-state bargaining. The consequence of this is 
twofold. First, practitioners do not profit from the insights of negotiation research, and 
indeed serious mistakes are made on matters like timing and trust, strategy and tactics, 
skills and styles. Indeed, obvious mistakes have been made at many conferences, and 
process experts would probably have noticed these and might have helped the process 
to avoid going off-track. Second, this attitude of the practitioners hampers academics 
and trainers in a serious way: unable to observe real negotiation processes has the 
consequence that alternative means, such as the observation of mock communication, 
and the study of ‘memoirs’ and other written accounts, have to be used in order to come 
as close as possible to the real processes. Interviews and surveys might help somewhat, 
but interviewees have a tendency to omit the things they did wrong and to stress their 
glorious moments.
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As has been stated, there is also an abyss between academics and trainers. There are 
several reasons for this. Academics sometimes feel that trainers – especially those from 
private-sector companies – do not really deliver something worthwhile. Their knowledge 
of literature is often scarce, second-hand, and confined to pieces of ‘academic’ work long 
overhauled, or it is literature given to them by others, who will have often transferred 
it into applicable exercises. Trainers also have a problem in understanding the more 
complicated academic findings and, even if they do, transformation into practical tools 
is often precluded by the complexity of the scientific findings. Therefore trainers such 
as Willem Mastenbroek (Mastenbroek, 1989) and Raymond Saner (Saner, 2005), were 
forced to create their own tools. Just as practitioners often do not believe in the value 
and relevance of the academic findings, so academics mistrust the added value and 
correctness of the training devices. Academic programmes on negotiation analysis are on 
the whole very different from training modules and they are seen by many trainers – and 
practitioners – as being too theoretical and therefore not applicable to the education of 
new practitioners.
Academics go for substance; trainers for format. There are many exceptions to this 
‘rule’, but it is true that trainers are often in the service of a company – or themselves – and 
they train for a living. It is just too costly to invest time in academic conferences and in 
writing chapters and articles, although there are consultants who try to balance the two. 
Trainers work in haste and because time is money, training programmes will often be 
‘routines’, formats that are applied to any situation. Tailor-made seminars are quite rare; 
and seminars balancing good content and good exercises are even more of an enigma.
Chapter XI of this thesis will focus on simulations as instruments in creating artificial 
and observable negotiation processes. The fact that they are ‘not for real’ makes a 
difference of course, but people are people. Their behaviour in simulated processes is 
not much different from their dealings in the real process. The emotional triggers, the 
need to plan and to use tactics, the importance of fostering relationships, the problems 
in managing complexity, formality and informality: these are variables that are – to a large 
extent – independent from the reality question. Provided that the simulation is as realistic 
and credible as possible, it will provide researchers with an opportunity to gain a better 
understanding of negotiation processes.
Parties and Interests
Who conducts the negotiations? This section will limit analysis of the phenomenon of 
international negotiation to negotiations between representatives of governments. These 
state representatives can be divided into two categories: politicians; and diplomats/civil 
servants. Consequently, negotiations between states can be held either on a political or 
on a diplomatic/official level. The political level is the highest level and mostly preceded 
and followed by diplomatic/official consultations. The category of diplomats and civil 
servants can also be subdivided, depending on the question of whether an ambassador/
director-general, a young diplomat/policy adviser, or someone in between these ranks, is 
conducting the negotiations.
The actors appear at the negotiation table from different positions. Apart from the 
interests that they have to consider, one can assume that one negotiator will be more 
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skilled than the other, will have a better knowledge of his dossier, is more motivated, better 
trained and could have more credit within his delegation, ministry or government than the 
other. Human differences will influence the course of the negotiations, not in the sense 
that they would be the most influencing factor on their own, but at decisive moments 
they can tip the balance. In other words, the more the other factors (that influence the 
negotiation process) are balanced against each other, the greater the margins in which 
the negotiator’s personal characteristics will play a role. Personal influence might 
be relatively marginal in most inter- and intra-state negotiations, but as we will see in 
Chapter IX, margins can determine outcomes in the same way as profit margins determine 
a company’s success.
The readiness of actors to be involved in the process depends on their interests. 
Negotiations will only take place when the parties, in one way or another, actually need 
each other. A relationship should exist between (parts of) the parties’ interests. It is very 
important for the negotiator to know to what extent the interests of both parties run 
parallel, or whether they largely exclude each other. For parallel interests, a strategy of 
cooperation will be chosen (integrative negotiating); the second case will see a more 
competing approach (competitive negotiation). The negotiations take place in a situation 
where interests practically converge with reasons to cooperate (the lower limit), or when 
the interests do not converge but enough reasons exist for consultation (the upper limit). 
Outside these limits, there is no question of negotiating but instead of conflict or staying 
aloof.
In most cases, the mutual (overlapping) and competing (conflicting) interests will play 
a mixed role. In addition, there is often a third category of interest, in which matters are 
important for one’s own party, but do not touch the other (neutral interests). However, one 
always needs to keep an eye on the latter category. To be neutral concerning interests can 
be of importance for those parties who are not participating in the consultations, but who 
will (or can) speed up the ongoing negotiations. Thus, for example, in a case when the 
Dutch and the Belgians will not reach an agreement, but the Dutch can offer the Germans 
something, in exchange for which the Germans will give something to the Dutch that is 
useful for the Belgians, this can lead towards a positive rounding-up of the Dutch–Belgian 
negotiations (‘expanding the cake’).
In other situations, interests can be arranged in such a way that even with the lack 
of parallel interests, reasons may occur for negotiating. No agreement will be reached 
regarding the subject in those cases, but that is not in fact what the parties involved have 
in mind. For example, two countries have the intention to enlarge their armaments but 
public opinion opposes their plans and demands negotiations on arms control before 
upgrading any defence. Through negotiating, both states meet the conditions that will 
make enforcement of their defence possible. Not only are the stated conditions met, but 
there is also the opportunity to point out that the other party is unwilling, and obviously 
has aggressive intentions in mind. Moreover, it is advantageous that both states are in 
consultation with each other and can exchange information. In some cases the desire to 
negotiate has only been prompted by the necessity to open up a flow of information. In 
that way, the mutual desire to negotiate has only been prompted by each party’s wish to 
prevent an agreement from being reached. In such a situation there is an agreement of 
intentions not to come to an agreement. Much more difficult is the situation where one 
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of the parties does want an agreement, and the other does not (as with Chamberlain 
versus Hitler before the Second World War). The latter party abuses the former for totally 
different goals. As previously mentioned, the negotiation disguises the idea to use means 
other than negotiations. The question is whether, in this case, one can speak of genuine 
negotiations, when not all parties were striving for a negotiated agreement that had to be 
successfully implemented in the future.
This issue leads to the question of Forward and Backward-Looking Outcomes 
(Zartman and Kremenyuk, 2005). On the question of Forward and Backward-Looking 
Outcomes, it should be noted that a lasting peace is in need of justice to be done, plus the 
instalment of institutions guiding future cooperation between the contending parties – in 
other words, the institutionalization of the process of cooperation. The European Union 
is a typical example of such an institutionalized process, and the Peace of Westphalia 
as analyzed in Chapter VI can be seen as a very Forward-Looking Outcome, because 
it created the very system of sovereign states in which we are living today. The Dayton 
Agreement of 1995, however, which settled the Bosnian question, might be viewed as a 
Backward-Looking Outcome. It put an end to the war, but it did not create a truly stable 
framework for the future. International governance and troops therefore had to be called 
in to stabilize the situation until Forward-Looking rules and regulations could create a 
platform for successful home rule.
Parties might also have reasons for concluding peace, in other words their interests 
might converge, while they have opposing positions concerning justice being done. Ruling 
elites might very well be ready to implement a cease-fire, and to quit their posts, but they 
would not be happy to be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court, or any 
other tribunal. They will therefore refuse to conclude a peace, because they want to be 
protected against prosecution. We are confronted here with the dilemma of ‘peace versus 
justice’. In some cases peace can therefore not be attained, or, when it can be attained, 
doing justice will be difficult, if not impossible. Institutions might not be created as the 
parties cannot agree on them. And if they did agree, the institutions might be so weak that 
peace and justice would be under a constant threat of collapse.
We need to analyze the countries’ positions in order to know whether an outcome 
can be expected. If positions and underlying needs are completely in opposition, then 
we cannot expect a successful negotiation process. As soon as there is an overlap of 
interest, however, an outcome can be expected. Even without the contending parties 
having overlapping minimum and maximum reservation points, an outcome could still 
be constructed, provided that the parties have included more than one issue in their 
negotiation process, and that by combining these issues, zones of overlap come into 
reach (‘package deals’). Depending on the interrelationship between the interests of the 
participating parties, we can expect more or less peace and/or justice, and thereby more 
or less security and/or stability.
There is one more element at stake here: the question of context. What situation are 
we in? Negotiation is highly situational; what is effective in one context can be disastrous 
in another. The question of whether negotiation and bargaining will be effective as a tool in 
conflict resolution is also very much connected to its context. William Zartman (Zartman, 
2005) postulates that we need a push and a pull in order to start any negotiation process 
and to create an outcome. The push is the ‘mutual hurting stalemate’ (MHS): a status 
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quo that is painful for all the involved parties, to the extent that they prefer a change 
(through negotiation) over the situation into which they are locked. At the same time there 
should be a perceived way out of the deadlock: the pull in the form of a ‘mutual enticing 
opportunity’ (MEO). We should note here that not everything is negotiable, but in cases 
where there are structural problems instead of situational problems to be solved, we might 
at least hope for mutual respect, such as the (in)famous ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ at the time 
of the Cold War, which might be called a ‘mutual beneficial stalemate’ (MBS) – beneficial 
and satisfactory as it ensures a peaceful situation in such a way that the major powers can 
use the stand-off to control their own ‘allies’. The MBS is stable compared to the MHS, but 
it thereby paradoxically precludes negotiation from being used as a tool in dealing with 
the underlying conflicts, because the dominant powers have no interest in solving them. 
Their allies may have such an interest, however, and they will do everything to undermine 
the MBS in order to open the situation to change. They will only be successful, however, 
if there is a regime change in the capitals of the hegemonic powers. In other words, 
negotiation can only be a successful tool if the context can be changed first. Additionally, 
while context determines perception, perception determines reality (Goodfield, 1999).
Process and Power
The way in which parties reach a settlement can also be divided into three categories. In 
the first place, there is the procedure whereby parties would like to see what are, for them, 
the all-important points included in the settlement: the synthesis of interests. A synthesis 
is often difficult to reach and even more difficult to implement. Second, there is the 
synergy of interests, when one tries to work not from a partial interest, but from a mutual 
interest. These kinds of results can be very satisfying, and can be well implemented. 
However, requirements include a very good atmosphere during the negotiations, and 
lots of time. Third, there are compromise and compensation. Compromise comes in the 
form of mutual concessions, in which each party loses some points and wins some, or in 
which parties compensate each other for their losses by trading concessions (‘package 
deals’). Especially in unequal power situations where one party has to deal with fewer 
concessions than the other, this formula can lead to ‘operation accomplished, patient 
deceased’. Agreement may be reached, but the loser might end up wanting to sabotage 
its implementation.
In connection with the aforementioned problems with implementation, experienced 
negotiators will arrange the agreement in such a way that it can be implemented step by 
step in order to reduce uncertainty (Jönsson, 2001).
If the implementation does not proceed according to plan, the damage will be limited. 
The implementation is, as it were, ingrained in the agreement and still leaves room for 
negotiations during the implementation process. One disadvantage of such a course of 
action is that trust between the parties – especially at the beginning – will remain slight, 
and trust is the basis of every negotiation when an agreement is required.
A negotiation process means going through various phases: preparation and 
diagnosis, information, searching for formulations, bargaining, and the drafting of all the 
details (Dupont and Faure, 1991). The factors influencing this process are so numerous 
that a thorough understanding of the actual proceedings is almost impossible. Previously 
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it was pointed out that the negotiators, with their own characteristics and circumstances, 
have a certain influence, but that the real determining factor does not rest with them but 
is ingrained in the power of the countries that they represent, or, in other words, in the 
power structure, the measure of asymmetry. How ‘distorted’ is that power structure and 
which factors determine this ‘distortion’?
The question of the direction in which the negotiation process is moving is therefore 
predominantly a question of power, at least in inter-state negotiation processes. It is 
interesting to note here that negotiation processes between equal powers are as a rule 
not very effective. Some power difference is needed in order to get the negotiation process 
to flow. Power can be distinguished in three components: power that is marginal and 
originates from the negotiator (power of conduct); power of the state being represented 
(structural power); and power that belongs to the state regarding the issues being 
negotiated (comparative power). In that context, Habeeb speaks of ‘behavioural power’, 
‘structural power’ and ‘issue-specific power’ (Habeeb, 1988).
Structural power involves the total of power factors that are available to a country 
in relation to that of other nations. This power is determined by issues such as the size 
and location (for example, a strategic position) of the territory or state, the nature of its 
borders, its inhabitants, the presence of natural resources, its economic structure, the 
level of technological development, its financial power, ethnic diversity of its population, 
social homogeneity, the stability of its political system (that is, how legitimate is the 
government?) and the nature of its people (whatever that may be, and whether it exists 
at all). The question that then follows is: in which way does a country handle its power? 
What is its ‘national strategy’? Is the country reticent about using its power (as was 
Germany before reunification), or does it use its power in a more self-conscious manner 
(Germany after 1990)?
Structural power is of importance when answering the question of which countries 
involved in negotiations will reach the best negotiation results in the end. It is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition for explaining negotiation results (Habeeb, 1988). In other 
words, it is not correct to more or less assume that in negotiations between a large and a 
small state the ‘stronger’ state will acquire the best negotiation results. History provides 
too many examples to the contrary, about the power of the weak and the impotence of 
the strong (such as the United States and Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, the 
United Kingdom and Iceland) to be able to come to a simple comparison by predicting the 
total weight of power of one country or the other. To obtain a better understanding, their 
comparative power should be drawn into the analysis. By comparative power, we mean 
the power structures around the issues being negotiated, or the power that is relevant in 
a particular situation. In practice it is impossible for a country to put forward every power 
potential in every field. For example, does the Russian Federation, or the Republic of Turkey 
for that matter, because of its enormous army, have increased power over, for example, 
Italy when negotiations are taking place in the field of economic cooperation? That is very 
doubtful. The existence of such an army certainly plays a role, but the danger is neutralized 
by the politico–military coalitions in which Italy finds itself. From an economic point of 
view, one could argue that the gigantic potential of the Russian Federation – because of 
its energy resources – could result in it having a strong position in the negotiations, but 
the time when this potential will be converted into a strong economic position is still a 
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long way off. Italy’s comparative power is bigger than the Russian Federation when, for 
example, the modernization of Russia’s car industry is the issue.
Comparative power is built of three components: the internal sources of power; (im)
balance with the sources of power of the other states involved; and the relevance for 
the issues being negotiated (Habeeb, 1988). There are, however, famous examples of 
countries with minimal internal sources of power that, through special circumstances 
(such as playing powerful states, or factions within those powerful states, against each 
other), can build up a great relevant ‘blackmail power’. Take, for example, the case of the 
Netherlands and Surinam during the negotiations about development aid since Surinam 
became independent in 1975. Comparative power is decisive, and structural power plus 
the power of conduct will enforce or weaken the relevant factors of power. Surinam has 
been capable of building up process power, or relational power, because it has been 
dependent on Dutch resources. Add to this the historical dimension (the Netherlands 
as the colonial power felt guilty about what it had done to its colonies in the past) and 
we can expect quite a favourable negotiation process as far as Surinam is concerned, 
notwithstanding – or better, because of – its weaker position.
Comparative power is influenced by three factors. The first factor is the alternatives 
that might be available for the relevant issue: the fewer alternatives a country has, the 
weaker its cause. Second, to what extent has the country committed itself: how far will 
willingness go to make use of its power factors? Is there, for example, a willingness to 
weaken a country’s economic power in favour of its military power? Third, to what extent 
does the country have control over the issues under negotiation? A small nation can have 
a lead position over a bigger country when it controls the dispute in question, as was the 
case for Iran in connection with the American diplomats who were taken hostage during 
the so-called ‘Iranian Hostage Crisis’. The hostages were at first in the hands of fanatics 
who were outside the control of the Iranian government, but once the hostages were 
being held by the Iranian government, it was possible to negotiate their freedom.
Bashing or Bargaining
A distinction should be made about negotiating in relation to other interactions between 
states, such as armed conflict, the use of international courts of law or arbitration, the 
use of services from third states as honest brokers, and diplomatic consultations in 
which certain issues are being clarified and points of view exchanged, as opposed to the 
phenomenon of imposed settlements or ‘diktat ’ such as ‘Versailles’, in which interaction 
was hardly the case. The following question presents itself here: in which cases will 
states prefer the instrument of negotiation, and when will they choose alternatives in 
international relations? If war is the continuation of politics with the admixture of 
other means (Clausewitz, 1984), could we then postulate – as done in Chapter V – that 
negotiation is war by other means? In other words, while the use of force is one way to 
manage a conflict, negotiation is another, and adjudication is a third road to be followed.
The choice has everything to do with the question of whether negotiation in a given 
situation is preferable to the use of other international interactions. Negotiating will be 
‘more advantageous’ in cases where the state would be able to acquire what it has in mind 
in a ‘cheaper’ way through negotiations than in any other way. In short, the question about 
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the limitations of the negotiation process is a matter of cost-benefit analysis. Depending 
on the situation at that moment, the balance will be different each time. When the expected 
benefit is considerably higher than the cost, the desire for a stable negotiation process is 
obviously justified.
The problem remains that cost-benefit analysis can, relatively speaking, rarely be 
determined, keeping in mind the influence of other states with their own cost-benefit 
situations, and given the impossibility, up to the present day, to verify costs. That is the 
first and biggest obstacle to providing at any one time an instrument for totally getting 
to the bottom of ‘the science of negotiation’. The second obstacle, as mentioned before, 
is that the researcher is not allowed to attend really important negotiations, or to carry 
out research in a systematic manner. Reports by the negotiators themselves are usually 
too biased, and not systematic enough, to enable a real scientific analysis. Third, in cases 
where good analysis should be possible, the results will nonetheless be so abstract 
because of the many factors playing a role that a more or less practical application, such 
as through training courses, will be difficult.
Nevertheless, the number of useful explanations about the role and direction of 
international negotiation processes is increasing. Slowly, but surely, there is a growing 
convergence of views. However, one has to be wary of those who think that they have 
found the stone of wisdom. They may have carried the building stones, perhaps even a 
keystone, but certainly not a cornerstone. Perhaps that cornerstone will present itself 
in the form of sound research, analysing in which cases negotiating can, and in which 
circumstances negotiating cannot, be an instrument of international relations.
It is interesting to observe that the notions of international negotiation processes 
as a method of bridging opposing interests, views and perceptions have evolved over 
time. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, negotiations were often used as a 
tool in warfare. Notably King Louis XIV of France used this constellation in order to break 
up coalitions formed against him, resulting in a series of short-lived peace treaties and 
ongoing warfare on the European continent. Moving into the nineteenth century, the role 
of negotiation in inter-state relations became more and more substantial, as the costs 
of war soared with the development of modern weapons technology, which resulted 
in an enormous toll of human lives. In the twentieth century, states tried to strengthen 
the value, and enhance the stability, of international negotiation processes through 
institutionalization – that is, the building of institutions in order to channel and stabilize 
negotiation processes and thereby to secure assured outcomes. Thus we witnessed the 
creation of the League of Nations, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union, 
etc. With the Second World War as a turning point, we might postulate that warfare 
nowadays can be a tool in negotiation, whereby negotiation is seen as the main tool in 
managing inter-state and other conflicts. We have come a long way since the seventeenth 
century. The institutionalization of the processes and the relative ineffectiveness of war 
(by using military means we can win the war, but not the peace) greatly enhanced the 
effectiveness, and therefore the role, of negotiation as a tool in conflict resolution.
Focusing for a moment on the developments in peace and justice at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, international adjudication was 
very much seen as a tool with major potential for the resolution of international conflicts. 
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The two Hague Peace Conferences were convened with high hopes for the future. The 
Peace Palace was opened in The Hague in 1913 to host the first court on international 
judicial conflict management and resolution: the Permanent Court of Arbitration. After the 
misery of the First World War, we saw the creation of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, followed after the Second World War by the International Court of Justice – all 
three in The Hague, and in the Peace Palace. However, notwithstanding the growing 
role of adjudication as an instrument in inter-state conflicts, a certain disappointment 
with adjudication’s effectiveness ensued. War and negotiation, or negotiation and war 
for recent history, remained the major factors in international conflict management. In 
view of its relative efficiency and effectiveness, and the growing strength of the building 
blocks around it, we might hope for negotiation to become the dominant methodology in 
bargaining for international rules and regulations, and in regulating international conflict 
situations in order to secure peace and justice. It therefore remains important to study 
negotiation, in order to explain outcomes by analyzing the process (Crump and Zartman 
2003, 10) and to train practitioners to become successful negotiators.
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION2
The seminal work of the PIN program, International Negotiation (Kremenyuk, 2002), which 
resulted from its first conference on international negotiation in 1989 in Laxenburg close 
to Vienna, addresses a wide range of people. It takes stock of the progress made in 
studying international negotiation processes and is useful for those engaged in the study 
and practice of international negotiation. The book approaches the subject of negotiation 
from many different angles, an indication of the impossibility of understanding the 
phenomenon through one or a limited number of approaches. The first eight chapters 
of International Negotiation are written under the heading ‘Levels of Analysis’, and the 
next nine chapters as ‘Approaches and Perspectives’, but all these chapters in fact try to 
enhance the understanding of negotiation by looking at factors involved in the process, 
thereby trying to get more grip on that process and attempting to explain its outcomes. 
The third part of the book discusses different issue-areas. Different issues have a different 
impact on the processes, but essentially speaking it does not matter too much what the 
issue-area is, with the exception of an extreme negotiation such as negotiating with 
terrorists. Although International Negotiation helps us to understand which analyses and 
approaches are relevant, it does not prioritize them and it does not solve the problem of 
lacking one paradigm that the majority of authors can agree upon. As the editor writes 
in his afterword, ‘The contributors to this volume agree that a new and more promising 
approach has to be found’ (Kremenyuk, 2002: 425). This approach has not been detected 
in the subsequent 22 years and it is doubtful whether it will ever be, as it is in the nature 
of negotiation to be multifaceted. This dissertation will attempt to provide a better insight 
into these different facets.
This section was specifically written for this dissertation in 2013.
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Approaches from ‘International Negotiation’
To Howard Raiffa (Raiffa, 2002: 5–21) in Kremenyuk’s edited volume, negotiation is both an 
art and a science: an art in the sense that some people are better negotiators than others 
as a gift from nature and culture; and a science because negotiation can be learned and 
thereby taught. Raiffa points to descriptive, normative and prescriptive orientations on 
decision-making and thereby on negotiation processes. Descriptive analysis is empirical 
and clinical. It strives to reflect reality as much as possible. Normative analysis, however, 
wants to point out how people should act, ideally. It is of a much more abstract nature. 
Prescriptive analysis is of an advisory nature. Raiffa points out that these three approaches 
can be distinguished by the criteria by which they are evaluated: empirical validity; 
theoretical adequacy; and pragmatic value, respectively. His study looks upon negotiation 
as a phenomenon that, if possible, explains why the actors reach certain outcomes. Again, 
it must be emphasized that this is an extremely difficult academic undertaking, because 
of the multitude of factors influencing the process and thereby its closure. Advice for 
being more effective and norms to be adhered to can be given, but cannot substitute for 
monitoring reality and thereby attempts to get to grips with it and to draw lessons from it. 
The art and science issue is equally difficult to unravel, but a focus on the scientific side 
would be preferable, as it is even more difficult to fathom the art dimension – because of 
its underlying in-born and acquired characteristics – than to gain insight into the scientific 
one.
International Negotiation’s editor-in-chief, Victor Kremenyuk, sees negotiation as 
a system of growing importance in international relations (Kremenyuk, 2002: 22–38). 
He focuses on international organizations as a systemic factor connecting different 
negotiation processes and enhancing their stability. Such a focus makes sense, even or 
perhaps especially today, but in this case it is very much influenced by the time in which 
the chapter was written: the frozen systemic crisis that we call the Cold War.
In their chapter, Christophe Dupont and Guy-Olivier Faure (Dupont and Faure, 2002: 
39–63) point to the problems in defining the negotiation process, which they first of all 
identify as a sequence of proposals and counter-proposals, to converge as a result of 
an exchange of concessions. The problem here is to explain the rules regulating this 
sequencing. They follow up by sketching an alternative approach, identified as ‘structural 
analysis’, which puts power at the heart of the negotiation process, influencing the 
resulting currents in the flow of the process. As a third ‘avenue’, they spotlight ‘persuasive 
debate’ as an approach for understanding the negotiation process – the exchange of 
signals, information, arguments and the like. Their fourth inroad has to do with game 
theory, with the question here being to what extent can game theory help us to understand 
the ensuing processes? As process is so difficult to penetrate, students of negotiation 
tend to switch to the actor in the process as the focal point of their analysis. Dupont 
and Faure order the process into successive stages: first, preliminary contacts and pre-
negotiations; second, multi-stage negotiations (that is, multiple actor, issue and stage 
rounds); and third, face-to-face exchanges. They then sum up the different theoretical 
approaches that they identify: the strategic approach; and the learning, decision-making, 
psychological, adjustment and reactive processes. They then turn to communication and 
referential variables (for example, face-saving is a referential variable). Finally, they look at 
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factors influencing the process of international negotiation, such as personal conditions, 
information, and structural issues like time.
Different cultures have different perceptions of negotiation processes. Americans and 
Europeans tend to see the process in a linear way, going from the awareness of having a 
problem and the need to solve it, to exploration, pre-negotiation, agenda-setting, further 
exploration, selection of issues, give-and-take, decision-making, closure, implementation, 
evaluation, and perhaps renegotiation, etc. This view holds that there is a specific starting 
and concluding point. In Africa, and foremost in Asia, negotiators tend to see the process 
as a circular, and thereby never–ending, stream. Connected to this is the importance 
attached to the relationship in that process, while Westerners often give priority to the 
issues at hand. Such differences in approaches have grave consequences for the flow of 
the process and thereby for its outcome.
In his chapter, Victor M. Sergeev clarifies international negotiation in a series of 
metaphors: the metaphor of bargaining, the bidding as we know it in the marketplace; then 
the metaphor of joint choice, the love child of the Harvard Project on Negotiation (PON); 
and the metaphors of joint research and joint construction of the future (Sergeev, 2002: 
64–70). Metaphors can be useful and misleading at the same time. They are useful in 
enhancing understanding because of linkage to a well-understood concept, but counter-
productive because they simplify, while negotiation is a complex process with many 
factors and actors. As far as the joint choice metaphor is concerned, this seems to be 
a cultural perspective applicable first of all to North America, but already less valuable 
for parts of Europe like the Balkans and the Caucasus, and much more problematic for 
regions in Asia and Africa such as the Middle East or the Great Lakes Region. Win–win 
solutions tend to be win–lose or even lose–lose, and practitioners and academics have 
to struggle with that. The metaphor of the marketplace is nevertheless valuable, as it 
highlights many elements of the negotiation process. A customer who can choose from 
different shops has the power of choice, of alternatives, a strong BATNA (‘best alternative 
to a negotiated agreement’, or ‘best alternative to no agreement’). The merchant will have 
to lure the customer into the shop. If the merchant manages to do this, the context changes 
in his or her favour. The merchant can now use his or her power: knowledge about the 
merchandise, or the dossier in diplomatic terms. The merchant, or negotiator, needs time 
to do this, as the weaker party normally needs more time than the more powerful one in 
an asymmetric negotiation process. Exploration, selection and bargaining will unfold and 
the customer might leave the shop with more – and more expensive – merchandise than 
he had wished for at the start of this negotiation. The process and the time that it takes 
are ingredients of the power of the seller, helping him to undercut the BATNA of the buyer 
by creating his own alternatives.
The structure of negotiation is the approach used by William Zartman in his chapter in 
International Negotiation (Zartman, 2002: 71–84). To him,
Negotiation is a process by which contending parties come to an agreement, 
but that process neither occurs nor can be analyzed merely by its own terms. 
It begins with a certain distribution of actor characteristics, which then become 
independent variables through which the process and its analysis are conducted 
(Zartman, 2002: 71).
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The structure of the negotiation process consists of different components. Structure is 
the most determining factor for answering the main question in negotiation analysis: 
how to explain outcomes? ‘Process follows form’. He sees the structural approach as the 
most adequate – he says ‘simple’– and comprehensive technique. The basic structure 
of bargaining is to be found in bilateral negotiation, more than in multilateral. A host of 
game-theoretical approaches are based on this dichotomy, if possible under conditions 
of symmetry. He notes that power equality is a static condition that can be translated 
into the dynamism of reciprocity coming to fair closure. He notes, however, that such 
situations are quite exceptional in real-life processes. More realistic analysis is needed 
and this confronts us with, for example, the ‘toughness dilemma’ and the role of structural 
and situational power and their sources. Besides power, values are involved, and values 
might overtake power as well as material interests. For analyzing multilateral negotiation, 
Zartman highlights the importance of approaches through coalition-building, leadership 
and the role of structuring devices such as procedures.
He also points to the virtual impossibility of gaining a good understanding of 
multilateral negotiation processes, because of their complexity. Most negotiation research 
focuses on bilateral processes – being constituent parts, if not the nucleus, of conference 
diplomacy – as these are more apt for measurement. This inherent problem of negotiation 
gives rise to biased research. Researchers study those cases that are explainable and to 
a large extent ignore the complicated parts of the negotiation process. This is even more 
valid for the international dimension, which is more complex than multilateral negotiations 
within countries, for example between different ministries or political parties in parliament. 
More is therefore known about simple linear bargaining at a (sub-)national level – for 
example, in the commercial sector – than about international processes, which might 
explain the undervalued role of negotiation international relations theory. The sovereignty 
of states adds to the problem of catching the intricacies of international negotiation 
processes, as states are to be influenced, but being more independent than actors at the 
national level, they evade structural analysis. To use structural analysis where structures 
are lacking is not an easy task.
Strategy in negotiation is the angle of descent in Dean Pruitt’s section (Pruitt, 2002: 
85–96). Pruitt sees three strategic choices for negotiators: contending; problem-solving; 
and yielding. He then turns to the dimension of relationships, stresses the importance of 
them and sums up six conditions for building ‘working relationships’. First, he stresses 
rationality. One should be rational, even if the other party acts emotionally. Second, try to 
understand the other party, even if they do not understand us. Third, try to communicate 
with them and consult them, even if they are not listening. Fourth, be honest and 
trustworthy, even if the other party tries to deceive you. Fifth, try to persuade them and 
do not go along with them if they want to coerce. Finally, be open to learning from the 
other party and care about them, even if they reject your concerns. He illustrates that with 
US–Soviet relations.
As a comment on Pruitt’s approach, we should first of all acknowledge that the 
contending, problem-solving and yielding approach is just one of many ways to fill in the 
notion of strategy. Sun Tzu’s dictum that strategy is nothing less than changing a situation 
in order to create a favourable climate for a successful negotiation (Chung, 1991), 
seems to be a more encompassing approach of strategy. The same seems true for the 
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Thomas–Kilmann strategic model of competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, 
or accommodating (Thomas and Kilmann, 1974), an approach that can be found in other 
formats with other authors, although it all boils down to the same perspective: combine 
the main option for strategies and look at their interactions. The Thomas–Kilmann model 
contains sixteen different interactions between the five poles of strategy. It is thereby a 
very flexible device, illustrating the ever-present tensions in negotiation, and indicating 
which strategy will be the most effective in a given situation. The conditions for working 
relationships, as sketched by Dean Pruitt, do not meet the conditions of ‘tit-for-tat’ 
strategies and tactics, and it is therefore no wonder that the American diplomats had 
problems in dealing with the Soviets in a satisfactory way (Meerts, 2009c), or with other 
‘difficult’ negotiators who perceive openness as weakness.
Jeffrey Rubin’s chapter analyzes the actors in the negotiation process as an approach 
to gain a better insight into its mechanisms (Rubin, 2002: 97–109). To Rubin, it is vital to ask 
the question ‘who is the actor?’, as negotiation is very much about the choice of partners. 
He then discusses the difference between actors who only represent themselves and 
those acting as an agent for a group of people, an organization, or a state – thus actors 
who need to be instructed, who need a mandate written by their superiors. Such agents 
have to stick to this mandate, but different countries have different degrees of freedom 
concerning the instructions they will hand out. These differences in flexibility will have 
an impact on the flow of the negotiation process. After the agents, Rubin focuses on the 
leaders and leadership, as well as the behaviour of individuals. He sees five attributes of 
effective negotiators. The first attribute is flexibility: negotiators will have to be flexible on 
means and firm on goals. Second, they have to be sensitive to various social cues about 
the other negotiator, although this does not necessarily mean that they have to react to 
that. Third, inventiveness is important: an effective negotiator has to be creative. Fourth, 
a negotiator has to be patient and should not react right away. Finally, the negotiator 
should be tenacious; persistence is important. All of these traits are influenced not only 
by character and experience, but also very much by culture.
It is interesting to see that Rubin’s level of analysis and especially his profile of 
the effective negotiator are shared by many. In chapter 26 of International Negotiation, 
Willem Mastenbroek (Mastenbroek, 2002: 433–454) concludes that the effective negotiator 
has to: (1) realize his own interests; (2) influence the power balance; (3) promote a 
constructive climate; and (4) obtain flexibility. Indeed, suaviter in modo, fortiter in re – gentle 
in manner, strong on principle – seems to be a common opinion among practitioners and 
academics. By observing diplomats during simulation exercises, Mastenbroek noted that 
the most successful actors were those who worked on the relationship with the other side 
– empathy but not sympathy – using the process for generating new options and thereby 
‘enlarging the cake’, while at the same time being determined to get what they wanted by 
using their power and influence in a civilized way. Simulations might be reflections of reality 
and not reality itself, but those who participate in these exercises negotiate in exactly the 
same manner as those who negotiate for real. The process is the same, simulated or not.
In his chapter in International Negotiation, Arild Underdal analyzes negotiation by 
looking at its outcomes (Underdal, 2002: 110–125). He therefore deals with output and 
impact. Underdal states that the impact of an agreement is difficult to foresee, the first 
reason being the uncertainty of the future, the second the options for adaption as times 
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change, and the third the consequences of fuzziness and vagueness of the final text. 
Underdal focuses on five dimensions of negotiation outcomes: the agreement; efficiency; 
stability; distribution; and distance from opening positions. The question of why there is 
an agreement, in other words why negotiations succeed or fail, is still unanswered today, 
although many books have been written on the subject. In itself, a negotiation process 
can be successful and could come to closure, but at the very end there might not be an 
agreement if one of the parties’ leadership torpedoes the outcome. This can be done 
before a formal agreement has been reached, or afterwards through non-ratification: in 
a strict sense there is an agreement, but de facto it will not fly. Underdal then sums up 
three obstacles to efficiently reaching a negotiated outcome: objective choice is difficult 
if not impossible, and even if the parties choose the best path, they might be hindered 
in following it; second, there is normally more than one criterion for choice; and third, 
there are process-generated stakes, meaning that negotiators are not robots, but have an 
interest in keeping up appearances, and that interest might override the material interests 
for which they are striving. As far as stability is concerned, it is questionable what we mean 
by it. Under certain circumstances, stability of the agreement will indeed be a prerequisite 
for an effective agreement, while in a changing environment it will become problematic, 
inciting defection. Distribution of the pay-offs is an important factor, because of the 
negative effect of partial exclusion, which might lead to blaming and shaming and long-
lasting traumas. The outcome, being backward-looking, will be a mortgage on the future. 
Distance from opening positions is Underdal’s last point. Even if there is a favourable 
position for both parties, one party might be unhappy if it feels that it had to give up too 
much, especially compared to its counterpart.
Another issue mentioned by Underdal is the question of ambiguity, which can 
of course also be used in a positive way in order to secure an outcome – that is, as 
‘constructive ambiguity’. In many cases, diplomats have no other option than to leave 
space for different interpretations of the same text. In United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 242 regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the differences between the 
English and the other texts form a classic example. While the English version proclaims 
that Israeli forces will have to withdraw from occupied territories, the French, Spanish, 
Russian, Chinese and Arabic texts state that the Israeli forces have to withdraw from the 
occupied territories. This gives rise to different interpretations. The English text suggests 
that some Israeli forces might remain in some of the occupied land, while the remaining 
five official UN texts suggest that exceptions to withdrawal are not acceptable. There are 
many more cases, such as the wording of the mandate of the Disaster Relief Coordinator 
of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization in draft resolution 15129(LI) of the 
Economic and Social Council of the UN (Kent, 1988, 138-139; Meerts, 2009d: 663–665). In 
reality and therefore in the exercise, the ambassadors struggle with the word ‘direct’ that 
is being pushed for by the United States, but is too strong for the French, the Soviets and 
the relief organizations. The problem is ‘solved’ by not being solved: in the English text the 
word ‘direct’ stays in; all the other official texts use the word ‘orient’.
 It would take too much space here to reflect on the other chapters of the ‘Kremenyuk 
book’. It must be suffice to mention, respectively, the historical, psychological and analytical 
approaches by Jean Freymond, Jeffrey Rubin and James Sebenius; the legal, economic 
and content perspectives by Dayle Powell, John Cross and Daniel Druckman; and the 
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reflections on organizational, game- and cognitive theory by Robert Kahn, Wilfried Siebe 
and Christer Jönsson. It is also useful to highlight an interesting approach to negotiation 
by Daniel Druckman in a recent book, in which he sums up the six factors by which a 
negotiation process could be analyzed: issues; parties; process; conditions; outcome; and 
aftermath (Druckman, 2013: 203).
Approaches from Other Sources
Also important in the literature, Christer Jönsson analyzed eight approaches by 
54 negotiation analysts (Jönsson, 2000). Jönsson states that game-theoretical approaches 
of negotiation as bilateral encounters between equally powerful and rational actors have 
been replaced by a host of new literature that takes into account factors such as complexity, 
continuity and culture. First, he first deals with the establishment of contract zones as a 
focus for research. The contract zone, bargaining, or settlement zone, also labelled as the 
Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) – an acronym to be avoided in Russian-speaking 
areas (where it can mean either buttocks, or something disastrous) – is a useful approach 
in bilateral negotiation research. Second, some analysts focus on tactics such as credibility 
and manipulation to get to grips with negotiation. Third, reducing uncertainty is yet 
another attempt to manage negotiation processes, and this can be done in different ways, 
such as by agreeing on formulas before descending to details. Balancing contradictory 
imperatives, seeing negotiations as a series of dilemmas, and paradoxes such as honesty 
versus secrecy and explicitness versus ambiguity are other ways of getting our thoughts 
together on a subject that is as resistant to generalizations as negotiation processes. 
Considering timing is the fifth approach: when is a situation ripe for negotiation, and 
when is a negotiation ripe for resolution? A sixth way to manage negotiation processes 
is two- or multi-level games: the coordination between internal and external negotiation, 
the ‘win-sets’ in negotiation. This turns out to be a very popular notion among university 
students engaged in writing papers on negotiation. Communication processes – verbal 
and non-verbal, conscious and sub-conscious, explicit and through signalling – are the 
seventh approach. Finally, Jönsson deals with social relations, the need to develop them 
and their value for a successful process as the focus of negotiation research. In conclusion, 
he criticizes the actor-orientation of many scholars, which neglect structural parameters 
like international systems and institutions. He pleads for more attention to the interaction 
between actor and structure.
One approach on its own is Howard Raiffa’s The Art and Science of Negotiation (Raiffa, 
1982), which has already been mentioned. Its subtitle, ‘How to Resolve Conflicts and Get 
the Best out of Bargaining’, suggests a book for the general public, but it is in fact of 
value to students and scholars more than practitioners. Raiffa poses some organizing 
questions, including: is an agreement required, is ratification required, are threats 
possible, are there constraints or time related costs, are the contracts binding, are the 
negotiations private or public, what are the group norms, and is third-party intervention 
possible? He then turns to research perspectives. In the three ensuing chapters, he deals 
with two parties negotiating one issue, two parties bargaining on many issues, and many 
parties negotiating many issues.
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Nevertheless, Raiffa’s book leans in the direction of another category of negotiation 
literature, and by far the most extensive one: books presenting negotiation as a kind of 
fractured, but still homogeneous phenomenon. These works are meant to help the reader 
to come to grips with negotiation in order to understand and/or manage it. The genre is 
less doubtful about our potential to understand negotiators and negotiation processes, 
but thereby it cannot be accurate, because negotiation, it has been said, is a colourful 
and multi-dimensional species. Leaving aside the host of ‘airport books’, which are meant 
to give readers straightforward advice in understandable steps and models that help 
them to become effective negotiators during the flight time they have, apart from the 
often non-academic value of these books, the topic is much more about negotiation as 
such, foremost in the commercial sense. Of the substantial academic and semi-academic 
literature on international negotiation, a few interesting books are selected here in an 
attempt to streamline our understanding of negotiation.
How Nations Negotiate by Fred Charles Iklé (Iklé, 1964) is, even today, one of the 
first and most seminal works on international negotiation processes. Iklé rightly notes 
(Iklé, 1964: ix) that ‘although negotiation has happily been more prevalent in the relations 
between states than war, it has never been studied with the same incisiveness’. He first 
discusses the question of agreement and disagreement, and then identifies five objectives 
of negotiation: extension; normalization; redistribution; innovation; and side-effects. Iklé 
focuses on different factors in the negotiation process between states: the rules of the 
game; domestic affairs; personalities; interpretations; the ways to reach outcomes; and 
effective negotiators’ negotiation skills. Like other books at the time, his work breathes 
the atmosphere of the Cold War, although he is not at all a Cold War warrior. The RAND 
Corporation supported his research, which is understandable, as the Americans were not 
too happy with their negotiation efficiency in dealing with the Soviets.
William Zartman and Maureen Berman’s The Practical Negotiator helps practitioners as 
well as scholars to deepen their understanding of negotiation (Zartman et al., 1982). Their 
thread is the sequence of the negotiation process, already touched upon when discussing 
formula and detail: after a diagnostic phase, establish a formula without touching upon 
the issues at hand, and then turn to the detail phase, being aware of the fact that the 
devil is going to be found there. How to operate with that devil is one of the issues in the 
book and, as we distrust the devil, valuable advice is given about enhancing trust. Of the 
book’s many useful insights, one should be cited here: ‘by now the world has established 
an international diplomatic culture that soon socializes its members into similar behavior’ 
(Zartman et al., 1982: 226). This, of course, will enhance the effectiveness of negotiation 
as an alternative to warfare. The book is based on interviews with experienced – most of 
them international – negotiators, who had been asked: ‘What do you know now about 
negotiation that you wish you had known when you first started?’ Twenty-three American, 
eleven non-Americans and 51 UN ambassadors and staff were interviewed, the vast 
majority being diplomats (Zartman et al., 1982: 231–236).
Roy Lewicki, David Saunders and Bruce Barry wrote the very lucid book Negotiation 
to explain the topic to – first of all – university students (Lewicki et al., 2006). They 
deal with the fundamentals of negotiation, including its nature, the difference between 
distributive and integrative processes, and the question of strategy and planning. To 
them, negotiations have the following characteristics: (1) there are two or more parties; 
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who (2) have a conflict of needs and desires; they (3) choose to negotiate because they 
think it is in their interest to do so; (4) ‘give and take’ is to be expected; (5) they prefer 
negotiation over open fighting; while (6) successful negotiation involves the management 
of tangibles and the resolution of intangibles (Lewicki et al., 2006: 6–8). In part two of 
their book, they discuss perception, cognition, emotion, power, influence, ethics and the 
importance of communication. Part three deals with relationships, agents, constituencies, 
audiences, coalitions, multiple parties and teams, which they define as contextual factors. 
They then move to individual differences in part four, such as personality, abilities and 
gender. Part five deals with culture, and part six with the resolution of differences, as there 
are impasses to be overcome, mismatches to be managed, difficult negotiations to be 
handled, and negotiators to be tamed, for example through intervention by third parties. 
They conclude with a list of ten best practices: be prepared; diagnose; have alternatives; 
be willing to walk out; master paradoxes; remember intangibles; manage coalitions; 
protect your reputation; do not forget that rationality and fairness are relative; and learn 
from the experience (Lewicki et al., 2006: 517).
Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, by Roger Fisher, William Ury 
and Bruce Patton (Fisher et al., 1991), is by far the most successful ‘how-to-do book’ 
that is based on academic insights. Of all the books on negotiation, it is by far the most 
cited. Its approach is that of common problem-solving. The authors advise the reader 
to separate the people from the problem, to focus on interests and not on positions, to 
invent options for mutual gain, and to insist on using objective criteria. Although the book 
is a practical guide to effective negotiation in the Western world and in the United States 
in particular, it is doubtful whether the formula will work in regions of the world where 
the people are the problem, negotiators prefer positional bargaining, options for mutual 
gain are unthinkable as the parties do not want their adversaries to get any profit from 
the process, or where subjective criteria dominate the proceedings and no authority or 
organization can set objective measurements.
In the French-language, it is first of all the late Christophe Dupont who wrote the 
crucial treatise La négociation: conduit, théorie, applications (Dupont, 1986). With this 
book, Dupont put France on the map again, after a long absence since the famous French 
diplomatists wrote about the process of negotiation and the most effective way of handling 
it in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. Proof of his decisive role are the ‘mélanges 
en l‘honneur de Christophe Dupont ’ (Colson, 2011). In addition, focused on practice is 
La négociation: Situation et problématiques (Faure et al., 1998), which analyzes not only 
international conflict situations, but also national and commercial cases.
Scholar Frank Pfetsch (Pfetsch, 2006) and practitioner Alexander Mühlen (Mühlen, 
2005) have written interesting books for the German-language world. Pfetsch’s approach 
is very much from the perspective of the phases in the negotiation process. He then 
focuses on conflict as the central issue in negotiation, discussing actors and factors, such 
as culture and power, and bringing the question to closure. His hypotheses on conflict 
and negotiation are interesting, with the first being that the nature of the conflict will 
determine the way to negotiate (Pfetsch, 2006: 207). Mühlen’s book is comparable to that 
of Pfetsch, be it more directed to the field of diplomacy, with less on ad-hoc conflicts and 
more on ongoing processes of decision-making.
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Ralf Spiller’s ‘German’ contribution is that of process orientation as well, especially 
as far as multilateral negotiation is concerned. He prefers process over structural and 
decision-making approaches, as it allows for a better grip on complexity, while it does not 
rely on simplifications:
Angesichts der enormen Komplexität multilateraler Verhandlungen und der 
daraus resultierenden geringen Zugänglichkeit für spieltheoretische Ansätze – es 
sei denn, man trifft eine Riehe von stark simplifizierenden Annahmen – erscheint ein 
prozessorientierter Ansatz besonders fruchtbar (Spiller, 2008: 35).
(A process-oriented approach seems to be more fruitful, because of the enormous 
complexity of multilateral negotiations, and as a consequence the very limited function 
of game theory in enhancing the understanding of multilateral negotiations, unless one 
strongly simplifies the assumptions).
Rudolf Schüssler agrees with Spiller, as far as negotiation in general is concerned, 
although he does not deny that game theory has some value for understanding negotiation 
processes: ‘I do not see more than simple proto game theory is needed, but on this count 
game theorists might prove me wrong’ (Schüssler, 2013: 31).
Raymond Saner provides insights in the German (Saner, 1997), French (Saner, 
2003) and English (Saner, 2005) languages. His standard work takes the negotiator by 
the hand and guides him through the negotiation wonder world. Saner’s approaches 
are on distributive and integrative bargaining, strategy and tactics, phases and rounds, 
negotiation behaviour and culture, etc. His books are basically the consequence of his 
negotiation seminars of the last three decades.
Willem Mastenbroek wrote a very handy guide to effective negotiation behaviour 
with his aforementioned book Negotiate (Mastenbroek, 1989). His work is different from 
many of the hands-on books mentioned earlier, as he approaches negotiation in a more 
synergetic way through a series of models, explaining to negotiators which behaviour 
is the most effective in which situation. In conclusion, he states that the ideal profile is 
that of a negotiator who is tough on interest and power and lenient on relationship and 
exploration, as has been mentioned above. His work bears some resemblance to the ideas 
of Fisher, Ury and Patton, but it was not derived from their book and it strikes a more 
realistic note.
The last book mentioned here is a bit different from the others, as it is a guide to 
diplomats who have to negotiate multilaterally. Johan Kaufmann’s Conference Diplomacy 
(Kaufmann, 1996) helps practitioners to deal with the procedures of institutionalized 
conferences, especially in the context of the United Nations. Its companion book, Effective 
Negotiation (Kaufmann, 1989), presents sixteen case studies from different authors, but 
does not point out how to negotiate in an effective way. Kaufmann follows the Oxford 
English Dictionary by defining diplomacy as ‘the management of international relations 
by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by 
ambassadors and envoys; the business or the art of the diplomatist’ (Kaufman, 1989: 1). 
He then deals with decision-making through voting and consensus, the organizational and 
human setting, the role of presiding officers, secretariats and groups, the characteristics 
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and requirements of delegations, permanent missions and conference diplomats, as well 
as tactics, instructions, speeches and coalition-building.
The journal International Negotiation is of enormous help in understanding the 
different approaches to diplomatic negotiation, as well as the many negotiation processes 
that it intends to clarify and discuss. The most important articles on approaches and 
negotiation research are to be found in issues 7:1, 8:1, 8:2, 9:3, 10:1 and 14:1. Useful as well 
is Negotiation Journal, especially issues 18:4 and 25:4, which are of interest as far as theory 
and approaches are concerned. In the introduction to the 25th anniversary issue, Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow gives us an interesting overview of the history of American – foremost 
the Harvard Project on Negotiation – negotiation theory, practice and teaching (Menkel-
Meadow, 2009). Her article provides us with fourteen clusters of questions for future 
research. In the same issue of Negotiation Journal, some interesting counterintuitive 
findings of negotiations at, around and off the table put our feet back on the ground 
(Druckman, 2009). After all of the treatises on negotiation processes where we found 
some valid generalizations, exceptions pop up again. Finally, the journals Group Decision 
and Negotiation and Négociations should be mentioned here, while very interesting 
articles on negotiation can also be found in journals such as International Organization. 
In addition, the non-peer-reviewed PINpoints Network Newsletter (www.pin-negotiation.
org/PINpoints) of the PIN program provides us with new ideas and findings, which might 
lead to new approaches in international/diplomatic negotiation in the near future. Its 
Dutch branch is the Netherlands Negotiation Network (NNN).
Approaches to diplomatic negotiation are scattered in such a way that one conclusion 
on its character and conduct cannot yet be made. Perhaps there will never be consensus 
on this, as the karma of negotiation will not allow for it. Actually, as scientists try to gain 
a better understanding of international negotiation processes by chopping international 
negotiation up into different categories, the picture gets more blurred each year. 
Daniel Naurin, for example, distinguishes deliberation and rhetorical action as separate 
categories from integrative and distributive bargaining (Naurin, 2010: 38). In his useful 
analysis of negotiations in the Council of Ministers and its preparatory committees, Naurin 
separates arguing from bargaining (Naurin, 2010: 32). In this thesis, however, elements 
like rhetoric, deliberation, argumentation and bargaining are regarded as part and parcel 
of the wider process of negotiation, even integral phases of it.
This introductory chapter has dealt with a wide variety of views on international/
diplomatic negotiation, which can perhaps be looked at through another perspective by 
focusing on the question of why certain processes give birth to certain outcomes. In this 
respect, Zartman indicates five schools of knowledge on negotiation processes (Zartman, 
2013: 210). First comes the ‘structural school’, which uses power as the means to explain 
outcomes of negotiation processes, ‘asserting that the strongest wins’. Second, there is 
the ‘strategic school’, which uses game theory to explain the connection between process 
and result. Third, there is the ‘procedural school’, which uses the economic approach, 
whereby a range of concessions is analyzed. At a certain moment the costs become 
too high and the margins disappear, but just before this happens the optimal outcome 
will be reached, as determined by the balance of costs and benefits. The fourth school 
is the ‘behavioural school’, wherein personality types are the variable and outcomes are 
explained by the chemistry between the negotiators. Fifth, Zartman identifies an ‘integrative 
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school’, which views negotiation as a staged process, with the actions at each stage then 
explaining the final outcome of the negotiation process. Zartman himself employs a mixed 
approach (Zartman, 2013: 212). He characterizes ‘negotiation as a choice of partners, as 
an establishment of relations, as a contest of alternatives, as a confrontation of power [...], 
as a process of elimination, or as problem-solving’. In the context of this dissertation, one 
could add to his view: ‘as an instrument in diplomacy’, be it as a governance tool in day-to-
day ongoing processes about non-violent issues, or as war by peaceful means in ad-hoc 
negotiations in situations of violent conflict.
In Conclusion
This introductory chapter has looked at the architecture of, and the approaches to, 
international – and thereby diplomatic – negotiation processes. It noted that a cleavage 
exists between practitioners, researches and trainers in the field, creating disconnectedness 
that cannot easily be resolved. The main components of international negotiation were 
considered: parties and their positions, the process and power involved, and the tension 
between bashing and bargaining – in other words between competition and cooperation. 
Negotiation was seen as an instrument to be used in situations where competition and 
cooperation are both immanent. If competition is dominant, distributive negotiation 
can be expected; where cooperation is the dominating mode, however, integrative 
negotiation can be implemented. If the cooperative mode is excluded, negotiation will not 
be applicable. The parties might use force, or freeze, or flight as instruments in dealing 
with the conflict at hand. Where the competitive mode is absent, negotiation will not be 
needed. Parties can discuss how to cooperate or not to cooperate, but a give-and-take 
process will not – or will hardly – be applied.
Approaches to international/diplomatic negotiation are manifold. The main lines 
of thought and research are qualitative and/or quantitative. In qualitative approaches, 
situations are analyzed through case studies on the basis of more-or-less consensus among 
negotiation academics on dimensions such as ripeness–unripeness, inclusion–exclusion, 
assured–unassured outcomes, etc. Although the formulation of these dimensions is still 
in progress, some kind of common understanding can be observed. It took academics 
half a century to reach this plateau. With a broader view, pondering on the meaning 
and effectiveness of negotiation can be stretched back to the seventeenth century or 
even earlier. According to the qualitative approach, negotiation is too complex and too 
situational to be put in a single model, or to be open for overall mathematical analysis. 
Richelieu already observed that ‘different circumstances require different approaches’ 
(Berridge et al., 2001: 77). This thesis approaches the process of international negotiation 
and its subset of inter-state – that is, diplomatic – negotiation through the qualitative 
holistic path. From that perspective, the quantitative approach is a very useful addition to 
the qualitative method. It provides valuable insights into those elements of the negotiation 
realm that are calculable. A combination of both approaches helps us best to understand 
the negotiation phenomenon, in the sense that the quantitative method is an addendum 
to the qualitative approach. However, this is only part of the problem.
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The other problem is about the researchers themselves: not only how they approach 
negotiation, but also by which means. First, their perspectives are influenced by their 
culture, but more seriously they rarely have an opportunity to be present at the negotiation 
process. Practitioners could therefore play the role of observer and participant at the 
same time, but most practitioners are too involved in the process to be able to hold a 
generalist view. Some of them do, however, and they publish very valuable accounts, 
but interestingly enough they are often kept to the sidelines, or at least denied the 
leading role in the negotiation of which they are part. ‘Although a close and fascinating 
observer at the Congress of Westphalia, he [Abraham de Wicquefort] seems not to have 
influenced their outcome’ (Keens-Soper, 1997b: 88). On the other hand, ‘as a secret envoy, 
he [François de Callières] negotiated the crucial terms with the Dutch which led to the 
Congress of Ryswick and a short-lived peace’ (Keens-Soper and Schweizer, 1983: 106), 
although de Callières was denied the post of Head of Delegation. David Hannay, who 
wrote an interesting account on diplomacy and its negotiation processes, managed to be 
one of Britain’s main multilateral negotiators both in the European Union COREPER and 
in the United Nations Security Council, but was barred from becoming Foreign Minister 
for political reasons – his pro-European stand – by Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher (Hannay, 2013). These academic practitioners are essential in helping academic 
researchers to formulate a theory of international negotiations, but the perspectives 
cannot be brought in line.
It is suffice here to quote Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater in the introduction 
to their reader Theories of International Relations: ‘There is no agreement about what 
counts as the best line of argument in any theory, and no agreement about whether their 
principle achievements can be combined in a unified grand theory’ (Burchill and Linklater, 
2009: 12). Negotiation is the tool to reach agreements where they are lacking, either 
through compromise, or trade-offs, or both. In academia this will not help, as science is 
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CHAPTER II: ASPECTS OF DIPLOMATIC 
NEGOTIATION
As was outlined in chapter I, international negotiations are different from national 
negotiations in the sense that there is no overarching authority to correct negotiators who 
fail to reach a conclusion. There is more control in national negotiation, less control in 
international negotiation, while transnational negotiations such as those in the European 
Union are a hybrid of the two. International negotiations can be conducted between 
private and public representatives.
This study labels international negotiations in the public sector as ‘diplomatic’. 
Diplomatic negotiations can be between politicians and their representatives from 
different states, or between civil servants in international organizations. The first part of 
this chapter sketches the evolution of the international/diplomatic negotiation process, 
while the second part deals with the nature of diplomatic negotiation. Understanding its 
evolution is seen as an important aspect of understanding diplomatic negotiations, actually 
in understanding the complexities with which they are confronted: ‘the vital importance 
of the past – an awareness of the history of a country or a people – in understanding the 
complexities of the present’ (Kingsley de Silva, 1996: 111).
Diplomatic negotiation is as old as the international system itself. Since the birth of 
the first sovereign units in China, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East, the desire 
to establish official relations has existed. Representatives were sent back and forth to 
establish international hierarchy and to spy on one another. Yet it was only during the 
Renaissance that a system was established in which representatives were accredited to 
another country and stayed there for some time (Berridge, 1995: 32–55). The travelling 
ambassador made way for the ambassador-in-residence and, as a result, negotiations 
developed a more structured character. Only as an exception were ambassadors sent who 
returned to their sovereign directly after negotiations. The resident ambassador became 
the first-level negotiator, a role that lessened somewhat during the last century with the 
development of large international conferences and increased ability to communicate 
between capitals, made possible by advances in transportation and communication. The 
present-day ambassador will be discussed in the second part of this chapter, while the 
first part of the chapter will sketch out development towards that position.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION1
We learn from the Book of Ecclesiastes, ‘The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; 
and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the 
sun’ (Ecclesiastes 1:9). Diplomatic negotiation is no exception to this rule. Since at least 
the middle of the third millennium BCE, the city-states of the ancient Near East maintained 
friendly relations – or prepared for war – using the paraphernalia of diplomacy. Well-
organized bureaucracies, based on the palace and consisting of officials trained in scribal 
schools, exchanged ambassadors and messengers bearing cuneiform tablets written in 
Old Babylonian. Calling each other ‘brother’, kings ‘at peace’ exchanged gifts, cemented 
their relationships with dynastic marriages, traded along the major routes, made military 
alliances, settled boundary disputes, and in general ‘gratified each other’s desires’. Their 
relations were regulated by an elaborate system of law, protocol and finance, and they 
negotiated numerous treaties (Kuhrt, 1998: vol. 1, 40–44; Beckman, 1996).
We know all this from the vast archives that were preserved for millennia in the 
tells – ruined mounds of ancient cities – to be rediscovered from the nineteenth century 
onwards. The royal archives of Mari, for instance, which consist of over 25,000 baked 
clay tablets, were found in 1936 by a French expedition. To date, 31 volumes have been 
translated and published in French, under the auspices of the French Foreign Ministry. 
Among the voluminous diplomatic correspondence dating to the 1760s BCE is material 
that sheds light on many features of early international relations, including in great detail 
the forms, conventions and substance of negotiations. Thanks to the highly informative 
dispatches of the envoys of King Zimri-Lim of Mari, we can read among many other things 
blow-by-blow accounts of peace negotiations between Mari and the Babylonian King 
Hammurabi.
At one point, Zimri-Lim’s ambassador, Abu-Machin, presented Hammurabi with the 
draft text of a peace treaty between the two countries. There followed long negotiations 
over possession of the town of Hit, which the allied kings had captured from Eshnunna. 
(Hammurabi did not know it, but Hit was non-negotiable because Zimri-Lim’s soothsayers, 
reading the entrails of two lambs, had ruled on the impermissibility of its concession.)
‘Why, despite all his fine words, does Zimri-Lim raise obstacles?’, Hammurabi 
complained. ‘My master has never coveted anything that did not belong to him’, 
Ambassador Abu-Machin responded. ‘Strike out Hit from the list of undertakings so that 
I can commit myself’, Hammurabi insisted, explaining why he wanted Hit:
Your country’s strength is in its donkeys and wagons, but my country’s strength is 
in its boats. I want this town for its bitumen and oil. For what other reason might 
I want it? In exchange for Hit, I’ll lend a sympathetic ear to whatever Zimri-Lim 
writes me. On the matter of Hit, I cannot concede (Elgavish, 1998: 66).
This section on ‘Development’ is based on Cohen and Meerts (2008); on Meerts 
(2011b); and on Meerts (2013d); as well as partly based on Meerts (1999).
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And so a tough negotiation unfolds, with Hammurabi proposing third-party arbitration 
to break the impasse and Abu-Machin stubbornly resisting. The Mariote ambassador 
reported: ‘I clarified the treaty obligations but he maintained his opposition in the matter 
of the town of Hit, arguing at length. I still did not agree with him, presenting my arguments 
in a way that he might find acceptable, wearing him down. Hit is now the last subject 
under contention’ (ibid.).
At the final stage of a negotiation, drafts of the treaty were exchanged in the form of a 
‘small tablet’ brought by visiting delegations passing to and fro between the two capitals, 
and the kings – who never met – pledged themselves to its contents (Charpin, 1988: 144). 
Even at this very late stage, discussions continued on some point of detail that one of the 
parties insisted be included (Elgavish, 1998: 71). Final drafts of the treaty in the form of a 
‘great tablet’ were then exchanged. In separate ceremonies at which solemn oaths were 
sworn to the gods, the kings and accompanying ambassadors each divided an ass and 
walked between the two halves.
In the Mari tablets, and also the diplomatic correspondence from the famous el-
Amarna archive (Moran, 1992; Cohen and Westbrook, 2000), we find thoroughly familiar 
procedures and ploys – extravagant opening bids, drawn-out middle-games, fallback 
positions, trade-offs, deadlines, last-minute demands, face-saving compromises, and so 
on. Arguments were made to morality, legitimacy, love, family piety, vanity, interest, the 
law and treaty obligations. Intelligence on military and diplomatic matters was assiduously 
collected, sometimes to be used in the negotiations. Soothsayers and prophets played an 
important role in the decision-making process.
At one level, negotiations seem to be about the exchange of princesses, gifts, 
physicians and sacred idols. At another simultaneous level, the issues at stake are finance, 
trade, the stability and survival of the regime, prestige, interest, the defence of the realm 
and imperial expansion (Elgavish, 1998: 62–71). By the time of King Solomon’s late tenth-
century BCE negotiation with Hiram, King of Tyre, for the supply of cedars to build the 
temple to Yahweh in Jerusalem (1 Kings: 5), the conventions and tactics of diplomatic 
negotiation had been thoroughly honed for over 1,000 years.
In the 3,000 years that have passed since then, the procedures and substance of 
negotiations have evolved. On the whole, soothsayers are no longer consulted (although 
astrologists sometimes are). Sacred oaths and sacrifices do not accompany treaty signings 
(although such occasions are still surrounded by an aura of solemnity and treaties are held 
to be sacrosanct in some way). Nevertheless, there is an undeniable family resemblance 
between the proto-diplomacy of the great kings of eighteenth-century BCE Mesopotamia 
and the sophisticated diplomacy conducted by the great kings of eighteenth-century 
CE Europe.
The resemblance partly derives from inherent, structural features of mixed-motive games, 
where the need to cooperate in situations of rivalry dictates resorting to negotiation – that 
is, joint decision-making under conditions of interdependent choice. At the same time, 
comparison of the assumptions, concepts and forms – the ontology – underpinning 
diplomacy in general and negotiation in particular in the two periods suggests the 
following proposition: that ancient Near Eastern, cuneiform diplomacy is the linear 
ancestor of modern diplomacy. Key ideas that are central to our civilization – such as 
the state, sovereignty, boundaries, diplomatic relations, war, peace, treaties, ratification, 
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ambassadors, delegations, passports, diplomatic notes, inviolability, and so on – were not 
invented by the ancient Greeks, let alone by the Italians of Renaissance Italy, but were 
handed down from Sumer and Akkad.
There can be no denying that the comparative analysis of historical cases has not been 
given the emphasis that it deserves by students of negotiation. Yet diplomatic negotiation 
is a fundamental human activity whose origins are lost in the mists of antiquity. Like 
other great institutions such as writing, governance, banking, medicine, the law and so 
on, it is enlightening to study its development over time. To date, the historical study 
of negotiation has largely been the province of historians and philologists, ancient and 
modern. Both historians and theoreticians have suffered from this cross-disciplinary 
compartmentalization. Historians of the ancient Near East have sometimes written about 
diplomacy while failing to grasp that one of the key roles of the diplomat is to negotiate.
As far as the student of negotiation is concerned, the study of historical cases – indeed, 
of the history of negotiation as such – has several justifications. First, it permits us to 
identify invariant structural features of negotiation that are more evident when viewed 
from afar than up close. Second, like students of embryology, observing the embryo helps 
us grasp the function of otherwise puzzling features of the fully developed organism. 
Third, if it is accepted that the basic ideas, the ontology of diplomacy and international 
relations are not continuously being ‘socially constructed’, it follows that the prospect of 
them being reinvented in our present brave new world is less likely than some people 
wishfully claim: again, we return to ‘The things that hath been, it is that which shall be’ 
(Ecclesiastes 1:9).
Finally, one good reason for studying negotiation with a historical perspective is that 
by focusing only on the recent past, we overlook most of the evidence on negotiation. Few 
negotiating specialists study cases from before the First World War, thereby excluding 
4,500 years of recorded history. When we study a contemporary case, we invariably have 
limited access to the archives, can observe only one side of the story, are often biased in 
a nationalist sense, and are unable to place the episode in the perspective of the longue 
durée. In contrast, historical cases can be researched while drawing on a much richer 
documentary database. We know how things worked out, plus, frankly, who cares whether 
Babylon or Mari struck the better deal?
In a special issue on ‘The Evolution of International Negotiation Processes’, the journal 
International Negotiation (2008: Vol. 13, No. 2) aimed to contribute to amending the lacuna 
noted above in the literature on negotiation. There have been some direct attempts 
(Lempereur, 2002; Dupont, 2003; Dupont and Audebert-Lasrochas, 2005; Meerts, 2005b) 
and indirect attempts (Numelin, 1950; Mattingly, 1955; Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995; 
Holsti, 1991; and Holsti, 2004) to do this in the past. Articles on different subjects and 
periods of international relations history were brought together in order to provide insight 
into inter-state negotiation processes and negotiators then and now. They shed light 
on the impact of historical context on negotiation strategy and tactics, skills and styles, 
power and positions, procedures and processes, and outcomes and implementation. 
Comparisons with contemporary negotiation processes are made as often as possible.
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The Problem of Establishing Outcomes
A successful outcome cannot be guaranteed. Mistrust between monarchs, and therefore 
between states, has through the ages dominated mutual relations (Cohen and Westbrook, 
2000). Negotiators were – and not seldom – killed, as this was seen as a signal for the 
opponent that the negotiator was an unequal partner. The envoy in fact represented his 
master and was seen as the personification of his monarch. In a way, this is shown in the 
position of the modern-day ambassador. To kill the representative of the other country 
was, therefore, a show of power and this behaviour cost some rulers dearly. The Shah of 
Chwarezm (Persia) showed his contempt for the Mongolian ruler Ghenghiz Khan by killing 
his entire representation, but the Shah did not survive these policy measures for very long. 
Apart from the material losses, the Mongol leader also felt that he had lost face, and this 
outraged him. The news of his envoys’ execution, as recorded by Ata-Malik Juvaini, the 
Persian servant of the Mongol Ilkhans of Persia in the late thirteenth century, ‘had such 
an effect upon the Khan’s mind that the control of repose and tranquillity was removed, 
and the whirlwind of anger cast dust into the eyes of patience and clemency, while fire 
of wrath flared up with such a flame that it drove the water from his eyes and could be 
quenched only by the shedding of blood’ (Black, 2010: 11).
States in ancient times were looking for means to increase trust in each other by 
exchanging hostages. The Kaghan of the Khazars – the Turkic tribe in Ukraine that 
converted to Judaism in the ninth century CE – not only demanded that his Hungarian 
and Bulgarian vassals come to an agreement with him, but also received hostages of 
royal decent at his court as a guarantee. A more subtle guarantee for negotiating results 
was the arranged marriage of children to an instantly conjured-up ally. By marrying the 
daughter of the Khagan, the emperor of Byzantium acquired more certainty about the 
intentions of his Khazar allied forces (Meerts, 2004a). All in all, these guarantees were 
of limited value and, in the given situation, going to war remained, until far into modern 
times, a more effective method in settling conflicts than inter-state negotiation.
Nevertheless, attempts were made to push back violence by establishing diplomatic 
networks, especially in Renaissance Italian city-states. In the course of the following 
centuries, negotiation increased in significance, probably also under the pressure of 
greater devastation caused by the advancing weapons technology. In the seventeenth 
century, the use of bilateral negotiations was intensified, which was reflected by the 
introduction of parallel bilateral negotiations. Whereas negotiations were limited before 
to discussions between two parties who would meet at a previously arranged location, it 
now became fashionable to start discussions at one particular meeting point with various 
representatives of ‘states’. The big example is the negotiations of the Peace of Westphalia 
in Münster and Osnabruck. These were, however, not yet multilateral negotiations (see 
chapter VI).
Parties continued their bilateral negotiations, in general indirectly through a go-
between. In this manner, the strong party had an advantage that could only be annulled 
in a multilateral framework, but this was at that time out of the question. One of the 
advantages of multilateral meetings is their repetition, which helps to stabilize relationships 
and thereby negotiation processes. As it was not yet possible to organize true multilateral 
talks, some attempts to enhance repetition and thereby stability were already being 
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made. Berridge notes that Richelieu saw the importance of continuous negotiation as 
a stabilizer: ‘What is immediately impressive about Richelieu’s account of the value of 
négociation continuelle (continuous negotiation) is the quite extraordinary emphasis on it’ 
(Berridge et al., 2001: 73). ‘Providing the capacity to persuade other states to favourable 
agreements with eloquence and reason, as well as the ability to observe them closely 
and so avoid unpleasant surprises, were strong arguments for continuous negotiation’ 
(Berridge et al., 2001: 75).
Negotiators did, however, convene in a multilateral fashion for ceremonial gatherings, 
but this was no way to negotiate, assembled in the guesthouse of some or other party. It 
is, incidentally, interesting to note that ceremonial gatherings were significant, however, 
because the way in which the seating plan was arranged, for example, could show the 
balance of power. The individual who sat closest to the chairman/negotiator was the most 
important, which is why, to enhance their status, church monarchs dressed themselves 
in ecclesiastical robes. For the formal part of the Treaties of Ryswick (now Rijswijk) at the 
end of the seventeenth century, the negotiators were seated in a circle without a table, 
otherwise one could not be certain about the goings-on under the table. Heralds made 
sure that diplomats were led into the ceremonial room at an equal pace, so that one 
person could not claim precedence above another.
 It is important to note that during this time, the negotiation process was also used as a 
means of warfare, as for instance by Louis XIV. During the expansion of France, Louis XIV 
was placed against forceful coalitions that he played out through peaceful negotiations, 
after which he again restarted the struggle until, yet again, a strong opposition developed. 
The consequence of this strategy is a whole series of void peace treaties.
Only in the nineteenth century were multilateral negotiations introduced as a method 
to regulate the international power structure, thereby facilitating successful outcomes. 
The significance of negotiation as an alternative to warfare was on the increase, but the 
problem of mutual mistrust remained. Effective handling of this phenomenon presented 
itself at the beginning of the twentieth century with intergovernmental international 
organizations, as already mentioned, such as the Court of Arbitration (at the end of The 
Hague Peace Conference), the League of Nations, and the United Nations, etc. The idea 
to create international organizations to regulate international relations between states 
and thereby enhance the effectiveness of international negotiation processes was not 
anything new. Immanuel Kant had already observed that a League of Nations modelled 
after the agreements forged a necessary condition in societies for international stability: 
‘dass ein Völkerbund, nach der Idee eines ursprünglichen gesellschaftlichen Vertrages, 
notwendig sei ’ (Kant, 2011: 75) (that there has to be a League of Nations congruent with 
the original social contracts). It is ironic, however, that the birth of these international 
bodies, whose aim is to establish a framework for the negotiation process and to provide 
guarantees for its observance, coincides with the most terrible wars in history.
To put these international negotiation processes into a framework, a great number of 
international organizations came into being after the Second World War, from regional to 
universal, and from sector-specific to general. These organizations formed a forum for 
the peaceful solutions of conflicts and for joint solutions to joint problems. International 
organizations differ greatly in their degree of institutionalization, ranging from the refined 
Conference-Secretariat of, for instance, the Group of 77 to the partly sovereign European 
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Commission. The result of this development is a patchwork of multilateral forums, in which 
diplomats and civil servants of close to 200 sovereign states negotiate with each other.
Changes over the Centuries
An important difference between international negotiation processes of the past 
and present is the question of the relevance of the bargaining process in conflict 
management. If warfare and negotiation are seen as alternatives – if both are politics 
by other means – warfare was the priority tool in inter-state conflict until the twentieth 
century. This is an interesting paradox, as no other era has seen such massive warfare as 
the last century. On the other hand, no other period in European history has witnessed 
such substantial periods of stable peace as the nineteenth century (Kissinger, 1957: 1–3). 
Throughout the centuries, negotiation became a more relevant tool, although warfare 
for a long time remained the preferred means to settle problems. In Europe, negotiation 
gained strength because of four developments.
The first development was technology. If anything characterizes human history, it is 
the change in technological devices. One can question the development of culture, for are 
we at a higher level than in the past? Perhaps not. One can state that art did not develop 
into a higher stage, but who is to judge the quality of Rembrandt’s work compared to 
modern and ancient art? One can question the development of the human psyche, of 
human health, yet are we better off than in the past? Perhaps we can acknowledge that 
our political systems reached some sort of ripeness. We can definitely prove, however, that 
technology evolved in a positive way, that it reached a higher standard than in classical 
times, medieval times, or the Renaissance. Technology influenced warfare in the sense 
that it created more destructive weaponry than ever. At the same time, technology gave 
diplomacy the sophisticated tools needed to forge organizations channelling negotiation 
processes. It contributed to the availability and speed of information facilitating effective 
negotiation. While technology made warfare an often too dangerous sword to wield, it 
made negotiation a more effective tool to bridge the gap.
The second development was that of regime-building, which will be discussed 
in chapter III. Regimes, in the form of international agreements stipulating rules and 
regulations of conduct and – at best – allowing for sanctions against those parties that do 
not comply with the understandings that have been made, can compensate for lack of trust 
by imposing control. They provide information about the parties’ behaviour and monitor 
their activities. Regimes can go a step further by establishing international organizations 
in order to have a more durable and ongoing surveillance of the (mis)behaviour of states. 
Surely, leaders might trust each other, but why should states set their raison d’état aside 
for something as feeble as trust, which can be turned over from one day to another? Not 
having any regimes to stabilize negotiation processes and secure the outcome contributed 
to the idea that bargaining could be – at most – a sideshow in warfare. Trust has always 
been the pre-eminent problem in negotiation. As long as one cannot be sure about the 
intentions of the other side and its willingness to stick to an agreement, governments have 
proven to be reluctant to put all their eggs in the basket of negotiation as an alternative 
to warfare.
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Negotiators tried to deal with this problem in different ways. They swore pious oaths 
and asked all the available gods to bless the treaties that they forged, but as this clearly 
did not guarantee any solid implementation of any holy pact, negotiators had to think of 
other ways, such as strengthening relationships, for example, or exchanging hostages, or, 
as in the seventeenth century, asking guarantors (like France and Sweden in the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648) to help implement the treaty. In the eighteenth century, after the 
(in essence) multi-bilateral Peace of Utrecht (1713), the number of conferences multiplied 
in an attempt to stop wars ravaging the European continent and to make bargaining the 
dominant mode in conflict management. In the nineteenth century, starting with the 
multilateral Vienna Conference (1814–1815), the meetings between heads of states and 
diplomats became a systemic feature, but ongoing organizational structures were still 
lacking. This changed in the twentieth century after the devastating First World War (with 
the Paris Conference and the Peace of Versailles in 1919) and then the Second World War 
(Conference of San Francisco in 1945), by creating regimes of ever-better quality and 
strength, not only on a regional, but also on a global level.
Regimes, in transforming negotiations into increasingly rationalized tools, dealt with 
the problem of trust in an effective way. The development of trust is the third remarkable 
trend in the evolution of inter-state negotiation. Secrecy was a major issue in early European 
diplomacy, much more than today. Ambassadors had to be versed in publicly representing 
their monarchs as well as dealing with issues under conditions of complete secrecy. Being 
able to keep secrets, to be specialized in treason, maintaining a poker-face and the like 
were the qualities of the effective ambassador-negotiator (Colson, 2008; Berridge, 1999). 
Distances, time-lags, transportation problems and communication distortions all helped 
secrecy. There are of course still secrets nowadays in diplomatic negotiation and the 
WikiLeaks revelations pushed them to the forefront of the public debate (Rosoux, 2013; 
Meerts, 2013e). Modern authors on negotiation even plea for openness as a means to 
further the effectiveness and speed of negotiation processes, although it remains unwise 
to show your trump-cards ‘in public’. So-called ‘corridor work’ (outside the conference 
room) and ‘huddling’ (small groups of negotiators talking informally in the conference 
room during a break in the formal session) are still an essential part of bargaining, also for 
cultural reasons. Open concession-making can lead to losing face, as negotiators might 
refuse to give in openly, only in informal sessions.
The fourth evolving element is power. The political context is changing. Power is 
more equally distributed today than in the past, even internationally (Cohen and Meerts, 
2008: 155), although it is still more bluntly used in international relations than in national 
politics, at least in and between democracies. This clearly has to do with the evolution of 
human history, the development of democracy, creating more diffusion of power, and the 
protection of minorities and human rights. At the same time, the distribution of power 
among states has become less volatile, while intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations are on the rise (Van Staden, 1987: 14), helping to stabilize power or to 
diffuse it.
Non-state groups, including regional and terrorist organizations, are able to undermine 
the hegemony of the state, because weapons technology has been globalized so much that 
the state’s monopoly of structural advantage is washing away. Nuclear states still hold this 
prerogative, but even they might be under attack in the future, as nuclear weapons are of 
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no avail against regional or global insurgencies. Furthermore, the idea that states should 
not be wiped out just like that, even with the rationale that the stronger state might use 
nuclear weapons in the future against other major powers, gave minor powers a rightful 
and legitimate niche in international politics, and therefore in international bargaining. 
Negotiation is situational and contextual. Major changes in the political context will 
influence the character and the effectiveness of international negotiation processes.
Can one therefore conclude that negotiation evolved into a more valuable and legitimate 
instrument in international conflict and international relations than other methodologies, 
such as, first and foremost, warfare? Indeed, ‘Negotiation becomes the prevailing method 
in conflict resolution and the prevention of further violent conflicts’ (Gasparini, 2013: 77). 
However, this does not mean – at all – that warfare has lost its significance. And in many 
cases it is still easier to go to war than to open negotiations. Given the present levels of 
technology, regime strength, the instruments to compensate for lack of trust and the 
attempts to respect minor powers, it can indeed be hypothesized that negotiation evolved 
into one – if not the main – tool in international conflict management and resolution. With 
disasters and scarcity ahead, the world might well want to learn from the experiences of 
the past, to be better equipped in dealing with the future.
CHARACTERISTICS OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION2
‘Diplomacy is the best means of preserving peace that a society of sovereign states 
has to offer’ (Morgenthau, 1967: 549), where ‘negotiators seek to produce a formula 
for agreement on the resolution of a problem, which is then translated into acceptable 
implementing details’, whereby the ‘principle of justice’ is its basic subject (Zartman, 
2003: 33–34). Henry Kissinger sees diplomacy as a negotiation process in a legitimate 
context: ‘Diplomacy in the classic sense [is] the adjustment of differences through 
negotiations [and it] is possible only in “legitimate” international orders. [Legitimacy] 
implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers’ 
(Kissinger, 1957: 1–2). René Albrecht-Carrié concurs: ‘Diplomacy, the art of finding [...] 
accommodation, is timeless. But in the recent period [...] a narrower definition may be 
given of diplomacy as the management of relations among sovereign entities through 
negotiations conducted by the appropriate agents’. He adds that ‘sovereignty, by its 
very nature, means the denial of any higher authority’ (Albrecht-Carrié, 1970: 3–5). This 
exemplifies the main characteristic of diplomatic negotiation: to harmonize the interests 
of different states without an overarching framework that is strong enough to direct them 
to a common agreement.
Christer Jönsson and Karin Aggestam attempt to get more of a grip on the term 
‘diplomacy’ by looking at its different functions:
This section on ‘Characteristics’ is based on Meerts (1999).
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First, ‘diplomacy’ sometimes refers to the content of foreign affairs as a whole. 
Second, ‘diplomacy’ might connote the conduct of foreign policy. A third connotation 
of diplomacy focuses on the management of international relations by negotiation. 
Fourth, diplomacy may be understood as the use of diplomats in a diplomatic 
service. Fifth, diplomacy, and especially the adjective ‘diplomatic’, often refers 
to the manner in which relations are conducted (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 
33–34).
To this they add diplomatic norms and practices facilitating conflict resolution: coexistence 
and reciprocity; open communication channels; shared language; commitment to peace; 
diplomatic immunity; and pacta sunt servanda, meaning agreements must be kept 
(Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 36–40). They also refer to diplomatic norms and practices 
that complicate conflict resolution: precedence problems; openness; constructive 
ambiguity and its consequences for implementation; questions of recognition before the 
process can start; and multilateralism and ‘polylateralism’ being problematic because of 
their complexity (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 40–61). However, others nuance both the 
positive and negative effects of the diplomatic norms and practices as summed up by 
Jönsson and Aggestam.
For example, their last point is particularly important to conference diplomacy, or 
negotiating in the framework of international conferences. Winham, however, sees 
advantages in complexity: ‘Complexity works in favour of reaching an agreement because 
the inherent lack of precision in the material makes it difficult to argue effectively against 
an agreement.’ ‘It pushes parties to adopt simplified logics and goals.’ ‘Complexity 
strengthens the position of the negotiator back home’ (Winham, 1977: 87–114). Albrecht-
Carrié agrees with Jönsson and Aggestam on ‘the advantages of a common medium of 
expression, whatever it might be, Latin, French, or some other, have often been pointed 
out’ (Albrecht-Carrié, 1970: 8), but he sees a gloomy future for this: ‘It is one of the less 
attractive aspects of our contemporary hypersensitive nationalism that this aspect of 
universality has ceased to exist in our day’. Diplomatic negotiation is therefore a process 
of international negotiation characterized by diplomatic norms and practices that can 
have a positive and a negative effect on its function of coming to closure, but it is difficult 
to point out which characteristics will have a positive or negative impact on its outcome 
because of the contextual nature of the process.
Turning to the question of process, this study already referred to it in the last chapter: 
many authors have defined process in many different ways, but in the end the differences 
are not substantial. It is a question of wording. According to Zartman, process ‘refers most 
precisely to the parties’ exchange of concessions and compensations in an effort to reach 
a point of agreement that is favourable and acceptable to each’ (Zartman, 2002: 9). At a 
later stage Zartman added ‘construction’, meaning reframing or restructuring the issues 
so that a new goal, which is of interest to both sides, will help to get things done.
Combining the views of Kissinger, Albrecht-Carrié, Zartman, Jönsson and Aggestam, 
this dissertation’s preface defined diplomatic negotiation as an exchange of concessions 
and compensations in a framework of international order accepted by sovereign entities. It is 
undeniable that shorter and more extensive definitions would be equally valid and useful. 
But for pragmatic reasons, the definition as formulated above will be used by this study as 
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an understanding of the term ‘diplomatic negotiation’. The definition clarifies the difference 
between diplomatic negotiation and international negotiation. Through the acceptance of 
the legitimate framework and the application of diplomatic norms and practices, it assures 
some control over the process of international negotiation. This control is instrumental 
in assuring closure, or at least in enhancing the probability of successful outcomes and 
effective implementation of these agreements. The framework became stronger over 
time, thereby adding value to negotiation as an alternative to warfare. This study will now 
analyse the elements of diplomatic negotiation processes.
Conflict of Interest and Power Relationships
Depending on their interests, states can have contacts with each other in three different 
ways. If their interests overlap completely, all that is necessary is to sit around a table 
together to discuss how business should be conducted, based on mutual interests. After 
the common interests have been established, common strategy can be determined. 
Negotiation is not necessary, as there are no conflicts of interest. Conferring is sufficient. 
In this situation, the representatives of the states need to ask how the parallel interests can 
be maintained. Indeed, if both states have identical interests on certain issues, it is possible 
that after achieving the common goal, the interests of the countries involved may then 
become diametrically opposed. An example can clarify this. In cases where two resistance 
movements fight against one government, it is possible for them to work together to bring 
down the government that they oppose. If they succeed in bringing down the ‘legitimate’ 
government, there is a serious problem if each resistance group wishes to form the new 
government without the other. In this situation, they can only work together before their 
success; once they succeed, cooperation changes to competition with each other. They 
try to eliminate the other party and a civil war can result. It is different if the two rebel 
movements have complementary interests. In that case, cooperation after the ‘successful 
overthrow’ of the government can be achieved by forming a new coalition government. In 
other words, even in a situation in which states have only common interests, a difference 
needs to be made between the situation before and after carrying out a common decision.
The other end of the spectrum in relations between states is the situation in which 
there are only opposing interests, so cooperation is not possible because of the lack of 
common interests. It is a question of ‘fighting’ or ‘fleeing’, of forcing the other party to 
agree, in the event that one side is stronger than the other and the issue of disagreement 
is a priority. One side can withdraw from contact because there is not sufficient power 
to force the issue, or because the problem in question is not so important. A difficult 
situation arises if a state does not have sufficient power to force an issue, but that issue 
is very important. In that case, it is important for the state to try to build up power quickly 
enough to lead to the desirable result. When there is a lack of sufficient common interests, 
the power relationship between states is the factor that determines whether or not the 
differences can be resolved by force. 
Negotiating power is determined by many factors, both internal and external (Frenkel, 
1969: 118–128; Northedge and Donelan, 1971: 61–64; Zartman and Rubin, 2000b: 3–20; 
Mearsheimer, 2001). The first question concerns the internal balance of the state that is 
negotiating. The position of a state will be undermined if that country is torn by internal 
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differences of interest and opinion. Then comes the issue of external dependence: the 
more independent a state is, the greater its power. These internal and external factors 
determine the structural power of the state. In addition, there is the specific power of the 
country, which includes the power a land can bring to bear on a particular dossier. It is 
clear that countries have comparative power advantages or disadvantages, depending 
on the subject in question. For example, even though Luxembourg is a small country, 
because of its strong banking position, it is a financial power within the European Union. 
Power is not an unchangeable variable and is not merely dependent on the strength of the 
state. The negotiator can also influence the balance of power by functioning more or less 
effectively (Mastenbroek, 1989).
The negotiator can try to influence the balance of power to his or her advantage 
in different ways. One method is to obtain the most information possible about one’s 
own position, about the position of the other party or parties, and about parties who 
are not included in the negotiation but who could become involved. This knowledge is 
necessary to determine what alternatives exist for the negotiations in question. Increasing 
the number of possible alternatives is another way to enlarge one’s own negotiating 
power. Those who have no alternatives are at the mercy of the other party or parties. 
A well-qualified negotiation delegation, in which participants combine good knowledge 
of dossiers along with good negotiation skills, can also contribute to strengthening the 
state’s position. In addition, coalition-forming is very important. Given that coalitions 
are easier to form in multilateral rather than bilateral negotiations, it is best for the less 
powerful states to try to negotiate with a more powerful state in a multilateral setting. 
Meanwhile, the more powerful state has a distinct advantage in bilateral negotiations. 
The choice of negotiation forum is thus of major importance in answering the question 
about in what context the negotiations should be held, which is also the reason for the 
pro-supranational inclinations of most of the small member states of the European Union.
The means that can be used to force the other side to agree in a situation where there 
are no common interests and where negotiation is not an option vary from political and 
economic pressure to use of violence. There are many examples of states using force, 
even when there could have been attempts to create common interests in order to avoid 
the use of violence. There are also situations where there are common interests and 
negotiation could therefore be used, but where one of the parties prefers to use force, 
because it feels that force can lead to better results. Examples such as the recent conflict 
in Chechnya and the Vietnam War show that there can be misjudgement on the part of 
the state with the most power. The more powerful party may feel that it can use all of its 
structural preponderance in the conflict, but that is often not the case. The specific power 
that the structurally weaker opponent can project can often be very effective, whereby the 
weaker party can achieve its goals in relation to the issue. In many instances, this can only 
be maintained in the short term and, at the most, the middle term. This sort of issue can be 
seen in the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours, and between the People’s 
Republic of China and Taiwan. How long can these potentially weaker parties keep the 
balance of power in their favour, or at least in a stalemate? When might there be a turning 
point and when is it the best time to act? This is one of the most difficult decisions for 
diplomatic negotiators: when should they make concessions and to what degree? If they 
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are too early, they will give away things they could have kept, and if they are too late, they 
will lose more than was necessary.
The temptation to use superior power and to avoid negotiation is sometimes too great. 
That does not lessen the fact that the use of physical power is increasingly difficult in a 
world in which there is so much interdependence. The rise of asymmetric warfare, the 
spread of modern weapons technology, and the increasing ‘refinement’ of guerrilla tactics 
and terrorist methods make it also less appealing for those with superior power to use it, 
because the ‘weaker’ party often has access to technologically highly developed weapons 
that neutralize the stronger party. This so-called ‘mosquito power’, whereby the ‘weaker’ 
party takes action against a weak spot of the ‘stronger’ party, thereby negating the power 
of the stronger, plays an increasingly important role in conflicts (Zartman and Rubin, 
2000b: 271–290).
Inter-state Negotiations
The third situation is that of both common and opposing interests between contending 
states. In this situation, negotiation is a usable means to arrive at solutions for mutual 
problems. In situations where the common ground is large and the differences small, 
negotiations can be without problems, relatively speaking. The parties can meet with 
openness and the approach of negotiating in openness can be used (Fisher, 1971). This 
is naturally more difficult in a situation where common interests are limited and opposing 
interests are great. In such cases, there is competitive rather than cooperative negotiation, 
and negotiations will be conducted in an antagonistic atmosphere. To build up trust in a 
situation plagued by distrust requires much skill on the part of the negotiator. In this kind 
of situation, such as in Bosnia, the question is whether or not negotiation is a usable 
method.
It is all too true that there are many situations where ‘negotiations’ take place, but 
where questions can be raised about whether or not this is the best procedure. The 
discussions do not have to be successful in the sense of solving the existing problems. 
The discussions serve other purposes, such as maintaining contact between the parties 
in order to make possible more successful negotiations in the future. The opposite is also 
sometimes true, for example when people do not really wish to negotiate, but refusing 
to negotiate would make this very clear. Thus, to confuse the issue, parties ‘negotiate’ 
to hide the fact that they really want totally different results than what the ‘negotiations’ 
seem to be trying to achieve. Well-known examples of this smoke-screen tactic took place 
in Munich in 1938, and in the meeting between Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and 
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein about Kuwait, just before Iraq attacked Kuwait in 1990. In the latter 
case, the Iraqis pretended to be interested in a peaceful solution in order to hide their real 
plans. There are also ‘negotiations’ where neither party wishes a solution. They want the 
negotiations to fail in order to prove to public opinion that other actions are necessary, 
such as the further strengthening of military forces. Make-believe negotiations can also 
serve to acquire information that might otherwise be difficult to get, or to embarrass the 
other party by breaking off discussions, etc.
Real negotiations can only occur if countries have common interests that they 
acknowledge. In many instances, an outsider can see that countries have common 
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interests, while the countries themselves cannot or do not want to see this themselves. 
Even if they acknowledge the common interests, they may view the issue at hand as less 
important than issues that they consider higher priority. That higher priority, however, may 
not be seen as such by third countries. For example, European Union countries considered 
avoidance of the destruction of lives and infrastructure in Bosnia in the first half of the 
1990s as much more important than the nationalistic desires of the fighting parties, while 
those fighting placed their feelings of national unity and desired national borders above 
the safety interests of human beings and property. The same point may be illustrated by 
the attitude of the People’s Republic of China, which for a long time considered its claim 
on Taiwan as more important than the risk of damaging its own economy by increasing 
tensions in the Strait of Formosa.
Negotiations are only useful, of course, if it is in the interest of the involved countries 
to solve their problems in a peaceful way. One important point is that it is not always 
necessary to have mutual overlapping interests at the beginning of the negotiations. These 
mutual interests can be developed during the negotiations by bringing up new discussion 
points and trying to create common interests by combining different questions: the so-
called ‘package deals’ that can help lead to effective negotiations. The more parties that 
play a role and the more subjects that are brought into the discussion, the bigger the 
chance of creating a common basis. The European Union could never survive without 
package deals on a daily basis. From a certain but insufficient overlapping common 
interest, negotiations occur until it is clear that no solution will result. Attempts are then 
made to combine different wishes, sometimes on totally different topics, so that progress 
can be booked. By definition, these trade-offs take place at the very end of the negotiation 
cycle, because it must first be clear what the unsolvable differences are, and which wishes 
and offers can be coupled together. This requires a negotiator being capable of analyzing 
complex situations and having the ability to come up with creative solutions. A good 
network is essential in such a situation. The creation of a good working atmosphere is 
a requirement in order to make progress in regard to the subject. These skills are very 
important for a diplomat. This is the real contribution of diplomacy, and this is where the 
specialists of other departments need the skills of the diplomats of the foreign ministry.
Although the term ‘negotiation’ can be defined on the basis of common interests 
between states, the term ‘common interests’ itself is not always simple to explain (Berridge, 
1998). In the first place, it is often not simple for the parties themselves to determine what 
their common interests are. Interests are often a sum total of smaller partial interests that 
can contain opposing factors. In general, the instructions that diplomats receive are the 
result of internal negotiations and are often a compromise that holds together because 
of vagueness. However, if the mandate is not the result of extensive internal negotiation 
or consultation, there is a great chance that the results of negotiations with the external 
party will be unacceptable to some internal groups. This can lead to very painful 
confrontations that damage the negotiation partner. If the result is not acceptable to one’s 
own supporters, what kind of trust can the external party have in future negotiations? 
Without legitimacy, good negotiations are impossible and this legitimacy is based largely 
upon internal consensus.
As well as the issue of the difficulty of defining the interests of a country in a certain 
situation, the perception of those interests plays a role (Berridge, 1998). How much of 
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a priority is a particular interest? What concessions are possible? What is negotiable? 
Especially those emotions tied to interests can create obstacles in the path of successful 
negotiations. Emotions in the negotiation process cloud the perception of the party’s 
position, especially because the opposing party often cannot understand those emotions. 
Insight into business issues can be shared, whereas understanding emotions in a 
negotiation process is more difficult. The basis of conflicts is often a disagreement about 
values and norms, rather than about interests. Ethnic, religious and linguistic differences 
are used to mask interests or to support them, while at the same time they are obstacles 
to successful negotiations and their closure (Anstey and Meerts, 2012: 376–390). They are 
not negotiable – a Protestant and a Muslim cannot negotiate about their religion. Such 
differences can make an ‘objective’ analysis of interests difficult.
The Diplomat and Negotiation Behaviour
Negotiations are carried out by people who usually act for organizations. Diplomats, the 
official representatives of their countries, bring all of their country’s power and prestige 
to the negotiating table, putting the negotiations under extra pressure, but also bringing 
risks with it that must be limited. Serious loss of face for diplomatic negotiators can result 
in serious loss of face for the country, which can lead to unforeseen consequences. After 
all, the representative was not only the representative of his emperor; he was, in a way, the 
ruler himself. This is still the case. The ambassador is not only the representative of his or 
her state; he or she personifies it. This is why representatives are listened to, but some of 
course carry more weight than others. Their influence, which is also determined by their 
skill, is still largely based on the power that they represent.
The diplomatic negotiator is protected by many rules and procedures, which see to it 
that no one state can be raised above the other. The Vienna Convention of 1961 put into 
black-letter law the accumulation of European practices, norms, values and regulations 
assembled over the centuries (Berridge, 1995: 19–31). In addition, a ‘diplomatic culture’ 
has developed, in which diplomats from very different cultures can interact with each other 
in a ‘safe’ manner. The great contrasts that cultural differences can cause are in this way 
reduced to acceptable proportions. It can be argued that differences in negotiation style 
have a more limited influence on the negotiating climate in diplomacy than in international 
business, unless the diplomat is planning to use these differences as a tactical weapon. 
Research has shown that – perhaps in contrast to popular belief – substantial cultural 
differences exist among negotiators from EU countries, but that such differences do not 
create any real barriers (Meerts, 2004). On the other hand, individual character-trait 
differences can damage the atmosphere. Differences in negotiating skills will naturally 
always have influence on the outcome of the negotiations; there is also a visible increasing 
difference in training techniques.
The difference between the official representative of a state, whether this person is a 
diplomat or an internationally functioning civil servant, and the negotiator who represents 
a company or other group, is based on the formal character of the negotiation mandate 
of the first. The instruction that the diplomat gets as a negotiator carries the status of 
the state. This almost emotional dimension of the empowered negotiator of a country is 
often an obstacle in searching for and finding the most rational and effective solution for 
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differences. After all, in addition to the ‘honour’ of the country, issues such as public opinion, 
the political position of ministries and parliament and, sometimes, military leaders play a 
great role. The political dimension, with its emotional aspects, often leads to negotiation 
results that, mildly stated, are ‘unbalanced’ and ‘not carefully thought out’. This can be an 
advantage or disadvantage for the negotiating state. Deliberately vague and contradictory 
agreements often provide a solution, when a crystal-clear and straightforward statement 
would lead to great resistance from parliament and public opinion.
Diplomatic negotiators not only have the task of problem-solving; sometimes their 
task is to conceal problems, to introduce uncertainty and ambiguity instead of clarification 
(Friedman, 1995). This has the consequence for negotiations that issues are continually 
pushed to the future and that finding solutions can be seen as untimely and even harmful. 
The interest of the state often requires negotiations to be strung out and solutions to be 
delayed, because the existence of the current unstable situation offers an advantage to 
one or more of the negotiating states. This can be seen in Cyprus over the past decades, 
where different groups within the Greek and Turkish communities have no interest in 
eliminating the island’s current partition. In other situations, an external power may want 
to delay a solution, because its influence would be limited. This is again the case on 
Cyprus, where the lines clearly go back to Greece and Turkey. Restoration of the status 
quo ante would lessen or remove the influence of both countries in Cyprus, although such 
a revision is further away than ever, given the outcomes of the referenda, the stagnation 
of EU enlargement and the euro crisis hitting Cyprus in 2013. Such tactics are often visible 
in bilateral negotiations, but in multilateral negotiations it is very difficult to determine 
why progress is not being made. There can be ‘legitimate’ reasons because a state binds 
different issues together in order to tie progress on one issue to progress on another; 
forced delays on one point may encourage solutions on another point. It is also possible 
that it is in the interest of all participants to frustrate progress, given the great costs that 
decisions may bring in the short term, even though it is clear that long-term damage 
will result to these states. Negotiations about environmental issues are a good example 
of this. Countries agree about the damage caused by air pollution, but if the changes 
required for out-of-date industries cost too much, a country may feel little enthusiasm 
about taking the necessary expensive and far-reaching steps.
Progress in inter-state negotiations depends on a number of factors: the mutual 
dependence of the countries involved; the quality of their political relations; power relations 
between the states; and the priority that states give to the subjects under negotiation. In 
addition, the skills and prestige of the diplomats play a role, but they must still operate 
within the four named parameters and must thereby use the negotiating space to the best 
of their ability in order to find a solution or to undermine the negotiations. It has become 
fashionable for effective negotiators to strive to maximize or optimize their goals to create 
a ‘win–win’ result. If the theorists have their way, this is what negotiators should strive for. 
And indeed, that is the best result for negotiators. But is that always realistic? In many 
countries, preference is given to a negotiation method that does not lead to an optimal or 
even a maximum result. Negotiators are prepared to accept a loss in the event that the 
other party suffers an even greater loss.
The negotiation strategy of states is, in part, determined by the state’s structure and 
the hierarchy within the ministries. Differences influence the process of negotiation and 
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its outcome, and can make communication difficult. This explains why there has been so 
much discussion going on for some time about a certain harmonization of the structure 
of the different ministries of foreign affairs, up to the point of proposals for radical change 
(Neumann, 1997; Coolsaet, 1998). Diplomats who negotiate for a federation, such as the 
Federal Republic of Germany, often have to deal with a long negotiation process within 
their country, whereby their instructions often arrive late and their position is inflexible. 
Centralized countries with a clearer command structure, such as France, can operate 
much more quickly, but the basis of acceptance of the decision taken is sometimes too 
narrow. This may lead to decisions that will be rejected by segments of the population, 
with strikes and boycotts as a consequence.
In Conclusion
International negotiations are being nationalized and national negotiations are being 
internationalized. This chapter noted that the domain of inter-state relations and a country’s 
carefully separated area of internal affairs are beginning to merge with each other. If it 
is no longer clear where the demarcation lies for the international dimension, how can 
the diplomat’s position as the monopolist in international relations be maintained? In this 
way, the diplomat loses his prerogative as an international negotiator. He or she is in 
competition with colleagues (departmental civil servants) who often know more about 
the specialized subject than the diplomat. The increasing complexity of international 
affairs increases the influence of the non-diplomat expert. The diplomat maintains her 
or his function as a generalist who is necessary for coordination. Improved means of 
communication make it easier for the civil servant to negotiate directly with his or her 
counterpart in another country. The same is true for ministers and heads of state who 
do business directly at summit conferences, sometimes ostentatiously closing out their 
assistants. Coordination is therefore often no longer needed or possible. In summary, 
the role of the diplomat as negotiator is being undermined. Inter-state negotiation is 
increasingly ‘inter-civil-servant’ negotiation and less often diplomatic negotiation – that 
is, if people view diplomatic negotiation as the process of give and take in which the actor 
is generally a member of the diplomatic service.
Above all, within the European Union, there are visible processes that threaten to 
marginalize the diplomat’s role in relation to the negotiator of the specialized departments. 
Also outside of the Union, there are developments that threaten to diminish the role of 
the diplomatic negotiator. In addition to the civil servant, there are other competitors. 
The democratization of society leads to increasing interventions by politicians and non-
governmental groups and organizations. This leads to greater openness and increases 
the role of the media and journalists as players in the international arena. Companies also 
play an increasing role in international affairs, certainly now that there is a higher priority 
placed on economic developments. The businessman and his interests can no longer be 
ignored by diplomacy. For example, the effort to increase exports has become a larger part 
of the diplomatic task. Saner describes and analyzes the divergent post-modern diplomatic 
roles in the economic sphere of representatives of states and of non-state actors (Saner, 
2009: 9). Commercialization, privatization, democratization, politicizing, professionalizing, 
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increasing interdependence, improved communication, improved transport, greater 
security risks and the increasing number of international issues: in short, the quality and 
quantity of the international questions to be negotiated is on the rise.
 Inter-state negotiations are thus less often synonymous with diplomatic negotiations, 
and international negotiations are less often the same as inter-state negotiations. The 
state has lost influence, and within the state, the diplomat. Paradoxically, because of the 
increase in importance of diplomatic negotiations, a more modest role is set aside for the 
diplomat. It would perhaps be better to speak nowadays about ‘inter-state negotiations’ 
– that is, negotiations in which diplomacy is only one of the players. In addition, it can be 
concluded that inter-state negotiations will have competition from an increasing number 
of other forms of negotiation, while the state-like character of negotiations between 
countries will lessen.
Does this mean that the roles of diplomacy and of the state are becoming so 
marginalized that diplomatic/inter-state negotiations will lose their meaning as a theme 
for study and training? The answer is just the opposite (Flemish Foreign Affairs Council, 
2013: 1; Modernisering van de diplomatie, 2013). The study of, and training in, diplomatic/
inter-state negotiations are increasing, just as the world is becoming more internationally 
oriented, just as international developments have an increasing influence on the internal 
development of states, and just as the increasing complexity of international developments 
bring greater pressure on the ability of states and their representatives to create order, 
without which further peaceful development is not possible. It is precisely in these 
circumstances that the role of the diplomat as coordinator, shaper and negotiator – in 
short, communicator – will gain in significance. The tasks of the modern diplomat of the 
twenty-first century will be difficult to compare to that of the twentieth century, not to 
mention of the nineteenth or eighteenth centuries.
The unpredictability of diplomatic negotiations and their outcomes is problematic. 
Unpredictability is bad for stable relations between states and is bad for effective 
negotiations. It is up to the diplomat to demonstrate his abilities and to improve 
predictability. In order to do this, the diplomat must be formal and flexible at the same time. 
He or she must maintain relations and continue to work precisely in those instances in 
which the conflicts threaten to become the most serious. Power must be used in situations 
in which states consider themselves inviolable, which calls for great knowledge of the 
dossiers. Diplomats work in extremely complex situations, making it necessary for them 
to have a lot of professionalism and general skills and knowledge. In negotiating, which 
by definition is a paradoxical method because of competitive and cooperative elements at 
the same time, the diplomat is confronted with difficult situations for which an acceptable 
solution must be found.
Diplomats will be inclined to take into account the consequences of their decision 
making in the future: ‘diplomats involved in international bargaining are almost always less 
concerned about the issue immediately at hand than about the impact of the settlement 
on resolving future issues’ (Ray, 1998: 143). Furthermore they ‘are anxious to avoid giving 
the impression that they make concessions easily’ (Ray, 1998: 145). Daniel Druckman 
highlights this problem by making a distinction between settlement and resolution: 
‘the former emphasizes getting deals; the latter promotes longer term relationships’ 
(Druckman, 2013a: 201). Seen from this perspective, diplomatic negotiation is still a useful 
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CHAPTER III: PROCESS AND CONTEXT
This chapter will deal with the context of the diplomatic negotiation process, not only 
because of its impact on the start, the flow and the closure of the process, but also 
because of its function in enhancing the utility of diplomatic negotiation in comparison 
to other instruments of conflict resolution. The chapter will first focus on the boundaries 
of negotiation as a function to channel the process in the desired direction. The role of 
six boundaries will be analyzed: geography; system; needs; resources; regulators; and 
time. The second part of the chapter will study negotiation as a tool to provide order to 
international relations and the role of regimes therein.
Trying to understand a negotiation process without its context is not helpful in 
explaining what happens, why and when. Despite this, most negotiation literature tends 
to focus exclusively either on procedure and process, parties and people, or positions 
and products. Of course, to take the environment of these phenomena into account 
complicates matters, touching, as it does, on the tension between vertical and horizontal 
research. If one digs into the vertical axis, it is difficult to include much of its horizontal 
context. The same dilemma is faced in negotiation itself, with the risk of the in-depth 
working groups installed in order to bargain on a given issue losing touch with related 
questions that are being dealt with in other committees. A good compromise might be 
reached, but the trade-offs will not necessarily be used. So-called package-dealing 
cannot be done and optimality will not materialize.
The famous Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, already referred to in chapter I, stated that 
strategy is to change a situation in such a way that it will be ripe for victory (Chung, 
1991: 12). In other words, you cannot solve a problem without changing its context. 
He meant that conflicts arise out of a certain situation and can thereby not be solved 
unless one tackles the environment producing the problem. In negotiation terms, this 
would mean that not everything is negotiable right from the start. In order to reach a 
solution, one might have to modify the context and thereby create the conditions needed 
to start the process of exploration, bargaining and deciding. The idea of the ‘mutual 
hurting stalemate’ might be of some help in timing the conditions for negotiations to start, 
since getting the people around the table is often the hardest challenge we face, but it is 
not applicable in every cultural context. However, the hypothesis that one has to suffer in 
order to understand that change is necessary may well be a typically Western rationalist 
notion. There are cultures, for instance, where suffering is the highest good. The hero is 
the one who suffers. In such a cultural context, suffering is more likely to aggravate the 
problem of negotiation than to resolve it.
Structural power asymmetry no longer guarantees victory (if indeed it ever did). 
Nowadays, the weak have missiles and, if needed, use the adversary’s planes to destroy 
the towers of the mighty, although 9/11 seems to be an extraordinary ‘accident of history’. 
One might turn the reasoning upside down: in the new millennium, it is easier to control 
a state that is well structured than to dominate a failed state, because there is nothing fit 
for control. Somalia is out of control, for example, and the world’s most modern warships 
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cannot put an end to piracy by tiny boats. To win a conventional war in Iraq was not much 
of a problem, but to control the country after the state’s structures broke down, that was 
a problem. To chase the Taliban out of Kabul has not been too difficult, but who will be 
the winner in Afghanistan in the end? What has long been recommended but constantly 
neglected is now finally going to happen: serious talks with the Taliban about power-
sharing.
The more unstructured the opponents, the more difficult they are to control. In 
negotiation, this can be both a problem and an opportunity. To be ambivalent until the very 
end comes with the risk of failing to reach any agreement, but to remain ambiguous during 
most of the process might be very useful in keeping options open. The more options one 
has, the more alternatives and the more process power can be generated. This is illustrated 
by British negotiation behaviour (Hemery and Meerts, 2006). The British are extremely 
good at keeping their hands free as long as possible, while they consistently work in the 
direction of a ‘fair’ solution, being at least very fair to themselves. They combine flexibility 
in the process and towards the people with toughness in defending their interests. They 
are capable of acting like that because this tenet of behaviour is engrained in their culture 
and language. Some negotiations can only end in agreement if constructive ambiguity is 
involved: parties can interpret the end result in their own way and will therefore agree. 
Depending on the situation, uncertainty can therefore be an asset or a weakness. For the 
weak, it is generally a strength, because it enhances their room for manoeuvre, while it 
restricts the effectiveness of their opponent with more powerful resources.
Weaker parties can be winners if they use the context most favourable to them. A good 
example is the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union. The fact that 
the Greek part of Cyprus wanted to become a member of the European Union was widely 
seen as the only incentive to be used to reunify the Greek and Turkish parts of the island. 
The Turkish Cypriots seemed to be ready for unification, as the referendum in 2004 on a 
UN-sponsored solution showed (https://www.cyprus-conflict.net/chronology.html). The 
majority of the Greek Cypriots, however, were not in favour of reconstructing a union with 
their countrymen in the north, but it was hoped that desire to be an EU member would 
wither away the Greek Cypriots’ worries. The EU, for its part, was of the opinion that a 
divided island with a strong military Turkish presence would keep the island unstable and 
might therefore create problems for Europe. The Greek Cypriots in the south were of a 
different opinion, however, as a divided island keeps the Turks out of the government and 
the economy – as the north is poor and the south is rich – while many landowners profit 
from the separation. The Republic of Cyprus used the context to be the winner. It took 
the opportunity of the EU being in an enlargement process with eleven other states as 
well. The Greek Cypriots managed to get their compatriots in Greece to threaten to veto 
enlargement with Central Europe if the EU would not initiate negotiations with Cyprus. 
As Central Europe was – especially for Germany – of much more importance to the EU 
than the accession of Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus could sneak into the Union as a full 
member. The opportunity to reunite Cyprus in a peaceful way was thus lost, affecting not 
only the Cypriots on the island, but also those in the diaspora (Hampson, 2012: 120).
Another example of context change is the European Union itself (Jönsson and 
Elgström, 2005: 1–5). The bilateral French–German relationship of the second half of the 
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century did not foster stability, let alone – to put it 
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mildly – an effective negotiation process for solving their differences. The world wars were 
needed to make the Europeans understand that this bilateral process should become a 
multilateral process, or, even better, supranational. In themselves, these crises were not 
enough to make the European Communities emerge. The threat to Europe’s existence by 
the Soviet Union and the willingness of the Germans to admit responsibility for committing 
the atrocities of the Second World War – combined with an internal balance between 
the United Kingdom, Germany and France on the one hand and the middle and smaller 
powers on the other – made for a context change that allowed negotiation processes to 
be the most effective tool in governance. Context and content became clearly connected, 
thereby optimizing the effectiveness of the policy tool called negotiation. This transnational 
negotiation process shaped the institutions of the European Union, while the institutions 
channelled the processes. In that sense, the European Union might be very much more 
about these processes – bringing together diplomats from different nations in an intense 
ongoing diplomatic negotiation – than about the content. Perhaps the process is of more 
importance than the question of what the end-stage of the European Union will be. It is 
more about the road itself than about the targets envisioned.
The importance of context change for effective governance and negotiation is 
something that was understood long ago by the Swiss. Switzerland is a potentially weak 
country without natural resources, land-locked, with two different religions and four 
languages, which had been one of the poorest European regions in the past, but which is 
today one of Europe’s richest countries. The light, however, is often seen when it is too late. 
During the Paris negotiations in 1919 following the First World War, the French minister 
of trade and industry suggested not occupying the German Rhineland and Saarland, but 
creating a joint regime where the French and Germans would collectively decide on the 
coal and steel in these areas. However, the chief French negotiator, Georges Clemenceau, 
rejected the idea. The minister of trade and industry had a young assistant, whose 
name was Jean Monnet (MacMillan, 2001). Jean Monnet, who became one of the most 
important founding fathers of the European Union, foresaw the disastrous consequences 
of the decision to exclude Germany from the Paris negotiations and to decide to punish 
the Germans in such a way that they would become resentful. He therefore opted for 
cooperation, but he could only successfully push this idea after the Second World War, 
30 years later.
BOUNDARIES IN BARGAINING1
Boundaries help to clarify a concept or object by marking its limitations. Actually, the word 
‘definition’ contains the Latin word for boundary. The first part of this chapter focuses on the 
positive and negative effect of boundaries – meaning limits or constraints – in bargaining 
processes. Boundaries can serve to define, promote and constrain the bargaining process. 
Boundaries are both an obstacle to – and an opportunity for – effective negotiation, and 
This section on ‘Boundaries in Bargaining’ is based on Meerts (2011a).
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thereby to its give-and-take component: bargaining. Negotiation is the broad concept 
of the process of planning, exploring, parking, trading, deciding and implementing in 
situations of opposing and converging interests. While negotiation is the broad process of 
giving something in order to get something, bargaining can be defined as the nucleus of 
this interaction. It is thus the heart of the negotiation process: the phase of compromising 
and compensating, of trading concessions and emotions. These processes of conflict 
management and resolution are not unlimited. They proceed in a distinct setting, a 
recognizable format. This section is about the interconnectedness between process and 
structure, flow and ebbing, river and shore. It focuses on the importance of the context for 
the process and its positive and negative impact.
As already mentioned, a boundary is a constraint and an opportunity in the process. 
Delimitations in negotiation restrict the freedom and flexibility of negotiators, but they can 
also be tools to push things forward. This chapter will distinguish six boundaries:
1. Geographic: borders between states and state entities, the issue of sovereignty;
2. Systemic: the strength of states and international organizations;
3. Needs: the role of interests and positions;
4. Resources: the capacity of people and their tools;
5. Regulators: the significance of rules and regulations, norms and values;
6. Time: short-term versus long-term perspectives and projections.
This analysis departs from the assumption that diplomatic negotiation cannot be a viable 
tool in international relations if it is not channelled in a certain direction by boundaries, 
provided that the positive aspects of boundaries outweigh the negative.
Geography: Bargaining Borders
Borders are not only an important factor in international negotiation processes, but they 
play an important role in organizing the world. They distinguish nation-states from each 
other and they facilitate the proper functioning of representative governments and the 
rule of law (Baudet, 2012: 239). Geographical borders were negotiated in the two classical 
ways to solve a bargaining problem: compromise, or compensation. Compromise in the 
sense of a negotiation focusing on the border and trying to change its course will be 
called micro-border-bargaining here (in the sense that diplomats focused on the border 
and bargained its change). Macro-border-bargaining would be the swapping of whole 
territories and people from one ruler to another, compensating for the loss of one territory 
by gaining another. Swapping people was done between Greece and Turkey after the 
First World War, while India and Pakistan swapped Hindus and Muslims during Partition 
after independence in 1947. There are many examples of land trade-offs, such as the loss 
of Swedish Finland to Russia in 1815, when the Swedes were compensated by being given 
Norway, which had been ripped from Napoleon’s ally Denmark. Another example might be 
newly proclaimed King William I of the Netherlands gaining Belgium and Luxemburg in 1815 
in order to strengthen his country against France, while losing the lands of his ancestors in 
Germany. Interestingly enough, the British hung on to their possessions in Germany until 
the First World War, which led to most interesting dynastic complications (Davies, 2011: 
541–573). The Second World War put an end to this second mode of border bargaining, 
73Chapter III:  Process and Context
although Yalta in 1945 can be seen as the last negotiation when major country-swapping 
was practised. From a negotiation point of view, this limited the range of options available 
to diplomats and those who instructed them. It removed opportunities for integrative  win-
win bargaining and strengthened the tendency to see border negotiations as distributive, 
win–lose processes, or even lose–lose situations, as in the former Yugoslavia.
The border question implicates sovereignty, and the autonomy of the people within 
the delimitations of their territory implies sedentary units, or states. The transition from 
societies of hunters to cattle-herding, to agriculture and craft, and trade in and between 
enlarged settlements like cities, created the prerequisites for states. In the process, more 
or less fixed borders emerged, demarcating the more or less absolute power of the rulers 
over people and palatinates. Within those borders to be bargained, (semi-)sovereign 
blocs came to flourish. Negotiations between these blocs became extremely tough. Unlike 
negotiations on internal matters, when the ruler could always force an outcome if internal 
haggling came to a grinding halt, negotiators were much less in control of external affairs. 
If anything distinguishes national and international negotiation, it is the measure of control 
over the process. While internal bargaining has more assured outcomes, bargaining 
across borders is characterized by less-assured agreements, both in creating an effective 
process and in securing implementation of the promises made to the other party.
Regime-building is to a large extent the answer to enhanced control in bargaining 
across geographic borders (Spector and Zartman, 2003). Perhaps it is not a coincidence 
that the growth of multilateral international organizations in the twentieth century 
is in tandem with the loss of opportunities for boundary swapping and the growth of 
packaging. Package-dealing is a hallmark of multilateralism. To dispense with the tool of 
country-swapping, compensating for territorial losses narrows possibilities for negotiated 
solutions. Package-dealing in a multilateral setting might be a solution. Countries can 
now swap issues instead of land. Rising interdependency implies a loss of sovereignty, 
both inside and outside international regimes. Geographic, and thereby political, 
boundaries are losing their significance in global governance. In the very long run, the 
border problem in bargaining might thereby wither away. Nevertheless, one should not 
be overly optimistic about the possibilities for settling geographic boundary problems 
through negotiation instead of violence, as shown by the annexation of the Crimea by the 
Russian Federation in March 2014. Border wars are less frequent nowadays, but they are 
still looming behind the horizon: ‘Ces guerres frontalières entre régimes jusquici sont peu 
nombreuses, mais leur présence est visible juste en dessous de lhorizon’ (these border 
wars between regimes are by now less frequent, but just behind the horizon they are still 
visible) (Zartman, 2009: 215).
However, geographic and sovereignty borders also had a positive impact on the 
negotiation process. Mandating diplomats has been a more or less transparent process. 
Ambassadors were instructed by the sovereign to negotiate on the external dimension. 
This is now, however, becoming less clear, as a horde of ministries, parliaments, companies, 
trade unions and other pressure groups are mingling in the process of mandating, just 
as national and international spheres are merging. Mandates are often unclear, as they 
are a compromise by themselves. Add to that the progress in means of communication, 
as well as the impact of specialized ministries entering the external bargaining platforms, 
and loss of autonomy for diplomatic negotiators comes to the fore. This in turn might have 
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a negative impact on their ability to be creative in the process and to act in a situational 
manner. As negotiation is context driven, and thereby by definition situational, the 
phasing out of geographic and political borders could have a stifling effect on negotiation 
navigation. This would in turn diminish the effectiveness of negotiators and thereby of 
bargaining as a tool in conflict resolution in global governance. Geographic borders are 
not, however, the only borders in international negotiation processes and the evolvement 
of other delimitations will also have consequences on bargaining. Although there are 
many limitations of a non-geographic nature, only a handful have been selected in this 
analysis, namely systems, interests, resources, regulators and time.
Systems as Boundaries in Bargaining Processes
The structure and dependencies of the international system create obstacles and 
opportunities in bargaining across borders. Intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations, states as well as regions, political parties and private sector companies will 
limit and enhance the opportunity for successful negotiation processes.
An important function of international and supranational organizations is to 
compensate for lack of trust. As has already been pointed out, trust is essential but not 
often assured. Exchanging family members does not work anymore, as royal courts are 
no longer the focal point of modern power structures. Leaving garrisons behind as a 
guarantee for implementation is also no longer done. Military bases nowadays have a 
more external function. The days of the Tatar or Polish garrisons in Moscow are long gone, 
as is the Dutch barrier of fortresses in what is now Belgium against a possible surprise 
attack by the French, which also acted as a control mechanism over the policies of the 
Spanish and Austrian rulers of the Southern Netherlands. International regimes will have 
to do the job instead. They create a more or less tightly-knit grouping of states that, if 
they do not want to live up to their international pledges, will be forced to keep them. Of 
course, if the international organization is weak, it will be less successful than if it carries 
supranational authority. In other words, the more interdependency between states, the 
more an effective negotiation process is needed, and the stronger the international fabric 
has to be.
Political reality, however, cannot be overlooked. Powerful countries cannot easily be 
constrained within the limits of international regimes. It could not be done in 2003–2004 
when the French and Germans violated the three per cent budget limit prescribed by the 
European Monetary Union. Neither did it work when the United Nations Security Council 
could not reach agreement to use military force to overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq 
or Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Yet international regimes do have an important function in 
channelling bargaining processes in such a way that their efficiency and effectiveness 
will be optimized (Spector and Zartman, 2003). Without these organizational boundaries, 
there can be no effective processes, but these limitations also, of course, might have 
negative effects, such as inflexibility through over-bureaucracy.
To take the argument one step further, governments have tried to overcome the 
trust – and partially also the power – imbalances by creating ever-closer cooperation. 
Attempts were made through regular diplomatic bilateral meetings and the first diplomatic 
conferences with more than two parties involved, as well as the foundation of long-lasting 
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conference frameworks, bringing the dimension of time into the picture. Long-term 
stability created opportunities for concession-making on a long-term as well as a short-
term basis, thereby diminishing the prisoner’s dilemma factor in finding common ground 
between opposing short-term interests.
Needs: the role of interests and positions
Parties take positions connected to their needs. These positions will normally be more 
radical than the interests that they have to defend. Depending on the situation, these 
positions will be more or less exaggerated. In ad-hoc bargaining, such as in the bazaar, 
more polarized behaviour can be expected. This will often be a one-time deal with a 
serious shortage of trust and information on both sides. There is also power asymmetry, 
which will have to be dealt with as a boundary to effective negotiation.
The negotiation problem is the fruit of the situation into which it has been born. 
Without changing that context, the problem cannot be solved through bargaining, as it 
will always pop up again until external incentives change its environment. A customer who 
has to choose from several carpet shops has a better power position than the merchants. 
By getting the buyer into the seller’s shop, the context will change, however, in favour 
of the carpet expert, who can now use his ‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’, 
being more beautiful and therefore more expensive rugs. The seller can now deploy his 
strengths, composed of alternative carpets, plus more expertise about the quality and 
price, and more effective bargaining skills.
There is a cultural element here as well. In some cultures, excessive first bids will not 
prevent buyers and sellers from concluding a successful agreement, while in others it 
will. Experience in training diplomats and civil servants, suggest that the perception of 
negotiating parties on process, procedures, positions, power and products (in the sense 
of agreements) is indeed important (Meerts, 2014). Perception determines reality. In some 
cultures, perceptions are important but are open to nuance and change, for example 
through neutral media. In others, perceptions are inflexible and static. People might be 
used to haggling and therefore would not hesitate to use distributive bargaining (and 
indeed may actually enjoy it), while others are accustomed to fixed prices and do not like 
the risk of the give and take (Faure, 2009: 311–314). It should be noted here, however, 
that flexibility in market haggling does not necessarily mean having an open mind-set 
on negotiation processes between states. To the contrary, the reverse situation has been 
observed: the majority of young diplomats from ‘haggling cultures’ have a tendency to 
be very positional/inflexible in inter-state bargaining. Those from cultures where horse-
trading is not part of day-to-day life, and where approaches to negotiation are more 
rational and less emotional, will be inclined to be more relaxed in inter-state processes. 
This is a general statement, of course, and there are many exceptions to the rule (Meerts, 
2014).
Some cultures see concessions as tools that can be used to bridge the gap between 
positions and to move in the direction of uncovering the real needs, thereby finding 
synergy between the parties – and if needs be, to create synergy and Zones of Possible 
Agreements between the actors through trade-offs (Peyton Young, 1994). In other 
cultures, however, a concession might be seen as a pure loss, even if this could be more 
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than compensated for by certain gains. To offer something will be seen as loss of face, 
not in the marketplace, but in a negotiation between states or sovereign units, especially 
if negative emotions rule the game, and hatred and traumas from the past bedevil the 
process. Even if a profit can be made, the parties will renounce it because the gambit is 
emotionally unacceptable, especially to the people in the streets. Culture and character 
can both limit and remove obstacles in bargaining.
There is also, then, the impact of the gap between the needs, and the question of 
how to bridge it in such a way that closure is possible. A wide gap will obviously be a 
barrier to win–win bargaining, whereas a wide zone of overlap between minimum and 
maximum positions will ease the negotiation process. Overlaps are sometimes absent, 
and negotiators have to remove this boundary through trade-offs. A multi-issue process 
might be needed, and perhaps a multi-party interaction as well. Both complexity and 
opportunities will be created on purpose, throwing in new obstacles and new solutions. 
If bargaining is anything, it is a paradox. Solutions create problems and problems open 
windows for outcomes, depending on the linkages between those problems and the 
relationships between the parties struggling with their common and opposing interests. 
In general, longer processes will be needed to overcome complex situations. Interests will 
have to be reframed, and negotiators’ mind-sets will have to be turned over. This takes 
energy, time, and also resources to deal with the bargaining barriers in an effective way.
Resources: Human, Immaterial and Material
Power and influence, as discussed above, are based on available resources. Power and 
influence create boundaries for the weak and remove them for the strong. Yet power and 
influence are not only structural, but also situational. The question is not only what the 
resources are, where they are and who is controlling them, but also how they are dealt 
with in the process needed to go from A to B, and how they are influenced by that process.
Humans, then, pose boundaries and create opportunities (Zartman and Berman, 
1982). Character, culture, expertise, profession, skill, style and non-verbal leaks all 
contribute to a positive or negative flow of the process. The question of the ideal effective 
negotiator is an old problem, but some authors have found some reasonable answers. 
For example, effective negotiators are those who are tough in defending their interests, 
while being flexible in the process. They use power without overdoing it, working on 
the relationship with the other side without coming too close, thus avoiding emotional 
blackmail. For example, parents have all the material resources that children lack, but 
the children are often the more successful negotiators, using the emotional means at 
their disposal. In relationship-dominated bargaining, this will indeed give the emotionally 
skilled negotiator power. In a business-like, more rationalistic process, the relationship 
will be of less importance. Rationale and emotions will either create boundaries or remove 
them, depending on people, the context and their interdependencies.
Immaterial resources were partly dealt with in the paragraph above, but these 
resources are not always tied to individuals. They can also be an integral part of history 
or culture, such as moral obligations, past suffering, or cultures of blaming and shaming. 
These all bring emotional boundaries into play. If the Germans had not accepted their 
wrongdoings in the Second World War, the European Union could not have been so 
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successful. In other words, boundaries to the convergence of material resources could 
only be removed by conceding on the emotional dimension. Without the expression of 
guilt, no business can be done. We see this problem in cases like the Rape of Nanking in 
1937, which has become a tool in the hands of the government of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) against Japan, whenever the political situation demands pushing Japan 
into a corner in order to strengthen China’s bargaining position. This event from the past 
has become a boundary to effective negotiation behaviour for Japan and an opportunity 
for the PRC. The same is true for the atrocities committed against the Armenians by the 
Ottoman Empire in 1915. Non-acceptance of responsibility will be a barrier to Turkey’s EU 
accession and can be used to keep the Turks out of the EU without naming other – more 
painful and important – obstacles.
Material resources will, in general, be a more decisive boundary for the less-powerful 
than immaterial resources. Again, however, the question is to what extent the relationship 
between the bargainers might reverse the power balance between them. We also need 
to answer the question: what are the boundaries to employing structural resources on 
unsuitable terrain? By winning the conventional war in Iraq, for example, the Americans 
changed the situation in favour of those who can swim as a fish in the water of guerrilla 
warfare. So-called ‘salami tactics’ will slice down the potential of the other side. Entrapment 
will undo the effectiveness of many of the structural material resources available. This 
step-by-step process can, according to prospect theory, only be undone by a government 
that does not carry responsibility. Thus French President Charles de Gaulle, not being 
responsible for the French entrapment in Algeria, could start the bargaining process to 
solve the problem. Likewise, US Republicans in the early 1970s could remove the barriers 
against withdrawal from the swamps of Vietnam in which US Democrats had landed the 
United States; just as in the new millennium the Democrats took the United States out of 
their entrapment in Iraq.
A special kind of material resources are natural resources like gas, oil, iron, gold, and 
to a certain extent food and wood. Their ever-growing scarcity will give rise to a multitude 
of bilateral and multilateral negotiation processes of a predominantly distributive nature. 
As availability of these commodities diminishes, the bargaining processes will multiply and 
polarize (Voorhoeve, 2011). The nature of these processes will not be limited to international 
bargaining, but will be characterized as much by trade-offs and compromises between 
regions within countries. This in turn can set internal strife into motion, enhancing the 
two-level dimension of bargaining across borders, and adding to its complexity. This will 
place serious strain on regional and global negotiation systems, to the extent that new, 
innovative forms of bargaining will have to be developed.
Regulators: Law, Procedures, and Diplomatic Norms and Values
Rules and regulations can also be both obstacles and facilitators of effective bargaining. 
The dictum of the Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Sea) by Grotius in 1609 is not by accident 
a Dutch ‘invention’, for the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands needed unrestricted 
usage of the seas in order to dominate them, thereby making as much money – through 
trade and piracy – as possible. Those who are weak need protection through international 
law, while to the strong, the law might be an obstacle. It is interesting to see the 
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changes in the United States’ policy towards the multilateral systems. During the Cold 
War, multilateralism helped the United States to keep the former USSR at bay. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, the multilateral fabric created a constraint to 
the optimal employment of US force against opponents. Therefore an anti-multilateralist 
attitude prevailed during the administration of George Bush Junior (2001–2009), providing 
new opportunities in the short run and creating serious long-term problems. Not being 
able to control the international disasters of the new millennium, while confronted by the 
rise of China as an upcoming superpower – usurping the vacant place of the former Soviet 
Union – President Obama has to steer the United States back into the multilateral system 
in order to restore some kind of balance in world politics, particularly because regional 
powers like Brazil, India and South Africa are now counter-balancing the traditional 
US allies of the European Union and Japan (Layne, 1993 and 2009; Kupchan, 1994 and 
2002; Nye, 2002; and Walt, 2005).
Procedures are important boundaries in inter-state bargaining, regulating the 
behaviour of the parties in such a way that the processes might be successful. In that 
sense, procedures are boundaries creating channels for effective processes, although 
they will also hamper those parties who want to exceed these delimitations for situational 
purposes. It is very much up to chairpersons, secretariats, facilitators, mediators and 
negotiators to deal with procedures in such a way that they will not be a negative 
bureaucratic obstacle, but can be manipulated in favour of a successful outcome. Stop-
the-clock tactics used by negotiators in the framework of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) – renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) in 1994 – are an example of mollifying the procedures in order to 
temper the negative effects of their inflexibility. While the CSCE had to finish work on 
the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975, the clock was stopped in order to allow for extra 
hours of negotiation. Another example, as already mentioned in the first chapter, is the 
incorrect translation of certain wording on the Human Dimension of the Helsinki Final Act 
in order to produce an outcome acceptable for all parties. While the English text allowed 
for criticizing the Soviet Union for human rights violations, the Russian text facilitated 
a defence against such criticism (van der Velden et al., 1976). It allowed the Soviets to 
proclaim that such critique was interference in their domestic affairs.
Diplomatic norms and values regulate negotiation behaviour in order to overcome 
cultural and other differences and to create opportunities for effective flow. Yet outsiders 
might see them as barriers to effective participation in the process, as not being 
acquainted with these prerequisites, they could feel excluded and discriminated against. 
Those who master the diplomatic formula will be more successful than those who do not, 
with French diplomat Talleyrand as a shining and, at the same time, monstrous example 
(as Talleyrand’s name is now also synonymous with diplomatic betrayal). Etiquette made 
diplomatic bargaining fit for those who knew how to observe it and use it – that is, for the 
nobility and the elite of the state (Wicquefort, 1997). It gave the nobility a monopoly on 
negotiation, also because of the money available to them at a time when the function of 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary did not generate any salary.
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The Time Factor
Time in a macro sense has already been touched upon because of the impact that past 
events have on present and prospective bargaining processes. History mirrors itself in the 
future, and the future will reflect on, and reflect back to, the present. For a member state 
of the European Union, upcoming negotiations will throw positive or negative shadows 
over negotiations today. On a positive note, time and the expectations of harmonious 
processes in the future – where counter-concessions are to be expected in order to 
compensate for our gambits of the day – will help negotiators to be more flexible in give-
and-take. Negative expectations, however, perhaps fed by bad experiences in the past, 
will leave negotiators less open to a fruitful bargaining process. A future threat might 
force us to cooperate, while short-term losses might create unwillingness to do so. As said 
earlier, an interesting example over time is the success story of the Confederatio Helvetica. 
Switzerland at first glance hardly appears to be a viable country with its costly agriculture 
and infrastructure, difficult terrain and autarkic people, no abundance of natural resources 
and the absence of seaports, two major religions and four different indigenous languages. 
Such a country, however, can exist because of the time factor: the prospect of poverty 
and loss of autonomy if cooperation is successful. The elite understand that continued 
fighting between elite factions supported by different segments of the population will 
weaken both the country and the grip of the ruling elite on state and society. Therefore 
cooperation should be give priority over competition. We see the same phenomenon, 
though underscored by different structures, in the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1968: 205–219).
In a micro sense, too, time is an important boundary to bargaining. It can have a 
positive and a negative impact on the success of the negotiation process (Haass, 1991). 
A shortage of time will limit the opportunities for finding integrative solutions, and there 
is always a restraint as far as time is concerned. Countries will create time pressure in 
order to reach conclusions; deadlines are needed as the process will otherwise continue 
endlessly. States will wait with major concessions until time is nearly up, thus creating a 
crisis atmosphere. If timing is important, when is the moment ripe for closure? Not too 
early, and not too late, but how can a negotiator be effective in this? We need time for 
pre-negotiation and for post-agreement bargaining. Some negotiators will buy time as 
they need the situation to change before they can bargain a profitable outcome; others 
are in a hurry. Upcoming elections might be a boundary to negotiating outcomes now, or 
they may force opponents to concede hastily, as a new government might not be willing to 
conclude a treaty with them. Negotiators in some cultures feel the absolute need to hurry 
up anyway, while in others, for example, their time horizon is so wide that they can wait 
another 50 years for Taiwan to fall into the cradle of mainland China. Action now might 
diminish the chances for an advantageous outcome later. Some bargainers can still follow 
a negotiation process while seven of them are talking at the same time (poly-chronic); 
others have a need for bargaining on a one-dimensional time level (mono-chronic). These 
different approaches also create opportunities as well as obstacles (Cohen, 1997).
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ORDER THROUGH ORGANIZATION2
The building of international regimes and organizations may be seen as an attempt to 
overcome several boundaries, as discussed above. How can one ensure multilateral order 
in a world where big states dominate medium and small powers, a world where the state 
itself is prone to erosion, where relations between states are shifting, where extreme 
non-state forces are putting enormous pressure on the web of states and the multilateral 
system, and where international law is losing its significance? In other words, how can 
we deal with conflicts resulting from this and how can we navigate within inter-state 
relations? The answer is as old as human history: give and take. Negotiations – nec otium, 
or not to be idle in Latin (Constantinou, 2006) – are a creative act, or action producing 
value, an activity by those who are free to choose their ways, in contrast to those who are 
forced to repeat the same act all the time in order to create quantities instead of qualities: 
‘work’ instead of ‘labour’ (Arendt, 1958).
As noted in the previous chapter, negotiations have been used since time immemorial 
as an instrument to reach goals in situations in which parties strive towards a common 
goal, when at the same time their interests are not exactly running parallel. If these 
interests are strongly opposed, one speaks of a distributive negotiation situation 
(Saner, 2005: 41–63). What one wins, the other loses; parties opt for maximum gain and 
negotiate – if necessary – a compromise. Integrative negotiating is possible, however, in 
a situation where both parties gain more from the negotiations than they lose in what 
was invested, because parties are looking for an optimal outcome (Saner, 2005: 81–104). 
In general, the interests of the parties involved will more or less overlap with each other, 
which determines whether they will give and take in a cooperative or competitive manner. 
In some circumstances there is no question of a direct overlap, but by combining issues 
a common interest can be created. Parties compensate each other’s losses with package 
deals and side-payments, thus ‘log-rolling’ as the process proceeds.
Where negotiating can be defined as ‘to give something, in order to get something’, 
inter-state negotiations add to the sovereignty factor. The consequence of the state 
dimension in negotiation processes is a certain loss of control over the process. Whereas 
an agreement can be enforced by a ‘third party’ in negotiations on a national level, for 
instance through the EU’s Council of Ministers, the problem arises that external pressure 
is not always successful.
Regimes
Robert Keohane denotes regimes simply as ‘devices to make agreements possible’ 
(Keohane, 1989: 111). In his view, they meet the demand for institutionalized multilateral 
consultations as a derivative of international agreements and institutionalism, and are 
created because of the lack of an international framework with enforcement capability 
This section on ‘Order through Organization’ is based on Meerts (2006a), with 
the support of Theo Postma.
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(Keohane, 1983). Another reason for their existence is the high transaction costs for 
successive multilateral agreements. It is cheaper for states to have consultations on 
a permanent basis than constantly have to organize separate conferences. In this 
perspective, governmental and non-governmental organizations act as ‘brokers’ on 
the ‘market’ for international agreements and promote a certain measure of order in 
international relations. Supporters of the regime theory are taking it one step further in 
stating that these types of permanent, multilateral consultation structures (regimes) are 
not only useful, bearing in mind international agreements, but that they also focus on 
implicit or explicit principles, values and codes of conduct. Krasner thus defines regimes 
as ‘a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which expectations converge’ (Krasner, 1983: 1). This would boil down to nothing 
other than a socialization process of sovereign states, which would comprise a sustainable 
added order of international relations.
Some see the development of regimes as a natural evolution of groups of countries 
trying to deal with their differences in a peaceful way. Morgenthau notes: ‘Each of the 
three world wars of the last century and a half was followed by an attempt to establish an 
international Government. The Holy Alliance followed the Napoleonic Wars; the League 
of Nations, the First World War; the United Nations, the Second World War’ (Morgenthau, 
1967: 438). Groom adds ‘[I]t was not until [...] Vienna in 1815 that institutions of the 
modern type emerged. The main political system was the Congress and, later, the Concert 
System, as subsequently modified by the Hague Conferences. At the same time a network 
of functional institutions began to spread’ (Groom, 1988: 11). Another author, Inis Claude, 
also sees the Hague Conferences as a turning point between negotiations where major 
powers are the decisive entities, but where also small powers are an integral part of 
the final decision-making: ‘In contrast to the Congress system, the Hague Conferences 
included the small powers not only of Europe, but also of Latin America as a matter of 
right’ (Claude, 1964: 25).  This does not mean, however, that all states have equal chances 
in influencing the final agreement. ‘Historical accounts suggest that powerful member 
states determine the policies of international organizations and induce the cooperation of 
weaker members with side-payments’ (Schneider, 2011: 331; Moravcsik, 1991 and 1998).
International organizations may be taken as formally structured international regimes 
that are recognizable as physical entities with head offices, staff and letterheads. 
International regimes like the Ottawa Convention banning landmines may exist without 
any organizational structure. Some authors postulate that international organizations 
come into being through the intervention of a supreme power and are not more than the 
institutionalization of existing power structures. As long as the international organization 
serves the interests of a supreme power, it continues to exist; when this is no longer 
the case, international organizations will disappear (Mearsheimer, 2001). Furthermore, 
the international organization will change or even disappear when the underlying power 
structure changes considerably (Strange, 1983). According to this view, the orderly effect 
of international organizations is therefore restricted and only as lasting as the international 
power structures themselves.
It is interesting to consider this controversy in the context of time. For example, at 
the beginning of the 1980s, the United States was considered a supreme power past its 
prime, which after the Second World War had created a great number of international 
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organizations in order to guarantee its position of power and to ensure maximum control 
over prospective inter-state negotiations. The field of security, for instance, had the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which would act as a guarantor for European 
security and US supremacy in Western Europe; and at an economic level there were 
the Bretton Woods institutions, which created the preconditions for the United States 
effectively exerting its economic power: free trade; exchange-rate stability; and free 
access to raw materials.
Some saw in these developments proof that the post-war Western negotiation regimes 
were indeed the resultant as well as an instrument for US supremacy to exert its power. 
A changed, more multi-polar power configuration would force regimes into fundamental 
adaptations or even make them disappear. Others stated that the own dynamics of 
negotiation regimes were probably strong enough to survive the shift in the underlying 
power relations, and that years of mutual cooperation between member states should 
have led to converging principles, values and codes of conduct.
Dramatic changes took place, however, in global power structures. The velvet 
revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, created a new world system in which the United States played an 
absolutely dominant role in terms of political, economic and military power. The effects 
of this on international regimes and the channelled flow of negotiations were clearly 
visible. The international trade regime was enforced by moulding the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, in order 
to provide it with a mechanism for settling trade disputes. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank threw themselves into liberalizing the planned economies 
of the former Eastern Bloc countries and raised the Western views on democracy and the 
economy as absolute norms. NATO rapidly recovered from the shock of a disintegrated 
Warsaw Pact and started its new lease of life as a transatlantic organization for collective 
defence, expanding towards the East and throwing itself into out-of-area operations like 
in Kosovo and Afghanistan. There was hope that the United Nations, which had been 
greatly paralyzed during the Cold War by the superpowers’ rivalry, could finally commit 
itself to executing its essential mission: keeping the peace by international cooperation 
and collective security (Langhorne, 1998: 5).
Regimes and Negotiations
Depledge observes that ‘[g]lobal negotiations are often closely associated with the 
formation and development of regimes, defined as sets of both formal and informal 
rules, institutions and procedures aimed at governing action in a particular issue area, 
usually based on a founding treaty’, while ‘an important function performed by regimes is 
precisely to provide an efficient framework for negotiations’ (Depledge, 2005: 13).  On the 
nature of negotiations within regimes, he notes that they:
[…] have a special character. Like all intergovernmental negotiations, they are 
repetitive, but more intensively so, often involving not only the same governments, 
but also the same individuals. [...] The negotiation process within the regime 
typically gives rise to its own set of informal practices and procedures, even 
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its own culture. While such intensively repeated games can provide important 
opportunities for learning and therefore improving ways of negotiating, the flipside 
is the danger of ossification: the negotiation process gets stuck in old ways of 
thinking and doing that drag down substantive progress (Depledge, 2005: 13–14).
Similarly, William Zartman points to the connectedness between negotiation processes 
and international regimes by arguing that ‘international regimes are continuous two-
dimensional negotiations among sovereign states for the purpose of resolving a problem 
of coordination under conditions of uncertainty’ (Zartman, 2003: 14). Zartman sees 
regime-building as an ongoing negotiation.
Like Depledge and Keohane, Zartman believes that ‘the concept of “regime” was 
devised to meet the need for something looser and less rigid than “international law” 
or “international organization”’ (Zartman, 2003: 17), although nowadays an international 
organization is regarded as a highly structured regime mode. Spector and Zartman point 
out that regime building is a painful negotiation process: ‘Fear of relinquishing sovereign 
legal authority is obviously a very serious issue that contrains the evolution of any regime. 
International regimes constitute governing in the absence of government through the 
processes of negotiation’ (Spector and Zartman, 2003: 282).
There is a rich variety of regimes. Spector distinguishes three kinds of national, and 
three kinds of international regime negotiations. On the national level, he identifies: 
(1) acceptance/ratification negotiations; (2) rule-making negotiations and enforcement; 
and (3) monitoring and reporting negotiations. As for international regime negotiations, 
he classifies: (1) regime formation negotiations; (2) regime governance negotiations; 
and (3) regime adjustment negotiations (Spector, 2003: 65–66). Together with Zartman, 
Spector concludes that the following categories of regimes can be observed: those that 
remain more or less in force as originally negotiated; regimes that grow and evolve; and 
regimes that follow a jagged course (Spector and Zartman, 2003: 372). The second kind 
of regime, those that grow and evolve, is seen most frequently in the world.
It is important to recognize that regime and negotiation are symbiotic: while regimes 
are created through national and international negotiation processes, they then protect 
these processes and thereby enhance their effectiveness in reaching outcomes. Moreover, 
‘for the most part, exogenous shocks or crises increase the probability of success in efforts 
to negotiate the terms of international regimes’ (Young, 1989: 371). These outcomes ‘are 
not monocausal events, but rather the product of a multitude of strategic, political and [...] 
psychological factors’ (Terris and Tykocinski, 2014: 14). ‘As in any negotiation, personal 
skills are an important factor in the process, but in the multilateral setting, the context, 
the jargon and the procedures rule the day’ (Perlot, 2014: 27). Nevertheless: ‘Institutional 
bargaining is likely to succeed when effective leadership emerges; it will fail in the absence 
of such leadership’ (Young, 1989: 373).
How structured or how fluid are regimes nowadays? According to Spector and 
Zartman, regimes tend to be more fluid than before: ‘In the early twenty-first century, 
reality tends to lie on the softer end of the spectrum’ (Spector and Zartman, 2003: 292). 
Taking the number of regimes in the world, this statement is true for sure, especially 
after the present-day erosion of the multilateral system through unilateral action. Yet if 
one divides regimes into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, ‘important’ and ‘less important’, or looks at 
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strength and effectiveness, the world might look very different. Regimes with most added 
value are normally more structured than those of a more fluid nature. In other words, more 
‘regimist ’ regimes seem to be more structured. As they matter more to the international 
system, one could make the statement that effective regimes in the twenty-first century 
tend to lie on the institutional side of the spectrum.
However, as regimes’ effectiveness seems to be dependent on their flexibility, one 
should add that effective regimes are highly structured institutions that are managed 
through fluid processes. If the processes become less fluid and more bureaucratic, as 
tends to be the case with successful regimes (which therefore have a long life-span 
in general), ‘regimist ’ regimes might hamper their own success in the long run, just as 
diseases tend to affect a body more as it grows older and older. The fluidity of the process 
is even more important if one looks at the political dimensions of the regime. According to 
high-ranking German diplomat Michael Schäfer:
Negotiations are the art of consensus-building, and the more political the subject 
matter is, the less formal the formats of the negotiation process will be to prepare 
for the best possible outcome. Why? Because of the heterogeneity of the various 
interests involved in that process (Hanschel, 2005).
Shifts in Multilateralism
In less than twenty years, the United States’ position on the world stage changed 
from a superpower past its prime in the Western world to the sole global superpower, 
although this monopolarity is already eroding into multipolarity in the second decade 
of the twenty-first century. In a slightly different form, the issue of being able to bring 
order in international negotiation regimes is more than ever of current interest (Van 
Staden, 2005). The problem has become the incomparably large dominance of the 
United States in international relations. Has the United States become too big for its self-
selected existing order of multilateral negotiation regimes? The foreign policy pursued 
by the George W. Bush administration points very strongly in that direction. The Bush 
administration’s willingness for military intervention when US national security was 
supposed to be at stake, without even a mandate from the UN Security Council, the sudden 
withdrawal of all support for the implementation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 
the US Senate’s refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
the US refusal to accede to the Statute of Rome on the creation of the International 
Criminal Court, and the neutralization – for example through the North American Free-
Trade Association (NAFTA) – of multilateral WTO agreements by ‘voluntary’ bilateral 
covenants with trading partners, all of these attitudes indicate that the way in which the 
United States lets unilateral action prevail over multilateral solutions was on the increase. 
In other words, in the first decade of the new millennium, the multilateral order became 
more of an obstacle than a transmission channel for pursuing US national interests, or, as 
Peter van Ham comments, ‘all in all the United States seem to have come to the conclusion 
that they no longer can afford the luxury of unadulterated multilateralism. […] The existing 
international order was established to manage the Cold War, not to take al-Qaida for a 
ride’ (Van Ham, 2004).
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After the Bush administrations’ interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, President 
Obama changed the United States’ course, as he saw that the dismantlement of the 
current multilateral order is not in the ultimate interest of the United States. Washington 
is aware that the collateral damage of a one-sided action can take a turn for the worst 
regarding national interests in the long run. Multilateral approval and support for US 
actions therefore remains advisable, if only for pragmatic reasons. Even if the United 
States puts aside the question of legality, the question of legitimacy remains an important 
consideration. The (neo-)realists’ point of view subsequently dictates that, for this reason 
only, it is not in US interests to blow up the multilateral order.
It therefore seems that the multilateral order has its own dynamics at its disposal and 
that it plays an enduring role in regulating present international negotiation processes. 
Unfortunately for the US regime’s thinkers, these dynamics do not emanate from 
converging implicit or explicit values, principles and codes of conduct, but from a (neo)-
realistic strategic perception of the national interests of the United States.
The United States’ position of power is in itself neither a positive nor a negative factor 
for the institutions that form the international processes of negotiation. The question 
is much more about whether these institutions include or exclude the supreme power 
(Meerts, 2004). To speak in terms of negotiating, are the institutions being integrative or 
distributive? The so-called BRICS are on the rise (Brazil, Russia, India, China and, to some 
extent, South Africa). They demand power-sharing with the United States and Europe, 
both inside and outside the United Nations Security Council.
But apart from a potential multi-polar supremacy of six countries plus the European 
Union – with Germany, France and the United Kingdom as the EU’s main powers – we 
live in a world of increasing mutual dependency, with a natural tendency in the direction 
of regime-building in order to reach more predictable negotiation results. The more that 
negotiation processes are embedded in strong international structures, the more stable 
they will be and the greater the chance of assured outcomes, guaranteed outcomes. 
With regard to the evolution of negotiation processes, it is clear that the disruption of 
the international order will erode the effectiveness of negotiating as a means of settling 
conflicts. The processes will increasingly lead to successful results in fewer cases, but the 
negotiation process as such is certainly here to stay.
Indeed, the more fragmented the international system, the stronger the need for 
negotiating as a bridging mechanism. Negotiating processes will have to compensate for 
the weakness of the structure. This is not ideal, because negotiations are more fragile as 
an instrument if they lack being embedded institutionally.
Coping with Challenges
New international orders often come into being after man-made disasters. The world 
apparently needed a first and a second world war in order to finally create global political 
organizations: the League of Nations and the United Nations, respectively. The Cold War 
gave rise to NATO and Warsaw Pact. Meanwhile, German–French animosity needed three 
wars before it was understood that a problem cannot be solved on the level that it arises, 
so the European Union was created.
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As soon as a major threat arises, regimes are put in place. The more serious the 
challenge, the more willingness there is to invest in dealing with it, but if and only if the 
threatened party cannot deal with it on its own and needs allies, and moreover if an ad-
hoc alliance cannot be the answer and an institutionalized structure is needed. If the party 
under threat is strong enough to deal with the issue, regime formation is not needed and 
will actually hamper the room for manoeuvre of the state involved so that an effective 
negotiation process cannot be expected to take place (Zartman and Rubin, 2000a).
New challenges might put life into existing organizations that never really got off 
the ground or that lost their significance. The need for peacekeeping operations led by 
countries in the region itself thus vitalized the Organization of African Unity, now the 
African Union (AU). The need for security, stability, protection of human rights and the 
emergence of new democratic systems gave new meaning to the earlier-mentioned 
CSCE, now the OSCE. But how effective are these regimes in comparison to the needs 
of the international community? How effective are new institutions such as the Yugoslav 
Tribunal and the International Criminal Court? They want to move from peace to justice, 
but peace versus justice is often the problem (Zartman and Kremenyuk, 2005) and there 
is not enough external and/or internal pressure to start a ‘common project’, to establish a 
regime that is strong enough to cope with the challenge.
Although many techniques have been developed in order to get regimes to deal with 
problems effectively, for example in the European Union (Meerts, 2004), they can hardly 
be successful if the major powers within and outside the regime want to handle regime 
change unilaterally, bilaterally, or trilaterally, or indeed outside the existing regime(s), as 
the restraints of the regime might block an effective ‘Alleingang’ (going it alone). Here 
we have the paradox that rules and regulations, and institutions and vested interests, 
strengthen the capability of a regime to cope with problems. This creates a bargaining 
platform, but at the same time it restricts the bargaining range and freedom of the more 
powerful states. They will therefore work in the spirit of negotiation, being a context-
dependent process, by acting in a situational way. This might then be favourable for some 
parties involved, but it can be disastrous for the common good. In the European Union, 
this is the classical dilemma of full or partial integration of new member states; in the 
United Nations Framework Treaty on Climate Change and the World Trade Organization, 
it is about short-term over long-term interests.
In other words, the constraints to having adaptable and effective regimes are of both 
an internal and an external nature. Internal delimitations are often difficult to handle if 
outside pressure is lacking. This is not so much an issue of a ‘mutual hurting stalemate’, 
but of lack of ‘painful pressure from outside’ (PPO). Perhaps this was comfortable hurting 
pressure from outside, which is what kept the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
together. When the Cold War was over, this pressure fell and so did Yugoslavia. PPO can, 
of course, be created by the regime itself, as with Indonesia’s regime, which sought to 
strengthen its internal position by seeking the ‘konfrontasi ’ (confrontation) with Malaysia 
from 1963–1966, and like the Soviet Union and United States, which gained more control 
over their allies in the Warsaw Pact and NATO, respectively, by overplaying the external 
threat. Both regimes flourished in this way, as a regime at least, but somebody of course 
had to pay for this – the civilians of the particular regime’s member states. NATO hardly 
survived the end of the East–West confrontation and the Warsaw Pact died on the spot, 
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yet with the regimes gone or destroyed, instability entered the European theatre (Davies, 
1996).
Negotiation processes within the regimes – a regime’s lifeblood, it has been said – are 
quite defenceless without their cover. Like a turtle, the process of international negotiation 
is a peaceful, but slow animal. It needs the shell of the regime to survive, or at least to be 
effective and sustainable. At the same time, the shell is a heavy burden that slows down 
the turtle even further, with the turtle thereby losing its relevance and perhaps being trod 
upon. If the shell is hard enough, however, the animal will survive and can wait for a better 
future.
Possible Future Developments
So what about that future, let us say the first half of the twenty-first century? From a 
political point of view, it will be impossible to calculate the evolution of international 
regimes as international organizations if national regimes in the form of the sovereign 
states are overlooked. The central question seems to revolve around the extent to which 
(member) states need each other in order to expect further regime growth.
As centuries pass by and violence becomes a more costly affair, one can observe an 
evolution in regimes in the sense of their international organization and cooperation. In 
general, regimes become more complex and more effective, although the one does not 
always favour the other. Interdependency fosters regime-building, but because it removes 
stimuli (threats), it also puts the brakes on.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there does not seem to be much room 
for optimism as far as the further growth of international regimes is concerned. The 
present distribution of power among states, which still continue to prioritize sovereignty 
over international cooperation and international organization, works against further 
regime-building. Some kind of equilibrium – whether mutual assured destruction or risk 
management, a Concert of Europe approach or a well-understood balance of interests 
(Dupont, 2003) – seems to be needed to create the cradle in which the international 
regime can grow old and flourish. So we cannot expect too much from regimes as long as 
a new balance between major regimes has not been established, and this might take the 
whole first half of the twenty-first century.
Strengthening regimes in the coming 50 years will only be possible if states not 
only focus on structured international cooperation and multilateral bargaining, but also 
prioritize ad-hoc negotiation processes and bilateral bargaining. Multilateralism does 
not work without bilateralism. As negotiations are the life-blood of regimes, so bilateral 
negotiation is the gist and juice in creating a new balance of power among the major 
regimes, whether they are states or international organizations. In other words, we have to 
look at both structured and less-structured modes of cooperation. Negotiation processes 
are fit for both.
Another important point is the level of negotiation. National problems will have to 
be negotiated at the national level. This seems self-evident, but in the European Union 
in particular, problems are shifted to inappropriate levels. Governments tend to get rid 
of difficult issues by pushing them to higher levels, then blaming ‘Brussels’ for not being 
effective (see chapter XI).
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Inclusiveness is also important. The OSCE is a good example of regional inclusiveness, 
both for issues and for countries. Again, inclusiveness might give rise to opportunities 
(such as trade-offs and multiple outcomes) and to problems (such as complexity). 
William Bottom gives an example of the disastrous consequences of exclusion at Versailles 
(Bottom, 2003), while Dupont shows both the importance of including the major players 
and excluding the minor ones in Vienna in 1814–1815 (Dupont, 2003).
We should keep in mind, however, that:
Regimes may assume a life of their own, a life independent of the basic causal factors 
that led to their creation in the first place. There is not always congruity between 
underlying power capabilities, regimes, and related behaviour and outcomes. 
Principles, norms, and procedures may not conform with the preferences of the 
most powerful states. Ultimate state power and interests condition both regime 
structures and related behaviour, but there may be a wide area of leeway (Krasner, 
1983: 357).
In Conclusion
Some positive and negative effects of boundaries and beyond have been dealt with in this 
chapter. The first part identified some aspects of process and context connectedness, 
concluding that bargaining is a viable alternative to warfare and other tools of conflict 
management, but that it can only be effective if it is set within certain limits. Without 
boundaries, there can be no effective bargaining. These processes can flourish in a world 
of carved-up states, structured by systems, squeezed between common and opposing 
interests, on the basis of human and other resources, regulated by law and mores, and 
operating under variable time constraints. This is the positive side of the coin – without 
this, the process will not work.
However, boundaries also pose problems. Geographic limits can be an obstacle 
to effective cooperation, which is why we try to let geographic and other boundaries 
evaporate in the European Union. Systems might exclude potential partners, and radically 
opposing interests create intractability. Governments and their representatives are 
often unwilling to negotiate because of the past, present and their vision of the future. 
Regulations can strangle creativity. Bargaining takes time; if not enough time is allowed 
for the process, it will falter or at least give sub-optimal outcomes. Yet these are the 
negative situational effects of a structural ingredient that we defined as a prerequisite 
for bargaining processes: boundaries. In other words, without limitations we cannot have 
negotiations, but we have to undo the negative aspects of them. Without nerves there is 
no happiness in life, but these same nerves can unleash pain that we would prefer to avoid 
as much as possible.
In order to balance the negative aspects of boundaries, regimes built networks in 
order to cut across the frontiers between them:
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Government networks promote convergence of national law, regulations, and 
institutions in ways that facilitate the movement of people, goods, and money 
across borders; that assure a high and increasingly uniform level of protection and 
legal rights; and that guarantee the cross-fertilization of ideas and approaches to 
common governance problems. That cross-fertilization, in turn, may in some cases 
produce competition among competing standards. It also makes possible informed 
divergence, where national regulators, legislators, or judges deliberately proclaim 
and preserve national law, rule, principle, or tradition in the face of countervailing 
global trends (Slaughter, 2004: 213).
As bargaining is an evolutionary process, boundaries will change with it. Context has 
a huge impact on the processes within its domain, but the processes will influence its 
environment as well. Just as the river erodes the mountain slopes, the process will change 
its context. In the short run, context seems to be the dominant feature, but in the long run 
the process will modify its own context. It is, in other words, a question of give-and-take 
between process and context.
Bargaining is another dimension, like negotiating a difficult road. Understanding this 
two-fold process of evolution is the real challenge. How did political processes create 
the state structures in which we are living, and to what extent do states and international 
organizations shape the processes that will have to take us from A to B? Clearly, this goes 
beyond the boundaries of bargaining, but it is important to state that process and context 
deserve equal attention because of the way they are intertwined. Only by studying them 
in connection with each other might we gain some insight into the role of bargaining and 
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CHAPTER IV: ENTRAPMENT IN 
NEGOTIATION
Entrapment in international negotiations is a form of escalation (Faure, 2003: 190) whereby 
parties involved in an interactive, non-violent decision-making process with others 
with whom they have both common and conflicting interests find themselves unable 
to escape from the costs and investments that they have already made. Brockner and 
Rubin define entrapment as a decision-making process in which individuals strengthen 
their commitment to a previously chosen, although failing, course of action to justify or 
recover their prior investments (Brockner and Rubin, 1985: 5). This chapter addresses 
entrapment in international negotiations, and focuses on the behaviour of states when 
they attempt to reconcile divergent interests in situations in which common ground is 
scarce and control is difficult. As a form of escalation, entrapment can be a transitive (that 
is, initiated) or intransitive (that is, phenomenal) process, although these two types are 
dealt with together as they are not always easy to keep apart in practice, and they share 
similar characteristics.
Entrapment in the context of international negotiations is one of the most fascinating 
and destructive of negotiation processes. A party that is entrapped (or that entraps 
itself) is in an unenviable position. For individuals who find themselves entrapped, the 
consequences can be serious in the sense that they lose out on a deal that they had 
hoped to achieve. For organizations or countries, the effects can be disastrous. Whole 
international systems can become entrapped, and the consequences of such a situation 
often run out of control. An example of this is the global situation during the period of 
US–Soviet confrontation from 1950 to 1990. The ‘Cold War’ is simply a short-hand way 
of describing the entrapment of the two superpowers at the time, which were caught in 
a ‘Balance of Terror’ (Schelling, 1963: 239). Nuclear power led the protagonists into the 
trap, and because of the global nature of the force involved, the whole world was caught 
in that trap. Albeit on a regional rather than a global scale, the same kinds of mechanism 
can be seen in the nuclear and conventional arms races between countries such as India 
and Pakistan.
Entrapment does not only occur in polarized situations. It happens in the European 
Union as well: ‘once Member States have committed themselves to a particular set of 
norms and/or policy course, they are likely to find themselves entrapped, constrained to 
take further actions that do not reflect their original intentions and/or current preferences’ 
(Frank Schimmelfennig, as cited in Thomas, 2009: 343–344). Daniel Thomas adds to this 
that ‘entrapment is most likely to occur when several conditions are met’, namely when 
actors are determined about the course to follow, if policy commitments have already 
been made, if external conditions are in line with those policy commitments, and where 
there is strong pressure to comply and public attention is significant (Thomas, 2009: 344–
245). In other words, entrapment is a process that limits the freedom to act. It can occur 
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in any negotiation process, although – as will be seen hereafter – more conditions than 
those mentioned here will enhance the risk of being entrapped.
The essence of entrapment is that even though one or more of the parties may not 
like the agreement towards which they seem to be moving, they find it extremely difficult 
to extricate themselves from the process. Entrapment occurs when the shape of the 
negotiation process is like a gorge that has a wide entrance, but that slowly but surely 
becomes narrower and narrower. One or more of the parties are left with increasingly 
less room for manoeuvre, so that at a certain point they can no longer turn back and are 
forced to work towards an agreement that they are finding less and less attractive. Even 
when they can still turn back, entrapped parties are often compelled to continue, just 
like gamblers who are very much aware that they are losing but want to recover some of 
the losses that they have already suffered. When individuals or groups find themselves in 
this situation, an appropriate response is pity. However, when it happens to countries or 
the international system itself, alarm bells should really start to ring. Leaders can guide 
a nation into entrapment situations without citizens being aware of it: ‘The apathy of the 
masses and their need for guidance has its counterpart in the leaders’ natural greed for 
power’ (Michels, 1966: 205).
Entrapment is thus a special form of escalation, in which the process itself has 
an enormous impact on the party’s perception of the ‘best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement’ (BATNA) (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 1991). The alternatives are at the same 
time increasingly better and increasingly worse. This chapter first offers an analysis of 
the characteristics of entrapment (choice, uncertainty, investment and repetition), and 
then considers the various levels at which it occurs (personal, interpersonal, national and 
international). It then turns to examining the major factors involved (planning, information, 
communication and control), and to presenting and analyzing a case study that is suitable 
for teaching negotiators about entrapment, and will draw appropriate lessons from it. 




Entrapment is the result of choices made: not just one or two, but many of them; small, 
step-by-step decisions that result in a step-by-step loss of room for manoeuvre. In 
principle, a party that enters negotiations has complete freedom of choice. (In practice, 
however, this is not always true, and in any event, complete freedom of choice is probably 
an illusion.) Although there may be different degrees of freedom of choice at the start of 
the entrapment processes, some freedom – or at least the perception of a certain degree 
of freedom – is a prerequisite for any negotiations. Brute force cannot be regarded as a 
type of international negotiation; rather, it should be seen as an alternative to negotiation. 
In negotiations, the parties decide on matters jointly, although power is rarely evenly 
balanced.
A dreadful example of entrapment was the treatment of the Jews by the Nazis during 
the holocaust. The Nazis often tried to make Jews responsible for the deportation of other 
Jews. To persuade them to cooperate, the Nazis tried to hide their true intentions until the 
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Jews had been entrapped sufficiently that they could no longer escape from the process. 
The Nazis divided Jewish communities into several groups to whom they gave different 
guarantees of protection. Many of those with the highest degree of protection were willing 
to cooperate in the selection and transportation of their fellow Jews in order to save the 
other echelons. At the same time, these collaborators, who were often well intentioned, 
found themselves in an increasingly difficult position as a result of their collaboration. 
The deeper they became involved in the process, the more difficult it became for them 
to extricate themselves. They believed that negotiation with the Nazis over the fate of 
some of their kinsmen would save the lives of many others by buying time. However, 
to paraphrase the German clergyman Martin Niemöller, first they came and took the 
communists, but I didn’t protest because I wasn’t a communist. Then they came and took 
the trade unionists, but I didn’t protest because I wasn’t a trade unionist. Then they came 
and took the Jews, but I didn’t protest because I wasn’t a Jew. Then they came and they 
took me ... and there was nobody left to protest against that.
The behaviour of these collaborators ensured that the process of the Holocaust could 
proceed smoothly, with minimum effort on the part of the Nazis and with minimum loss 
of time. This meant that the Nazis did not need to use too many resources. Although they 
probably would have been able to force the Jews into the death camps without using 
entrapment techniques, such a move would have reduced their capacity to wage war on 
their military enemies. The Jews – and prisoners of war – were also forced to work for 
the Germans and thus support their captors against their potential protectors, the Allies. 
The Germans tended to use these tactics more in Western Europe (where the situation 
was more transparent and the population less anti-Jewish) than in Central and Eastern 
Europe, where mass killings were often committed. However, as we shall see, entrapment 
tactics were used even in Central and Eastern Europe, as in the city of Vilnius, for example 
(Szur, 1997).
Choosing to embark on a process weakens one’s ability to exit that process. However, 
this particular loss of control may be more than compensated for because participation 
in the process could give you greater control over some matters within the process that 
would otherwise have been beyond your reach. This means that there are two kinds of 
choice: namely, those related to the process; and those related to the situation. To enter 
into an alliance with others entails sharing control over the process and the structures 
that direct this process. Creating greater situational control within the main process and 
within the structures may be a better choice than trying to keep what in theory is absolute 
control, but may actually turn out to be control over nothing. What is decisive is the 
substance of control: for what purpose does a state desire control and freedom of choice? 
If the result is reduced control over a more substantial economy, a state may decide 
to cede absolute control in exchange for less control over a better situation. Leaders 
can decide to force their people into a situation by destroying their alternatives, and so 
deliberately limit choice: for example, ‘He [the general] puts his troops in a position where 
they have no choice but to fight and stay alive’ (Chung, 1991: 12). However, it is important 
to consider to what extent this situation is actually an improvement. One cannot be certain 
that entrapment is not just around the corner, which brings up the question of uncertainty.
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Uncertainty
Uncertainty is a hallmark of any negotiation. Negotiators have a natural tendency to keep 
their hands as free as possible, and thereby to create uncertainty. In the simulation game 
‘Crisis in Yugoslavia’, participants ‘tried to prevent attacks by keeping their positions 
veiled as long as this seemed possible’ (Meerts, 1989: 346). Negotiators start off with 
a lack of knowledge, not only of the other party, but often of their own situation as 
well. Their instructions are often fuzzy, being the result of a bargaining process within 
the bureaucracy. Some diplomats are quite outspoken about this. ‘I never’, wrote 
Lord Malmesbury, ‘received an instruction that was worth reading’ (Nicolson, 1998: 81). 
Negotiators need time before and during the actual negotiations to gather as much 
information as possible, not only about the subject matter, but also about the negotiators 
with whom they have to deal: their skills, style, character and culture, as well as the 
political system and bureaucracy that they represent, and so on. Culture has a decisive 
effect on the question of exploring for information. In some cultures, people shy away 
from a lengthy process of ambiguous reconnaissance, and negotiators want to tackle the 
business ‘straightaway’. In other cultures, the exploration phase is considered essential 
for a proper evaluation of the negotiation situation.
But however much exploration occurs before the process starts, and however much 
time is spent on exploration before the actual bargaining phase, one will not have all the 
information needed until the entire negotiation process has occurred. The negotiation 
process is not a neutral instrument. It has an impact on itself, because complete information 
can only be obtained in a step-by-step sequence. As information is released in small bits, 
this influences the direction of the process as a whole. In other words, to obtain all the 
information required takes time, but time can be dangerous. Time can be manipulated, for 
example, by setting deadlines and thereby forcing the negotiators into taking decisions. 
Without deadlines, international negotiations have a tendency to go on forever. This is 
because certain countries want to make progress on certain problems, but they know 
that the other states will not accept certain proposals unless several months or years of 
negotiations have been invested in them, and so they procrastinate. So much progress 
would not have been made in the European Union, for example, without the deadline of 
the change of the rotating Presidency every six months. It is, of course, possible to exclude 
uncertainty about one’s intentions, as in the ‘chicken game’ (Garnett, 1975: 127). However, 
this might have disastrous consequences.
Conversely, deadlines can be moved or not set. If the situation changes in favour of 
one of the parties, that party may use time to change the balance of power, in which case 
time works in their favour. Without having to make any additional demands, one of the 
parties may manoeuvre itself into a stronger position, and entrap the other side by using 
time as its weapon. Time, often overlooked by the other party, is one of the most effective 
tools in an entrapment strategy. It adds to uncertainty, which makes it one of the elements 
on which negotiators need to focus if they want to avoid (or create) a trap. Negotiators 
need time to be sure about certain points in the negotiations. However, time may also 
create uncertainty: the context may change and the direction in which it is changing may 
be unpredictable.
Uncertainty about the nature of the relationship between the negotiators on the 
two sides can also be used as a tool in entrapment, because the relationship can be 
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manipulated. By creating the impression that you and your opponent have an excellent 
relationship, it is possible to suggest the existence of a degree of trust that is not really 
there. Trust is therefore an element of uncertainty that should be added to the role of time 
management. Negotiators need to examine the negotiation situation closely in order to 
decide whether the other party can be trusted. If one of the parties benefits from breaking 
the relationship, additional measures need to be taken. A good relationship is no longer 
enough and guarantees need to be sought. So-called prisoner’s dilemma games are an 
excellent tool for training negotiators to deal with the matter of trust (Siebe, 1991: 181–185; 
and Hayes, 1991, 365–366).
The more insecure the situation, the more trust is needed and the more difficult it 
is to build up trust. If emotions enter into the proceedings (and trust is, after all, closely 
related to emotion), negative influences may be expected. Positive emotions can reduce 
uncertainty and can therefore lower the chances that a process of entrapment will arise. 
However, positive emotions can also lead to entrapment. If they are absent (that is, if trust 
is low and the relationship is not good), negotiators need to take care not to be trapped. 
They may move slowly and seem indecisive, like Fabius the Procrastinator, who avoided 
joining battle with Hannibal. However, if positive emotions are present, entrapment may 
result for two reasons:
• First, because one side may trust the other without there being good reason to do so;
• Second, because if negotiators within the same team like each other, they may not be 
sufficiently critical of each other’s behaviour, which leads to ‘group think’.
An example of the second was the entrapment of the Dutch during negotiations in 1991 on 
the Maastricht Treaty (Blair, 1999). Negotiators within the Dutch Foreign Ministry’s team 
failed to react to negative signals because they were convinced that their own strategy 
was right and no one within the group dared to criticize the others. Positive emotions may 
thus be dangerous.
The Roman Senate was not happy with Fabius’s procrastination and replaced him 
with two consuls who stormed forward and were – quite literally – trapped at Cannae. 
Hannibal did not really do anything. He just started off with a certain formation, and the 
Romans, through their own push and power, simply entrapped themselves. In this case, 
it was not so much uncertainty that led to entrapment, but the false sense of security 
that arose because the Romans underestimated their enemy, or overestimated their own 
strength. More powerful countries often overestimate themselves, which can lead to their 
entrapment by the weaker party. Uncertainty may give rise to caution, while certainty may 
lead to recklessness and to entrapment. Uncertainty can function as a warning signal and 
is therefore a factor that can help cautious negotiators to avoid entrapment.
Investment
To avoid entrapment, it is therefore important to keep control of the investments. To 
lose track of these may easily lead to entrapment. A party that is losing control of its 
investments may try to regain control with new investments that escalate the investment 
process. If these investments are also lost, entrapment becomes more difficult to avoid. 
To abandon this situation may mean losing invested concessions, and since such a loss 
may be unacceptable on the home front, more investments may have to be made to try to 
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recoup those that have been lost. Huge losses can be sustained during such a process of 
entrapment, but the gradual nature of the process means the magnitude of such losses 
may not become apparent until the mid-game phase, by which time too much has been 
invested to make turning back an option. On the other hand, further investments may lead 
to even greater losses and further entrapment. In this dilemma, a higher authority needs 
to step in to take responsibility for cutting losses. In other words, a General de Gaulle-
type character is needed to call a halt to the spiral of entrapment, but he or she should 
be aware not to become part and parcel of the entrapment process. If this happens, the 
intervention of the Deus ex machina – or unexpected intervention of a new event – might 
create an even more dangerous situation.
Investment in the negotiations may take either material or emotional forms. Negotiators 
are tied to the success or failure of the negotiations: their position, their status, and their 
face are involved. Depending on their cultural backgrounds, this investment of the self 
can be serious to a greater or lesser degree. In many cases, emotional investment is a 
more serious matter than material investment. This is because material investment can 
be viewed with a certain distance, a certain objectivity. Losses are never pleasant, but 
they may be compensated by gains elsewhere. The more senior the officials are, and 
the greater overview and power they possess, the more likely they are to be in a good 
position to compensate for the loss of A by the gain B. If B is more important than A, this 
combination of losses and gains may even be part of a deliberate strategy of gambits. 
Decisions may be taken on a purely business-like basis, even to the extent of ruthlessly 
sacrificing negotiations in one sector to give negotiations in another sector a chance of 
being successful.
However, such a chess game cannot be played easily if emotional investments are at 
stake. People are not flexible in matters such as face and status. ‘People responsible for 
a losing course of action will invest further than those not responsible for prior losses. 
[...] People can become so committed to a position that they will pay more for a monetary 
reward than it is worth’ (Staw and Hoang, 1995: 474). It is not easy to ‘separate the people 
from the problem’, and it is often not desirable to cut the links between the two (Fisher, 
Ury and Patton, 1991). Negotiators are human beings, and like most human beings they 
prefer to win, not lose. This is again very much a cultural matter. To prevent loss of face 
and faith, negotiators are often inclined to invest at a stage at which investment is no 
longer wise. This self-propelling nature of the immaterial side of investment may be of 
greater importance in explaining the dynamics of entrapment processes than the material 
side. The emotional side of investment is more difficult to handle than the material side. 
To keep control of the situation, the negotiators themselves need to be brought under 
control. The way to do this is to send in a person of higher level, if available and willing. 
High-ranking officials are often unwilling to step into an entrapment situation, as they are 
blamed if things go wrong. Moreover, the higher they are in the hierarchy, the deeper they 
fall. High-ranking people are also in a position to shy away from involvement, as they are 
not easily commanded by others.
Much depends, therefore, on the negotiator’s position in the hierarchy of his or her 
organization. If the negotiator has a very senior – or even the most senior – position, 
entrapment is an imminent danger. Who is going to turn the minister around? Who 
dares to contradict the dictator if it means endangering one’s life? The higher the rank 
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of the negotiator directly involved in an entrapped situation, the greater the danger that 
entrapment will escalate. High-ranking politicians who make mistakes will find it difficult 
to acknowledge a mistake out of fear of losing face. They might try to justify themselves 
in order to protect their reputation, which may lead to giving precedence to their personal 
emotional interest over the interest of their country – the phenomenon of entrapping 
themselves through ‘egotiation’, as analyzed in chapter IX. Their advisors and assistants 
might want to correct their superior, but it is doubtful how he or she will respond, as being 
corrected by underlings might imply loss of face as well. The politician’s staff would thus 
not always be happy and willing to correct their leader, as this might have a negative 
impact on their own career. To keep their superior on track is one of their most difficult 
and thankless tasks. They might decide to allow the self-justification to stand as it is and 
abstain from correcting their minister. One reason for this self-justification is the tendency 
to ‘associate persistence [...] with strong leadership’ (Staw and Ross, 1987: 70):
[R]egardless of any need to justify, individuals may also learn that consistency 
in action is a more desirable leadership strategy than experimentation. Such an 
implicit theory of leadership would mean that many individuals would choose to 
remain committed to a dubious course of action simply because the opportunity to 
receive a positive evaluation by others would be greater in the case of consistency 
than with experimentation (Staw and Ross, 1980: 259).
Repetition
Entrapment is made up of a series of incidents. This makes it relatively invisible, and also 
relatively stable. One of the parties (or sometimes both) is devoured, little by little. The first 
move in entrapment is often made by the party that will be trapped, and the entrapment 
occurs through the assertiveness of that party. This is one of the most interesting and 
characteristic features of the entrapment processes: victims are often trapped by their 
own actions. The party that uses the circumstances in which entrapment becomes 
possible often plays a somewhat passive role – rather like a quicksand or gin trap that is 
already there. Victims become increasingly ensnared as a result of their own actions and 
emotions in an intransitive escalation. Each move forward by the victim serves to make 
the trap more effective. Neither the trap nor the trapper need to do much to add to this.
Entrapment may be seen as an escalator moving downward, not upward. In this sense, 
entrapment may be seen as the counterpart of escalation. It shares the step-by-step 
nature of a development in which tension mounts with each successive step up. The crisis 
steadily evolves until an almost inevitable finale. It is a balanced evolution that leads to 
revolutionary consequences. The differences between this and escalation are, however, 
the step-by-step growth of an imbalance in power, and the step-by-step fixation of the 
situation. Entrapment could be defined as a stable process of escalation in which one 
(or more) of the parties systematically loses out as a result of their own actions. The 
growing imbalance of power is channelled into an environment that creates a kind of self-
fulfilling prophecy, a kind of predestined situation. As in escalation, exit options begin to 
disappear, but normally only for one of the two parties; and step-by-step investments are 
increasingly made, but more by one party than the other. It is possible, however, for both 
parties to be entrapped, with the same mediation working on each.
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A prisoner’s dilemma exercise (Meerts 2014, 47-48) has been used to train people to 
understand entrapment. This has been used extensively to confront players with issues 
such as trust, insecurity, implementation, win–win, win–lose, and lose–lose situations, 
and emotional, rational and irrational behaviour. By using real names of countries and 
realistic situations (such as Iran and Azerbaijan negotiating an oil deal, or Mongolia and 
China negotiating a cashmere wool deal), cultural elements can be brought into play as 
well. Depending on how the game develops, it can illustrate either one-sided or mutual 
entrapment. As trust diminishes and emotions rise, an entrapment context is created, 
to which one or both negotiation teams may fall victim. They will win much less than 
they could, and the third party will gain from this lack of cooperation. Again, we see the 
typical hallmark of entrapment: the third party, doing nothing, not present, and unable to 
act or exert power, may win because of the counterproductive actions of the negotiating 
partners.
In this exercise, two negotiation teams decide on the price of oil or other product 
deliveries to a third country. In the first round, the delegations decide on a price without 
being able to negotiate on it. In a second, third, or fourth (etc.) round, parties may 
bargain about the price to be set for the round under consideration. The game master 
can introduce variation by calling for negotiation in only even-numbered rounds, inserting 
a mediator, adding additional negotiators to the actual talks, calling for an international 
conference of all parties, or doubling or tripling the stakes. In a normal game, the parties 
discuss their strategy and tactics and formulate a mandate for one of the team members 
who is sent to meet the envoy of the opposing side. The two negotiate a price, but they 
need to ‘sell’ their results to their own delegation. The delegation then either decides to 
stick to the agreement or to renege on it. Only after they have taken their final decision at 
the end of each round do the teams hear the results.
This creates, of course, the typical insecurity of the prisoner’s dilemma, or a price 
war (Saner 2005, 93-100). Teams are inclined to start in an avoidance manner by setting 
the lowest price on which they cannot be undercut. In a subsequent round, they try to 
negotiate trust and to raise the price for the absent third party. If both raise their prices, 
the third party suffers. If one of the two decides on a lower price than its counterpart in 
the negotiation, that party undercuts the market of the other side and therefore makes 
a good profit. The third party, by choosing the cheapest product, therefore provides that 
product’s party with a relative gain, while the opponent who set too high a price makes a 
relative loss. The losing side normally retaliates by lowering its price at the next step and 
both often end up charging the lowest price possible. They are in a mutually entrapped 
situation, which is beneficial for the consumer country. The producers can only escape 
from the trap by investing in their mutual relationship – that is, by risking a gambit, by 
conceding in the next round, and thereby compensating the side that made a relative loss 
in one of the earlier rounds. In most cases, the teams end up with a relative joint loss. 
In some cases they regain trust and end up well. In exceptional cases, by keeping their 
promises from beginning to end, they do not become trapped in the downward spiral of 
mistrust.
These oil-price exercises are a fine illustration of the impact of successive rounds on 
tendencies towards entrapment. The repetitive character of the rounds raises the tension, 
but the repetition is also a resource. It creates opportunities for doing better and restoring 
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trust, as time is available. Depending on the skills and styles of the negotiators, their 
communication with each other and with their own party is decisive in overcoming the 
tendencies towards entrapment. The game therefore also demonstrates how effective 
negotiation can offer the option to restore trust and escape entrapment. Handling the 
emotional side is an essential factor here. More than the actual relative losses, emotions 
are the difficult factors in the game. People feel betrayed: they are angry and want 
revenge. They end up in an entrapped lose–lose situation. They could escape, but they are 
often unwilling to take the risk. They prefer to punish the other side, and thereby punish 
themselves as well. They know that a good settlement would be good for both sides, but 
they no longer want the other side to benefit. They are prepared to lose providing that the 
other side loses as well. Although they normally start out with full confidence in the other 
party, the structure of the game often leads them into distrust and entrapment that they 
cannot reverse and overcome (Winham and Bovis, 1978; Griessmair and Koeszegi, 2009).
Levels
Intrapersonal
Given that human beings react not only to their environment, but at least as much to their 
inner world, entrapment cannot be seen solely as a contextual development. To adapt 
Marx, to a large extent, the underlying structure determines the super structure. The 
psyche of the negotiator is as important to understanding the mechanics of entrapment 
processes as the factors analyzed in the section on characteristics. The inner world of the 
negotiator can be viewed from many angles, but here we limit them to the question of how 
to deal with the psychological dimension of one’s own behaviour and the actions of the 
other side in the context of the entrapment process in international negotiations.
In psychoanalysis, we need to examine the negotiator’s past to understand part of his 
or her reactions during the process of entrapment. As this process develops and stress 
builds up, personal characteristics start to play an increasingly important role. Matters 
and feelings that lurk in the shadows will appear as higher levels of stress force them 
out into the open. When these become explicit, they affect the entrapment process as 
an important semi-autonomous factor. Furthermore, negotiators themselves spend a 
lot of energy trying to understand the other party, and thereby forget about their own 
psychological processes. If the negotiators are part of the crisis they are bargaining about, 
there is a serious risk that they will be carried away by their own experiences and traumas. 
They become ensnared in their own and their opponents’ psychological frames, and thus 
complicate and exacerbate the entrapment process as it proceeds.
As it is impossible to dig into the psyche of the other negotiator, it is absolutely 
essential to at least investigate the background of one’s opponent and the culture and 
political history of his or her country, while at the same time being aware of one’s own 
culture and experiences, and their impact on one’s own behaviour. Thus, for example, 
it is difficult to judge the negotiation behaviour of Armenians in negotiations with the 
Turks if one is unaware of the genocide that took place in the early twentieth century. 
How could we judge Israel’s negotiation behaviour in talks with Palestinians if we were to 
overlook the Shoah (Holocaust) and the probability that old enmities and sufferings would 
affect negotiations with others who might also be seen as enemies? This shadow of the 
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past, the projection of old images on fresh situations, is quite a common phenomenon in 
international relations, not only in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, but also 
in Western Europe between, say, the French and the Germans, the Irish and the British, 
and so on. Negotiators have to live with these ‘facts of life’, and, since they cannot be 
stamped out, teach themselves how to deal with them.
To observe the behaviour of the opponent is the second tool that negotiators use to 
understand better the motivation and psychological needs of those on the other side of 
the table. Non-verbal behaviour, especially non-verbal leaks, unveils the real intentions 
of the negotiator. However, for a non-expert it is extremely difficult to read non-verbal 
behaviour well (Goodfield, 1999). Behavioural analysis is not sufficient alone and has to 
be supplemented by the background knowledge mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
One may combine both by making good use of the corridors. In the informal talks that 
take place, such as in plenary sessions, both verbal and non-verbal signals should be 
registered. However, informal talks may disclose more about the personality of the other 
negotiator, while in plenary sessions we are probably limited to observations of more 
superficial signals. To probe deeper in informal talks, it is often necessary to open oneself 
up to an extent that could be dangerous during the rest of the negotiations, as it could give 
the other side material that could be used for blackmail purposes. On the other hand, trust 
can only be established by opening oneself up, at least to a degree. This is one of the more 
difficult dilemmas in negotiation processes in general, and in entrapment in particular. 
Openness can work both ways. There are many dreadful examples of negotiators doing 
things to cover up mistakes that, when discovered by the other party, trigger serious 
entrapment processes.
All negotiators view reality through their own spectacles: these are necessary if one is 
to get to grips with reality, but they also shape and colour the situation that one observes. 
‘The moment we want to say who somebody is, our vocabulary leads us astray in saying 
what somebody is [...] with the result that his specific uniqueness escapes us’ (Arendt, 
1958: 181). The greater the gap between oneself and the other negotiator, the greater the 
risk of serious distortion and the greater the risk of miscommunication. Being misled by 
one’s own and the other negotiator’s misperceptions creates an ideal breeding ground for 
entrapment. This leads to the conclusion that one must check negotiators’ understanding 
of their own mandate and the negotiation process. They will also need to check their own 
perceptions, especially in processes that are prone to entrapment, since misperceptions 
are one of the main sources of entrapment and one of the most difficult to eliminate.
Interpersonal
The chemistry between negotiators is one of the factors that determines the failure or 
success of a negotiation. If the personal chemistry is not good, entrapment processes are 
unlikely to occur as a result of the psychological dimension of the process. Negotiators 
who have negative feelings towards their opponents are very careful not to become 
trapped: negotiators are unlikely to be trapped if they feel they cannot trust the other 
party. The paradox of entrapment is that the negotiators need to build trust for the trap 
to work, and since entrapment is not just a question of creating a one-time trap situation, 
trust needs to be implemented in such a way that the other side only starts to mistrust 
the opponent when it is already too late to withdraw. However, since entrapment also 
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very much depends on the situation and the way in which that situation arises, outright 
deception may not be necessary. In addition, the action is mainly undertaken by the 
entrapped party, not the entrapper, yet it is vital that the entrapped side takes the view 
that the only way to escape the trap is to move forward, not to withdraw. It is here that 
the entrapper needs to create certain carrots and sticks with which to entice or goad the 
other party into the trap.
The relationship between the two parties is therefore an important factor. It might 
be argued that if the negotiators know each other well, entrapment would be unlikely to 
occur. After all, ambiguity is an important element in entrapment. However, it could also 
be argued that negotiators who do not know each other well view the other side’s actions 
in a more distant and rational way. They may therefore notice the entrapment signals quite 
early in the process. Those who are emotionally close to the other party, by contrast, may 
overlook the signals of entrapment, since their feelings prevail over their reason. Indeed, 
many entrapment situations occur if there is emotional closeness between the parties. 
Emotional closeness blurs personal views, which have already been shaped by past 
experiences. It is extremely difficult to change one’s focus from what one is accustomed 
to or expects, and to see things differently.
Here we have another paradox in entrapment negotiation. To avoid being entrapped, 
one has to try to understand the other party. It is therefore necessary to keep an eye on 
the psychological make-up both of the other party and of oneself. However, one should 
not become engrossed in this, as it distorts one’s clarity of vision, which can equally 
lead to entrapment. Emotional closeness should therefore be avoided, as it is one of the 
elements in entrapment processes. The closer people work together, the more likely they 
are to become emotionally attached and the more likely they are to become entrapped. 
Hence ‘President Carter ultimately lost faith in the reports of his ‘man-on-the-spot’ in 
Tehran, William Sullivan. But [...] Carter continued to rely on some of Sullivan’s reports 
for some time [...] and [...] did not dispense with a resident ambassador but sent out 
a second one’ (Berridge, 1995: 42). Another example is provided by the Dutch Foreign 
Ministry during the Dutch Presidency of the EU (van den Bos, 2008), when a group of 
diplomats who worked on a draft treaty for the Maastricht meeting knew each other 
well and held the same views about the desired content of the treaty. They turned a deaf 
ear to warnings from the Dutch Permanent Representation in Brussels that the Germans 
would not agree. This ‘groupthink’ led to entrapment. Diplomats are in general quite open 
to signals from the outside world. They have developed a sixth sense about potential 
traps in international relations. Civil servants, however, are often not very sensitive to 
the entrapments of international politics. As civil servants are becoming more important 
as international negotiators and are even taking over the hegemony of the diplomat 
within the EU (Meerts, 1999), entrapment processes may become more frequent and 
more successful in the sphere of international relations. In general, negotiators should 
be open to one another, but in some cases it can be useful to avoid being influenced 
by the people at the other side of the table. The famous Dutch captain of industry, Frits 
Philips, ‘admonished his negotiators not to listen too well to their opponents because by 
listening they would run the risk of being convinced’ (LePoole, 1991: 34). At the same time, 
however, negotiators should be close enough to their opponents to detect certain signals 
that can be used to avoid entrapment.
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National
Systemic factors are also at work. If a society is very individualistic, entrapment in 
negotiation may be less likely, whereas if a society is more collectivist, entrapment may 
occur more often. Geert Hofstede defines individualism as a situation in which people look 
after themselves and their immediate family only (Hofstede, 1980). Collectivism is seen as 
a situation in which people belong to in-groups (families, clans, or organizations), which 
look after the groups in exchange for loyalty. In a collectivist political system, civil servants 
see their ministry as a network of alliances, whereas in an individualistic political system, 
the ministry may be seen as a machine. In an individualistic system, people may be less 
vulnerable to entrapment, as they are less dependent on relationships. In Asian countries, 
which often score high on collectivism, entrapment may therefore occur more frequently 
than in Europe. However, to claim that entrapment is encountered less frequently in 
wealthier countries than in poorer countries would certainly be going too far.
Interpersonal communication depends partly on the systemic environment, and 
that environment differs depending on the society or the ministry in which one lives or 
works. Individuals, however, exercise their own judgment as well, and they can go against 
undercurrents in the system within which they operate. People’s characters also influence 
their interpersonal relationships in an entrapment situation, their norms, their values, 
their life experiences, and, of course, their living conditions. Hofstede also introduced the 
distinction between competitive and cooperative societies, although he used different 
terms (Hofstede, 1980): in competitive societies, the dominant values are achievement 
and success; in cooperative societies, the dominant values are caring for others and 
quality of life. To entrap another party is a competitive, or distributive, activity. We may 
therefore expect entrapment to happen more often in societies in which negotiators take 
a competitive stand. In line with this, we may expect entrapment to be more frequent in 
distributive (that is, win–lose) negotiations than in integrative processes.
International
Entrapment processes occur abundantly in negotiations between states and within 
international organizations such as the UN, the African Union, the EU, or the Association 
of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Entrapment processes in international politics 
often start with serious misjudgements of the intentions of countries that are perceived as 
enemies (Rivera, 1968: 71). The United States became entrapped in Vietnam, just as the 
Soviet Union became entrapped in Afghanistan. ‘[The US was] caught in an intervention 
which cannot be brought to a successful ending [… while being] reluctant to admit defeat’ 
(Frankel, 1969: 232). The consequences of entrapment at the international level are more 
serious than those at the national, interpersonal or intrapersonal levels, but are they more 
likely to occur? Entrapment may be a greater danger at the international level because the 
consequences may easily become out of control. There is no international authority strong 
enough to exert the same degree of control as states can. However, precisely because of 
this lack of control, which can be seen as a sign of less intimate relationships, entrapment 
may occur less often than at other levels. If it is true that entrapment is more likely if 
parties are closer to each other, the lower of the four levels (the personal level) may show 
a higher frequency of entrapment than the higher levels (the national and international 
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levels). Also, if the higher the level and the more serious the consequences to be faced, 
parties may (or at least should) be more vigilant against it.
The consequences of entrapment in international negotiations can be very far-
reaching:
Caught up in the investment that has already been made in some course of action, 
foreign policy decision-makers may find themselves unable to bring to bear the 
kind of rational, dispassionate analysis that is necessary to make wise decisions in 
the throes of international crisis (Rubin, 1991: 224).
Since entrapment may occur less frequently at the international level than at other levels, 
negotiators may be less prepared to deal with it. However, the effect is such that diplomats 
and other negotiators need to be trained to be aware of the phenomenon. If the parties 
decide not to be restrained, international cooperation and control will break down. An 
example may be found in the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
to attack Serbia to gain control of Kosovo. Since the UN Security Council was unwilling to 
agree to such a step, NATO either had to settle to do nothing or decide to circumvent the 
UN. NATO decided to take unilateral action and as a consequence it became entrapped in 
the Kosovo situation. It was only through the use of excessive force that the organization 
managed to destroy the trap (and Serbia in the process).
In international negotiations, as in other negotiations, it is often the more powerful 
party that becomes entrapped through its own actions. Entrapment is a tool of the weaker 
party and a trap for the strong. Guerrilla warfare is based on the same principle. The weaker 
side tries to bog down the stronger party by avoiding direct confrontation, luring the 
stronger party into its web. Numerous examples of this kind of entrapment can be found 
in warfare, such as the weaker Flemish foot soldiers who lured the heavy French cavalry 
into the swamps during the Battle of the Golden Spurs in 1302, or the Mongol horsemen 
who avoided direct confrontation with the heavily armoured European knights during the 
Mongol invasion of Europe in the thirteenth century, but attacked them first with arrows 
until they were so weakened that the lightly armed Mongol horsemen could easily defeat 
them. Weaker parties look for the weak spots of their more powerful opponents and then 
exploit those weaknesses to entrap them. The problem of entrapment at an international 
level is not only the seriousness of the consequences, but also the difficulty of repairing 
the damage done. Once a party has been entrapped, no other mechanisms are available 
to make good the damage, so when more powerful countries entrap smaller ones, there is 
a risk that the smaller countries may not survive.
In multilateral international negotiations an additional problem is that of coalition-
building. Seeking allies does help weaker parties to survive in entrapment situations, but it 
creates more entanglement at the same time, which makes it more difficult to free oneself 
from the spider’s web: ‘[I]f you are representing some group or constituency, it may be 
hard for you to explain sunk costs; once engaged in the negotiations, you may be forced 
to stay longer than you want’ (Raiffa, 1982: 89). At the same time, one’s coalition might 
become more dependable on the other caucus ‘if the no-agreement alternatives of one 
coalition improve, the zone of possible agreement [...] correspondingly shrinks’ (Lax and 
Sebenius, 1994: 182). To steer away from such a situation is more difficult if a whole group 
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of countries is involved, with all their face-losing fears. To step out of the coalition might be 
seen as treason. Such defection is not easily accepted by the more powerful member(s) of 
the group, which will use the resources they have to stop the smaller country that tries to 
withdraw and thereby weaken the allied forces. ‘If an organization has the ability to exact 
a high price for exit, it thereby acquires a powerful defence against one of the member’s 
most potent weapons: the threat of exit’ (Hirschmann, 1972: 96).
Factors
Planning
If there is one way in which a party can save itself from becoming entrapped, it is by carefully 
planning the negotiation in which entrapment may arise. Overall planning, including 
strategy, is probably the best tool by which to avoid entrapment. Overall planning not only 
reveals potential traps, but also indicates potential linkages and opportunities for package 
deals. One of the characteristics of the entrapment process is over-commitment to certain 
issues, which creates blind spots. This problem can be alleviated by incorporating other 
issues: the broader the net, the less likely entrapment is. The greater the number of issues 
that are brought into play, the greater the number of escape routes that are available. 
What are the options in creating a strategy? Looking at the Thomas–Kilmann (Thomas and 
Kilmann, 1974) model of determinants of conflict behaviour, we can distinguish five main 
strategies: competition; accommodation; avoidance; compromise; and collaboration 
(Saner, 1997: 111). In general, parties that employ the first two strategies are more likely 
to become entrapped than parties that use the last two. Since parties may move from 
one strategy to another as the context changes, the Thomas–Kilmann model actually 
provides for sixteen potential strategic paths.
Competition is an effective strategy for a situation in which the stakes are high and 
the competitive party has a power advantage over the opponent. At the same time, the 
interdependence of interests and the quality of the relationship may be relatively limited. 
A competitive strategy may lead to entrapment because the weaker party can use the 
assertiveness of the stronger party to entrap it in a situation in which the best option is 
to go on, moving deeper into swamps that are not yet apparent. In my training groups, 
negotiators often score quite low on competitive behaviour, unless they have experienced 
warlike situations from which they have learned that competitive behaviour leads to the 
resolution of conflicts in ways that, for them at least, are effective. Israelis and Croats, for 
example, score high on competition in the Thomas–Kilmann self-assessment exercise. 
Men tend to score higher on competition as a natural mode of conflict resolution than 
women, but there are exceptions. Women who have to fight for their posts as diplomats 
may score high on competition as an intuitive mode of conflict management. In an Omani 
group, the highest score on competition was achieved by the only woman diplomat.
Accommodation, the converse of competition, may also lead to entrapment. A party 
that continuously appeases the other side quickly finds itself trapped through salami 
tactics applied by the other side. That party will be eaten bit by bit, slice by slice. While 
each slice is digestible, the final result will be disastrous, as the opponent will have gained 
much more than originally foreseen. By focusing on short-term problems, the long-term 
effects remained out of sight.
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In distributive international negotiation processes, the competitive side generally 
wins and the accommodating side generally loses. In this win–lose situation, compromise 
may provide a middle-of-the-road solution. In any event, strategies along the win–
lose dimension run the risk of creating opportunities for entrapment. Accommodation, 
like competition, is one of the strategies that score low in self-assessment exercises. 
Negotiators dislike making concessions; they prefer other modes of conflict resolution. 
Accommodation generally scores higher with women than with men. In some countries, 
accommodation hardly exists as a mode of negotiation: negotiators would rather fail to 
reach agreement than reach an agreement that benefits the other side as well as their own. 
The win–lose axis is very much the emotional dimension in the model. Negative feelings 
towards the other party may lead to competitive (or avoidance) strategies, while positive 
feelings may lead to accommodative (and collaborative) approaches. EU negotiators score 
relatively high on accommodation.
Avoidance can be seen as the start of a collaborative strategy. The avoidance– 
compromise–collaboration axis could be described as the win–win dimension, provided 
the parties are moving from avoidance towards collaboration and not from avoidance to 
competition or accommodation. Avoidance can be seen as the most effective of the anti-
entrapment strategies. However, since action is obviously needed to create a negotiated 
settlement, avoidance is also one of the more powerful anti-negotiation strategies. 
Avoidance is only effective for a while. For example, in recent conflicts, as long as the 
Western allies had air superiority, both Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Slobodan Milosevic of 
Serbia confronted them with an avoidance strategy, preferring to avoid confrontation with 
a stronger enemy than to be defeated in open battle. In that sense, avoidance may be the 
most effective strategy for the entrapping party to adopt, to lure its opponent into the trap 
by withdrawal. In the Thomas–Kilmann exercise used during workshops (Meerts, 2014: 
12–14), men score quite highly on avoidance as a preferred mode to deal with problems. 
In addition, we see that people who have suffered in conflicts also often choose avoidance 
as their main intuitive strategy, as a way to wait for better times and not meanwhile to 
waste resources. Palestinian intellectuals, for instance, score highly on avoidance as a 
preferred mode of behaviour in conflict situations.
Collaboration or cooperation is the hallmark of integrative bargaining, under the 
motto ‘we either sink or swim together’. By integrating values, this approach leads to 
a negotiation result whereby each side wins more than it loses. Collaboration that is 
genuine may be a good strategy with which to counter entrapment. If collaboration is 
competition in disguise, however, entrapment is just around the corner. As compromise 
is halfway between avoidance and collaboration, it may be an ill-balanced strategy. It is 
not as effective a tool against entrapment as avoidance or solid collaboration. It leaves 
open the danger that parties will fall back into competition or accommodation. In the oil-
pricing exercise described above, compromise is a dangerous halfway house on the path 
from avoidance to collaboration. If one of the parties is lured into competitive behaviour, 
a relapse into avoidance, and thus to lose–lose situations, is imminent. Normally, both 
men and women score high on compromise as their natural inclination to deal with 
conflicts. Consequently, by definition, they are not prone to entrapment, but a change 
in circumstances may signal that entrapment is luring. Women often score quite high on 
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collaboration, and it is often their second highest score (in contrast, men’s second highest 
score is avoidance).
Information
An important anti-entrapment tool is information. Staying well informed helps negotiators 
to avoid entrapment; being ill informed increases one’s risk of entrapment. As more 
information trickles in, the entrapped party notices that the trap is tightening, and that 
the swamps (if they have spotted them at all) are actually much more extensive than they 
thought. The pathways through the swamps may be narrower than expected, and more 
information is needed. However, in the negotiation processes, complete information is not 
available. The parties need to enter the process to obtain more information, but in doing so 
they need to realize that entrapment is one of the factors with which they have to reckon. 
In international negotiations, it is even more difficult to collect trustworthy information. 
It is therefore absolutely vital in negotiations with other states to be as well informed 
as possible. As intercultural and other factors add to the fog, reliable information is a 
prerequisite for avoiding entrapment. Besides having good security services, embassies 
can be very useful in helping negotiation teams prepare by providing them with in-depth 
and (hopefully) reliable data. However, it is as important to use the available information 
wisely and in an appropriate manner. As the ‘rogue trader’ who brought down Barings 
Bank in early 1995, Nick Leeson, wrote: ‘The odd thing was that although people were 
aware that the numbers were big, they weren’t as frightened by them as they had been by 
the small numbers’ (Leeson, 1996: 177).
Information, and especially misinformation, can also be used to create entrapment 
situations. As long as the Russian people remained ignorant of how the war in Chechnya 
was proceeding, the danger of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin becoming entrapped 
was relatively slight. In contrast, the United States’ government was entrapped by news 
coverage of the Vietnam War, between North Vietnam and the Vietcong on the one hand, 
and US domestic public opinion on the other. And in the Second World War, the Germans 
used misinformation to trap members of the Dutch resistance in what became known 
as the ‘England Spiel ’ (England Game). Information about possible coalition partners 
in a negotiation, about alternatives, about the strengths and weaknesses of the other 
party, and about the road ahead, is vital to create or avoid entrapment. The Germans 
entrapped their Jewish victims by giving them false information about the concentration 
camps. Pretence is an important element in entrapment, so to be well informed is often 
an effective antidote. However, this antidote works only if the information is credible and 
if it is accepted by the negotiation party. If the negotiation party doubts the accuracy of 
the information, then entrapment will again be imminent. Why, for instance, did Stalin not 
heed the warnings he was given that the Germans were on the verge of attacking the 
Soviet Union?
Communication
This brings us to communication as a strategic device with which to create or avoid 
entrapment. Entrapment may occur through lack of communication, but in general 
communication is a neutral tool that can be used either to create or avoid entrapment. 
The crucial factor, of course, concerns the reliability and quality of the communication. 
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The entrapping party can communicate a willingness to negotiate an agreement that is 
favourable to both parties. By concealing matters that may lead to entrapment and by 
stressing issues and options that may look attractive to the other side, the entrapper can 
try to create a trap. From the point of view of honesty, this can be seen as untrustworthy 
behaviour. In diplomacy, however, such communication is more often the rule than the 
exception. Diplomatic negotiators are inclined to tell the truth, but not the whole truth, and 
by not mentioning certain matters, they construct a partial image of the real situation. They 
know this about each other and are therefore cautious in their communication. Diplomats 
communicate by sending the signals needed to allow the negotiations to progress while 
still keeping their options open as much as possible. This forces diplomatic negotiators 
to know the ‘language’ of diplomacy, to know the ‘codes’, and to be able to decode them.
This caution shown by diplomats in communicating with others is often a major source 
of irritation to people from other professions in which communication is more direct. 
As a result, misunderstandings may occur in negotiations with non-diplomats. Military 
officers, in particular, are often outraged at the ‘fuzziness’ of diplomatic communication. 
Civil servants, too, are less inclined or able to use diplomatic smokescreens. Diplomatic 
ambiguity may lead to entrapment, but diplomats know how to handle it and their patient 
approach often produces dependable outcomes. A civil servant who is more forthcoming 
and seemingly more assertive, on the other hand, may form a prime target for entrapment. 
Viewed in this light, diplomats – with their special mode of communication – are well armed 
against entrapment, whereas other international negotiators may be more prone to walk 
right into the swamps, with disastrous consequences. Since non-diplomats increasingly 
play a major role in international discussions, especially within the EU (Meerts, 1999), 
entrapment may occur more frequently in future negotiations.
By keeping lines of communication open, by creating a good understanding and 
a positive atmosphere between the parties, and by using communication as a tool to 
improve transparency, it may be possible to keep entrapment at bay. After all, entrapment 
only flourishes when mists shroud what is going on. Transparency lifts the mists to reveal 
the swamps ahead and can thus save one of the parties from becoming entrapped. 
As diplomats are (or should be) communicators par excellence, they should be able to 
avoid entrapment or to use it as a defence weapon against non-diplomatic international 
negotiators. Indeed, entrapment is often a tool that they need, as diplomats have to rely 
on words to achieve their goals, unable as they are to use force. Diplomats can certainly 
ask others to use weapons of force, but they themselves must rely on their verbal and 
non-verbal behaviour. Communication is at the heart of their profession, and since they 
have fewer means at their disposal than other professions, they need to resort to those 
strategies that are available to the weak, of which entrapment is one. This implies that 
diplomats are also entrappers par excellence. If this is true, and if diplomats are, indeed, 
likely to be less dominant in international negotiations in the future, we may see a decline 
in the frequency with which entrapment occurs in that context.
Control
Entrapment is a process whereby one party gains control at the expense of the other. To 
create entrapment, a party must therefore aim continuously to gain more control over the 
other side (that is, to change the balance of power in its own favour). Of course, entrapment 
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also creates its own shift of power, in a mixture of transitive and intransitive effects. Once 
the process has started, this shift of power becomes visible. While one side tightens its 
grip on the other (or watches it embroil itself in a situation in which its options diminish), 
the other side senses a loss of control. In entrapment, this shift in control from one side to 
the other is not a zero-sum game. The party that gains the upper hand certainly acquires 
greater control, but an essential part of entrapment is that this increase of power is not 
blatant. The entrapped party loses a great deal of control because of the situation that 
it encounters. In other words, the context itself becomes a controlling device. However, 
this device is only partially in the hands of the entrapper: the entrapper can only control 
the situation up to a point, and does not have full control. The situation itself plays a kind 
of autonomous role in the loss of control by the party being entrapped, which is only 
partly managed by the entrapper, who sometimes is not managing it at all. If this was not 
the case, it would be impossible to explain cases of double entrapment, in which both 
negotiating parties become trapped and no third party can be held responsible (see, for 
example, the oil-pricing dilemma described above).
To avoid entrapment, it is therefore necessary to keep control of the situation, and 
to keep control, it is necessary to have an overall strategy, to be well informed and to 
create transparency through effective communication. But this is not enough. It is easier 
to exercise control if one is well organized. Internal organization is almost a prerequisite 
for external control. Thorough decision-making, minimum goal-setting, threat reduction, 
and accountability for decision processes and outcome (Simonson and Staw, 1992: 421) 
are internal control mechanisms that dampen the risk of entrapment. To keep control, one 
needs to have alternative escape routes in place and to use them if necessary. Control 
can be kept up to date by participating in good coalitions. However, such bandwagons 
also have negative effects on control and may enhance entrapment instead of stopping it, 
as discussed above on entrapment at the international level. If you are weak, ally yourself 
with those who are stronger. Surely, this is one of the central tenets of the EU – or NATO, 
for that matter: have skilled negotiators to exercise control and to use it effectively. To have 
control over the situation is, indeed, a necessary prerequisite to avoid entrapment, but 
power as such is not enough. Power itself can lead to entrapment if you try to control the 
outcome of the negotiations; power used to control the environment of the negotiations 
can lead to entrapment avoidance.
Case Study
Roy Lewicki wrote a very illustrative case on entrapment, ‘The Pacific Oil Company’, which 
effectively conveys the idea to both skilled and unskilled negotiators (Lewicki, 1993: 659–
687). Pacific Oil (in reality, Gulf Oil, for these negotiations apparently actually took place) 
supplies Reliant with a chemical that Reliant uses to manufacture plastics. Some time 
ago, the parties agreed a contract at a price favourable to Pacific. However, the contract 
has to be renewed in two years’ time, and conditions are changing from a seller’s market 
to a buyer’s market. This change in the environment persuades the people at Pacific’s 
Paris office to decide to aim for early renegotiations. Although Pacific’s head office in 
New York seems to like the idea, they issue no explicit mandate to the Paris office to 
reopen negotiations, one reason being that Pacific’s management structure is unclear. 
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Meanwhile Reliant has a pyramidal organizational structure. In the confrontation to come, 
this difference in structures favours Reliant: a more transparent command structure 
always gives a party a clear advantage in conflict situations.
Lesson One: To avoid entrapment, make sure that you have received a clear mandate 
from those who have the legitimate power to issue it and make sure that internal information 
flows and communication are transparent and effective.
Since Pacific was (and always had been) more powerful, the company’s Paris 
negotiators entered the renewal negotiations full of self-confidence. They prepared the 
negotiations carefully, and believed that the talks would be short and deal with only one 
issue, the question of price. They had always been able to convince the other party to 
accept the price they preferred. As a result, they failed to consider the possibility that 
things might be different this time. In planning for only one issue, and being blind to the 
need to create an overall strategy that covered all the elements that could arise during 
the negotiations, they overestimated themselves and underestimated their opponents. 
The whole process became fuzzy, opportunities for package deals went unnoticed, and 
unnecessary concessions were made. Furthermore, time could not be managed, as no 
deadlines were set. And as time worked in favour of Reliant, Reliant’s delaying tactics had 
disastrous consequences for Pacific.
Lesson Two: To avoid entrapment, make sure you have a realistic perception of the 
strength of the other party, develop an overall strategy, and set deadlines.
Right from the start of the negotiations, Pacific was eaten up bit by bit as a result of 
Reliant’s ‘salami tactics’ (Van Houtem, 2010: 114–116). The Pacific people thought that 
they had a good relationship with Reliant, but failed to realize the significance of the fact 
that the Reliant team did not contain people they knew from previous negotiations with 
the company. These new negotiators felt no loyalty towards the Pacific team on account of 
any earlier relationship, and no emotional attachment to Pacific that might hold them back 
in their entrapment strategy and tactics. On the contrary, their attitude towards Pacific 
was actually rather hostile. This situation often occurs when a weaker party feels that it is 
being obliged to accommodate a stronger party. It is interesting to note that in such cases 
the dominant party does not share such negative emotions, having no reason to do so. As 
a result, it often fails to notice the hostile attitude of its opponents and the consequences 
that this may have for the negotiations. When this hostile attitude eventually becomes 
apparent, it often comes as a surprise to the stronger and more successful party and leads 
to cognitive dissonance.
Another relationship issue that played a part in the Pacific–Reliant negotiations was 
the distorted communications between Pacific’s head office in New York and the branch 
office in Paris. New York had not really been following the negotiations and was surprised 
by the bad turn that they took. By the time the bosses became aware of it, it was too late 
to do anything: things had gone too far. The head office may have had a good reason for 
not monitoring the negotiations closely: they had more important things to worry about 
and they wanted to keep their hands clean. However, this meant that they shied away 
from taking responsibility. Paris, for its part, was happy enough not to have to deal with 
‘unnecessary’ intervention by people ‘who don’t know the situation’ in the field: a typical 
embassy–foreign ministry relationship. The problem was made worse because the Paris 
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people were old colleagues and worked very well together. As a result of this excellent 
relationship, they did not criticize each other, which led to unrealistic ‘groupthink’.
Lesson Three: To avoid entrapment, make sure that you check your assumptions about 
relationships, and create good, clear, workable relationships, but avoid becoming too close, 
and avoid the possibility of emotional blackmail.
Before the start of the negotiations, Pacific’s Paris team had received reasonably 
optimistic information from the head office in New York about how the market was 
developing, despite the shift from shortage to abundance of the product they were selling 
to Reliant. They were also told about Pacific’s plans to build its own factory for making 
plastics. This alternative to a deal with Reliant – with Pacific supplying chemicals to its 
own future factory – gave the negotiation team a powerful counterweight to the shift 
in market conditions. However, without consulting the Paris team, Pacific’s head office 
decided to drop the idea of building its own chemical factory, and made this information 
public straightaway. This meant that, at a stroke, they deprived the Paris negotiation 
team of an important means of control. This sort of thing is not uncommon – the lack of 
consultation, the unthinking publication of information, and general ignorance at head 
office about what is going on at the branches. In the overall balance of interests, one set 
of negotiations is often only part of a greater whole. Higher levels may decide to sacrifice 
those negotiations because there are more pressing priorities. They may not bother to 
inform or consult the team involved – they are seen as merely minor executive players. 
Unless those negotiations fit in with their line of thinking, they tend to overlook them. 
Being unimportant, they can be discarded. Moreover, if they consult a minor player, they 
are afraid that this may be interpreted as weakness on their part as a macho decision-
maker.
However, as insignificant as these negotiations may have been to the managers in 
New York, they were nonetheless very important to the negotiators in Paris. The New York 
people were not emotionally attached to the negotiations with Reliant. Their interest was 
purely material. Of course, investments had been made and, of course, they would lose 
something, but they had to set priorities and the Reliant negotiations were not an overriding 
priority. The Paris people, however, had invested their credibility, their face, their energy 
and their self-image in these negotiations. For them, these negotiations were their only 
priority. This meant that they were unable to exit the negotiations and had to bet more 
money to try to recover their losses. They were emotionally trapped and could not turn 
back. Pacific’s headquarters was trapped in material terms, but had enough resources to 
pull out. In the end, Pacific’s boss flew to Paris and used the ‘take it or leave it’ tactic on 
Reliant and Reliant signed the contract. Why? Because it was now so valuable to Reliant 
that by not signing the contract it had more to lose than to win. It no longer had any ‘best 
alternative to the negotiated agreement’. The power relationship had shifted again.
Lesson Four: To escape from entrapment, make sure that you are well represented in 
the power centre of your organization, and take care that those in power see your priority 
as their priority.
To summarize, the Pacific negotiators became entrapped because they had no 
overall and integrated planning, incomplete information, clogged internal and external 
communication, and no control, as they had no power over the negotiation process 
itself or over top-level decision-making. They were therefore unable to select the most 
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attractive options. The situation became more uncertain as the process unfolded. The 
investments mounted and, as long as the final stage could not be reached, the returns 
were virtually nil. Meanwhile, Reliant’s ‘salami tactics’ resulted in delays and a lengthy 
series of concessions. These repeated concessions tended to hide the extent of the losses 
and make them more acceptable. The rule of thumb, ‘whenever you offer a concession, 
ask for one in return’, had not been applied. Emotional factors made it difficult to 
withdraw, interpersonal relationships broke down or lost their function, and even national 
differences may have made matters worse because of communication problems among 
Americans, French and Germans. Finally, the international dimension of the negotiations 
made matters even more difficult to control. The entrapment worked, in the sense that one 
of the parties gained more out of the negotiations than the other. The process could only 
be stopped by an actor who was not closely involved in the negotiations, who intervened 
when the potential agreement had become too valuable for the winning party to lose it. 
Alternatively, this could have been a decision-maker who had been opposed to the action 
of his predecessor and who came to power in a democratic or an undemocratic way, be it 
a new civil president or a military junta.
In Conclusion
Entrapment is a decision-making process whereby individuals escalate their commitment 
to a previously chosen, although failing, course of action to justify or recover previous 
investments. Entrapment is an intransitive process, a process that happens beyond the 
will of the entrapped, and as such is difficult to see in its early stages of development. 
Unfortunately, by the time that entrapment has begun to become apparent, it is often 
too late to escape from it. This is one of the dangers that countries most fear when they 
have to decide on peacekeeping or peace-enforcing matters. Gross violations of human 
rights, refugee flows and media coverage can draw nations, individually or in groups, into 
entrapment processes (Hippel, 2000: 98–100).
The ‘do something’ effect can entrap people, organizations, countries or groups of 
countries (Both, 1995; Kamp, 1998; Cha, 2000; Blandy, 2009; Buergin, 2010; Morin, 2010). 
To avoid entrapment, negotiators should have a clear understanding of their own aims 
and the aims of the other party. To escape from entrapment, a party must regain control 
over the dynamics that operated beyond its control. Through careful and overall planning, 
sufficient information, transparent communication and control over the inner and outer 
environment, it is possible to contain the impetus towards entrapment. In other words, 
to avoid intransitive entrapment calls for careful and forceful negotiation tactics, with 
internal support and external control built up as much as possible, and information and 
communication keeping the actors up to date. Sometimes, too, these actors need to be 
changed: ‘New senior executives are likely to provide a fresh perspective’ (Staw, Barsade 
and Koput, 1997: 140). Exit options are vital to counter entrapment processes (Ross and 
Staw, 1993: 726–728).
Entrapment can also be used in a transitive way, as a deliberate strategy on the part 
of one negotiating party over the other. Entrapment is a powerful option that is open to 
the world’s less powerful countries. Just as in judo, such countries can try to use the more 
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powerful nations’ strength and assertiveness so that those nations become entrapped 
through their own actions. To use entrapment as a transitive strategy, a country should 
plan carefully to create as many smokescreens as possible, while laying bait down at the 
same time. It is not enough just to have a carrot to lure the opponents into a process in 
which a number of traps are carefully hidden along the way. One should also have a stick 
available to narrow down the other side’s options.
As the process unfolds, the opponents’ choices need to be limited, insecurity generated, 
and concessions forced – and this will need to be done repeatedly. The other side needs 
to be driven forward in such a way that, psychologically, it sees the route ahead as the 
most effective way of satisfying its needs. Feelings of guilt may be very useful in forcing 
the other side not to leave the charted course. In the interpersonal sphere, the suggestion 
of a trusting relationship should be created. Care should be taken to arouse no suspicions. 
National characteristics should also be studied and used. For example, the impatience of 
the other side can be very powerful in luring it into an entrapment situation; also, honour 
and fear of losing face are very effective mechanisms. Information should be distorted; 
communication should look more open than it actually is. All of these mechanisms serve 
to strengthen control over the other party’s crises. Although entrapment can, of course, 
be used by powerful countries, it is predominantly a strategy used by the smaller countries 
to compensate for their lack of power.
Yet entrapment within or outside negotiations does not always have to be negative. 
Entrapment can also have a positive side – and not only for the party that introduces it 
into the process. Lack of central control (or lack of push) at the international level can 
easily lead to procrastination, and indecisiveness can easily lead to disaster (although the 
opposite is also true). In situations that require action, but where countries are unwilling 
to act because the costs will be too high, entrapment could very well be the answer, as it 
forces them to act. Natural disasters are a classic example. Investment in combating global 
warming may not be opportune for any individual country, but the collective community of 
states will be entrapped in the long run if it does not take appropriate measures in time.
In the case of the Syrian civil war in the second decade of the twenty-first century, we 
are confronted with an intransitive process: the outside world avoiding entrapment. As a 
consequence of this ‘unentrapment’ the war has dragged on, for there is no exit strategy 
at hand as long as one of the parties does not feel itself to be in a hurting stalemate. 
Exit strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan were made possible by changes in the American 
leadership. US President Obama could develop ‘unentrapment’ by turning the process 
around. Instead of going deeper and deeper into the conflict, he ‘disentrapped’ by pulling 
out little by little: a so-called ‘reverse salami tactic’. This exit strategy turned the process 
upside down by repeating the step-by-step process leading to entrapment in the reverse 
direction. The smoother the process, the less damage is done to the context and parties. 
Patience and time are of the essence. It is like unscrewing a screw: to remove the screw 
one has to stop turning it to the right; the screw must now be turned to the left, but 
carefully, otherwise it could break, with all the negative consequences that the political, 
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CHAPTER V: NEGOTIATION AND 
WARFARE
Warfare and negotiation are two sides of the same coin and, for this reason, negotiation 
may be described as ‘war by peaceful means’ (Meerts 2014b: 4). They are the most 
important instruments in managing conflicts between and inside states. The question is: 
which is the most effective? It is often easier to start a war than to negotiate a conflict. 
Still, negotiating a conflict is more effective, as it avoids personal and material casualties, 
while the costs are negligible. Casualties not only weigh heavily on the present, but also 
constrain the future. Traumas created by warfare do not easily fade away. It might – and 
often does – take centuries before these traumas are overcome. We do not need to go to 
the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa or East Asia to find traces of wars still impacting upon 
the present. For example, when Englishmen meet the French, they sometimes show them 
their right hand as if it draws a bow: a remembrance of the victory of the Black Prince over 
the French King in the fourteenth Century. While negotiation is more effective in the long 
run, it does not mean that it is the best tool in the short term.
While we might prefer peace over war as a more effective way of running the society 
of mankind, it does not necessarily mean that war is the exception and that peace is 
normality:
From the point of view of evolutionary psychology, if war is so universal and 
ubiquitous as has been claimed by advocates of the Universal Human Belligerence 
theorem, the mere fact [of] peace constitutes a problem, and we would have to 
develop a theory of peace as an abnormal, anomalous condition (Dennen, 1994: 
498).
However, we should keep in mind ‘Kant’s principle that no one should do anything in war 
that will make reconciliation impossible’ (Randle, 1973: 501). One way to create ripeness 
for reconciliation is diplomacy. ‘Diplomacy, like war, can be seen as a perennial institution, 
influencing relations between polities throughout history’ (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 
34). According to Jönsson and Aggestam, diplomatic norms and practices can facilitate 
conflict resolution through coexistence and reciprocity, open communication channels and 
shared language, commitments to peace, diplomatic immunities and pacta sund servanda 
(agreements will have to be kept) (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 36–40). They also notice, 
however, that diplomatic norms and practices could complicate conflict resolution because 
of problems of precedence and recognition, too much openness, constructive ambiguity 
and complexity in multilateral and polylateral negotiations (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 
40–46). Furthermore, as Iklé has argued, negotiation can also be used to gain time in 
order to prepare for war, or to stop the other party from going to war until that war is no 
longer an attractive option (Iklé, 1964: 51). Likewise, negotiation can be used to avoid any 
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outcome, following the reasoning that the time is not ripe for conclusion as long as the 
negotiation process is in place – in short, negotiation as deception.
The utility of War and Words
The title of this section on war and words has been inspired by General Sir Rupert Smith’s 
fascinating book The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Smith, 2005). The 
following question comes to the fore: what about the utility of that non-overpowering tool 
that we call ‘negotiation’, or in a more narrow sense ‘bargaining’, in relationship to warfare 
in risky situations, with bargaining here being part of the much more encompassing 
process of – in this case international – negotiation? The other author of interest here is 
the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, with his saying ‘that war is the continuation 
of politics with the admixture of other means’ (Holsti, 1991), which was referred to earlier 
in this thesis.
The idea behind this chapter is to compare warfare and negotiation in the framework 
of inter-state relationships. The chapter therefore looks at the role of the state as actor in 
both the use of violence against other states, as well as peaceful give and take, because 
‘Clausewitz regarded the growth of the modern state as the most significant process 
in history’ (Paret, 1976: 3). If we are in agreement with Clausewitz’s opinion, we might 
add that one of the main issues with which states have to deal are internal and external 
conflicts. The more advanced – in other words ‘modern’ – states are, the more sophisticated 
their conflict mechanisms will have to be. Negotiation processes are probably the most 
frequently used tool of conflict management, and anyway are peaceful, a characteristic 
that they share with facilitation, mediation and adjudication. ‘Negotiating in warfare can 
be used in different ways. An alternative way of reading Clausewitz would be: negotiating 
is the continuation of war with non-violent means’ (Van Es, 1996: 105).
As a mode for conflict prevention, management and resolution, negotiation has 
to compete with – or go hand-in-hand with – the use of force, whether for defence, 
containment, repression, or conquest. What can we say about negotiation and warfare? 
Are the two connected? How did they develop in history, how do they relate to each other, 
and did this connectedness change? What do they have in common, and to what extent 
do they differ? Are they equally effective in dealing with risky situations, or is there more 
risk involved in using one or the other?
This chapter starts with a short review of the evolution of inter-state (‘diplomatic’) 
negotiation and the use of force (‘warfare’). In a second step, the nature and characteristics 
of both conflict mechanisms will be analysed: what is their commonality? Step number three 
focuses on the differences between negotiation and warfare. Which situations are more 
apt for warfare, and which for negotiation? What are the consequences of this? Part four 
deals with the synergy between the two phenomena: whether they go together and if so 
when? In a fifth step, some conclusions are drawn about the utility of negotiation and 
warfare in dangerous international relations.
While the application of military means in conflict situations has been the object of 
study for thousands of years, for example by the aforementioned Sun Tzu (Chung, 1991; 
Handel, 1992; Hanzhang, 1993), the analysis of negotiation processes is a more recent 
phenomenon (Hemmer, Garb, Phillips and Graham, 2006: 129–162). Yet both negotiation 
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and warfare are among the oldest professions in the world (although perhaps not the 
oldest), not only connected as a means of conflict management, but also as a means of 
economic and imperialistic expansion. Trade (negotie in ancient Dutch) and war have 
been twins for ages of human history. It is interesting to note that the leisured class of the 
Roman Empire, the patricians, had two main activities in life: warfare; and negotiation, in 
the sense of trading.
Historical Background
As mentioned in the second part of chapter II, states settled their conflicts first of all 
through violent means. City-states fought over resources, as did nomadic tribes whose 
political structures could be defined as ‘mobile states’. ‘If anything, war was more central 
to the politics of the Amarna period than it has been in modern times’ (David, 2000: 62). 
The ‘Amarna period’ or ‘Amarna age’ is named after the Amarna archive (fourteenth-
century BCE), documenting the diplomatic and military relationships of five major powers 
in the ancient Middle East: Pharaonic Egypt of Ramses II; Hittitian Hatti of Muwatalli; and 
Mesopotamian Babylonia, Assyria and Mittani. Although diplomacy – and thereby inter-
state negotiation – played a role, it was merely a side-effect of military strength, a tool to 
serve successful military policies. In an age of naked power, diplomacy played the role of 
the loincloth, and the power of states was translated into soldiers, not in diplomats. This 
does not mean that diplomacy was overlooked in ancient times. For Sun Tzu it was a very 
useful tool in warfare. ‘He [Sun Tzu] used to make alliances with forces in order to fight 
against a common enemy’ (Hanzhang, 1993: 27).
Yet as far as diplomacy and inter-state negotiation had a role to play, it was subordinate 
to the military effort. It is interesting to note here that in some societies this is even 
true today, because the state has the tendency to define a crisis in the context of its 
means to deal with the problems at hand. If the state is powerful, it will use the means 
available. A strong and technologically advanced army is there to be used. ‘Si vis pacem 
para bellum’ (if you want peace, prepare for war) might in theory lead to the prevention 
of war, as the other side will refrain from an attack, but in practice the temptation to 
use the tools you have is often stronger than the wisdom to refrain from action. Even 
though, Sun Tzu thought ‘it best to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting’ (Hanzhang, 
1993: 21), and rulers through the ages have used peaceful means to implement their 
aggressive objectives. Examples include Louis XIV of France, fighting for the expansion of 
his kingdom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who used peace talks to divide 
his enemies, but resorting to war again as soon as their coalition faltered; and Adolf Hitler 
in 1938 in Munich, who using the mere threat of his army to occupy Czechoslovakia, and 
later Denmark, without a shot being fired.
There is more to be said, however, about the dynamics obstructing the use of peaceful 
means. One element is the security dilemma of risk-taking. ‘Si vis pacem para bellum’ 
expresses the fear of being surprised by the other party, of being unprepared for war. It 
is better not to take the risk of having to rely on peaceful means like negotiation. Having 
a strong army, however, means a higher risk of using it. One step further, it implies the 
preventive use of force in order to prevent the risk of losing your dynastic possessions. In 
the absence of effective diplomatic relations, cooperation could not be sustained, could 
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not perform as a sufficient guarantee against the ‘evil empires’. As words can only function 
in the framework of diplomatic cooperation, they could not hope for an equal footing with 
war. Negotiation could therefore not function as risk insurance; its basis was too feeble, 
trust was lacking, and treason lurked around the corner. In order to prevent the risk of 
being overtaken, preparation for violence was the only means available, with negotiations 
in a supportive role.
Many cultures in our modern world still regard the offer to negotiate as a sign of 
weakness instead of wisdom (Schecter, 1998). Decisions are often made to fight, even if 
the advantages of dialogue are obvious. The state’s face is at risk if hands are reached out 
to the opposite side, which might undermine the country’s credibility, thereby weakening 
its overall position in the region and in the world. Negotiators are sometimes unwilling to 
make a trade-off, even if it is more than obvious that they will gain more in return than they 
will sacrifice, because the loss is more difficult to digest than the fruitfulness of obtaining 
a concession from their opponents. Moreover, if the other side concedes, there must be 
something strange about the situation, so how can we be confident that they are not 
gaining something in secret? It might be a gambit, a bait to catch a bigger fish, or a short-
term loss for long-term gains. The psychological mechanism is entrapment, as analyzed in 
the preceding chapter. According to prospect theory, people – and thus negotiators – will 
take more risks if they are threatened with losing something than if they expect a profit. 
This will result in tying negotiators to downward spirals and investing more and more 
in situations from which they should, rationally speaking, withdraw. Emotions steer 
rationality and the actor, fearing loss of face, works against his or her own interests. The 
more powerful states have more face to protect, and are thus more prone to entrapment 
cycles than smaller states. As already discussed, entrapment can therefore be used as a 
tactical device by weaker powers, both in negotiation and in warfare.
Over the course of the centuries, war became an extremely costly affair and a severe 
risk for a state’s treasury. The relative importance of negotiation as a cost-effective 
means of settling conflicts therefore slowly came to the fore. One of the first diplomats 
to understand this, as illustrated in chapter VII, was the famous and notorious French 
ambassador Talleyrand. Confronted with the defeat of Napoleon and having to rescue 
France from oblivion, Talleyrand used the Congress of Vienna negotiations in 1814–1815 
to strengthen the French position through coalition-building, meanwhile introducing true 
multilateralism into the negotiation process. Later, the disastrous twentieth century with 
its ravaging two world wars showed the ineffectiveness of large-scale warfare in settling 
international conflicts. It became seen that negotiation often creates options for win/
win outcomes. Wars in the past led to win/lose solutions, but modern technology and 
mass participation created so much devastation that statesmen increasingly preferred 
negotiation over warfare. The world saw a shift from negotiation as a tool in warfare 
towards warfare as a tool in negotiation.
One more factor in diminishing the effectiveness of war in conflicts is the growing 
complexity of states, which became so institutionalized that it is nearly impossible to 
overthrow them and subdue them on a permanent basis. However, states might be held 
hostage through nuclear threats. The chance today of being completely overrun is much 
less immanent than in ancient and medieval times. Add to this the strength of ideology 
and religion, the interconnectedness of the world through television and the internet, as 
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well as the availability of modern technology to guerrilla and terrorist forces. In short, 
leaders started to acknowledge the necessity of channelling, strengthening and protecting 
negotiation processes as a major tool in international relations. As a consequence, 
international regimes were created, both on global and regional levels, which were meant 
to streamline and fortify inter-state negotiation. Regime-building has the important 
function of diminishing risk through cooperation. Regimes can help to press their member 
states in living up to the agreements made. Trust and risk have always been a major 
problem in settling conflicts through give-and-take. Ambassadors were beheaded, or had 
their beards shaved off if they were lucky, for the sake of showing strength and contempt 
to the other ruler, thus, in turn, provoking war (Frey and Frey, 1999).
Commonalities
War and words share a number of characteristics, while they differ at the same time. 
This section focuses on their commonality and asks to what extent common features 
are applicable to both, looking at the relationship between one of the main formats in 
which negotiations take place – trade – and one of the main systems in which the use 
of force plays a dominant role – war. As said before, they often go together in history. 
Wars opened trade routes or blocked them. Profitable trade links were often created by 
force and force was needed to sustain them. Yet the trade itself was done by bargaining. 
Negotiations were the focus; force supported the negotiations. This was an interesting 
pairing, which conceals another phenomenon: the contradiction between trade (and 
therefore an important component of negotiation: commercial bargaining); and warfare. 
They often went together, but like twins it does not mean that they were always identical. 
In fact, trade and warfare have their own character and characteristics.
Trade and warfare can also be opposed to each other. War diminishes net profits. War 
puts profit margins at risk, so peace was the preferred option. While violence was often 
the preferred option in opening trade links and creating monopolies, in order to sustain 
the monopoly, war should be avoided if possible. This is why colonies in the seventeenth 
century were mere trading posts, controlling areas around them through indirect rule. 
It was only in the nineteenth century, the age of imperialism, that European powers 
substantially expanded the overseas territories under their direct control into full colonies. 
Portugal and the Netherlands were cases in point.
Using war and negotiation in order to handle contentious issues is, as said before, their 
main common characteristic. In that sense, they are tools used by other strata in society. 
Negotiation/warfare is the servant of politicians, civil and military servants, financers, and 
some religious groups. In other words, it is not an end in itself. Negotiation/warfare is a 
path, a route, a pathway in dealing with conflict, and this road is walked by negotiators 
– diplomats, civil servants and merchants – and soldiers, on foot or horseback, boats or 
planes, tanks or offices. Negotiators and soldiers share the task of dealing with conflicts, 
being dependent on others in society and judging the circumstances.
What are the best ways to deal with a conflict in a given situation? In order to deal 
with the context in which they find themselves, both negotiators and military men and 
women deploy strategies and tactics. They are closely connected to risk. ‘[T]here is 
more than one kind of risk in a peace agreement and [...] the type of risk will, to some 
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extent, determine the kinds of negotiation tactics and resolving formula’ (Hampson, 
2006). Meanwhile, Clausewitz states that ‘[t]actics teaches the use of armed forces in the 
engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of war’ (Luttwak, 1987: 239). 
It seems that this statement is directly applicable to negotiation: tactics teach us the use 
of bargaining – in the sense of give and take – in the encompassing diplomatic negotiation 
process; while strategy teaches us the use of negotiation for the object of an agreement. 
The next few paragraphs focus on strategy in order to look for the commonality and 
divergence of war and negotiation.
One way to approach strategies is to use the aforementioned Thomas and Kilmann 
approach (Thomas and Kilmann, 1974). Five modes figure in one model: competition 
(domination); collaboration (integration); compromise (sharing); avoidance (neglect); 
and accommodation (appeasement). The order of the strategies here is intentionally in 
accordance with the Thomas and Kilmann approach, as used to score participants in 
a self-assessment exercise that they developed alongside the model. This exercise is, 
of course, only applicable in table-top gaming (simulation exercises) and not in field 
operations.
To start with: competition. When will parties compete with the other side, risking 
total failure? In both warfare and negotiation, a dominant strategy will be effective and 
realistic if the stakes are high, while enough power is available to push the other party 
into agreement. This minimizes the risk of failure and maximizes the chance to harvest as 
much profit as possible. In negotiation, parties can do this by maximizing their profits in 
such a way that the other party will – still – not walk out because of future benefits from 
the dossier under negotiation, or from other dossiers that are of more importance to them. 
To remain within the realm of negotiation, the other party should not be overwhelmed 
completely. If one of the parties is brought fully to the mercy of its opponent, the process 
can still be defined as warfare, but no longer as a negotiation process.
If the opposing parties are bullied into an outcome that is unacceptable to them, the 
negotiation framework will break down. Negotiation is, after all, a process in which both 
parties come to an agreement in a more or less voluntary way. Negotiation is a bi- or 
multilateral, more or less balanced, and fair process, while war can be unilateral. One of 
the parties can just be forced to cede, while the common understanding of negotiation is 
to give something in order to get something. In cases of high priority of interest and low 
structural power – that is, not enough power resources – negotiators and military officers 
will have to build up strength during the process itself. Negotiators, as well as soldiers, 
can do this by having more and stronger allies than the other party, better organization 
and more efficient leadership than the other side, employing more effective strategies 
and tactics, having more skilled negotiators or fighters, and collecting more and better 
information, in short by changing the situation in such a way that it will be ready for their 
victory. Both negotiation and warfare are highly situational.
Collaboration stands for value-added behaviour. In this strategy, parties will cooperate 
if they perceive this to be a lesser evil than confrontation. Through collaboration, 
negotiators and soldiers create a more favourable situation than in a non-cooperative 
mode. For negotiators, collaboration means integrative negotiation processes: diagnosing 
a problem as a common problem and not just as a cake that should be divided. The 
outcome might be a win–win situation: all of the parties involved will get more out of the 
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process than they put into it. In other words, collaboration is possible, even if the parties 
are opponents, as long as they perceive the object of bargaining as a matter of common 
concern. They should be willing to go for an optimal outcome, not simply maximizing their 
profits in the short term, but expecting benefits from long-term cooperation. In view of 
future developments, they should be prepared to sacrifice part of their profits now, in 
order to create sustained positive margins in the future.
If countries are equally powerful, war will be difficult, the outcome will be uncertain 
and the costs will be high. Both sides will have to understand that a fight is not yet in their 
interest. The consequence of this collaboration is a status quo, a situation of peaceful 
coexistence, but not a solution for the problem. However, a status quo can create the 
circumstances under which negotiations can be used to move in the direction of a 
solution. This will only happen, however, if the status quo is seen as inferior to a possible 
solution, or, as discussed in Chapter I, if the parties involved perceive their ‘relationship’ 
as being a ‘mutual hurting stalemate’ (MHS) while they also have a vision of a ‘mutual 
enticing opportunity’ (MEO) to change their circumstances (Zartman, 2005: 1–3). Yet 
collaboration between allies is, of course, a military option, and enemies can turn into 
allies and vice versa. The ally of today might be the enemy of tomorrow.
Compromise is a half-way solution, accepted by both parties, while they might do 
better by going for collaboration. In a way, the parties are half-hearted: they want to avoid 
both the risks of confrontation and collaboration. There is trust, but not enough to take the 
risk of being exposed. However, in many cases of negotiation, the pie can only be divided 
and not be enlarged. Effective negotiators will normally try to move from ‘distributive 
bargaining’ (win–lose) to ‘integrative bargaining’ (win–win), whereby we should be aware 
of the fact that even in a win–win outcome, one side might win much more than the other. 
Circumstances (time, for example) will not always allow for this, and a division of profits in 
a linear way might be the only solution (Saner, 2005).
In warfare, a compromise will normally be an unplanned outcome of a battle, a 
stalemate in which both sides are unable to be victorious. There are some exceptions, 
however, to this outcome. For example, army leaders during the European Renaissance 
sometimes decided to call it a day after a symbolic fight, as they preferred this compromise 
over the risk of losing to many of their expensive mercenaries. In ancient times and during 
the Middle Ages, battles were sometimes decided through a compromise, with each side 
nominating a strong and brave fighter and agreeing to accept defeat if their champion 
lost. One problem of solving conflicts through comprise is its sustainability. Compromise 
is often an unsatisfactory solution for all the parties involved. It is of a backward-looking 
nature. To build a regime on the foundations of compromise is not an easy task, and time 
might quite easily undermine the settlement, after which it collapses.
Avoidance – or shying away from a risky situation – can be a useful strategy in both 
negotiation and warfare if one of the parties sees that it will be outmatched, while it 
perceives possibilities for stalling the confrontation until the context has changed in 
such a way that negotiation or battle might deliver a positive outcome. This can be taken 
literally: parties refuse to negotiate or to fight. Negotiators might feel that a fake process 
of bargaining will be more beneficial than a real one – for example, a process going in 
the direction of a solution, or an outcome. In the 1970s, the former USSR and the United 
States negotiated on arms reduction in Geneva over many years, not with the aim of really 
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reducing the level and quality of their armaments, but in order to be in contact with each 
other and perhaps to exchange information. Communication can thus be an important 
confidence-building measure and collecting information can be very useful for both sides. 
Stalling might also function as a means to wait for a more favourable situation. Finally, the 
USSR–US talks were a good excuse for neither disarming nor raising the level of armed 
forces, especially if the talks ultimately ended in failure. This might have been in the 
interest of some politicians on both sides, who were strengthening their internal positions, 
and perhaps also for the military men with an interest in not fighting, but in collecting as 
many arms as possible. Diplomats were, perhaps, less happy with this, and tough internal 
discussions therefore followed suit.
In Renaissance times, condottieri (leaders of the professional mercenary forces) often 
preferred manoeuvring over fighting, thereby keeping each other in the saddle instead of 
destroying one or both sides. They might have had a common interest in avoiding battle, 
much to the sorrow of their monarchs. But who was dependent on whom? It was often the 
prince who was dependent on his general. Often the soldiers themselves refused to fight, 
for all that they wanted was to be able to profit from their payments instead of dying on 
the battlefield, which was one of the reasons that induced Machiavelli to be critical about 
mercenary armies over conscript armies (Skinner, 1981).
The most obvious example of avoidance strategy, however, is guerrilla warfare. As the 
enemy is too strong to be confronted directly, avoidance will be combined with selected 
small-scale actions. Guerrilla forces will use the terrain where they have a situational 
power advantage over their structurally more powerful opponent. As the situation 
changes to the advantage of the weaker party, open warfare will again become an option, 
as we have seen in China in the late 1940s with Mao Zedong’s guerrilla tactics against 
the Kuomintang, and during the Vietnam War by the Viet Cong. NATO’s involvement in 
Kosovo in 1999 and its out-of-area wars at the beginning of the twenty-first century are 
tragic examples of the effectiveness of avoidance strategies by the weaker party, and the 
failure of the ‘dominant’ power to be successful in its competitive strategy. The paradox 
in Afghanistan (but in a way in Iraq as well) is that the United States and its Northern 
coalition, in crushing the Taliban (and Iraqi) regular forces, created a situation ripe for 
guerrilla warfare. The conventional means that are needed to be successful in a head-on 
clash are not apt for winning an indirect confrontation.
Accommodation, or appeasement, is the policy of not putting the relationship with 
the other side at risk. It is a strategy to be used if the relationship with the opponent is 
more important than the actual outcome of the negotiation or the battle. The Munich 
Agreement of 1938 is again the stereotypical example of negotiations in which one 
side decides to have the opponent gaining much more than one’s own party – or even 
everything. However, accommodation is quite a normal process in the European Union, 
although in this case it is not a question of giving in to an overwhelming power, but to the 
necessity of solving collective problems. The strategy hinges on the question of priorities, 
as different countries have different priorities. While the political and security situation 
in the Mediterranean is of great concern to the Union’s southern countries, the northern 
member states might have their worries about the Baltic Sea, or the western countries 
about the Atlantic, while the new members in Central Europe have a special concern 
about the Union’s relationship with the Russian Federation and – for other reasons – with 
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Ukraine and Belarus. Negotiations on an issue are not of equal importance to all parties, 
which might therefore decide to accommodate the parties that have a vested interest 
in a crisis where they do not see major stakes for themselves. Of course, they equally 
expect other countries to appease them in cases when a dossier deals with issues of vital 
importance to their country.
The Hexagame that will be analyzed in Chapter XI shows that the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) can only maximize its profits if the member 
states go for optimal outcomes. In other words, the collective whole can only really be 
successful if non- or less-involved partners agree to accommodate. Yet the reverse could 
also be true. The most involved, but also most vulnerable, countries might accommodate 
opponents in order not to disrupt relationships. During the Cold War, for example, the 
Federal Republic of Germany showed more willingness to accommodate the Soviet Union 
than the United Kingdom and the United States. The Germans could be blackmailed after 
all, as many of their compatriots lived in the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal 
Republic of Germany itself would be among the first victims of Soviet troops attacking 
Western Europe. Meanwhile, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and – perhaps despite 
a lot of rhetoric – Syria have to be more prudent with the state of Israel than the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. He who is close to the fire can burn his hands. Thus South Korea has to be 
more accommodating in dealing with North Korea than Japan, and Japan has to be more 
sophisticated in handling the issue than the United States. For armies, accommodation 
can be a strategy if one is outnumbered, as one might decide to give in without a fight, or 
after a symbolic battle.
Alternatively, armies might even join the enemy. Especially in the history of the 
nomadic people, we see an ease in joining the stronger party and even adopting its 
identity. In Central Asia, many Turkic tribes adopted the enemy’s name as if they had 
always been allied with them. Yet the reverse has happened as well. The Turkic tribe of 
the Bulgars gave its name to (Danube) Bulgaria, and the Thracian and Slavic tribes in the 
region became known as Bulgarians as well, but the original Bulgars lost their identity and 
accommodated the language of the people they once conquered. Equally, the Serbs and 
Croats – originally Alans and thereby Iranian nomadic tribes – became Slavonic as they 
moved deeper into Central and later into Southern Europe (Ascherson, 1995: 242); and the 
Franks adopted the language of the Romanized Celts whom they conquered. On the other 
hand, however, most of the people from Asia Minor accommodated the language of their 
Turkish overlords. It can go either way.
Divergences
The processes of negotiation and warfare share many characteristics and ways to handle 
risky matters. Their objective is often identical, but the tools that they use are very different. 
It is time to turn to the differences between negotiation and violence in order to be able 
to conclude about the questions: how are they connected and to what extent can we see 
them as being identical or at least complementary? Differences between warfare and 
negotiation already came to the fore in the paragraphs on commonality, in which common 
characteristics were stressed, as expressed in the use of strategies for example. Yet there 
are also differences, and the final question will be to decide whether these disparities 
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should be seen as being more important to our understanding of the two phenomena than 
the elements that they share.
There are differences in the behaviour of actors, the character of their needs, the 
implementation of available tools and the consequences of the outcomes. Concerning 
the behaviour of actors, the obvious differences between soldiers and diplomats come 
to the fore (Sjöstedt, 2003). While discipline and flexibility are important for professionals 
from both strata, it is clear that discipline is of more importance for military people than 
diplomatic staff, and flexibility for diplomats. Their tools are, of course, completely different. 
For military officers, technology dominates the scene. Without knowledge of – and insight 
in – advanced weapons technology, the armed forces cannot be effective. This goes along 
with the soldier’s dependence on material tools for defensive and offensive purposes. 
The inter-state negotiator will also lean on high-tech tools, but his or her main modes are 
the spoken and written language, networking, analysis of behaviour or other negotiators, 
cultural and character understanding, skilful use of procedures and processes, in-
depth knowledge and understanding of the balance of interest, and – more than with 
soldiers – political empathy. For the negotiator, immaterial needs are of more importance, 
while for soldiers material support is vital. This is, of course, a bold statement, as morale is 
vital for warriors while diplomats in multilateral conferences cannot do without language 
equipment. Still, warriors are more vulnerable without technological means, and diplomats 
are more helpless if the political and bureaucratic climate is working against them. The 
military seems to be more dependent on hardware, while diplomacy is by nature more a 
matter of software – software of the human mind. Negotiation is human interaction and 
bridge-building, while warfare is human struggle and bridge-blowing.
As military men and women need more hardware than civil men and woman who have 
to solve problems in a non-violent way, the costs of military action are clearly far higher 
than those of diplomacy. As civil society will have to pay for the costs of military action, the 
burden on mankind is much more substantial than the expenses to be made for diplomatic 
action. However, this does not mean that it is easier to get money for peaceful means, 
including war prevention and peace-building, than for military devices. The process of 
collecting money for the build-up of strong forces is much smoother than that of collecting 
money for conflict prevention and peace-building.
A lost military battle is a more serious issue than a lost diplomatic battle. The threat to 
survival is more serious with a lost military battle, and therefore the willingness to invest 
more heavily. We can even see this in the fight against terrorism. Terrorist activities are, 
of course, a major threat to nation-states, but in comparison to large-scale conventional 
and nuclear threats, terrorism is still perceived as less damaging to the survival of state 
structures, so less money is therefore allotted to those units fighting terrorism. This also 
has to do with the fact that conventional and nuclear means are more costly than the 
weapons needed to fight insurgents, but the fact remains that less energy seems to be 
needed to collect money for regular arms build-up than for means to ward off terror. This 
might change over time, but we cannot expect an easy race for diplomacy here. One 
should add that this issue is linked to overall power: if you have a hammer, you are inclined 
to see your problem as a nail; if you have a carrot, you will define your problem as a rabbit. 
Your tool defines your action.
127Chapter V: Negotiation and Warfare
Military action and diplomatic overtures are dramatically different in their 
consequences. It is obvious that a successful military campaign assures more control 
over the other party in the short run, while a positive negotiation outcome does not assure 
too much as far as the probability of implementation is concerned. But how should we 
diagnose the mid- and long-term consequences? They are different as well, but are 
perhaps more to the advantage of diplomacy than to the military. A lost war creates huge 
risks of enormous collective remembrance, but this is much less so if a negotiation’s 
outcome is more favourable to the opponent than to one’s own country. The first is more 
traumatic than the other and will therefore throw a shadow over future relationships. One 
might postulate that an outcome by military means assures short-term security but long-
term insecurity, while in diplomacy a victory through negotiation will not result in much 
short-term stability, but will probably assure a more stable relationship over the years to 
come. A crisis can be handled effectively and immediately through the use of force, but 
the risk of a renewed crisis emerging on the same issue is enormous.
Diplomatic means are often insufficient in handling serious crises, but it is possible 
that the crisis will no longer arise after agreement has been reached, or the risk of flaring 
up will be less (Bercovitch, 2011). This might be true for present times, when technological 
tools create much more destruction – and often a more equal power balance on the 
ground – than in the past. As war was less destructive in the past – in general at least 
– and nations and societies were less rooted in their own identity, problems could be 
solved by war without having the boomerang effects that we see today. There are many 
unresolved conflicts from the past lingering on today, but not – with some notable 
exceptions – in a violent way. In sum, the decision to use military or diplomatic means 
has grave future consequences, but the choice to use either one will shape the future in 
completely different ways. Military and diplomatic tools can, of course, also be used in 
concurrence and in one way or another they are often not to be separated, like Siamese 
twins with different characters and therefore different consequences.
Synergies
Negotiation and the use of force often in practice go together, run parallel, or interchange. 
Wars might start after diplomatic negotiations have failed, or diplomacy steps in after one 
military force has been more successful than the other – or has failed to achieve its goals 
and therefore negotiations have to break the stalemate. It is clear that in negotiations 
after the defeat of one of the parties, the victor will most of the time follow a dominant 
negotiation strategy, while the other side has to accommodate. In that sense, we can 
ask the question of to what extent these negotiations can really be labelled as such. If a 
negotiation process is a voluntary exchange between more or less autonomous parties, 
how can we use the label of ‘bargaining’ for a situation with an extreme asymmetrical 
balance of power? Perhaps this should instead be seen as a dictate, as the Germans – or at 
least Adolf Hitler – perceived the Versailles conference to be after Germany’s First World 
War defeat.
These kinds of negotiation will not easily lead to a truly peaceful situation. They anyway 
require extra measures to be taken. The victor should avoid taking measures that are too 
draconic and should as well create conditions that will foster peaceful development in 
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the foreseeable future. The mistakes of the post-First World War negotiations were not 
repeated after the Second, which was concluded with a conciliatory peace settlement, be 
it almost 50 years after the end of the war, in 1990 with the Treaty on the Final Settlement 
with Respect to Germany. Justice must be done, but this is easier said than done. The 
crooks are not ready to conclude peace if they know that justice will be done at their 
expense. Still, for reconciliation purposes (Anstey, 2011: 24–29; Anstey and Rosoux, 2011: 
31–33), ‘some’ justice should indeed be done, but the victims of this are often those 
who played a relatively minor role in any atrocities. The leaders, those who held final 
responsibility for the conflict, find – and are often offered – their way to safe havens before 
it is too late. Peace and justice alone are not sufficient, however, and should be followed 
with long-term cooperation. A common project for the future (as with the Arab League, 
or European Union) will take the problems to another level, thereby solving – or at least 
diluting – them. Negotiations rolling out of an undecided war have a much more balanced 
character than those where victors and victims are sitting around the table, although the 
skilful way in which Talleyrand operated on the behalf of the defeated France during the 
Vienna Conference of 1814–1815 clearly showed that circumstances can sometimes be 
changed by skilled and effective negotiators.
Besides negotiations being used in pre- and post-war situations, there are processes 
of conflict management in which negotiation and warfare are used as parallel tools, where 
they go hand-in-hand. There will not always, of course, be equilibrium. During this process, 
war or negotiation might be dominant according to the developments at hand, changing 
parties’ positions and strengths, and shifts in interests and emotions. Emotions will play a 
decisive part in this. Atrocities can lead to an abrupt end of hostilities and the upgrading 
of negotiations as parallel to the war theatre. It is often supposed that outbreaks of war 
will put a hold on negotiation processes, but this is doubtful. Parties always have need 
for communication, be it over temporary cease-fires like on the Western Front during 
the First World War, exchange of prisoners, or attempts to put an end to the fighting 
when both sides suffer serious losses. Havoc can inspire new talks. These negotiations 
will not be visible, but will go through ‘back channels’. Back-channel negotiations can 
be extremely helpful in restraining the warring parties, and in devising formulas for the 
future. Just as negotiations can be pushed forward by the threat or use of force, they can 
also be disrupted by this. The risk exists, however, that spoilers might discover the back-
channel talks and publicize them, thereby derailing the process (Wannis-St John, 2006).
There are many examples of ‘coercive diplomacy’ pushing the negotiation process in a 
positive direction, although the question can again be asked of to what extent these talks 
can still be seen as genuine bargaining. We have many examples of fruitful negotiation 
processes being destroyed by violent acts, which are often aimed at the destruction of 
the peaceful attempts to end the crisis. For example, implementation of the Oslo peace 
process in the first half of the 1990s has been eradicated by the violence of extremists 
who did not want the moderates to be successful. As a case in point, Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzak Rabin was killed by one of his own countrymen. The downward spiral initiated by 
this destructive behaviour could hardly be bent in a positive direction, and indeed this has 
not yet been the case. The problem is that violated trust is even more difficult to handle 
than lack of trust, which is a problem that we often face within the negotiation process, 
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where violation of trust creates an atmosphere of more severe distrust than before the 
start of negotiations, as people’s positive emotions relapse into negative ones.
In the case of the Oslo peace process, one of the main problems was the inability of 
the parties to sell the outcome to their populations. The political leaders took the risk of 
signing an agreement, while they could not be sure of its implementation. One notices 
the same development in South Caucasus since the successful negotiations between the 
governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in the first half 
of the 1990s. (Then) Defence Minister Vazgen Sargysyan took the risk of settling the 
issues with Azerbaijan, but was later shot and killed when prime minister in the Armenian 
Parliament in 1999, while Armenia’s first President Levon Ter-Petrosyan had to resign 
in 1998 in favour of one of the staunch opponents against the deal: the ‘President’ of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Robert Kocharyan, who then became the president of Armenia, 
ending the peace process, and the Minsk group is still unsuccessful in its attempts to 
repair the ‘crisis’. Is this a crisis, or is it non-peaceful coexistence? The term ‘smouldering 
crisis’ seems to be appropriate here. The negotiations continue without any visible process, 
while the Azerbaijanis can one day use their oil revenues to reopen the war that ‘ended’ 
over twelve years ago, incidents left aside. However, it is to be hoped that Azerbaijan will 
refrain from doing so, as it has been quite clear since the Georgian–Russian war that 
Russia will side with its Armenian ally.
It should be added here that – although public support is vital for successful 
negotiation – it is even more important in cases of warfare (Wijk, 2005: 257). A war that 
lacks public support will be shipwrecked sooner than a bargaining process.
In sum, the interaction between negotiation and warfare as parallel tools in 
conflict management is an uneasy one. Depending on the circumstances, the mix can 
be successful or disastrous. No prescription can be given, apart from a tentative one. 
An approach through negotiations ‘supported’ by the threat of viable – and if possible 
legitimate – warfare seems to be a more or less balanced pairing between the phenomena 
of negotiation and warfare. Abiding by international law and the legitimate use of force – for 
example, sanctioned by a UN Security Council mandate – is of utmost importance in 
avoiding a never-ending collective remembrance by the losing party, and negotiations will 
also have to play their part in preparing for ‘just’ warfare. This combination of negotiating 
and trying to work within international law is not always successful, as we saw in the run-
up to the War in Iraq in 2003. It depends on the actors and their interests. The dilemma 
is that by voting against the resolution, opponents to the war could not prevent the Iraq 
War from breaking out, while at the same time they blocked the option of a war waged in 
a legitimate way.
Between warfare and negotiation we have coercive diplomacy (George, 1991). 
Coercive diplomacy can be seen as a tool to be used if negotiations do not work, while it 
is still too early to apply warfare. Coercive diplomacy can be regarded as a tool between 
negotiation and warfare, for it tries to prevent the risk of stand-alone negotiations and 
stand-alone warfare. How effective is it to threaten the other side, supposing that the 
victim will perceive the threats as credible? Looking at warfare, one might postulate that 
a threat can be a useful means in getting the enemy to surrender without a fight, as 
happened in the case of Denmark’s surrender to Germany in the Second World War. Terror 
has exactly that significance: threatening the opponent, in this case by using limited but 
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focused force, without unleashing a full-scale war. However, by threatening the other side, 
surprise is gone. This could become a major obstacle to success, as the opponent can also 
now prepare for war.
Mediation
If negotiation does not help in managing a conflict and war looms around the corner, 
mediation might be the tool to prevent warfare and save the negotiation process as an 
instrument. With Herding Cats, Crocker, Hampson and Aall edited a book on mediation 
that acted as a milestone in mediation research (Crocker et al., 2001). It gave rise to 
much more work, for example in the Journal of International Negotiation. From thereon, 
Jacob Bercovitch’s contributions helped to further the understanding of international 
mediation as an instrument in international negotiation. Bercovitch’s book Theory and 
Practice of International Mediation is his legacy to academics and practitioners in the field, 
and a very valuable one (Bercovitch, 2011). This thesis will now discuss Bercovitch’s views 
on mediation in connection with Kyle Beardsley’s book The Mediation Dilemma, which is a 
valuable extension of, and critique on, Bercovitch’s writings (Beardsley, 2011). According 
to Beardsley, mediation is often counterproductive in the longer run. Mediation might be 
useful in managing a conflict in the first few years, but after about four-and-a-half years, 
the mediation effort loses its impact and the conflict will resurface. Beardsley argues that 
mediation has often put the lid on the can without solving the underlying issues. As a 
consequence, the recurrent conflict might be even more violent.
How to study and do research on mediation is the opening chapter of Bercovitch’s 
book. He gives us a definition by enumerating nine characteristics of the phenomenon, 
describing it as an extension and continuation of peaceful conflict management. He then 
introduces the elements of mediation to us: the parties in conflict; the issues and their 
nature; identity and characteristics of the mediator – the context of it all. In doing this, 
he arrives at a contingency framework where context, process and outcome are linked.
In the first part of the book, Bercovitch connects context and mediation. To him, 
mediation is an appropriate method for dealing with international conflict, when a conflict 
is long, complex, or intractable, when the parties themselves proved unable to break 
the impasse and there is a ‘mutual hurting stalemate’, as well as a ‘mutual enticing 
opportunity’ for cooperation to end the cycle of conflict. In other words, Bercovitch 
defines mediation as a decisive factor in negotiation processes that cannot be managed 
by the contending parties. He then poses four questions for research: why do parties and 
the mediator decide to enter into mediation, who may mediate, how do the mediators 
behave, and what are the conditions for success? On the last issue, he does not really 
draw substantial conclusions. This is obviously outside his reach, which is problematic, as 
both practitioners and researchers will look for these conditions in order to judge whether 
a mediation process will be effective or worthwhile to study.
The second part of the book deals with two case studies in the context of Israeli–
Palestinian peacemaking: Camp David; and Oslo. Bercovitch puts them in an interesting 
sequential framework and distinguishes ‘antecedent’, ‘concurrent’ and ‘consequent’ 
phases. Within that flow, he shows us the interrelationship of goals, personal factors, role 
factors, interactional factors, situational factors, and the outcome of the process. He then 
131Chapter V: Negotiation and Warfare
gives the reader a prescription for the actions that the mediator should take in order to be 
successful. He enlightens us on at least one condition for an effective mediation process: 
how the third party should behave. He adds a prerequisite: ‘international mediation is a 
form of conflict intervention that requires the prior acceptance and cooperation of the 
parties’ (Bercovitch, 2011: 129).
The third part of the book deals with quantitative studies in mediation, starting with 
the question of choice between mediation and negotiation. On two different occasions, 
Bercovitch shows that mediation is an important means in conflict management. According 
to the data used, mediation comes first in something like 60 per cent of the cases of 
peaceful conflict resolution, in 309 conflicts between 1945 and 1995. Negotiation comes 
only second, in almost 40 per cent of the instances of peaceful conflict management. 
Although based on the same dataset, the percentages differ slightly in the tables presented 
to us. It is in this part that Bercovitch discusses three strategies for mediation, concluding 
that mediation is a diverse and complex process of social interaction, a conclusion already 
drawn by the reader before he or she started reading the book, presumably.
‘Current Issues in Mediation Research’ is the title of Part IV. Four mediation issues 
are dealt with: 1) internationalized ethnic conflict; 2) culture in mediation; 3) intractable 
international conflicts; and 4) the contribution of international mediation to the prevention 
of deadly conflict. On the first issue, Bercovitch proves the usefulness of mediation in 
dealing with ethnic conflict. On the second, he concludes that culture has a major impact 
on mediated negotiation processes. This is why he stresses the necessity of selecting 
culturally sensitive mediators. On issue three, he presents his finding that mediation 
has little impact in intractable conflict situations, but he does not offer a solution for the 
problem. On the final issue, Bercovitch recommends institutionalization of mediation, in 
the sense that the international community should create a mediation system like the 
system of international negotiation, a system that is ready to respond quickly whenever 
mediation is needed to prevent (more) casualties.
Kyle Beardsley’s The Mediation Dilemma is more consistent than Bercovitch’s ‘reader’, 
but at the same time it lacks its richness and helicopter view. To Beardsley, ‘[m]ediation 
is the inclusion in a peace process of a third party with mutual consent of the parties 
involved without binding authority or the use of violent coercion’ (Beardsley, 2011: 43). 
The author thereby limits himself to mediation in violent conflict situations, excluding 
mediation in more peaceful processes such as the European Union and United Nations, 
etc. His main conclusion is that by solving short-term problems through mediation, long-
term stability might not be accomplished. In other words, mediation will often allow 
conflicts to linger on, and might therefore be questioned as a tool in managing internal 
and external conflicts. This is quite the contrary of Bercovitch’s approach.
Beardsley presents five chapters on the questions of: ‘Negotiating Mediation’; the 
issue of accepting mediation as a tool in conflict resolution; the ‘Short-Term Benefits of 
Mediation’; the ‘Struggle for Self-Enforcing Peace’; as well as ‘Mediation in Intra-state 
Conflicts’. The final chapter is on ‘Implications, Applications and Conclusions’. Beardsley’s 
‘Policy-Relevant Recommendations’ are:
First, mediation should be used sparingly when there are major vulnerabilities to 
failed implementation, […] Second, third parties should be aware of issues related 
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to legitimacy, […] Third, outside actors should intervene more carefully when the 
disputants could benefit from using mediation for ends other than peace, […] 
Fourth, potential third parties should hesitate to become involved in a peace 
process when coordination and implementation is likely to prove difficult […] 
Fifth, the use of leverage itself is not actually a source of long-term instability; it 
is the attenuation over time of that leverage that increases the propensity for re-
negotiation (Beardsley, 2011: 183–187).
Beardsley’s study has been based on an analysis of international crises since 1918. He 
finds that nearly half of those conflicts ended with some sort of agreement, but that 
52 per cent of them recurred, while 50 per cent of the crises that did not end with an 
agreement also recurred. In the first ten years of the new millennium, 34 per cent of the 
mediated conflicts relapsed, against 21 per cent of the unmediated ones. Mediation, then, 
creates less stable peace. He notes the catch-22 that under the UN system, countries 
have an obligation to defend human security, which then might lead to more problems 
instead of fewer. He continues by testing his hypotheses on several inter-state cases: 
Jimmy Carter in the Middle East when they mediated the Camp David Accords in 1978; 
Carter in North Korea in the 1990s mediating the Agreed Framework; and Teddy Roosevelt 
at Portsmouth, mediating the end of the Russo–Japanese war of 1904–1905. He then tests 
the hypotheses on intra-state cases: Rwanda; Haiti; Sri Lanka; and Aceh; as well as ‘Oslo’ 
as a hybrid between intra-state and inter-state.  ‘Beardsly’s research shows to us that in 
addition to considering dynamic properties in the supply side and demand side factors 
that produce mediation, we must also consider the dynamic properties of the conflicts 
they are designed to resolve’ (Mitchell, 2014: 199).
While Bercovitch values mediation highly as one of the few tools – with shortcomings 
for sure – to deal with conflicts in a peaceful manner, Beardsley modifies this statement 
by proving that mediation is useful in the short run, but often contra-productive in the 
long term. Beardsley concludes with five recommendations for policy-makers: (1) use 
it sparingly; (2) be aware of issues related to legitimacy; and (3) of disputants using the 
mediation efforts to prolong the conflict; (4) coordinated implementation must be feasible; 
and (5) attenuation of leverage over time might increase the propensity for renegotiation.
In conclusion, the two books help us to get to grips with the positive and negative 
consequences of mediated negotiations. While mediation is often an international 
obligation, it does not always help to solve the problems at hand; it might even be counter-
productive. As the Buddhists say, not acting is sometimes more effective than taking 
action. This seems to be valuable advice to the political systems of our world, foremost to 
the most powerful on Earth.
On multi-party mediation, Sinisa Vukovic’s doctoral dissertation Analysis of Multiparty 
Mediation Processes discusses cooperation and coordination, exogenous geopolitical 
shifts, changes in conflict dynamics, the way to negotiate for cooperation, the strategic 
interests involved and their legitimacy, and achievement of coordination (Vukovic, 
2013). He launches a game-theoretical model (Vukovic, 2013: 57), which is essentially a 
prisoner’s dilemma. Vukovic’s study concurs (Vukovic, 2013: 10) with William Zartman’s 
hypothesis that ‘if a number of conciliators are available to the parties themselves and if a 
number of friends of the conflicting parties can coordinate their good office and pressure, 
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the chances of success are improved’ (Zartman, 1989: 276). This does not mean, however, 
that we know to what extent multi-party mediation will soften the Kyle Beardsley’s 
conclusions of mediation as a tool in actually solving conflicts, instead of postponing a 
renewed outbreak.
In Conclusion
As analyzed in this chapter, negotiation and warfare are intimately linked. They are meant to 
diminish the chance of unnecessarily yielding to the other side, they share a common goal 
and use the same strategies, but their tools are completely different. Words and regimes 
are negotiation’s methods; violence and technology are warfare’s instruments. Diplomacy 
is based on software; military is dependent on hardware. Their actors will therefore have 
to be of a different character. Creativity is important for diplomatic negotiators; discipline 
is vital for military officers. This does not mean that diplomats do not need hardware and 
discipline at all, or that military men or women can do without software and creativity. 
All of these skills will have to be applied, but the emphasis is different. Negotiation and 
warfare are closely connected, run parallel, or interchange constantly. Negotiation can 
often fail without the threat of war, and wars cannot be concluded without follow-up 
negotiations.
On the basis of common aims, common strategies and close connectedness, we could 
reach the conclusion that negotiation is indeed warfare by other means and vice versa. 
The question is about in which conflict phase we are. In practically all circumstances, 
warfare will be followed by negotiation, and therefore this particular bargaining is bullying 
by other means. Negotiations will almost always preclude warfare, and in those cases 
war is wheeling and dealing by other means. Of course, both will often run in parallel: 
negotiations will take place during violent conflicts; while skirmishes often happen when 
serious peace talks are occurring. It is important to analyze the strategies used in warlike 
situations. According to James Ray, ‘“bullying” strategies led to war in almost two-thirds 
of the crises (researched in recent history) [...] while reciprocating strategies achieved 
either diplomatic victory or a compromise nearly two-thirds of the time’ (Ray, 1998: 147).
Using threat and force might help to manage a problem in the short term, but 
bargaining is the best tool for long-term problem-solving. By using force, you risk violence 
being used against you, but by only using words, you might give the other party time to 
build up strength. Conflict management can be done by using force, but negotiation is the 
most effective tool for conflict resolution, if the risk against doing so is perceived as being 
minimal. In that sense, the utility of negotiation is greater than that of warfare: to solve an 
inter-state conflict through violence is virtually impossible; to do so through international 
negotiation is very probable.
Not all conflicts are ripe for negotiation, and therefore the less utile tool of warfare is 
often seen as the only alternative. Even then, however, diplomats should try to keep the 
dialogue going, to negotiate as a form of communication in order to keep the option of real 
give-and-take open. The sooner that enforcement can give way to mutual understanding, 
the more valuable the final solution will be. And if the argument against negotiation is that 
warfare is a more effective tool as it will create more assured outcomes than bargaining, 
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one might counter this by stating that war creates problems for the future because of 
the traumas involved. Add to that ‘an undecided war creates a feeble peace’ (Teitler, 
2002: 59) and the conclusion that negotiation is more utile to politics than force comes to 
the forefront of one’s mind.
One can brush aside the notion that peace established by outright enforced victory 
might be established in the short run, but will fail in the long run to create a sustainable non-
violent situation. There are always exceptions to these value judgements. In some cases, 
war is unavoidable and must be waged, but never without giving ample opportunities to 
negotiation processes to perform their peaceful duties for mankind’s peace. Negotiation 
can then be a tool in conflict management or conflict resolution. In conflict management 
the means of conflict can be demoted from violence to politics; in conflict resolution the 
issues between the parties will be resolved. Whether it will be management or resolution 
depends very much on the nature of the conflict and the phase during which negotiation 
enters into the conflict situation. In some cases, conflict management can be transformed 
into conflict resolution.
Can negotiation cope with conflicts in an efficient and effective way? Kalevi Holsti 
identifies eight major prerequisites for peace: the negotiations should effectively deal 
with problems of governance; legitimacy; assimilation; deterrence; conflict resolution; 
war; peaceful change; and issues concerning the future (Holsti, 1991). Did the famous 
peace treaties tackle these issues? Holsti analyzed five major international negotiations 
as turning points in recent European history: Westphalia (seventeenth century); Utrecht 
(eighteenth century); Vienna (nineteenth century); Versailles (twentieth century); and the 
proclamation of the United Nations in San Francisco (twentieth century). Westphalia only 
coped with half of the conditions for enduring peace; Utrecht with one-quarter; Vienna 
and San Francisco with a slight majority of the prerequisites; and Versailles with only a 
minority of them. Holsti therefore identified Utrecht and Versailles as ineffective peace 
negotiations, and Vienna and San Francisco as successful regime-building attempts.
In other words, while Utrecht and Versailles were backward-looking outcomes, 
Vienna and San Francisco were forward-looking conferences. Westphalia then takes a 
balanced position, producing a forward- and backward-looking mix (Meerts, 2005b). This 
list does not suggest a substantial evolution in diplomatic negotiation becoming a viable 
alternative to warfare as centuries pass. However, Holsti does not include the 1949 Treaty 
of Washington and the 1957 Treaty of Rome in his overview. These treaties, which gave 
birth to NATO and the EU (ultimately), created strong regimes that in turn secured more 
substantial outcomes than previous negotiations could assure. According to Schelling, 
eight characteristics of negotiation processes will stimulate substantive outcomes 
(Schelling, 1963: 28–35). First, the use of bargaining agents; then the reputation of the 
bargaining parties; precedents to which to refer; continuity of the process; simultaneous 
bargaining; options for compensation; the mechanics of the process; and its principles 
and commitments. All these factors are part and parcel of modern bargaining in the 
stronger regimes of our times. We therefore dare to conclude here that the negotiation 
process of the twenty-first century is gaining strength as an alternative to warfare, but this 
does not preclude warfare from happening.
War between countries seems to be diminishing. ‘Violence has declined over long 
stretches of time, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era of our species’ 
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existence’ (Pinker, 2011: xxi). The Conflict Barometer 2012 of the Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research (Conflict Barometer, 2012: 2–3) observes that inter-state 
conflicts remained at the same level on average from 1945 until 2012. This was not the case 
for intra-state conflicts, which went up from around five to over 40 in 2010. Is the decline 
of inter-state violence the consequence of negotiation? We cannot be sure about this, 
but there might be some indication that this is indeed the case. ‘In the new millennium, 
the number of conflicts ending in victory has declined, while the number ending in 
negotiated settlements has increased’ (Mack et al., 2007: 35). For example, while sixteen 
wars came to closure in the 1950s through the victory of one of the sides, only nine were 
dealt with through negotiation. Meanwhile, in the 1960s the balance was 23 to eleven; 
in the 1970s, 22 to thirteen; and in the 1980s, twenty versus eight. Then, in the 1990s, 
the balance switched in favour of negotiation: 23 to 41; while in the first five years of the 
new millennium, it was five to seventeen. In total, from 1950–2005 there were 104 conflicts 
settled through victories and 82 through negotiation (Mack et al., 2007: 35). While more 
wars are ending through negotiation, the number of multilateral negotiations has been 
exploding: ‘In the middle of the nineteenth century there were about three international 
conferences annually; today more than three thousand (Holsti, 2004: 191).
Nevertheless, one has to be cautious about linking the diminishing frequency of conflict 
to the frequency of international conferences. Jan Geert Siccama states that ‘If wars are 
time-dependent, and earlier wars can be considered a cause of later wars, previous peace 
conferences may also determine the outbreak of subsequent wars (and the success of 
later peace settlements)’ (Siccama, 1993: 125). The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 seems 
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CHAPTER VI: THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY: FORWARD- AND 
BACKWARD-LOOKING 
OUTCOMES
The 1648 Peace of Westphalia represents one of the most outstanding examples of 
forward-looking outcomes in human history (Wilde, 2000: 29 and 43). Moreover, the 
regime created at the negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück – a regime that marked 
the end of the Respublica Christiana and the beginning of the system of sovereign, 
independent states (Schrijver, 1998: 144) – is still alive and well today. By legitimizing the 
de facto status quo, Westphalia established a new political and legal system in Europe and 
sowed the seeds of further changes in European societies:
The essence of the old system of governance was that all peoples were held 
together in a universal society by a non-exclusive form of territoriality, in which 
political authority was both personalized and divided within and across territorial 
formations and for which inclusive bases of legitimization prevailed. The sharp 
division between citizens and non-citizens, being an important feature in the 
modern state, was not there (Van Staden and Vollaard, 2002: 179).
Some see Westphalia as the beginning of international state law: ‘It was then that 
international law emerged as a law of “states” that could be thought of as “legal subjects” 
or “persons” distinct from their rulers of elite groups’ (Koskenniemi, 2011: 5).
There have always been attacks on the regime of formal equality between sovereign 
states that was created at Münster and Osnabrück, and the regime will probably be further 
undermined in the decades to come. Nevertheless, after 350 years, the system of states, 
as created in the mid-seventeenth century, is still the most effective way of avoiding chaos 
and structuring the world community. This chapter will deal with how the negotiations 
came about, what kind of negotiation processes (forward- or backward-looking) took 
place, how matters of peace and justice were handled, what regimes were installed, and 
what their prospects might be in the twenty-first century.
In the middle of the seventeenth century, wracked by wars between and within the 
old hegemonic powers of the Holy Roman Empire and Spain, and the ascendant states, 
such as France, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands, Europe was looking for a lasting 
peace agreement. The wars, a mixture of internal and external warfare under a cloak of 
religious differences, were devastating. Civil wars raged, sparked by emotional religious 
outbursts, and these cruel conflicts were used as a pretext for external interference in 
the internal affairs of states. The Swedes, for example, used the threat of Catholic action 
against the Protestant fiefdoms in Germany as an excuse to intervene in the affairs of the 
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Holy Roman Empire, which had been invited in by the Protestant overlords to rescue them 
from Catholic oppression. Moreover, many such rulers had converted to Lutheranism or, 
in the Netherlands, to Calvinism to mobilize the people against their feudal masters. This 
resistance to emperor or king was, in fact, a reaction against the attempts of the highest 
rulers to modernize their states. The states were in reality composite territories, rooted 
in the medieval feudal system that had withered away at the end of the fifteenth century 
(Groenveld, 2000: 52). They could no longer deal with modern-day demands, and attempts 
to move in the direction of a unitary state brought about their demise.
Yet even as the people transformed into Renaissance men and women, as societies 
became more open, as the merchant class, step by step, marginalized the noble families, 
and as cities grew into pre-eminence, the feudal system still clung on in its increasingly 
outmoded and irrelevant forms. In other words, the political system was now inappropriate 
both in terms of the underlying values and norms of society and of its economic structures 
and processes. Confronted with this problem, the emperor of Germany and the king of 
Spain started to modernize their states by introducing a relatively strong bureaucracy 
whose success depended on greater state centralization. The attempts by these sovereigns 
to remove the root cause of the internal weakness of the state – namely the extreme 
decentralization of their domain – provoked resistance and revolution. Thus, paradoxically, 
the efforts to assure an effective implementation of sovereignty led to a breakup of the 
old powers. This gave birth to the peace negotiations in Westphalia, which, in turn, can be 
seen as the cradle of today’s notion of sovereignty. It should be added, however, that the 
tendency to centralize the state was not always a rational process. In Spain, it also had to 
do with the character of King Philip II, who was not only incapable of delegating, but also 
a master of procrastinating micro-management and a workaholic who read all documents 
and signed all decrees himself with ‘Yo, el Rey ’, or ‘I, the King’ (Vroom, 2000: 45 and 49).
The Peace of Westphalia had many faces. It was a necessary instrument of transition 
from the old era to the new. As far as peace and justice are concerned, it stood for 
important elements both in backward- and forward-looking negotiations. For the old 
powers, the peace agreement acted as a safeguard against further decay. For the young 
powers, it was the place to obtain justice, to assume their rightful place in the community 
of states. In that sense, the agreement had more of a forward-looking character for the 
young states than for the old. In fact, Westphalia put an end to the division of the world 
between Spain and Portugal that had been made in the Treaty of Tordesillas and, at the 
same time, legitimized Hugo Grotius’ idea of a mare liberum. It had a mixture of short-
term, backward-looking aspects and long-term, forward-looking aspects: it put an end to 
internal and external wars and, by installing committees and guarantors to oversee peace, 
it created – formally at least – the equality of states and religions.
Let us try to define the major concepts that will be covered in this chapter. Although 
Westphalia created new regimes, it had some difficulty in doing so, as will be explained 
below. ‘Building institutions in world politics is a frustrating and difficult business. 
Common interests are often hard to discover and to maintain. Furthermore, collective 
action invites myopic behavior’ (Keohane, 1983: 246). Regimes were defined in chapter III 
of this thesis as:
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[…] implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice (Krasner, 1983: p. 2).
Westphalia’s forward-looking outcome is an example of a negotiated regime. ‘These 
regimes are characterized by conscious efforts to agree on their major provisions, explicit 
consent on the part of individual participants, and formal expression of the results’ 
(Young, 2003: 99).
The Westphalia negotiations created the regime of equal sovereign states, or ‘black 
boxes’, as the building blocks of Europe – and, in effect, of the world – as we know it 
today. The principle of justice meant respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of each state over its own territory to the exclusion of other actors. The norm was the 
communis opinion (common opinion, generally accepted view) regarding the way in 
which European countries should deal with each other. The rules were the agreements 
on the implementation of the principles and norms, translated in diplomatic codes, ways 
of conducting war, exchanging goods, and dealing with any matter concerning inter-
state relationships. A decision-making procedure was established, in the sense that only 
heads of state could decide on inter-state matters through consensus. It should be noted 
here that – with the possible exception of the Chinese, Ottoman, Persian and Ethiopian 
empires – states outside Europe were not seen as equal to those in Europe. They could, 
and thus should, be conquered and colonized, and the principle of equality was applicable 
only to Christian countries. As time went on, more states were seen to come under the 
equality rule which, in our own century, applies to all states. The principles, norms, rules, 
and procedures are now largely codified, but it took 350 years for them to arrive at their 
present level of institutionalization, and we will not see their end for quite a few centuries 
to come.
Parties and Positions
The need to start peace talks came at a time when all of the parties were stuck in hurting 
stalemates. None of the parties could win a decisive victory, with the exception perhaps of 
the Dutch, who were easily able to strike a favourable deal with their Spanish opponents. 
These stand-offs were particularly hurting the civil population, as human rights were 
violated on a grand scale. In the Palatinate, the French engaged in such systematic 
slaughter that it might well qualify as the first modern-day genocide. Why, then, were the 
countries of Western Europe so much at odds with each other? In order to understand this, 
and its consequences for the negotiations in Münster, an overview of the developments 
in and around the Westphalia Treaty has to set the stage. There is quite a lot of literature 
on the Münster negotiations (Dickmann, 1959; Anderson, 1963; and Duchhardt, 1993), 
especially in the Netherlands (Groenveld, 2000; Meerts, 2000; Rietbergen, 2000; Tromp, 
2000; and Wilde, 2000), as it was a crucial negotiation, not only for Europe in general, 
but for the Netherlands as well. After all, it was in Münster that the European monarchs 
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allowed the Republic of the United Netherlands to be a sovereign state, although it had 
already been independent for half a century.
Although religious differences were seen as one of the engines of the Thirty Years’ 
War, the Catholic French had no qualms about intervening on the side of the Protestant 
princes against their Catholic overlords. In that sense, rulers were often very pragmatic as 
far as religion was concerned; nor did they care about the fate of those who were close 
to them in terms of nationality or language. The Dutch had no compunction, for example, 
about blocking the River Scheldt and causing starvation to the Dutch-speaking Flemish 
population in Antwerp. Indeed, Amsterdam owed its wealth to the blockade and fall of 
Antwerp, which had once been the largest city in Europe and where Calvinism had a 
foothold long before it came to Amsterdam. In fact, Amsterdam remained Catholic and 
loyal to Spain for such a long time that the other Dutch cities made it the formal, but never 
de facto, capital of the Netherlands. To the present day, the Dutch head of state and the 
government reside in the city of The Hague which, in the seventeenth century, was a 
village and thus without city walls. Neither religion nor nationality, nor any other value-
loaded reasons, were at the heart of these ongoing conflicts. They were really all about 
power politics, about who would have a dominant position, and what territory would be 
accepted as a legitimate state.
At the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the hurting stalemates were 
such that pre-negotiations, leading up to agreements to break the deadlocks, became 
unavoidable. The pre-negotiations between Spain and the Netherlands, starting in 1621 
and becoming regular in character from 1626 onwards, were in themselves illustrative 
of the road to Westphalia. After 80 years of war, interrupted by a twelve-year truce, both 
parties were tired, but not everybody wanted peace. While some factions within both 
camps longed for peace, others saw it as most inappropriate. The principal adviser to 
Spanish King Philip IV, the Count-Duke of Olivares and San Lúcar, Don Gaspar de Guzmán, 
made the mistake of renewing hostilities against the Dutch after the Twelve Years’ Truce, 
creating more disaster for Spain. When the count-duke was finally obliged to make good 
this error by suing for peace, he had to grant many concessions to bring the Dutch rebels 
to the negotiating table. One problem that arose was the question of where to meet 
the Dutch rebels and how to provide passports for them. After long negotiations, the 
Dutch accepted passports that mentioned the king of Spain as their protector rather than 
sovereign. This, in itself, was a major concession on the part of the Spaniards, and indicated 
that the Spanish king was willing to give up sovereignty over his Dutch provinces. A long 
discussion followed as to whether or not the king could describe himself as a protector in 
perpetuity (Poelhekke, 1948: 22).
On the Dutch side, Prince Frederik Hendrik of Orange, the lord governor or stadtholder 
of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, resisted the idea of a ‘hasty peace’, as his 
French allies – in return for their support – had asked the Netherlands not to conclude a 
separate peace agreement with Spain as this would weaken the French war effort. But 
while France needed the Dutch fleet in its war with Spain, French support for the uprising 
in Catalonia in 1640 had exacerbated relations with the Dutch. Prince Frederik Hendrik 
also needed the French, but not for his war effort; he needed the French as an ally within 
his own country. The Dutch fleet at that time was a mighty one that could plunder the 
Spanish colonies more or less at will; on the ground, however, Prince Frederik Hendrik 
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had destroyed the Spanish forces and made the northern part of the southern province of 
Brabant an effective land barrier. The merchants were in power in the major cities of the 
Netherlands and in the seven sovereign provinces, but Prince Frederik Hendrik’s duty as 
governor was to maintain the unity of the country. He had no sovereign powers but was an 
appointee of the states-general, the representative body of the provinces. As he tried to 
become more independent of them, he was also in competition with the Raadspensionaris, 
the prime minister of the hegemonic province of Holland. Frederik Hendrik thus needed an 
ally in a struggle within his own country, and the French were available.
As France still had to consolidate its position as a result of new territorial acquisitions 
made from the house of Habsburg, especially in Germany, the war was prolonged. In 
the Netherlands, however, most of the provinces wanted peace. Although the war was 
profitable for provinces that earned a living by keeping Antwerp closed or by pirating 
Spanish and Portuguese possessions (notably the province of Zeeland), other provinces, 
especially Holland, which was paying more than 50 per cent of the war budget, wanted 
peace, because the war and the damage it was causing to merchant vessels were 
too costly. The necessity of maintaining land forces was a particular thorn in the side 
of the merchant families, partly because of the cost, and partly also because the army 
was the power base of the governor, so the merchants were consequently subsidizing 
the powerful arm of their political rival. Frederik Hendrik had inherited the army from 
his brother, Prince Maurits, who had modernized it to create one of the most effective 
forces in Europe. As the merchants were interested only in overseas trade, they even 
contemplated giving up the inland provinces to save money on the army, an extraordinary 
situation as there was no political or military need to do away with these territories. The 
House of Orange also resented these ideas, because it had hopes of playing a role in 
Germany again, where it had its Nassau possessions. It feared anyway that a peace treaty 
would mean a permanent separation between the Northern and the Southern Netherlands 
(De Schepper et al., 1997: 5). Yet the House of Orange could not avoid peace negotiations 
forever and, slowly but surely, it was forced into contacts with Spain. It agreed to peace 
negotiations on the condition that the French would negotiate with Spain at the same 
time.
The French, for their part, had overcome their internal religious feuds. By the 
Edict of Nantes in 1598, the French Protestants (the Huguenots) were given equal rights 
with the Catholics, thus restoring internal unity to France, which would last over 100 years 
and provide the French King Henry IV with a basis for a more effective foreign policy. 
Henry used this opportunity to intervene in Habsburg affairs in Spain (by supporting the 
rebels in Catalonia), in the Spanish Netherlands (modern-day Belgium), and in Germany 
(mainly the Rhineland and Bavaria). French offensives came to a halt in the first half of 
the seventeenth century with the advent of the Thirty Years’ War. Notwithstanding French 
alliances with the Protestants in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, their successes 
threatened to fade away, as Spain and Germany proved to be tough opponents. The French 
needed a peace agreement to divide their opponents. They were also in danger of losing 
their Dutch ally, as the Eighty Years’ War with Spain was now drawing to a close. France 
had obviously not yet had its fill of warfare, but needed to buy time for more expansionist 
wars. That is why, for France, the Peace of Westphalia was a short-lived peace.
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Westphalia was a forward-looking outcome in the sense that it gave birth to the new 
notion of sovereignty and did away with the old hierarchy of states that was headed by 
the Pope and the German emperor and its retinue of various monarchies and republics. It 
created self-ruling entities within Germany, thereby removing Germany as a central power 
from the European balance-of-power system for more than 200 years. France’s intention 
of expanding its territory to the River Rhine, and into Italy and ‘Belgium’, was revealed 
after Westphalia in a succession of negotiations on warfare and peace that lasted more 
than 50 years to the beginning of the eighteenth century, for negotiation now served as 
a tool in warfare, instead of warfare as a tool in negotiation. In terms of ending all wars 
between all negotiating partners, however, Westphalia was not very forward-looking for 
the French–Spanish and French–German relationships, but a mere breathing space in a 
series of struggles for hegemonic power by Spain, France and Germany, as each party 
sought justice in its own quest for dominance.
The Spanish urgently needed peace, as their position of hegemony was declining 
under internal and external pressure. They were ripe for negotiation. Internally, they had to 
cope with the rebellions in the Netherlands, Catalonia and Portugal. The northern part of 
the Netherlands was out of their control by the end of the sixteenth century, but the Dutch 
had again subdued the southern part (present-day Belgium). Calvinism had taken root. As 
the south was far more important than the north, Spain was ready to sacrifice the north 
to keep its hands on the south. That part of the kingdom, however, was under threat from 
both the Dutch and the French. Moreover, the Thirty Years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire 
and the hegemony of the Dutch–English fleets in the North Atlantic made it extremely 
difficult to defend ‘Belgium’ in an effective way. By destroying the home-bound armadas, 
pirating coastal areas, and even taking over colonies, the Dutch and English were draining 
Spain of revenues from its colonies in Latin America (with a large amount of gold and 
silver to pay the mercenaries falling into Dutch and English hands). The breakaway of 
Portugal with the Treaty of Tordesillas made things worse, both in the colonies and on 
the Iberian peninsula itself. Meanwhile, the French interventions in Catalonia threatened 
the very heart of the kingdom – the union between Castille and Aragon – as well as the 
Spanish (formerly Aragonese) possessions in southern Italy (Naples and Sicily).
For Spain, peace negotiations were not the tool for progressive warfare that they were 
for France, but were deemed indispensable in defending the status quo. At that time, 
Spain was ready to pay a high price for peace, both with the Netherlands and France. The 
Spanish strategy, however, was to conclude a peace agreement with the lesser danger, the 
Dutch, in order to have its hands free against the greater one, the French. As mentioned, 
however, the French had little interest in a peace treaty and therefore had considerable 
interest in keeping the Dutch at war against Spain and the Swedes at war against the 
German emperor. Both the Dutch and the Swedes were running out of steam, adding 
their contribution to the ripeness of the situation – for different reasons, however. The 
Dutch, because of the high costs of the war and the power that an agreement would give 
to the House of Orange, were ready to come to terms with Spain, and Spain was ready 
to come to terms with them (Meijer Drees, 1996). All the major concessions would come 
from the Spanish side, and the parties more or less had an agreement in the first weeks 
of the negotiations. They even signed an ‘eternal cease-fire’ in 1646, but final agreement 
took a further two years because of France, and even then a Spanish–French agreement 
147Chapter VI:  The Seventeenth Century: Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes
would have been rather unlikely had it not been for the considerable threat of a separate 
Spanish–Dutch agreement.
Sweden also had its own reasons for wanting a peace accord. At the beginning of the 
Thirty Years’ War, Sweden had been relatively successful under the leadership of King 
Gustavus Adolphus, but Sweden was a country of limited resources. Its few colonies did 
not produce the silver and gold required to pay mercenaries; it was engaged in an ongoing 
competitive struggle with Denmark; and it also had to hold off Russia and defend its 
interests in the Polish kingdom. After the Union of Lublin with the Archduchy of Lithuania, 
Poland had gained enough strength to start to become a threat to Swedish hegemony 
in the Baltic, especially after the defeat of the German Teutonic knights by a Polish–
Lithuanian force. The greatest threat to the Swedish possessions in Finland and the Baltic 
states, however, was tightening its claws around Swedish Ingermannland (the present-
day St Petersburg area): the Russian bear was now waking up after freeing itself from the 
Mongol yoke.
The Baltic offset Sweden’s lack of major colonies and was its economic power base, 
as well as an indispensable part of the economy of the main Swedish ally in the Baltic 
arena, the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands. The Dutch United Provinces and 
their fleets fought on Sweden’s side against Denmark but, when Denmark became too 
weak, switched sides, joined the Danes, and defeated the Swedish fleet. As the Dutch 
Protestant ally became less and less reliable, the other Protestant allies – the Lutheran 
princes in northern Germany – came under growing pressure from the ever-more assertive 
armies of the German emperor and the German Catholic states. The fortunes of war in 
Germany were turning against Sweden, which did not have enough potential to maintain 
its northern dominance.
If anyone needed peace negotiations, it was the Germans. Germany had been 
devastated by the Thirty Years’ War, and was a hopelessly divided country. Situated at 
the centre of Europe, the largest and wealthiest of all European states and the successor 
state of the western Roman Empire, it fell into disarray because of its feudal system. 
The decentralized state also fell victim to the growing importance of the seven electoral 
states that decided who would be the Holy Roman Emperor. As the major German states 
were virtually independent, with all the characteristics of sovereignty apart from formal 
acknowledgement of it by the highest authorities, the emperor sought to re-establish his 
power through centralization and, taking his cue from his opponents, tried to use religion 
as a tool. A peace treaty would not even mean a loss of the Netherlands, which was 
officially still part of the Holy Roman Empire, as it had already acknowledged its de facto 
independence at the Diet of Augsburg in 1548 (De Schepper and De Vet, 1997: 28) .
This introduced to the fight the ideological dimension of justice, which seemed to be 
a struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism but was, in fact, a struggle purely for 
power. Other players in Europe took advantage of this opportunity and became involved 
in the civil war, thereby turning it into an international war. As long as the outside powers 
still had a sufficient stake in the conflict, the war would rage on, even if the German 
states themselves were tired of the situation. It was only when the foreign powers also 
became war-weary that a negotiated solution became feasible. The hurting stalemate 
in the fourth decade of the seventeenth century created the opportunity at Westphalia, 
although the French still tried to procrastinate as much as possible. It is no coincidence 
148 Diplomatic Negotiation
that many of the wars in the second half of the seventeenth century were initiated by 
the French, who were dissatisfied with their expansionist progress in the first half of the 
century.
Procedures and Processes
The stage was thus set for one of the most important negotiations in the history to date 
of Western Europe, with all players ready to come to the table, eagerly or reluctantly, as 
victorious powers or victims. The peace negotiations were a turning point in the struggle 
for power in Europe, as the ‘upwardly mobile’ states – such as France, Sweden and the 
Netherlands – evened the score with the declining forces of the Holy See, the Holy Roman 
Empire of Germany, and Spain. Through international negotiation processes, this political 
change projected itself into changes in the formal relationships between the states of 
Western Europe. The formal inequality of states was transformed into formal equality. The 
pyramid structure was transformed into a flat one; formal hierarchy was replaced by an 
informal hierarchy. In a way, the state system was, at least formally, democratized. State 
sovereignty became a universally applicable way of creating an international order. These 
newly established principles of justice would pertain for the new international regime. 
For the moment, however, the negotiations would primarily create opportunities for a 
new European order where politics, not prerogative or religion, would determine the way 
in which the continent was ruled.
Adversaries negotiated backward-looking beginnings on the exchange of prisoners of 
war, and negotiations finally resulted in temporary truces such as the Twelve Years’ Truce 
between Spain and the Netherlands from 1609–1621). During negotiations between the 
French and their Swedish allies in Hamburg in 1641, it was decided that peace negotiations 
should be started with their opponents. The Danes pleaded in favour of this proposal at 
the German imperial court, where Emperor Ferdinand III accepted the idea of peace talks, 
also on behalf of Spain, and it was decided to invite the Netherlands as well, even though it 
was not directly involved in the Thirty Years’ War (Dickmann, 1959; and Groenveld, 2000).
Münster and Osnabrück were declared neutral. In Münster, negotiations were 
carried on by the German emperor, German Catholic states, France and Spain, and 
between Spain and the Netherlands. The German emperor, German Protestant states and 
Protestant Sweden did their bargaining in Osnabrück, and Denmark, Poland, the Swiss 
Confederation and several Italian states sent observers. In 1645, the French succeeded 
in having the representatives of both the Dutch and the German Electoral States 
accepted at a diplomatic level, which opened the final gate to Westphalia. In the end, 
more than 190 political entities – about as many as the members of the United Nations 
today – participated in the overall process. Of these, 109 sent their own envoys, while the 
others used their allies’ ambassadors to monitor the meetings or to put their proposals 
forward. The negotiations at Westphalia started in 1644, two years later than planned, and 
were over in 1648.
It was the largest conference the world had ever seen. Only the Germans held plenary 
sessions: the Protestants in Osnabrück; and the Catholics in Münster. The bulk of the 
negotiations were bilateral, sometimes face-to-face, normally only through documents, 
but in the toughest cases through mediators. The role of the mediators in Westphalia was 
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clearly an active one. Not merely neutral brokers, they also had to steer the process, to 
promote a favourable climate and to propose helpful ways out of deadlocks. In Münster, 
the mediators were the Venetian envoy and the papal ambassador, or nuncio. Informal 
mediators intervened in many cases, and these were normally envoys of countries with 
an interest in a peace agreement between two other states. The Dutch, for example, 
often mediated between their French ally and their Spanish ‘enemy’ (Groenveld, 2000). 
They needed the French for a peace treaty with Spain, but they preferred a weak Spain 
as ruler in the southern Netherlands to a strong France taking over and therefore directly 
bordering on Dutch soil (something that would happen some 25 years later anyway when 
the ally became the enemy under French King Louis XIV).
Westphalia, and particularly the Münster agreement, can be viewed as a system 
of connected bilateral negotiations. It thus had a multilateral connotation, albeit not in 
the modern sense of the word. This study therefore proposes the term multi-bilateral 
negotiation, as the meetings had the character of a conference and led to many informal 
contacts between delegations that were not involved in formal negotiations with each 
other. It is interesting to note that this kind of transverse or translateral negotiation, in 
combination with regular longitudinal negotiation, is also common practice in today’s 
conference diplomacy. In fact, the greater the number of participating parties and the 
more complicated and numerous the issues, the more translateral negotiations inside and 
outside the conference rooms are necessary to keep the process flowing. The process 
of European integration is one outstanding example of this. It is clear, however, that in a 
situation where multilateral negotiation is not performed and parallel bilateral negotiations 
between many actors abound, translateral negotiations are even more necessary to keep 
the fabric in place. Just as today’s negotiators use the corridors extensively and the major 
decisions are often taken outside the conference room, ‘at the Congress of Ryswick [in 
1697], the English and French negotiators very nearly accomplished the work restoring 
peace to Christendom while walking up and down an alley under some apple trees’ 
(Matveyev, 2000: 13) – an early version of the famous ‘walk in the woods’ of 1982 by US 
and Soviet arms-control negotiators.
At Westphalia there was a quadruple communication problem. First, the negotiators 
had no conference building at their disposal and had to negotiate in their lodgings. 
Second, the distance back to their superiors in the capital was enormous, in terms both 
of time – long distances on horseback through war-ridden regions – and of power, as 
they received their instructions from the monarchs themselves. Third, questions of rank 
and status hampered informal negotiations and often led to miscommunication, or even 
went as far as direct fighting. Fourth, negotiators were on the whole quite intransigent in 
their negotiation behaviour. In the virtual absence of mechanisms to provide assurances 
and safeguards, distrust was universal. Verification took a long time and was often highly 
inaccurate. These obstacles, together with the absence of the multilateral mode, gave 
birth to a slow and non-transparent process. The consequence of this ‘scattered’ form 
of negotiation, which remained the normal pattern until the Congress of Vienna some 
170 years later, was a range of treaties without much interconnection, notwithstanding 
the use of translateral contacts.
The processes in Münster can be regarded as ‘diplomatic negotiations’, which are 
defined here as negotiations between official representatives of sovereign (or semi-
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sovereign) units. At the Münster peace negotiations, the units in question were sovereign 
states, autonomous federal states, plus de facto independent states that were asking 
for recognition (in this case, the United Provinces of the Netherlands and the Swiss 
Confederation). ‘Rebels’ were also present, but only as part of one of the recognized 
delegations. The Catalans and the Portuguese, for example, were part of the French 
delegation. As was noted above, the most important actors – the German empire and 
its federal states, the kingdoms of France, Spain and Sweden, the republics of Venice 
(as co-mediator), Switzerland and the Netherlands and, last but not least, the Holy See 
(as co-mediator) – were never in the same room at any time during the negotiations.
As the negotiations were bilateral, taking place in turn at the residency of each of the 
parties directly involved, secrecy was more or less guaranteed, but so too was a power 
imbalance. This system of a set of partially linked parallel meetings, which was customary 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, afforded the larger party superior power. 
Simulations of the 1697 Congress of Ryswick by the Clingendael Institute in 1987 and 1997 
have clearly shown how weak the coalitions were (Meerts, 1997b: 29). Their members 
were not only unable to communicate effectively, but weak transverse communication 
and negotiation enhanced the power of the stronger parties. While the procedures and 
processes of the negotiations at Westphalia favoured the larger countries, the smaller 
parties counted themselves fortunate to be invited. Without the gigantic gathering, they 
would have been left much more out in the cold, and this is one of the reasons in this 
day and age why small countries are so in favour of multilateral meetings while their 
bigger ‘brothers’ often prefer the bilateral mode. With regard to procedure and process, 
Westphalia can be seen as being between the old-fashioned bilateral interaction and the 
conference diplomacy of the twenty-first century.
At Westphalia, proposals could be put forward in three ways. The first was the most 
formal. An official letter would be sent to the mediator, which he was allowed to open and 
examine. He would then either forward the letter unaltered, or first negotiate alterations in 
the text with the sender. The second method of making a proposal involved official papers 
of a more exploratory nature, while the third method was to make tentative, informal 
proposals to which the parties did not yet wish to bind themselves. Complete treaty texts 
were agreed by reaching a series of sub-agreements. In some cases, these complete 
texts were published as proposals before the parties were allowed to give their opinion. 
Proposals remained provisional until an overall final agreement was reached (Poelhekke, 
1948).
The lingua franca at the Münster negotiations was Latin, but French and Italian were 
also used. The main language used at Osnabrück, however, was German, a language in 
which the Swedes were also proficient. The Dutch and the Spanish negotiated mainly 
in their own languages. In direct contacts, negotiators of the smaller countries often 
agreed to use the language of the larger country, which added to the difficulties that 
negotiators already had in terms of power difference. Negotiating in a situation where 
one opponent can use his mother tongue and the other cannot is obviously advantageous 
to the former (Marcos, Eisma-Lubbers and Guimon, 1977). All in all, some 800 meetings 
were held, mostly during the winter. As the generals went off to battle again in summer, 
the diplomatic process more or less ground to a halt during the warmer weather. How 
did the negotiators deal with their problems, given the prevalence of warlords, the many 
151Chapter VI:  The Seventeenth Century: Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes
procedural restrictions, the non-transparency of the processes, the procrastinating tactics 
of the parties, their inflexible positions, and the multitude of problems at hand while a war 
was raging directly outside the neutral conference cities of Osnabrück and Münster?
The paradox of the negotiations in Münster was the undeniable backward-looking 
character of the negotiation process leading to forward-looking outcomes. The delegates 
did what they could to defend their states’ interests without taking into account the 
interests of the collective whole in Europe. This strategy is notably different from the 
intra-European negotiations of today, where there is a greater balance between national 
and supranational interests than in the seventeenth century. The delegates had a 
far less flexible mandate than, for instance, the EU negotiators of our own time; their 
personal safety was much less well guaranteed; they had to cope with unrestricted 
power differences; and they were hindered by strict procedures mirroring those power 
differences. In this situation, they could do no more than negotiate an end to warfare and 
were denied the capability of working on a more lasting peace by building in forward-
looking elements. The backward-looking agreements, however, would have been of no 
value whatsoever had the status of the negotiating parties remained fixed. In other words, 
no backward-looking peace deal could have been concluded if the Helvetian, Venetian 
and Dutch republics had not been acknowledged as genuine states, if the German empire 
and the Spanish kingdom had not been willing to accept France and others as equals, and 
if Protestantism had not been accepted as a branch of Christianity in its own right. It was 
only such structural changes that made situational agreements viable. As a consequence, 
the negotiation process had a backward-looking character that led to a forward-looking 
outcome.
People and Posture
It is, of course, even more problematical to analyze the behaviour of the diplomatic 
negotiators of 350 years ago than of our own time (Kaufmann, 1989: 301). Nevertheless, 
we can say something useful about the negotiation behaviour during Westphalia, 
especially the Münster dealings, as extensive and detailed accounts are available. 
According to Johan Kaufmann, the conference diplomat had to be able to play many 
roles, including silent partner, lobbyist, orator and procedural specialist (Kaufmann, 1996: 
124). Detailed accounts by J.J. Poelhekke, Fritz Dickmann and Simon Groenveld on the 
negotiation process and the behaviour of negotiators at Westphalia show that, in this 
sense, seventeenth-century diplomatic negotiators were not really different from those 
operating in our own time (Poelhekke, 1948; Dickmann, 1959; and Groenveld, 2000).
Negotiators and their governments were inclined to ask for more than they could 
reasonably expect to get (Fisher, 1971: 86). For several reasons, the willingness to make 
concessions at Münster was, by contemporary standards, extremely small. The first reason 
was fundamental: the stature of the participating states. It was extremely important for 
each actor not to lose face, a backward-looking consideration par excellence. At this 
conference, where the Europe of medieval unity was to be replaced by a Europe of 
sovereign states, each state needed to reflect its (supposed) sovereignty to the greatest 
possible degree in its rights and prerogatives. Every concession made by a state was 
considered to be detrimental to its own position. This applied most of all to the German 
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empire, which was about to lose both its internal and its external sovereignty, as well 
as the right, which it shared with the Holy See, to be the symbol of European unity. The 
Catholic Church was in the same position. Recognition of freedom of religion by individual 
states or sovereigns detracted from the notion that the Catholic Church was the sole 
authority in Western and Central European Christianity.
The same applied to the states that were trying to turn their de facto independence 
into sovereignty de jure, as well as to states that were already sovereign but fighting for 
the best position within Europe. All sovereign states were equal, but some were more 
equal than others. They bargained extensively over the problem of precedence, and 
not only in a peaceable fashion; it was not unusual in those days for there to be bloody 
encounters between delegates’ assistants. States’ insecurity about their own position led 
to a hardening of attitudes, reinforced by differences of opinion between the mediators 
and differences of vision and power within various delegations. These differences were 
turned into issues of status and resulted in positional negotiations. Hence, before the 
substance of the meeting could even be discussed, the parties argued at length about the 
formalities that they felt not only defined their positions, but also protected and defined 
the stature of the negotiator (read: of his superior). Form had priority over substance and 
obstructed smooth progress. In fact, the formal opening of the Münster talks was delayed 
for six months because of arguments about questions of precedence (Anderson, 1963). 
Before new borders could be defined, the boundaries between the negotiators had to be 
determined.
From the outset, this highly inflexible structure, which was dictated by the subject 
matter of the negotiations – namely, establishing the differences between the states rather 
than pursuing their interdependence – resulted in extremely distributive negotiations. 
One party’s gain was another party’s loss. Maximization was paramount. If Spain wanted 
peace, it would have to offer more than just recognition of the Dutch Republic. Moreover, 
the people of Amsterdam and Zeeland, demanding the blockade of the southern 
Netherlands, did not seem to care that this would be punishing former fellow compatriots 
who had themselves become victims of the Spanish Reconquista. If France wanted to 
increase its power, it had to be prepared to support the advance of Protestantism – an 
anathema within its own borders – in Germany and the Netherlands. Such opportunism 
was not considered at all unethical. The question was how tough a stance to adopt. Those 
who wanted peace needed to be more willing to make concessions than those who would 
benefit from the continued pursuit of justice through war. Thus, it was the various interests 
of the factions within the participating states that contributed to determining how willing 
the parties were to make concessions. War remained an alternative to an agreement.
Maximizing one’s power through the use of force was an acceptable and even 
approved tool of diplomacy, as evidenced by the fact that the war continued to rage during 
the negotiations themselves. Negotiating was itself seen as something of an admission of 
weakness. It could lead to situations where the stronger party forced an agreement on the 
weaker party, resulting in the losing party remaining resentful towards the other side and 
waiting for a chance to exact revenge. The negotiation might be a success in the sense 
that a treaty had been concluded, but the aim of reaching a satisfactory resolution of the 
conflict for both sides was still light years away. If certain goals could not be achieved by 
force, only two options remained: negotiation; or avoidance. Negotiation was simply a way 
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of continuing the battle using other means and resulted, sometimes literally, in bellicose 
behaviour; there are many examples of carriage races and fights between servants, as 
happened between the Spanish and Portuguese delegations. It also resulted in a wait-
and-see attitude, because the tide on the battlefield might turn, and a dominant position 
might help to enforce one’s own demands.
The use of power outside the negotiation rooms thus resulted in a certain abstinence 
from power inside them. The negotiators of the more powerful parties often refrained 
from making use of their superior position because they were afraid that any agreements 
they might reach would be weaker than agreements dictated by military victory. Everyone 
waited for the battle tides to turn, and the negotiations in Münster can therefore be 
seen as encouraging the further use of force. The Treaty of Münster may – for some 
countries – even be viewed as a ‘break’ that was deliberately created for the purpose of 
achieving a better position in a renewed conflict, a forward-looking aspect of a negative 
character. The stronger parties could not yet overturn their weaker opponents. At issue 
was the ‘power of the weak’ (Jönsson, 2000: 18). Time was running out for them, however, 
so some of the stronger parties had to buy time through a treaty. Confirmation of this may 
be seen in the subsequent wars that the states fought to consolidate their own positions 
in the hierarchy of states.
An effective use of superior power was seen as completely legitimate within the peace 
talks, as the structure of the meetings implies. As argued above, the bilateral nature of the 
negotiations afforded the stronger party the chance to capitalize on its superior power – at 
least, if developments on the various battlefields warranted this. At Münster, virtually no 
coalitions were formed – the strict mandates of the negotiators left no room – although 
multilateral conferences are usually an outstanding opportunity for coalition-building. The 
meetings’ formalities also restricted the informal formation of alliances. Some parties did, 
however, attempt to win over negotiators to their side by means that would be considered 
unethical today. For example, bribery was rife, but it usually had little effect. Payments 
were considered, rather, to be a security measure: states paid their own allies large sums 
of money to prevent them from accepting money from the opposition. In fact, it was also 
common practice to accept money from the opposition. The charms of the ambassadors’ 
wives were also deployed to soften the position of some negotiators. The Spanish 
ambassador’s wife, for instance, played just such a role at the Ryswick peace conference.
Everyone at Münster was constantly trying to affect the balance of power, but the net 
result was that the delegations suffered from a chronic lack of funds and only ended up 
worse off, with no real shifts in position having taken place. The real victims of this were 
the townspeople of Münster, for if an ambassador absconded and left large debts, it was 
almost impossible to recover them. The Münster conference was, in fact, little more than 
a means of communicating decisions that had been made elsewhere. Progress could be 
made only if the time was ripe for an agreement outside the negotiation rooms. Whereas 
the goal of negotiations nowadays is to reach an agreement, the aim of the Münster 
negotiations was to have a forum for sealing decisions that were made externally. In other 
words, whether any negotiations took place in the sense in which we understand the 
term today is seriously open to doubt. The balance of power at the negotiating table was 
therefore relatively irrelevant, because power was not going to be used there anyway. 
What mattered was the balance of political and military power outside Münster.
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Münster was a conference of diplomats, not a conference of rulers or their direct 
political representatives (Dickmann, 1959). In that sense, Münster was different in 
principle from the conferences at Vienna and Versailles in later centuries. There was 
no direct possibility of any real compromises being agreed, and the difference in power 
between those mandated and those doing the mandating led to loss of power on the 
part of the envoy and, consequently, to a marginalization of Münster as a whole. This 
is illustrated by the problems that arose in communicating with the negotiating states’ 
capitals. Although Prince von Thurn und Taxis established a regular postal service linking 
Münster, Vienna, Amsterdam, Cologne and Hamburg in 1643, messages were often 
intercepted, both by plundering soldiers and by the opposing party. Moreover, it took 
a very long time for an answer to be returned, which delayed the negotiating process 
even further. The geographical distance between the capital and Münster entailed long 
travelling times, which emphasized the difference in power between the diplomats and 
their masters.
The delegations consisted of all sorts and conditions of people, and their procedural 
conflicts reinforced the negotiations’ backward-looking position politics. It was beyond 
dispute that the delegation’s leader was formally in charge, if only because he was 
representing his sovereign. Delegation leaders representing kingdoms and republics 
were either members of the high nobility or the patrician class. They were sent to Münster 
for many different reasons, at best because of their experience and virtue, and at worst 
because their sovereigns wanted to get rid of them. The reason for their removal from 
court varied from the political, as in the case of the French, to the personal. The King of 
Spain, for instance, sent his ambassador because he wanted to separate him from his 
young wife in Madrid. Representatives of the Mediterranean countries, in particular, saw 
Münster as a punishment, on account of the cold weather, bad facilities, and the fact 
that it was situated far from the centres of power and in a country that was still partly 
at war – and dangerous. Although the town itself was safe, because the emperor had 
stationed a special regiment of soldiers there, there were still gangs of soldiers roaming 
about the countryside.
Some information is available about the behaviour of the delegation leaders. 
Count von Trauttmansdorff, the ambassador of Emperor Ferdinand III and chief 
representative of Germany, was described as decisive, yet friendly. The French 
ambassador, the Duke de Longueville, tried to improve the atmosphere by using his young 
wife’s skills and charms. This put their residence at the centre of diplomatic life in Münster. 
Johan Oxenstierna, however, the Swedish ambassador and son of the Swedish chancellor, 
Axel Oxenstierna, was wavering, blunt and, even worse, uncontrolled. As self-control 
was considered an indispensable quality in negotiators, the last characteristic violated 
seventeenth-century standards. The Swedish ambassador also offended good taste with 
his extreme vanity: trumpets blared when he got out of bed, when he ate his meals, and 
when he went to bed again (Poelhekke, 1948).
In almost all cases, the delegations’ ‘seconds-in-command’ were lawyers of great 
repute. There seems to be little doubt that these specialists had more influence than 
their official leaders, who were sometimes more interested in worldly pleasures than in 
substantive negotiations, in so far as we can speak of substantive negotiations at all. 
Pleasures were only sparingly available and were therefore created, at great expense, 
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by the gentlemen themselves. Bickering between ambassadors and their seconds-in-
command was a common occurrence, partly because the former held the latter in such 
contempt.
In some cases, the seconds-in-command also had differences of opinion among 
themselves. For example, one of the two French seconds-in-command, the Count 
Claude d’Avaux, was, like the ambassador, an opponent of the French policy of supporting 
the German Protestant princes. The other, Abel Servien, found it less objectionable. 
Both men worked on the same files, a seemingly impractical arrangement, unless one 
considers that they were, in fact, being used to check on each other (Tischer, 2008). They 
each represented different factions of the court and continued their battle in Münster. 
They reported to the capital independently and tried to blacken each other’s reputation 
as much as possible. Within the Swedish delegation, there were great frictions between 
Johan Oxenstierna, who represented his father, the chancellor’s interests, and his second-
in-command, Johan Adler Salvius, who promoted the interests of Queen Christina of 
Sweden. Adriaan Pauw, Godard van Reede and Johan de Knuyt, the Dutch diplomats, 
also clashed regularly, which is not surprising when one considers that they were each 
promoting completely different interests (those of Holland, Utrecht, and the governor of 
the Republic, respectively). Delegates also tried to stir up differences of opinion in other 
delegations to weaken their position, or to help restrain these opposing views if they were 
a hindrance to agreement (Poelhekke, 1948; Geurts, 1997).
Tensions between the delegations were expressed in all sorts of precedence disputes, 
which were sometimes settled by threats or the use of violence. Ambassadors seized 
every opportunity to show their precedence over others; and lower-ranked diplomats did 
all that they could to gain higher formal prestige. The electors eventually managed to have 
themselves considered as sovereigns for the duration of the talks, which immediately 
gave them a higher status. This temporary power of the electors was responsible for 
the inclusion in the final agreement of a number of conditions on the exercise of certain 
important imperial powers. Electors with an ecclesiastical status sometimes called upon 
this status to gain temporary precedence. The Church was ranked highest of all, so the 
papal nuncio (envoy) was the only one allowed to sit on a dais. By wearing their vestments, 
some electors with the rank of bishop managed to gain a better place during solemn 
ceremonies (Rietbergen, 2000: 92). The French tried to discriminate between monarchies 
and republics, with republics, of course, thought to be of a lower order. The French were 
not prepared to accept equality of status until, on one occasion, the representative of the 
Doge of Venice threatened to leave the conference permanently.
The French were apparently not primarily interested in stimulating a fruitful negotiating 
atmosphere, but preferred to give priority to prestige issues. For example, considering 
the Venetian mediator to be inferior in rank because he represented a republic and not 
a monarchy, they treated him with contempt by waiting for him at the foot of the stairs 
instead of at the door of his carriage. This ceremony was repeated upon his departure. 
The attitude shown by the French a few years earlier during talks on the continuation of 
the French–Dutch alliance was even more offensive: at every available opportunity, they 
made it clear in their ceremonial behaviour towards the Dutch that the Republic was 
of a lower standing than France. Indeed, irritation at this behaviour contributed to the 
Dutch decision to dissolve their alliance with France. The Spanish, by contrast, were much 
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smoother operators in this respect. At Münster, for instance, they went to sign the treaty 
at the quarters of the Dutch legation – an action that typified the attitude of Spain towards 
the Republic, for it was very much in Spain’s interest that the Republic should withdraw 
from its alliance with France. The handling of questions of rank had a strong emotional 
effect on the players involved, and a decisive impact on the willingness of negotiators to 
compromise.
Nor, often, were relationships with the various home authorities very good. This was a 
result of chronic financial worries caused by expenditure on all the pomp and splendour 
that the delegations needed to emphasize their superiority, expenditure that the capitals 
were unwilling to cover in its entirety. The need to bribe other parties was another cause 
of financial troubles. Money was offered even to the highest nobles, who accepted it 
eagerly. The republics seemed to have more scruples in this matter than the monarchies. 
The representatives of the Dutch States-General, for example, prohibited the acceptance 
of gifts, but this was circumvented by directing the gifts to the negotiators’ wives.
It cannot be said, therefore, that the delegations paid no attention to cultivating their 
relationships with other parties, but they went about it in such a way, and in such an 
atmosphere of mutual distrust and pomposity, that any positive effect on the mutual 
relationships was minimal. In a situation in which the mandates were severely restricted 
or non-existent, however, it is doubtful whether the relationships between the diplomats 
were of any real significance. In some cases, countries even refused to associate with 
each other during the conference or to use the translateral opportunities that were 
available. This is most clearly illustrated by the refusal of France and Sweden to meet at 
all, which was in part why the peace talks had to be located not only in Münster, but also 
in Osnabrück (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995).
There were endless discussions and, in that sense, the parties can certainly be said to 
have explored the possibilities of reaching an agreement. It is doubtful, however, whether 
this really led to any outcome that integrated opposing viewpoints. The position-based 
manner in which the parties conducted the negotiations and the limited instructions that 
they were given did not leave much room for genuine forward-looking exploration of 
new options for both justice and peace. Furthermore, negotiations on details were left 
to lawyers of lower rank, who knew little about the agreement’s overall structure. The 
ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire, Count von Trauttmansdorff, considered that these 
underlings only confused matters, and the Venetian mediator, Alvisi Contarini, deemed 
them completely incompetent to carry out the sort of negotiations involved. Exploration 
was more a question of espionage and intrigue than of any genuine search for new and 
creative solutions. If, however, we consider exploration as the interaction that takes place 
prior to the start of negotiations proper, there was indeed extensive exploration – or rather, 
the start of the negotiations proper was continually postponed. In fact, the whole process 
might better be described as ‘playing for time’ than ‘exploratory negotiations’ – playing 
for time that was intended to put the other party off balance and to strengthen one’s own 
position (Poelhekke, 1948).
In general, the negotiations that took place in Münster were indirect, whereas those 
that took place in Osnabrück were direct. By the mid-seventeenth century, the use of 
mediators had become relatively unusual, but they were still employed at Münster. The 
papal nuncio Fabio Chigi, and the Venetian Alvisi Contarini, acted as mediators and, as far 
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as we know, they conducted themselves as neutral mediators, formally maintaining their 
distance from the negotiators (Poelhekke, 1948). They did not dine with them, nor did 
they accept any gifts. Up to a point, however, each mediator clearly had his own hidden 
agenda as well. For the nuncio, it was important that the power of the Protestant states 
be limited; for the Venetian, the main issue was peace on the continent, as the turmoil 
in Central Europe was not conducive to the Venetian transit trade. Furthermore, Venice 
was under threat from Turkey and would therefore welcome some military assistance. The 
other countries were well aware of these hidden agendas, and limited the role of the papal 
negotiator to mediation only between Roman Catholic countries.
The involvement of the two mediators made it both easier and more difficult to explore 
options. On the one hand, by creating a buffer in this way, direct encounters were avoided, 
which meant that options could be explored without the risk of immediate confrontation. 
On the other hand, it hindered any direct, informal contact, ruling out from the start much 
chance of flexibility in the negotiating process. Where face-to-face negotiations could be 
practised, for example between the Spaniards and the Dutch, the process ran much more 
smoothly, but this also had to do with the greater amount of common ground between 
them, so that cause and effect were circular.
Prevention and Prospectiveness
What came out of the Westphalian negotiation processes and how forward-looking were 
they? Although there is no overall Westphalian peace agreement, but only a number of 
separate treaties between different parties, we can still describe the Peace of Westphalia 
in terms of different agreements with several common denominators that collectively 
changed the political theatre of Western Europe. The short-term common traits were 
backward-looking – that is, peace that was achieved through ending hostilities and settling 
conflicts that had bedevilled the Christian European states during the first half of the 
seventeenth century. The mid-term commonalities were that all of the pacts tried to create 
a peaceful situation and more fruitful cooperation for the remainder of the seventeenth 
century. The long-term effects were the establishment of new criteria of justice: a new 
regime and a new political order for Europe and, as it happened, for the world as well.
The states at the time saw the deteriorating political situation as a common problem 
needing a cooperative solution. It was not at all feasible to deal with this common issue 
in a multilateral setting, yet the countries envisaged the need for a gathering of all the 
parties involved, even those – such as Denmark and Poland – that were only indirectly 
affected by the disastrous Thirty Years’ War. At the same time, they took the opportunity 
to settle other long-term conflicts, such as the Eighty Years’ War. Translateral negotiations 
and coordinated mediation were effective enough to create a good deal of synergy 
to compensate for the lack of multilateral negotiation processes and very inflexible 
procedures.
Most of the agreements on international political matters confirmed the status quo 
of 1648 in Europe and overseas. On these issues, Münster and Osnabrück were forward-
looking, as the political agreements that put an end to an unstable situation laid the 
foundations for new regimes. They were based on a status quo that, in its turn, was 
based on a ‘mutual hurting stalemate’, the only alternative to which was a peace pact. 
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The forward-looking outcomes, however, were based on backward-looking agreements, 
settling issues that had already been settled in reality, and an acceptance of painful 
concessions that were already lost, sometimes for decades.
In a century in which saving face was the most important characteristic of the ruler 
and his land, it was extremely difficult for the countries to accept changes that could 
be seen as losses. Even if one gained something else in return, losing was simply ‘not 
done’. Negotiators could often only agree on maintaining the status quo; new solutions 
appeared to be intractable in nearly all short-term outcomes. As the restoration of a true 
status quo was impossible, however, new arrangements were made on national political 
and religious matters, and these outcomes would last for centuries. This was possible only 
in negotiations where the internal dimension had precedence over the external, where, 
in other words, more control could be exercised and deals could go beyond status-quo 
agreements.
The Eighty Years’ War was ended by an agreement in Münster between Spain and 
the Netherlands, by which Spain gave up the sovereignty that it had lost half a century 
earlier over the northern part of the Netherlands. Both Spain and the Netherlands kept the 
overseas possessions that they held at the time of the agreement. The borders between 
‘Belgium’ and the Republic remained unchanged, but had to be fixed in detail. This was 
a difficult question as the de facto borders cut through Flanders, Brabant and Limburg. 
To avoid problems, a chambre mi-partie (bilateral chamber) was established to fix the 
correct frontier and to decide on questions of ownership, and both parties were equally 
represented. This chamber is an interesting expression of the forward-looking outcome of 
a backward-looking, status quo-compliant process. The institution had a time limitation, 
but is nevertheless an interesting phenomenon, as institutionalized international 
cooperation, let alone inter-state arbitration, was nearly non-existent in seventeenth-
century Europe.
The Dutch blockade of Antwerp came to an end, but only formally. In fact it remained, 
with high import and export tariffs being imposed not only on Antwerp but also on the other 
Flemish ports to avoid indirect trade with Antwerp itself – measures that still fuel Flemish 
resentment against the Dutch today. The peace treaty, however, can be characterized as 
forward-looking, settling issues so thoroughly that it provided for a stable peace. Indeed, 
Spain never really became the enemy of the Dutch again, in contrast with the French ally, 
which became an enemy of the Dutch state for the next 150 years. It should be noted, 
however, that this Spanish–Dutch treaty ended a war that had already ended by itself; 
it merely confirmed the existing peace, and this might have been the main reason for its 
forward-looking character.
A formal reason to characterize the Spanish–Dutch pact as forward-looking was the 
decision that all sovereignty ties, not only between the Netherlands and Spain but also 
between the Netherlands and Germany, would thenceforth be cut. It was in 1648 that 
the Dutch officially left the Holy Roman Empire, an empire that they had once provided 
them with a Roman king who was never enthroned, as he was killed by the Frisians. 
(As an interesting aside, some 200 years later, the Dutch were officially drawn once more 
into German affairs when the province of Limburg entered the German Confederation as 
compensation for the incorporation of western Luxembourg into Belgium.)
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Another argument for labelling this treaty as forward-looking was the establishment 
of the chambre mi-partie. This can be seen as the creation of a very limited new regime, 
in the sense of an institution to guarantee peace and to help to solve currently unknown 
differences of opinion, a truly forward-looking outcome but on a backward-looking basis.
The peace agreements to end the Thirty Years’ War, which continued to rage until the 
very last days of the negotiations, were on the whole quite forward-looking in creating 
peace for some decades at least, although it would not be too long before France and 
Spain became entangled in the Twenty Years’ War. Here, it was the military and political 
situation that primarily determined the final agreements while, in the Spanish–Dutch case, 
judicial reasoning played a much larger role. In the negotiations between France and 
Spain in Münster, no agreement could be reached and the war continued for another ten 
years (until 1659). More successful, however, were the negotiations in Münster between 
France and Germany that dealt with German territories west of the River Rhine (which had 
already been in French hands for nearly 100 years). Some of these regions were owned 
by the Habsburg monarchy itself, so the Spanish resisted any concession on them. As this 
blocked any peace agreement, the Germans had to decide to cut ties with their Spanish 
ally on this matter, just as the Dutch had to break their alliance with France in order to be 
able to conclude an agreement with Spain.
The German peace agreement with Sweden in Osnabrück could also be attained 
only through German concessions, both on land and money. In contrast with the French 
deal, however, Sweden did not obtain sovereign rights over the territories along the 
Baltic coast, which remained nominally within the German realm. This had the advantage 
of bringing the Swedes into the German League, where they could now participate in 
the collective decision creating between the German states in a legitimate way. These 
agreements provided some stability, although not to the extent of the Spanish–Dutch 
pact, and legitimized future Swedish interventions in the affairs of another ‘state’.
The agreements also led to the Osnabrück settlement of national political and 
religious differences within the Holy Roman Empire. It was not just a peace accord. It was 
a Christian peace, a Pax Christiana. Politics and religion were intertwined; they were now 
two sides of the same coin that bore the name ‘peace’. The religions were distributed over 
the empire on the basis of the situation in 1624. In other words, the predominant religion in 
each fiefdom would be determined by the religion pertaining in that Normaljahr (particular 
year). Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism were legitimized as official religions of the 
empire. A major change was the ending of the requirement that subjects automatically 
assumed their ruler’s religion (cuius regio, eius religio) – a repudiation of the 1585 Treaty of 
Augsburg. If the ruler changed his/her religion, the people could not be forced to convert 
as well. This was an extremely forward-looking outcome that can be seen as a crack in 
the theory of monarchical sovereignty and a step in the direction of sovereignty of the 
people. It had pertained in republics such as Venice and the Netherlands, but never before 
in monarchies. Even in the republics, however, the devolution of sovereignty was slow, 
residing in the hands of the richest people.
Furthermore, the relationship between the emperor and the German states had 
been changed radically by the Osnabrück conference, not only in its outcome, but also 
in its process. The lords of the German states had negotiated with the sovereigns on a 
more or less equal basis, and it proved impossible to take back this prerogative later. 
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The lords already regarded themselves, and were in fact acknowledged, as sovereigns 
in their own domain. It should therefore be no surprise that, short of full sovereignty, the 
German states were given far-reaching mandates for home rule. They already had the ius 
territorialis (territorial rights), and now received the ius foederis (treaty rights) – another 
redefinition of justice, with the terms of an alliance coming into play. Germany now 
became a confederation of ‘almost equals’, retaining the difference between those states 
that had a say in the emperor’s election and those that had not. The lords could now 
conclude alliances, conduct international relations and have their own foreign policy, with 
the only bar to full sovereignty being the precondition that their politics should not harm 
the interests of the Holy Roman Empire as a whole. From 1648 onwards, the German 
emperor could no longer claim to be the most important and highest monarch in Western 
Europe, the successor to the emperors of the western Roman Empire, just as the Russian 
tsar regarded himself as the inheritor of the eastern Roman Empire. The Westphalian talks 
resulted in peace but disunity in Germany and, in that sense, foreshadowed Bismarck’s 
policy of reunification in the second half of the nineteenth century.
A negative element in this development was the enormous multiplication of actors in 
Europe’s foreign affairs. This enhanced the risk of new frictions and new wars. Westphalia 
found a forward-looking solution, delegating France and Sweden as guarantors for 
keeping the peace in Germany. Both in the treaty between Germany and France, and 
between Germany and Sweden on 24 October 1648, these ‘outside’ powers were given the 
responsibility of upholding the treaties. To make this feasible, the treaties included an anti-
protest clause that disallowed any protest by the Holy See against the treaties – another 
redefinition of justice. This was forward-looking indeed, as the Pope did protest, refusing 
to accept the religious terms of all the treaties, including the Spanish–Dutch treaty, which 
was even more forward-looking as it comprised the dissolution of the papal claim of 
religious sovereignty over Europe. Just as the emperor lost his claim to political monopoly, 
so the Pope lost his claim to religious monopoly. Not only were the states now equal, 
but so were the religions. The Pope de jure nullified the treaties for reasons of saving 
face, status, religion and politics. The Roman Catholic Church did, however, refrain from 
a de facto attempt to undo the peace agreements that had been attained (Rietbergen, 
2000: 98).
Although the agreements can be seen as forward-looking and did end the ongoing 
conflicts in many areas, this did not mean that all problems were solved, for wars soon 
broke out as a consequence of other disputes. Nevertheless, Westphalia had become the 
basis of the peace treaties that followed. Until 1714, the peace treaties of Westphalia were 
referred to as the basis of later peace agreements, as the ‘mother of all treaties’, for at least 
the next 70 years. During that time, Westphalia was still seen as a moral guide for justice 
in dealing with international relations in Europe and its dependencies, until the French 
Revolution destroyed the old order. The hierarchy of states and religions was gone forever, 
and the equality of sovereign states and religions lives on to this day. These are the most 
forward-looking outcomes of all.
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In Conclusion
In the seventeenth century, the agreements to end the Eighty and Thirty Years’ Wars 
established new regimes in Europe and its dependencies, most of them long-lived. This 
chapter has analyzed the negotiations in Westphalia that established the principle of the 
equality of states having full authority within, and only within, their own territory. It also 
created equality between religions and thus eliminated religion as the source of political 
power. It also did away with the highest political and religious authorities – the Holy 
Roman Emperor and the Pope – and, in that sense, it put a final end to the myth of the 
Roman Empire still being the overall European regime, albeit in a transcendent form. With 
republics now accepted as equal to monarchies, the norm of a ruler being the only power 
within each sovereign unit was weakened, and the seed of sovereignty of the people 
was planted. Indirectly, Westphalia contributed to the breakdown of absolutism and the 
growth of the first rudimentary roots of both democracy and nationalism.
Before Westphalia, war was the rule and negotiation the exception. The conference 
made it clear that peaceful methods of conflict resolution should be the rule for the future. 
It did not work that way, however, as the newly established balance of power was still 
highly unstable. The decline of Germany and Spain and the growth of France and Britain 
were still to reach their equilibrium. Seventeenth-century Westphalia was the eruption 
of the volcano, but there were many aftershocks to come before the Congress of Vienna 
in the early nineteenth century. The procedures established by Westphalia were weak, 
especially compared with those that regulate the relations between countries today. 
Westphalia did, however, create the forerunners of the sophisticated mechanisms of the 
twentieth century. It established some rules and regulations for the peaceful solution of 
conflicts by diplomatic means (Melissen and Van Staden, 2000: 10), for ‘Implied in the 
Münster Treaty was the theory that [...] Sweden and France had rights of intervention in 
the [German] empire’ (Doran, 1971: 94). Westphalia came at a time when the social and 
economic situation in Europe was changing dramatically, and it constructed the political 
regime that fitted this societal evolution.
It should be noted, however, that this has been the outcome, but was not so much the 
intention of the negotiators:
The peacemakers at Westphalia were not concerned with establishing a system 
or framework of international relations that would endure for centuries. What 
Westphalia did do [... was to envisage] Europe and [...] the rest of the world [...] as 
being made up of sovereign, autonomous states. What remained undecided was 
how those states ought to behave toward one another (Wright, 2006: 301).
The most important result – that is, the establishment of a system of equal sovereign 
states as the structuring principle of our world – is still relevant, even if sovereignty has a 
much more limited notion today than in 1648 (Schrijver, 1998: 141). The only way to put an 
end to the desynchronized situation of seventeenth-century Europe when armed conflict 
failed was through international negotiation by diplomats, in spite of the ineffectiveness of 
some of these processes at that time. That said, in view of the recent failures of important 
diplomatic international negotiations, such as those on climate change, we may have 
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reason to review how we negotiate today in complex settings where many countries try to 
find a common denominator.
The proliferation of nation-states, growing necessity of having treaties ratified, rising 
internal turmoil in many modern states, increasing regulation of international issues 
and the growing involvement of non-state actors create a multilateral complexity that 
seems to prohibit effective international negotiation processes and decision-making 
(Brower, 2000: 77–78). Comparing then and now, perhaps the Westphalia negotiation 
process was not so ineffective after all. That does not mean, however, that the regime that 
Westphalia established will be as suitable a framework for cultural, social and economic 
developments as it was in the mid-seventeenth century. After all, Westphalia was a typical 
European solution for European problems of centuries ago. The ‘Eurocentric’ character 
of the Westphalian system (Harding and Lim, 1999: 10) simply may not fit the globalized 
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CHAPTER VII: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: 
BEHAVIOUR OF 
NEGOTIATORS
The Peace of Utrecht – in fact a series of bilateral treaties – put an end to the Spanish 
War of Succession from 1702–1713, a war that affected nearly all of Western and Central 
Europe, as well as parts of Asia, Africa and the Americas through their European colonies 
(Bruin, De, 2013; Onnekink and De Bruin, 2013). The Spanish War of Succession has even 
been labelled the first world war in history because of its spread over the world (Onnekink 
and de Bruin, 2013: 42). It was also the ‘first peace settlement to include an express 
reference to the “balance of power” in treaties’ (Lesaffer, 2013). Others refer to it as a 
‘replay of the Westphalian drama’ (Holsti, 1991: 72). It is anyway a ‘series of compromises, 
a settlement without clear winners or losers, at least in the short term’ (Ghervas, 2013: 28). 
This chapter will analyze these negotiations, comparing them with other negotiations in 
the Netherlands around the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with a 
special eye to the behaviour of the diplomatic negotiators in comparison to those of the 
twenty-first century. Furthermore, the ‘Utrecht’ negotiations will be compared to two other 
important negotiations on Dutch soil: those of Nijmegen; and Ryswick.
What was it about?
[T]he essential purpose of a peace is to protect the independence of the dynastic 
sovereigns by limiting hegemonic designs and policies. The purpose of the Utrecht 
settlements was not so much to avoid future wars as to resolve the issue of 
hegemony – a replay of the Westphalian drama (Holsti, 1991: 72).
Holsti identifies the 1713 Peace of Utrecht as one of the five major peace settlements in 
Europe since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Of these five (the remaining three – as 
mentioned in Part One – are Vienna, Versailles and San Francisco), he values Utrecht 
as the negotiation process with the feeblest outcome. He identifies eight prerequisites 
(Holsti, 1991: 340) for a forward-looking outcome (Zartman and Kremenyuk, 2005), 
meaning a substantial agreement creating a regime for effective management of future 
conflicts: governance; legitimacy; assimilation; deterrent; conflict resolution; war; peaceful 
change; and future issues. In Holsti’s view, Utrecht only satisfies the first two factors, but 
these are still of great importance, as governance and the assimilation of states into a 
common agreement are stepping stones in the direction of some kind of proto-European 
regime that Westphalia hardly created. After all, while Westphalia changed the meaning 
of sovereignty in Europe, it did not clearly define it. Sovereignty in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries is not as watertight as it is today (Schrijver, 1998: 141), although 
developments at the end of the twentieth century indicate that sovereign rights are 
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eroding, which might mean that we are – in the long run – heading towards the same 
unclear situation as 300 years ago. The condition of sovereign rights 300 years ago was 
of great importance to the question of the behaviour of states and their negotiators, as 
‘norms surrounding the institutions of diplomacy were very much tangled up with the 
issue of sovereignty and the status of the dynast’ (Holsti, 2004: 185).
This chapter views the Peace of Utrecht from the perspective of its contribution to 
a better organized Europe, where conflicts might be solved through peaceful means as 
much as possible. Peaceful contributions to the European equilibrium could only be made 
by ‘periodic consultation and negotiation among the great powers, and by some degree of 
willingness to allow every strong power at least a little scope for its ambition to add to its 
territories and its influence’ (Roberts, 1947: 3). We look at the Peace of Utrecht here as a 
forerunner of present-day international negotiation processes, asking ourselves what they 
have in common and where they differ.
Although Westphalia changed the relationships between the European states, making 
them all equal in principle, some remained more equal than others. This is, of course, still 
true today, but the problem is not so much the power differences, but the question of how 
to regulate them in such a way that the constellation of states and the positions of their 
rulers will not be in constant danger. This poses the issue of hegemony and how to manage 
it. The question of hegemony is a major problem in European history, especially after the 
breakdown of the medieval system whereby the Pope and the Emperor of the Holy Roman 
Empire were the supreme sovereigns in Europe. As successors of the western Roman 
Empire, they were the spiritual and political hegemons. When they lost their religious 
and political legitimacy respectively, the scramble for dominance became the focal point 
of inter-state relationships. Westphalia created religious peaceful coexistence; Utrecht 
had to do the same for the political arena, establishing some kind of regulatory regime. 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, Münster and Osnabrück produced an embryonic 
facility – the chambre mi-partie – appointing France and Sweden as guarantors of the 
agreement (Meerts, 2005b: 34–35). With the peace negotiations in Utrecht during 1712 
and 1713 putting an end to the Spanish War of Succession, dynasties and states tried to 
settle the issue of power balance on the continent and abroad, which does not mean that 
the Peace of Utrecht can be seen as a conscious attempt to create some kind of regime 
to settle differences (Roberts, 1947: 240). However, it was an important benchmark in a 
century of constant renversement (reversal) of alliances, making it hard to understand the 
diplomatic history of the eighteenth century (Aalbers, 1980: 35). ‘The Utrecht settlements 
do provide insights into the problems of international relations in an environment of 
anarchy. Unlike the other multilateral conferences that preceded it, the diplomats [...] 
were concerned with order and stability’ (Holsti, 1991: 72). Moreover, Utrecht did work 
when the first serious threat to its integrity, the Spanish attempts to unite the crowns of 
France and Spain after the death of French King Louis XIV, was countered by the 1717 
Triple Alliance of France, England and Holland (Veenendaal, 1956: 29).
How, then, to settle the issue? Through war or negotiation? In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, war was the dominant mechanism in settling external disputes. This 
did not mean that negotiation had no role to play, but it is very much seen as being a sub-
tool of warfare. Louis XIV of France used peace negotiations in order to create pauses 
in his wars; he needed breaks to regroup, to prepare for the next war. Slowly and truly, 
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however, the process of negotiation gained more respect, albeit in connection to the use 
of violence. The best way to peace is through war, the German emperor said, as the War of 
Spanish Succession raged through Europe (Doesburg, 1886: 120). The hard-fought last-
ditch French victory in this war, at Denain in July 1712, created a ‘mutual hurting stalemate’, 
thereby opening the road to Utrecht. Without this victory, the war might have dragged on 
and more damage would have been done before the states accepted the necessity of 
negotiating a final and lasting peace. Perhaps negotiation is war by other means, but the 
two are anyway interconnected in a symbiotic relationship (Meerts, 2006b) and in 1712 it 
was up to the negotiators to take the heat. Meanwhile, the war did not come to a full stop.
The Political Context
The big question in the early eighteenth century was: who will dominate Europe as the 
Habsburgs lose their grip on their lands and thereby on the surrounding states? The 
erosion of Spanish power and the gradual dissolution of the German empire created 
a power vacuum in Western Europe, with France in the wings to fill that gap. Stability 
and equilibrium on the continent was of great importance, not only to the continental 
dynasties, but also to the European sea powers: Britain; and the Republic of the United 
Netherlands. Britain was still struggling with itself in the second half of the seventeenth 
century, but came to the fore at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Republic of 
the United Netherlands, which dominated trade and was a maritime world power – was 
losing ground at the beginning of the eighteenth century, partly because of its outdated 
political system, which was a confederal system that supported the expansion of its 
commercial interests as long as no other power competed with it in a serious way. This 
became obsolete in a massive confrontation with France on the continent itself. France, 
which was regaining strength by suppressing the Huguenots and centralizing power in 
the hands of an absolute monarch, could now turn to the outside world. France could now 
radiate energy, which had been used for managing internal problems, into its international 
environment. As France began to expand its zone of influence and territory, the continental 
(German empire) and maritime balancers (the Republic of the United Netherlands and 
the British Kingdom) had to act again. This new counter-offensive resulted in the War of 
Spanish Succession at the start of the eighteenth century, which cannot be understood 
without its immediate pre-history, of course.
One starting point could be the beginning of what some call the Forty Years’ French–
Dutch War (1672–1712) (Deursen, 2005: 163). However, as our time-span should not be 
too wide and as this chapter deals with negotiators and their behaviour, we will begin with 
one of the two important international negotiations on Dutch soil: the Peace of Ryswick 
in 1697. The Peace of Ryswick was mediated by the Swedish diplomat Niels Eosander, 
Baron of Lilliënrot, and concluded the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697). Several treaties were 
signed, but none of them had the same wording. However, all of them indicated that – at 
least in a formal sense – this peace should be seen as forward-looking. Terms such as 
‘fruitful and inviolable’, ‘religiously and sincerely observed’, and ‘universal and perpetual’ 
(Clark, 1970: 381) indicated the political intention to go for peaceful relations between the 
sovereigns. François de Callières’, one of French King Louis XIV’s envoyés extraordinaires 
plénipotentiaires (special envoys), was impressed by the value of this negotiation process 
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and wrote a book on lessons learned for other diplomats, including how to behave in an 
international conference like this and which techniques would help to conclude a good 
agreement, for example by putting the diplomats in quarantaine (quarantine) (Lempereur, 
2002: 11). Notwithstanding the high-brow phraseology of the Ryswick Treaties, however, 
the French were fighting again within four years. In hindsight, these negotiations were a 
tool in French warfare, and they provided breathing time. More importantly, provisions for 
dealing with future conflicts – or at least diminishing the prospects of war – were lacking 
altogether. The French kept their forces on the same strength as during the war.
Ryswick did not solve an important problem: the question of the Spanish Succession, 
which had been the focal point of French foreign policy ever since 1665, the year when the 
Spanish King, Philip IV of Habsburg, had died. He was succeeded by a four-year old frail 
child, Charles II. Numerous attempts were made to solve the Spanish question through 
negotiations, but to no avail. When Charles II died in the year 1700, he left all of Spain 
and its oversees possessions to Philip of Anjou, a grandson of Louis XIV, King of France, 
the reason being that he did not want the ailing Spanish Empire to crumble further. The 
danger of Spain and France becoming united under kings of the same dynasty – and 
perhaps under one crown in the future – caused the War of Spanish Succession from 
1701–1714, defending the Austrian claims to the Spanish throne. The main continental and 
sea powers (the German empire, and Britain and the Netherlands, respectively) united in 
a new Great Alliance in 1701 to contain France within its borders. This was yet another 
step in the struggle for hegemony in Western Europe, a repetition of all the other wars 
with France and its direct neighbours, albeit with another label. The actual war – with the 
German emperor, Britain, the Netherlands, Hanover, Prussia, Portugal and Savoy on one 
hand, and France, Spain, Bavaria and Cologne on the other – only started in 1702 and 
would come to an end in 1713. Peace negotiations in Utrecht in 1713) and Rastatt in 1714) 
would conclude the conflict. Both sides had their victories and suffered their defeats, and 
at the very end not much had changed. Louis XIV did not succeed in expanding France, 
thanks to allied generals such as the Duke of Marlborough. But at the same time, France 
could not be decisively defeated. A compromise on Spanish Succession was reached: 
Philip remained king, but the thrones of Spain and France remained separated for eternity 
(Onnekink, 2013).
This is not a surprising outcome. The first reason is that none of the belligerent parties 
outmatched the other in military strength. In general the French were stronger on land, 
and the British and Dutch at sea. Only when the sea powers upgraded their land forces 
to the extent that they – together with the Austrians/Germans – outnumbered the French 
on the continent did the war come to a grinding halt. Exhausted parties started to look for 
peace in secret preliminaries. The second factor here is the mutual distrust of the allies. 
After the death in 1702 of William III, King of England and Lord Governor of the Republic 
of the United Netherlands, old rivalries between the British and Dutch over trade came 
to the fore again. They had always been there, and they were the source of numerous 
Dutch–British sea battles during the seventeenth century, but had been contained by the 
political framework under the House of Orange and the ‘French threat’. The Dutch were 
afraid of a separate peace between France and England, which indeed occurred, giving 
the British trade concessions on Spanish continental and colonial soil. The British wanted 
to keep Dutch power limited in order to keep competition at a low level. Meanwhile, 
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the Habsburgs, having lost all of Spain, had an interest in keeping at least part of it: the 
Southern Netherlands (today’s Belgium). The Southern Netherlands therefore shifted from 
Spanish to Austrian rule in 1701, while the Republic of the United Netherlands demanded a 
long-promised substantial barrier of fortresses in that area (Onnekink, 2013). The French 
then tried to keep the balance of power between the sea powers intact, in order to prevent 
either one becoming the hegemon of the sea – a wise policy, because after the waning 
of Dutch trade dominance at the start of the eighteenth century, Britain became France’s 
main competitor until the resurrection of Germany at the end of the nineteenth century.
Pre-negotiations
Negotiations about the Spanish Succession had been ongoing since 1661, but gained 
momentum in November 1700 with the death of Spanish King Charles II of Habsburg and 
the beginning of the Spanish War of Succession in its aftermath. Talks in 1700 between 
the States-General (representatives of the seven sovereign united Dutch provinces) and 
Count d’Avaux (Tischer, 2008), the ambassador of Louis XIV in The Hague, did not work 
out well (Doesburg, 1886: 5) and could not prevent the war from starting. Later, while the 
war raged on, both sides sent peace signals. In 1705, the French made some indirect peace 
proposals to the Dutch, with the aim of turning around those Dutch merchants who saw 
the war as a threat to their commerce and trade. The proposals were very advantageous 
to the Dutch (Doesburg, 1886: 9–11). In reaction, the Dutch worked out a secret peace 
plan in 1705 to be discussed with the British, with the intention of sending it to the French 
if the British did not oppose these ideas. The war government in London despised the 
plan, however (Stork-Penning, 1958: 40–41). The Dutch initiative by Willem Buys, who was 
the representative of the city of Amsterdam, raised suspicion among the British: were the 
Dutch, and especially the merchants of the powerful port of Amsterdam, heading towards 
unilateral peace with the French King Louis? The British were worried as the Dutch 
conditions were not very favourable for England, while they were quite mild on the French.
After these failed negotiations, the French made a serious attempt to court the Dutch 
again in 1709, especially after the French defeat at Malplaquet at the hands of John Churchill, 
Duke of Marlborough, a Tory who was in line with the war politics of the Whigs. Secret 
French–Dutch negotiations ensued. The French seemed to be ready to accept all of the 
allies’ demands. The French envoy Antoine Louis Rouillé bargained in secret with the 
Dutch representatives Buys and van der Dussen in the Dutch town of Geertruidenberg. 
Interesting enough, they were instructed and mandated by the Dutch Raadspensionaris 
(prime minister) Antonius Heinsius, but not by the States-General (supreme authority). In 
order to show their seriousness, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colbert de Torcy, 
paid an incognito visit to Heinsius. Both the British and the Austrians became involved 
in these negotiations and, together with the French ambassador, the allies worked out a 
peace agreement in 40 preliminary articles (Veenendaal, 1956: 24). However, France’s 
King Louis XIV refused to agree to article 37: to convince his grandson Philip V – if need be 
by force – to hand over the throne to the Habsburgs. This created turmoil in the alliance. 
Those who had warned the negotiators about a French ploy to use bargaining time to 
win time for war preparations gained strength. At the same time, British suspicions of a 
Dutch Alleingang (going it alone) gained momentum again. This round of negotiations had 
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started with a French–Dutch à deux after all. The French and Dutch went on to negotiate 
bilaterally in 1710, trying to find a solution for the French ‘non’, but no outcome could be 
reached (Veenendaal, 1956). A last attempt by the French, to have an armistice for France 
but to continue Spain’s war, was attractive to Prince Eugenius of Austria, but rejected by 
the British and Dutch.
In the third important preliminary negotiation, it was the turn of the British to try 
back-channel bargaining with the French. After the fall of Britain’s Whig government of 
Godolphin, the Tory minister St John Bolingbroke took the initiative for secret negotiations 
with France. This had to do with the ‘blind’ trust of Heinsius in the ‘paper promises’ of 
the Whig government in London (Stork-Penning, 1946: 194–197) and the absence of a 
permanent representation of the Republic of the United Netherlands in London after the 
death of Ambassador Marinas van Vrijbergen in 1711 – a serious mistake, as the French and 
British made their deal in 1711 and nothing could change that anymore (Onnekink, 2005: 
53). Both the Dutch and the Austrians were outraged, as their options were now severely 
limited. They felt betrayed by the Perfide Albion (perfidious England). The outcome of the 
French–British negotiations was very favourable to Britain, at the expense of its allies. The 
war continued, but now without the British. After the French victory at Denain, the Dutch 
gave up and joined the English in their armistice, though the Austrians did not yet yield. 
The German emperor continued his fight, but his general Prince Eugene of Savoy limited 
himself to skirmishes at the fringes. Open warfare was over. The French tactic finally 
worked: approach one of the allies, give them a good deal, and the war will be over, one 
reason being that a pact with the powerful British made more sense than an agreement 
with the weaker Dutch Republic. The stage for the Peace of Utrecht negotiations was 
set, as was the outline of the upcoming peace agreement. The conference could start, 
although it was only at Rastatt in 1714 that France and the Holy Roman Empire settled 
their differences.
Negotiations
The Congress of Utrecht attracted much attention, with people crowding into the city for 
amusement or profit. Utrecht’s City Council introduced regulations to protect the envoys 
against the townspeople, ordering the citizens not:
[…] to rail against, slander or abuse, by any word or deed whatsoever, the said 
Lords, the Public Ministers or those of their retinue; and all transgressing was 
to be punished arbitrarily and corporeally, according to the exigency of the case. 
Provisions and agreements were made to prevent rivalries and quarrels between 
the pages, coachmen and domestic servants of the respective representatives, 
who were prohibited from carrying sticks, swords and arms of any kind. The 
respective Plenipotentiaries were to come to the conferences in coach, with not 
over two horses and in a small retinue (Gerard, 1885: 227–228).
The attending diplomats came from Great Britain, Austria, France and the Republic of the 
United Netherlands, as well as Hanover, Poland, Saxony, the German empire, Portugal, 
Prussia, the Papal States, Savoy, Sweden, the Swiss Confederation, Tuscany, Bavaria, 
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Venice, Geneva, Lorraine, Cologne, the Palatinate, Modena, the Protestant Swiss Cantons, 
and many lesser principalities. A total number of 83 plenipotentiaries arrived in Utrecht. 
The chief negotiators were the Marquis d’Huxelles, the Abbé Polignac and the Chevalier 
de Mesnager for France; the Bishop of Bristol John Robinson and the Earl of Strafford 
Thomas Wentworth for Britain; Buys, van der Dussen and the Count of Rechteren for the 
Republic of the United Netherlands; while the Count of Sinzendorf and Herr Consbruck 
from the German empire played a role behind the scenes (Doesburg, 1886: 99). Many 
other personages attended the conference, representing their own interests or those of 
petty potentates (Gerard, 1885: 228–229).
Protocol inside the conference hall was of even more importance than outside. In a 
‘total make-over’ the hall had been refurbished in such a way that no delegation could 
even give the impression of sitting in a place where they had preference over others. At 
the opening session on 29 January 1712, French and British negotiators were the first to 
enter the conference hall. As usual for the era, they entered at the same time and same 
speed, saluting each other in a great show and sitting down at the table at the same 
moment. The others followed suit. But it was clear who would dominate the conference, 
and indeed nothing could be decided upon without Anglo-French consent. If there was 
not to be one hegemonic power in Western Europe, there were effectively two of them, 
pre-cooking the conference results.
The fifteen months of the Utrecht negotiations were part of an ongoing European 
negotiation process, with unclear beginnings and fuzzy endings: a process without a 
protecting regime, like in the European Union of today. Utrecht has been described as 
‘a useful clearing-house for the ratification of decisions arrived at by much more devious 
processes’ (Pitt, 1970: 446). It confirmed the agreements made in London and Paris in 
1711 (Frey and Frey, 1995), but not right away, as the Dutch and Austrians were not willing 
to accept the outcomes of the secret French–English negotiations at face value, meaning 
the continuation of warfare while the diplomats were negotiating (Veenendaal, 1970: 443). 
Until mid-March 1712, a general session between France and the allies was held twice 
a week at 10 o’clock in the morning. In the nine months that followed, plenary sessions 
were hardly held any more. Intense bilateral negotiations dominated the scene, both 
between delegations in Utrecht itself, and between the conference negotiators and their 
capitals. The meetings were rocketed by external developments, such as the death of the 
French dauphin (crown prince) and his two potential successors within a few months of 
each other, as well as the failing health of Queen Anne of Great Britain, thus forcing the 
British to speed up the negotiations. Queen Anne’s Hanoverian successor, George I, was 
known as an enemy to France and his reign would thus have precluded any Utrecht Peace 
Agreement. There was so much time constraint at the end, and so much fatigue, that in 
the last stages French and British negotiators sometimes decided on the formulation of 
certain phrases by throwing a dice (Gerard, 1885: 283). Interestingly enough, Utrecht 
did not end with a formal signing session; the Treaties were just handed over to the 
Dutch secretariat of the Utrecht congress (Hamilton, 1995: 80–81). There were festivities 
in several countries, however. In London a service was held in St Paul’s, under the tones 
of cantate by Georg Friedrich Händel that had been specifically written for the occasion 
of the conclusion of the Peace of Utrecht: Utrecht Te Deum; and Jubileum (Weber, 1891: 
399). The informal ending of the congress stands in sharp contrast to the formalities seen 
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in Münster, Osnabrück, Nijmegen and Ryswick, and seems to mark the beginning of the 
end of congresses as general assemblies. After Utrecht, there was a ‘growing tendency 
for congresses to break down, or to meet so sketchy a way as not to be congresses at all’ 
(Hamilton, 1995: 80–81).
Including the Treaty of Rastatt in 1714, the ‘Pacification of Utrecht’ contained 
23 treaties. The five main outcomes were the separate treaties between France on the 
one hand, and Britain, The Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia and Savoy on the other. In 1713, 
an additional series of treaties, which were connected to Utrecht, followed suit. Spain, 
which was represented by France, was absent in Utrecht, but it concluded treaties with 
Britain, The Netherlands and Portugal. Germany made an agreement with France and 
The Netherlands, and The Netherlands with Britain. Besides these outcomes, there were 
also minor treaties, as well as a ‘Memorial of the Protestants’, particularly for the relief of 
the Huguenots in France. However, the Protestants were not happy with the substance 
of this memorial, and they filed a complaint with the magistrates of Utrecht about the 
unwillingness of the plenipotentiaries to act as mediators between them and French King 
Louis XIV. The treaties mainly dealt with land issues – that is, which territory belonged to 
whom under which conditions – such as the secession of Gibraltar and Minorca to Britain 
and the creation of a barrier of Dutch fortresses in the Austrian Netherlands against future 
French adventures. Yet they also settled commercial and other issues, such as the right of 
Britain to ‘supply the Spanish West Indies with negro slaves, for the space of thirty years, 
to the extent of 144,000 negroes, at the rate of 4,800 yearly’ (Gerard, 1885: 292), or freeing 
Huguenots who were galley slaves in France, on the condition that they would not return 
to their home country. At the other end of the political spectrum, one of the Utrecht 
treaties brought about the international recognition of the King of Prussia.
Negotiators
The British were the most assertive negotiators. Moreover, they had a solid plan as they had 
to defend what they had gained in the Franco–British agreement of 1711, while the Dutch 
were reluctant to negotiate because of what they saw as British betrayal. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the Dutch had tried to come to bilateral terms with France twice before, they 
felt no ownership of the political frame in which the Utrecht negotiations had to evolve. 
Moreover, they were irritated by British opportunism during the Congress of Utrecht itself: 
‘St John [Bolingbroke, the Tory minister] hardly distinguished between the weapons of 
war and diplomacy, or between ally and enemy’ (Pitt, 1970: 461). It was only at the end of 
the negotiations that British–Dutch relations took a turn for the better. The Dutch were 
not the only ones who were critical of British negotiation behaviour. Two English historians 
once noted that the British had forsaken the Dutch, betrayed the Catalans, while the 
great loss of Britain was its loss of honour (Gerard, 1885: 309–310). Others spoke of 
‘Tory betrayal’ (Aalbers, 1977: 80); and in sketching the behaviour of British politician 
Robert Harley, Alastair MacLachlan notes that his approach was not geared by ‘intended 
perfidy, but because his opportunism, his hypocrisy and his pragmatism seemed to be that 
to more exacting mentalities’ (MacLachlan, 1969: 213). The Brits did not trust the Dutch 
either: ‘The Dutch are our Rivals in trade, and have Cheated us’ (Coombs, 1958: 376).
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While the Republic of the United Netherlands had done most of the fighting, with 
the biggest army in the field, the British took the spoils at Utrecht, thus humiliating and 
finishing off the Dutch, and contributing to the decline of the republic as a world power 
(Geyl, 1937: 189–190; and Schutte, 1978: 276), with the main cause being the decline 
of Dutch trade (Israël, 1989: 374–377). Whether the British strategies and tactics were 
wise in the long run is another matter, as it endangered ‘Anglo–Dutch friendship, the 
bulwark of the Protestant Succession [in England]’ (Hatton, 1970: 93). This did not come 
as a surprise. The British and Dutch ambassadors, Strafford and Buys, had an enormous 
quarrel even before the negotiations started. It was clear that the Dutch had to fear their 
ally, not their enemy (Onnekink, 2005: 59). Interestingly enough, however, the use of 
threats and blackmail could have positive effects on trustworthiness as well. The Duke 
of Marlborough, writing to Harley in 1706, disclosed that ‘Your letter to M. Buys has had 
its effect, for he is in extreme good humour and has really acted like an honest man to 
Her Majesty and England’ (Stork-Penning, 1958: 63).
The French, because of their alliance with England and their final military successes 
as a consequence of British abstention, had increased their diplomatic strength to the 
extent that they were seen as arrogant by their fellow negotiators. As representatives of an 
absolute monarch with permanent diplomatic positions in Paris, they were less dependent 
on the outcomes of the negotiations than their British colleagues, whose tenure in office 
was only linked to the duration of the peace negotiations. They tried, by the way, to 
extract more concessions from their English allies at the very last moments of the Utrecht 
negotiations, when the text was in fact finalized, which truly irritated the British. As British 
diplomat/politician Bolingbroke wrote: ‘They act neither fairly, nor wisely [...] they chicane 
with us, concerning the most essential article of our treaty’ (Gerard, 1885: 280).
The Dutch were stubborn and on the whole this lack of flexibility was contra-productive 
(Geyl, 1937: 219). They were determined to stick to their guns. In a way they had done 
this for too long in the pre-negotiation phase, thereby losing the opportunity to side with 
the British at the end of the secret French–British preliminaries, but their inflexibility did 
sometimes pay off in the Utrecht negotiations. The French once attempted to bulldozer 
them, supported by English manoeuvres to outflank them by setting up the Prussians and 
the Hanoverians, but the Germans did not let the Dutch down, and the French bluff failed. 
The Dutch could also be arrogant at times, but when they threatened to quit the negotiations, 
the French called their bluff. One of the French envoys, the Abbé Polignac, spoke the 
famous words – still cited in Dutch history books today: ‘Messieurs, Les circonstances 
sont changées – il faut changer de ton. Nous traiterons chez vous – de vous – et sans vous’ 
(Sirs, the circumstances have changed – it is necessary to change tone. We will deal with 
you – about you – and without you) (Gerard, 1885: 275–276). Had inflexibility really been 
the main reason for Dutch negotiation ineffectiveness? David Onnekink is of the opinion 
that internal quarrels, bad assessments and denial of sound advice were the real reasons 
for its failure (Onnekink, 2005: 65). Interestingly enough, these are the same factors that 
caused the demise of the Dutch draft for a 1991 Maastricht Treaty (Van den Bos, 2008).
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Other Congresses on Dutch Soil
Comparing Utrecht to the two major peace conferences on Dutch soil after Westphalia 
– Nijmegen and Rijswijk – is not something new. British and French diplomats studied 
the Nijmegen negotiations in order to be well prepared for Rijswijk and Utrecht (Hatton, 
1980: 3–4). Comparisons showed the same kinds of negotiation procedures, process and 
behaviour. Procedures were tight, and fighting for precedence was a threat to the success 
of the negotiation. The Utrecht conference organizers thus learned how to prevent such 
clashes before they could even take place. In Nijmegen, the City Council had made a rule 
about the traffic of diplomatic carriages in the city streets; Ryswick kept the opponents 
apart by building two new bridges to cross the ditch leading to the conference hall; and 
Utrecht, as already discussed, tried to prevent clashes between the general public and the 
honourable envoys. Nijmegen was the first conference after Westphalia where Catholics 
and Protestants could sit together (Hatton, 1980: 7). Looking at the three processes, 
however, one gets the impression that procedures were less important in Utrecht than 
in Nijmegen and Ryswick. For sure, they were there at the beginning and at the end, but 
during the actual negotiations they did not really play a role.
Utrecht, Ryswick and Nijmegen had their official meetings, but just like today, 
progress was made in the corridors. In Ryswick, the decisive step was taken completely 
outside the negotiations, and by the way, by diplomats of a military background. When 
the negotiations did not move forward, the French Marshall Boufflers and the Dutch 
envoy Bentinck (the Count of Portland) made the deal on which the negotiations could 
be finalized. This led to Boufflers’ remark ‘While the ambassadors wage war, the generals 
conclude peace’ (Keens Soper, 1997a: 38).
The processes were different in the sense that in Nijmegen and Ryswick, the 
preliminaries were much less substantial than in Utrecht. The consequence of this was 
extensive wheeling and dealing with the home front, which took time and energy. These 
negotiations with the constituencies distorted the negotiation process at the location, 
resulting in loss of time and procrastination. As Utrecht was a kind of formalization of the 
preceding bilateral agreements, the bargaining could gain and keep momentum much 
more easily. This might have been one of the reasons for the relative forward-looking 
outlook of the Utrecht Treaties. The past was done with; the treaties had to regulate 
the relationships for the future. Yet there is a human dimension to this forward-looking 
aspect as well. At Nijmegen, French King Louis XIV was at the height of his power, having 
invaded the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, having built a strong alliance with 
the British and Germans, and occupying the city of Utrecht and celebrating mass in its 
cathedral, thus threatening the Dutch heartland itself: the province of Holland and the 
city of Amsterdam. In Ryswick, however, Louis had a hard time against an overwhelming 
alliance of Britain, Spain, The Netherlands, The Holy Roman Empire and others. In Utrecht, 
he was back in business, but exhausted at the same time. Moreover, he had become an 
old man. The end of his reign was in sight and Europe was preparing for that. Utrecht was 
thus a more inclusive peace process and inclusiveness tends to support forward-looking 
aspects.
Both Nijmegen and Ryswick had mediators, trying to help to create a smooth negotiation 
process: in Nijmegen these were – as in Münster – papal representatives, who were only 
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allowed to transfer documents (Rietbergen, 1980: 44), at least officially; in Ryswick the role 
of mediator was with the Swedish chair (Huitsing, 1997: 16). Utrecht had to do without – at 
least official – neutral intermediaries. Why could those peace negotiations do without 
mediation? After all, the number of actors in Utrecht was far larger than in Nijmegen or 
Ryswick, thereby creating more complexity. The main reason for the absence of mediators 
was the dominance of Britain and France over the Utrecht procedures. A mediator would 
have been an unwanted ‘stand-in-the-way’. The negotiations were already more or less 
decided by the last Franco–British preliminaries, meaning a quite clear-cut framework for 
Utrecht, and although the absence of mediators might have attributed to the rudeness of 
the Utrecht negotiations, it also prevented indirectness. Mediators such as the Italians 
in the Münster negotiations (Meerts, 2005b: 32) can also complicate matters. Direct 
negotiations can lead more easily to clashes, but they can also speed up the process, 
averting miscommunications, deliberate or not. Here we have an interesting connection 
between behaviour and procedure. The more brutal the behaviour, the more strict and 
formal procedural aspects we may find (Mastenbroek, 2002). It might have to do with 
something else as well: the connection between warfare and negotiation as tools in 
international relations. Both negotiation and warfare were seen as an art to be performed 
(Neveu, 1980: 242). To show off at the battlefield might help one side to win, as it could 
impress the opponent to such as extent that he might give up without much fighting. The 
same seems to be true for the bluff poker of the French in the Utrecht bargaining process 
and the harshness of the Dutch defence against this kind of behaviour.
The Peace of Utrecht in a Broader Perspective
In order to value the evolution of diplomatic negotiation in Western and Central Europe, 
we distinguish five factors influencing the process of international negotiation since the 
second half of the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries: the number of 
European states and their connectedness to each other and to the world; the rule of law 
and the respect for human rights; the societal–political and professional cultures; the level 
of popular participation in policy-making; and the level of welfare and technology.
Do we have more or fewer states in Western/Central European negotiations than 
three centuries ago? Are they more or less connected to each other and to the world? The 
numbers have not really changed. Europe had a multitude of sovereign or semi-sovereign 
entities at the time of Utrecht, Ryswick and Nijmegen, as we have today. The difference 
is in the clarity of their status. Three centuries ago the status of countries was not always 
clear and the question of which dynasties owned those lands was a dominant factor in 
negotiations. It meant that lands could easily be tossed around and traded off against 
other territories. Land was a commodity that could be traded. Having more trade-offs 
available, negotiations were more easy-going than today. Diplomats could package trade 
benefits and regions in the offering. During Utrecht, for example, the Italian lands were 
seed money to smooth the negotiation process. Trading colonies for colonies was another 
popular game, helping to make intra-European bargaining easier.
States were less dependent on each other, so could more easily use warfare in 
competition with negotiation. This diminished the value of the negotiation process as 
a tool in international relations compared with inter-state relations nowadays. Actually, 
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negotiation could be seen as a tool in warfare, while nowadays we tend to take the 
opposite viewpoint: warfare might be a tool in a negotiation process.
The lack of rule of law bedevilled the negotiations at the time. Procedures had to 
compensate for that, but could not manage. Managing an anarchical situation through 
a peaceful process like negotiation is a very difficult task. Negotiators were relatively 
helpless in this, with the effect that negotiation had a quite meaningless role in 
international politics at the time of the Utrecht negotiations. Diplomats and their rulers 
were aware of the negative effects of international lawlessness on international relations 
and give-and-take processes. The dilemma was a chicken-and-egg problem, however. 
Trust could have helped in compensating for a lack of rules and regulations, but trust itself 
was problematic: ‘states are only willing to enter [...] negotiations when they are able to 
trust their opponent to stick to an agreement’ (Ghosn, 2010: 1058). ‘Trust is a most difficult 
condition to build’ (Faure, 2012: 371).
Although negotiation regimes had to be created, as they were lacking, negotiation itself 
could not be seen as an effective methodology. Being aware of this, especially after the 
successful but incomplete Westphalia talks, countries tried to regulate their relations more 
and better through the Utrecht agreements, understanding that the quest for hegemony 
threatened the stability of Europe and thereby of its dynasties. There is, of course, an 
enormous difference in respect for human rights between now and then. On the one hand, 
this made negotiations smooth: people could just be traded for another ‘commodity’. Yet 
it also meant that negotiators did not really respect each other, notwithstanding the neat 
manners of the diplomatic noblemen, which led to a kind of warlike negotiation process in 
which the important factor of trust was lacking. Moreover, the rule of law to compensate 
for this lack of trust was not yet around: the rule of power existed, but not much of law.
Societal, political and professional cultures were less ‘civilized’ than today. Brutality 
distorted stable and trustworthy negotiation processes. The mob could threaten the 
envoy, envoys’ servants fought with each other on several occasions, and negotiators 
showed contempt to each other. None of this enhanced a fruitful atmosphere at and 
around the table. We have already remarked upon the Dutch angriness about Britain’s 
secretive attitude, but have also commented that the Dutch themselves came close to 
a separate peace agreement with France on two occasions. They were obviously not 
more reliable than the British, nor the French for that matter. Nevertheless, there was a 
diplomatic culture, which was synonymous with the culture of nobility. There were certain 
norms and values and a certain etiquette to help negotiators work with each other. There 
was also their lingua franca – quite literally, as French was the dominant language at the 
conference table. Actually, many diplomats preferred to speak French among themselves, 
even if they were not from a francophone country. The Dutch diplomats, not being of noble 
birth, had French as their first foreign language, and had problems speaking, reading 
and writing English. This situation was quite normal until the middle of the twentieth 
century, and gave French diplomacy the advantageous position that the British (and 
Americans, etc.) have nowadays.
Limited popular participation in politics – other than peasant revolutions –made life 
easier on the negotiators, although there were remarkable differences between French 
absolutism on the one hand and English parliamentarism and Dutch particularism on the 
other. In Britain and the Republic of the United Netherlands, party elites and city council 
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oligarchs respectively did intervene indirectly in the Utrecht peace negotiations, while 
the French elite had to hide behind the back of their absolutist ruler. The problem of 
constituency bargaining was quite non-existent for the French delegation, as they had to 
obey the monarch’s direct orders, while the Dutch and British situation could be described 
as being more multiform: negotiators had to take into account the opinions of different 
elite factions. Still, however, in comparison with present-day diplomatic bargaining, 
negotiations were seldom interrupted by political parties and parliament, let alone by 
public opinion. Negotiators were quite dependent on monarchs and ruling elites, who 
could be extremely whimsical. Negotiators also lacked a protected position vis-à-vis their 
bosses, and as we have already seen, a more permanent position could translate into a 
more influential one.
Nowadays diplomats can use public opinion as a tool to apply pressure on their 
opponents or as an excuse not to implement the agreement (Rosoux, 2003: 45–55). Not 
having this weapon, not being able to play divide-and-rule between different internal 
power centres, being in a very dependent position, and sometime fearing for their 
lives, the legal position of individual diplomats was much weaker than today. This then 
affected the process of bargaining, as their insecurity and limited mandate hardly made 
creative solutions to negotiation problems feasible. On the other hand, the closeness of 
the negotiating elite made life easier sometimes, as there was much less control of the 
negotiator’s behaviour:
In the eighteenth century, a member of the European nobility would have more in 
common with members of his own class in another country than with a different 
class in his own. Even when non-nobles served as representatives, they accepted 
the aristocratic precepts of the ambassadorial corps and perpetuated the traditions 
with civilité (Frey and Frey, 1999: 212).
Yet at the same time it was difficult to be effective and to have substantial outcomes if you 
were so dependent on your ruler, your ruler’s character and his or her own private – and 
thereby not always state – interests. The limited room for manoeuvre and creativity stifled 
negotiation processes, as diplomats were extremely dependent on their sovereign’s 
instructions. The main statement of the famous book The Ambassador and his Functions, 
by Abraham de Wicquefort (1606–1682), is that the diplomat of his time should have a 
wider mandate – being more autonomous – in order to be effective (Keens-Soper, 1997b).
Technology and welfare make an enormous difference for the diplomatic negotiator 
today and yesterday. The lack of efficient communications in the past meant a huge loss of 
time, creating a reservoir of misunderstandings and misinterpretations. In the meantime, 
the war raged on and every battle lost or won had its impact on the progress of the 
negotiation process. Wars were waged to get a better position at the table, leaving ample 
time for serious bargaining, unless parties became completely exhausted. Yet as long as 
they had resources, the combatants preferred weapons over words. Time was therefore, in 
general, not favourable to the negotiation process, especially not the summertime, as wars 
could then easily be fought. Negotiations came to a grinding halt, and then resumed in 
wintertime. As people’s well-being was at a low level, wars over resources were abundant, 
and more wars meant more work for the negotiators and less possibilities to come to 
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grips with the international situation. On the other hand, the exhaustion of resources gave 
negotiations a chance. Negotiators, by the way, spent lots of money to show off to other 
negotiators, and most became indebted to local shopkeepers, who could not sue them 
because of diplomatic immunity.
Past and Present: The Effective Negotiator
Another angle for comparison between the past and present has been offered by 
Bernard Bot, former Permanent Representative at the European Union and former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, in a speech commemorating 300 years 
since the Peace of Ryswick (Bot, 1997: 51–57). Bot described the features of the effective 
diplomatic negotiator: (1) The negotiator should have a trusting relationship with his 
or her constituency. This was probably even more important in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries than today, as ambassadors were acting in relative isolation on 
the basis of a direct mandate from their country’s sovereign. Apart from trust between 
the negotiator and the home front, we have the problem of trustworthiness between the 
negotiators. Treacherous behaviour caused the same uproar in the past as today, but 
seemed to be a much more common practice than in the twenty-first century. (2) The 
negotiator should feel empathy for the other party’s position. This seems to be more 
self-evident today than in the past. (3) The negotiator should know their dossier. This 
was important in both the past and present, with the additional remark that substance 
today is much more complicated in quality and quantity, requiring management skills that 
diplomatic negotiators of the past did not have or need. (4) The negotiator should maintain 
excellent networks. This is very important nowadays, even more important than in Utrecht, 
Ryswick and Nijmegen. Without the alternative means and sources that are provided by 
modern technology, personal relationships were the heart of diplomatic bargaining at the 
time. Paradoxically, the distributive negotiation mentality did not always help to create the 
understanding and trust that were needed to move forward. As we have already seen, 
treason was a commonly used tool, probably more than nowadays, as secrecy today is 
even more difficult to guarantee than yesterday. (5) The negotiator should have a good 
feel for the political context and the ability to see through political bluff. This is important 
now, and was even more important in the past, in a period when bluff and power-play 
were more regular features of international negotiation than in present-day life, in a much 
more insecure political environment. (6) The negotiator should prevent loss-of-face of his 
or her opponent. This was certainly much more important than in today’s Europe, as face 
played an overriding role in European bargaining. (7) The negotiator should be a stage 
actor. Again, this was very important in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, much 
more so than nowadays. (8) The negotiator should have endurance, a quality really needed 
in today’s marathon meetings in Brussels and New York, but the pace of negotiations 
300 years ago was much slower and endless general sessions hardly happened. (9) The 
negotiator should have a good sense of timing and knowing when to give in – important 
then and now. The Dutch did not grab the opportunity to team up with the French and the 
British in the final pre-negotiation phase of the Peace of Utrecht and it cost them dearly. 
Dutch stubbornness is a regular feature in Dutch negotiation behaviour, including today. 
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(10) The negotiator should be true to him or herself and stick to their personal style. This 
seems to be of equal importance in both eras, then and now.
Willem Mastenbroek is of the opinion that effective negotiation can be measured 
within four main dimensions: interests/substance; power/influence; climate/relationships; 
and flexibility/exploration (Mastenbroek, 1989). Comparisons between the seventeenth-
century Westphalia negotiations and those of the present, made on the basis of these 
four levels, indicate quite a few differences in the management of diplomatic negotiation 
processes in the seventeenth and twentieth centuries (Meerts, 2000: 78–84). Reframing 
the four paradoxes produced five conclusions concerning the similarities and disparities. 
More than today, negotiations at the time: (1) were a by-product of warfare; (2) tended 
to be more competitive; (3) seemed to be less value-added; (4) had outcomes of a more 
distributive and backward-looking nature, sowing some seeds for future peace and 
stability and some for upcoming wars and volatility; and (5) were of a bilateral more than 
a multilateral nature, with ambassadors having stricter mandates and a more treacherous 
negotiation style than today (Meerts, 2000: 85).
Differences between the past and present are numerous. As noted in chapter III, 
the relevance of the negotiation process has changed over time. While warfare was the 
preferred means in conflict resolution in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a slow 
transformation in the direction of bargaining evolved in the nineteenth and especially the 
twentieth century – from negotiation as a tool in warfare to warfare as a tool in negotiation. 
What did not change is the interplay between the two instruments; the change is in their 
relative weight. This thesis notes the importance of technological changes and their 
impact on the balance between ‘words and war’. Technology upgrades the instruments 
of negotiation and warfare, but the effects are completely different. Technology has been 
an impetus to more effectiveness in non-violent conflict resolution through mediation and 
negotiation, while technological evolution has equally created more disastrous outcomes 
of violent conflict resolution, thus enhancing the costs of warfare and the benefits of 
negotiation.
Another issue mentioned in chapter III is the evolution of – and the linkage 
between – regime-building and trust. As has been noted, the lack of regimes prevented 
actors from using organizational trust to compensate for a structural lack of trust. Trust 
has always been a problem, as are imperfect organizational constructions. Yet trust is 
more of a problem if parties cannot be contained by external factors like international 
organizations and substantial international law. Lack of trust also gives precedence to 
back-channel over front-channel bargaining. Less trust inspires less transparency, and 
less transparency plus less containment equals instability, for example in coalition-
building. A change of coalitions – as occurred before the actual Utrecht conference as 
the British–Dutch (or actually Britain–Holland) coalition gave way to a British–French 
caucus – has much more impact in a context where regimes are lacking. These coalitions 
throw their weight around, but the effect can hardly be corrected if other forces are of 
limited significance. The self-evident and widely accepted constantly changing coalitions 
of today’s European Union, which creates a ‘natural’ equilibrium between contending 
parties, would have been unthinkable in the past. One could therefore hardly speak of a 
stable international system, although the Treaty of Utrecht is a tiny step in the direction of 
a more stable and transparent web of international political relationships.
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Chapter III of this thesis also stated that power is another major factor of influence in 
the evolution of inter-state negotiation processes. Power differences in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries were less constrained by an international community, or by 
some state structures. Autocratic and plutocratic regimes dominated the scene 300 years 
ago; today they are balanced by polyarchic and democratic political systems in which 
negotiators are held responsible, through their political superiors, for their deeds towards 
representatives of their societies. This has an impact on their attitude and behaviour. On 
the one hand, negotiators are more protected in the sense that they, as professionals, 
have a fixed position in a bureaucratic bulwark and normally they do not fear for their lives. 
On the other hand, they lose flexibility. Negotiators representing dictatorships do not need 
to worry too much about the home front. On average, it is clear what the demands of their 
masters are, unless the dictator is an unpredictable ruler. The ‘democratic’ negotiator, 
meanwhile, has to struggle with the political forces and stakeholders back home. The 
outcome of internal negotiations is often unclear and when it finally materializes in a 
mandate, that instruction could be overhauled completely if elections overturn the 
government. The home front is therefore of more importance today than in the past. This 
distribution creates a more complex negotiation process, and more complexity often 
diminishes effectiveness.
Another difference between the past and present has to do with the role of culture. 
Better communication might create better understanding, but it can also enhance 
civilization clashes. While the negotiators of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
were often amateurs, they did share the culture of the nobility. This created strong bonds 
and limited the impact of cultural divides. However, the negotiations often suffered from the 
vanity of the negotiators (Stücheli, 2013: 80). One could argue that today the professional 
diplomatic corps – with its norms and values, and rules and regulations – helps to soften 
cultural contradictions. This is true indeed, but we also see an influx of non-diplomatic 
negotiators in today’s world, both from the political and the bureaucratic side, and the 
public and private sectors. The nature of the impact of culture on the negotiation process 
changed, but not in such a way that it has a more positive or negative influence on the 
process comparing the past and present. Limiting culture to language does not provide 
us with a different conclusion. After all, as English serves as the bargaining lingua franca 
today, French (and before that Latin) performed that role for the noble and upper-class 
diplomats who negotiated the treaties of Europe between Westphalia and San Francisco.
In Conclusion
The process of inter-state negotiation evolved over time, particularly in the last 
three centuries. This chapter has presented the Peace of Utrecht as a case study to 
shed light on the progress made, for example by comparing negotiation behaviour in 
the eighteenth and twenty-first centuries. Daring to say that the bargaining process 
improved, the question remains of in what respect and why. Inter-state negotiation does 
better today than at the time of Utrecht because of its output. Things that could then 
only be decided by warfare can now be solved through negotiation. In other words, the 
productivity of the negotiation process has risen substantially, as has the productivity 
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of society. Does this mean that we can be satisfied about the evolution of diplomatic 
negotiation and its contribution to international relations? There is a counterbalancing 
factor that diminishes the optimistic picture just sketched, for with the growth of 
interconnectedness between states, the number of conflicts grew as well. Therefore, more 
negotiation effectiveness is indeed needed, but it remains difficult to cope with the mass 
of problems and actors – including public opinion, parliament and lobby groups – that we 
face today. Life at the time of the Utrecht negotiations was less complicated and easier 
to handle, even with the more primitive tools of the time. The instruments at the disposal 
of negotiators have been refined, but the quantity of the problems has multiplied. There 
are more conflicts to deal with, although we have more – and more effective – negotiators 
available to tackle them. The characteristics of an effective negotiator in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries were more or less the same as those of the twenty-first century 
diplomatic bargainer, but there are variations. Seven out of ten effectiveness traits were of 
different importance in the past or present.
Why did the negotiation process evolve as it did? We can think of several reasons. 
First, the development of regimes, international organizations, and a system of 
international rules and regulations embedded the negotiation process in such a way that 
processes became smoother and outcomes more assured (Meerts, 2006a). Second, the 
alternative tool in international relations – violence – became too costly to be effective 
under all circumstances. This made negotiation more valuable. Third, the negotiators are 
professionals now, not noble amateurs, and are better educated and better managed 
people from much broader strata of society, more rooted in the country that they are 
representing. It should not be forgotten that many negotiators of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were a kind of mercenary working for whichever monarch was 
in need of them. Loyalty to their ruler prevailed, but they were not embedded in an 
organization supporting them in being effective negotiators. Fourth, peaceful relationships 
and communication are much more the norm today than in the past. As we have seen, 
waging war was seen as the best way to create peace. Such an attitude may have been 
standard at the time, but today it would cause a diplomatic scandal. This evolution helps 
negotiation to be effective and efficient, as it is the main tool of diplomacy, the blood of 
the international system. Finally, fifth, negotiation became integrated into society, making 
it a self-evident tool to be used in cases of conflicts.
Did the Treaty of Utrecht contribute to a less conflictual era thereafter? According to 
Charles Doran, it did: ‘From 1713 to 1740, Europe enjoyed a peace broken only by minor 
conflicts. This situation is generally said to have been an indication of the success of the 
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CHAPTER VIII: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: 
INCLUSIVENESS AND 
EXCLUSIVENESS
The nineteenth century witnessed a multitude of inter-state negotiation processes and 
this chapter will analyze the most outstanding: the Vienna Congress of 1814–1815. All of 
the concerned parties were invited to the congress, whether they were the former victims 
or the former allies of Napoleon. There were two reasons for inviting all of the relevant 
countries – irrespective of size or importance – to participate: first, for a legitimate 
conference and therefore a legitimate Final Act, all stakeholders had to be present; and 
second, if one country could be left out, why not another? Even for the Great Powers, this 
would be a dangerous precedent. What would the criteria be for excluding a country from 
the congress as a whole? This would be a political decision to be negotiated, and there 
was no way to do that. To exclude those who had been in the enemy’s camp could not 
be a criterion as – apart from Britain – all of the stakeholders had been with Napoleon 
at a certain time. The duration of that connection was not a criterion either, although 
in the political process of the congress, duration did work to the detriment of some 
countries, such as Denmark and Saxony. What could be done, however, was to create 
inclusiveness and exclusiveness inside the congress itself: some negotiators were allowed 
to be a decision-maker, but most were kept at bay. There was neither a procedure nor a 
principle for this either; it was just decided by the Great Powers and the others had no 
choice but to allow it, notwithstanding the fact that the decisions of the Great Powers 
would have consequences for them: ‘It is accepted wisdom that negotiations often have 
consequences for a broader group of actors than the parties directly involved in the talks’ 
(Troitskiy, 2013: 10).
Important sources for this chapter are the eye-opening book Rites of Peace by the 
English/Polish academic Adam Zamoyski (Zamoyski, 2007) and the works on the Vienna 
negotiation processes by Christophe Dupont (Dupont, 2003; and Dupont and Audebert-
Lasrochas, 2005). The Zamoyski book takes both a broad and a deep view into the Vienna 
negotiations and the negotiators. It is broad in the sense that it connects the Vienna 
Congress with its wider context – politically, psychologically, sociologically, historically 
and geographically. We say politically, because Zamoyski gives us an insightful analysis 
of the political currents and interests at the time; and psychologically, because Zamoyski 
shows us the capacities – both positively and negatively – of the main negotiators and the 
consequences for the negotiation process. He does this by going through the archives 
of the Austrian secret police, as Austria’s Prince Metternich had spies in nearly all the 
embassies (although they had problems in penetrating the British and French legations), 
as well as in the Austrian Imperial Court. Zamoyski does so sociologically, as it tells 
about the mores of the time and the underlying network of mistresses – through bed and 
ball – who cater for an indirect and unseen back-channel of communication between 
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the main players; historically, because his story is deeply embedded in the developments 
leading up to the Vienna Congress and the events thereafter; and geographically, as Rites 
of Peace shows us the importance of understanding the geographic situation if we want 
to understand the countries’ political interest.
Other important sources are the works by the father of modern French negotiation 
research, the late Christophe Dupont. It is perhaps telling for the non-linkage between 
historical and negotiation research that Dupont is not among the sources used by 
Zamoyski. Dupont focuses on the negotiation process in Vienna in a chapter (Dupont 
and Audebert-Lasrochas, 2005) and an article (Dupont, 2003) in publications from – or 
related to – the work of the PIN program. In both papers, Dupont deals with the question 
of coalition-building. In the book chapter, he tries to show the proximity and distance 
between the main negotiators as far as the main negotiation problem of Vienna is 
concerned: Poland/Saxony. In the journal article, he puts the Vienna Congress in the 
context of modern approaches to coalition-building. He distinguishes three phases in the 
negotiation process at Vienna. After a pre-negotiation process, the Russians, Austrians, 
Prussians and British managed to establish the Vienna Congress through the First Peace 
of Paris. In Vienna itself, the Great Powers – including France for a time – first move from 
unity to less cohesiveness; they then stumble in disruption; but third, they reconstitute 
themselves in order to determine the Final Act. In the post-negotiation process, after 
Vienna, their cohesion starts to disintegrate, most notably when France is excluded from 
the negotiations on the Second Treaty of Paris after the second downfall of Napoleon. As 
such, Dupont distinguishes five phases if we take the treaties of Paris into account as well. 
In Vienna itself, the flow from unity to loss of cohesion to reconstitution has to do with 
the question of Saxony, which split the coalition into a camp of three and a camp of five: 
Britain, France and Austria, against Prussia and Russia. This nearly led to war.
Another interesting analysis of the interrelationships of the Great Powers and their 
perceptions of themselves and of the other four has been made by Charles Doran (Doran, 
1971). Doran asks the question: if all the powers try to dominate the others, how do you 
assimilate them into the circle? The answer: through trade-offs until a balance is reached 
with which everyone can live.
The Vienna Congress is, of course, a subject widely studied by historians and political 
scientists (Kissinger, 1957), but much less so by the ‘newcomers’ devoted to the research 
of international negotiation processes (Dupont, 2003), who are trying to understand the 
negotiation intricacies of the Vienna Congress, particularly as the classical diplomatic 
negotiation historians, such as François de Callières, wrote their treatises before the 
Vienna Congress took place.
In order to prevent too much repetition and description, this chapter attempts to take 
the different constituent parts of the Vienna negotiations apart. First, it deals with the 
question of choice and thereby of inclusion and exclusion: who will be in, and who will 
be out of the actual decision-making, separating the participating powers into different 
circles of influence? Then, the chapter will sketch the context of the negotiations and 
the construction of the Vienna Congress: the procedural perspectives. The chapter next 
turns to the main counterparts, the characteristics of the negotiators representing their 
countries, followed by their process of interaction under the heading ‘Conversations’. 
After this, the chapter deals with the process of convergence of positions and interests as 
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a means of closure. For this, a few general politico-historical works (apart from Zamoyski 
and Dupont) were consulted (Albrecht-Carrié, 1970; and Luykx, 1971), as well as some 
specific studies (Webster, 1919; and Gruner, 1993), and others that set ‘Vienna’ in a larger 
diplomatic and security perspective (Kissinger, 1994; and Holsti, 1991). On negotiation 
itself, Zartman’s concepts of negotiation as a choice of partners (Zartman, 2009) and 
the necessity of creating ripeness (Zartman, 2005) are referred to in this chapter. The 
conclusion of the chapter will comment upon Zartman’s ‘Lessons Learned from “Vienna”‘.
Choice
Our main focus will be on the dilemma of inclusiveness and exclusiveness and its 
consequences. Negotiation can be seen as a choice of partners. In general, negotiation is 
defined on the basis of its content. What are the positions of the contending parties and 
how far are they apart, and therefore how difficult will the negotiation process be? However, 
we can also define negotiation on the basis of the participating actors, and – in the case of 
diplomatic negotiations – the countries and their representatives, their agents. From this 
perspective, negotiation can be defined as ‘a process of identifying an appropriate partner 
and constructing a joint pact’ (Zartman, 2009). From such a perspective, it is as much the 
contending counterparts around the table as the distance between their interests that 
will determine the flow of the process, the options for convergence and closure by means 
of an agreement. Leaving a party outside of the process could have grave consequences 
for the value and viability of the treaty, but taking the party into the negotiations could 
obstruct the process too much, thereby never allowing closure of the negotiation process.
The main criteria for co-opting a party into the day-to-day negotiation process of the 
Congress of Vienna were twofold: did the party belong to the anti-Napoleonic alliance; 
and was it so powerful that a peace treaty could only be implemented if that power 
participated fully in the central negotiation process? This principle implied that Russia, 
Austria, Prussia and Great Britain would be included, but that France would not. For power 
political reasons, France was allowed into the inner circle shortly after the bargaining 
process got underway, as at least three out of four Great Powers saw the benefit of it, 
skilfully clarified by the French plenipotentiary. Power politics dominated and the mistake 
of the later Paris Peace Conference of 1919 – to keep two of the main powers outside the 
inner circle because it had been the enemy (Germany) or was seen as a potential enemy 
(the Soviet Union) – was not made in Vienna. French participation did not obstruct the 
negotiation process and the question of ‘what to do with France?’ did not dominate the 
proceedings. On the contrary, to have an uneven number of actors on board proved to be 
vital for avoiding durable stalemates.
For the implementation of negotiated outcomes, it is vital to have as many relevant 
parties as possible in support of the final agreement. However, a successful negotiation 
process with more than five parties seems to be very difficult to achieve. Complexity 
hampers effective negotiation; the number of parties matters. One could postulate that 
the greater the number of parties, the richer the process, because the more choices 
are available, and the more opportunities, the more integrative the final outcome. This 
is certainly true, but to manage a very complex multilateral process is often a burden, 
especially if, as in the nineteenth century, rules and regulations were rather absent. The 
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Vienna Congress, for example, never decided on uniform procedures and, without such 
protection of the bargaining process, it is very difficult to move the parties in the desired 
direction. It was only in the twentieth century that we started to manage multilateral 
negotiations through rules that were embedded within international organizations. Even 
then, we bounce at the boundaries of negotiation. It is perhaps no coincidence that it is 
the Security Council of the United Nations where the main decisions can be taken, and 
within that Council, five countries play a decisive role – a ‘pentacracy’ of the victors of the 
Second World War, indeed, but still. We see this in 1919 in the Paris Conference, where 
five countries formed the nucleus of the conference, although only three really played a 
decisive role. Meanwhile, in 1814–1815 at the Vienna Congress, we had Austria, Russia, 
Prussia, Britain and France taking the lead, effectively excluding the other countries from 
real participation.
The exclusion of France at the beginning of the process was not in the long-term 
interest of – foremost – Austria and Britain. France had to be included in order to control 
it. After all, Austrian Prince Klemens Lothar von Metternich said that ‘When Paris sneezes, 
Europe catches cold’ (Davies, 1996: 762). Furthermore, Austria needed a counter-balance 
against its greatest competitor, Prussia. Britain needed to keep both Austria and Prussia in 
check, and therefore France had to become an integral part of the deliberations. Another 
reason for integrating the French enemy had to do with the unreliability of Russia on the 
one hand, and the need to control the Bonapartists and Republicans in France itself. It 
was self-evident that only France’s inclusion could provide a balance of power in Europe, 
a balance that was needed to secure the peace wished for by the monarchies. Excluding 
a major power from the negotiation process – as with Germany and the Soviet Union in 
1919 – would have had disastrous consequences, especially as other major powers like 
Spain and Poland had lost their former strength or vanished completely. Excluding the 
minor powers, however, was in the interest of the negotiation process and the need to 
reach an agreement within a certain time. The Vienna Final Act was signed nine days 
before Napoleon Bonaparte escaped from Elba, but the powers were not aware of this 
threat. His escape, on the other hand, would have been instrumental in forcing the allies 
to come to closure if their business had not yet been done. External threats forge internal 
agreement, but in the Vienna case, such a push was not necessary. The process itself 
managed to converge into closure.
Excluding other powers from real participation did not mean, however, that they had 
no influence at all. Hundreds of their representatives – and their mistresses – were also 
gathered in Vienna, and this closeness to the actual process gave them some kind of 
leeway. They were, however, dependent on the benevolence of the main negotiating 
parties, and sometimes literally had to beg for attention. In order to keep them busy, an 
enormous circus of events was established. These festivities were far more lavish than 
those we know about in earlier congresses like Westphalia and Utrecht, or the conferences 
that came after. While the costly social events kept the minor powers at bay, they also 
provided them with opportunities to lobby the negotiators of the five powers that were 
central to the process. These powers could afford to keep the middle and smaller powers 
at a distance, as long as they could be sure that they could control them afterwards. The 
decisions at Vienna would not be of value if the five powers themselves did not stick to 
them, nor if the secondary powers could not be forced to obey them. In order to keep the 
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excluded powers in check, a two-tier system was of help. One group of excluded parties 
was given a quasi-permanent position as consulted constituencies. Although they were 
not allowed into the inner circle, they were in part included on an intermittent basis. 
Countries like Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, Spain, Portugal, Naples and the Netherlands 
had to go along with this in order to be able to push the truly small powers – for example, 
the small states in Germany and Italy – in check.
Stratification of countries into ‘great powers’, ‘middle powers’ and ‘small powers’ helps 
us to get a better understanding of the functioning of the Vienna system (Holsti, 1967: 73). 
The trickling down of power on the basis of inclusiveness and exclusiveness could only 
be effective if there was a layer of middle powers who were both included and excluded: 
included because they were regularly consulted; and excluded because they did not have 
a ‘permanent seat’ in the negotiation process. We could label them ‘involved parties’. As 
the middle class in a society provides stability in the social and economic sense, these 
countries provided the sustainability that was needed for the nineteenth century to be 
reasonably peaceful.
One other condition for the success of the Vienna framework was the willingness 
of the major powers to act ‘in concert’. Like in the European Union of today, the smaller 
countries are needed to cement the interrelationships of Germany, France and Britain. 
If these three cannot agree among themselves, the Union will not be able to make any 
progress. At the same time, some dissent among the main powers is needed to give the 
auxiliary states the opportunity to influence their behaviour, and thereby the course of the 
Union.
Another condition for the Vienna framework was the absence of a major threat from 
the outside. As the United States was not yet a world player, as China and Turkey were 
in decline, and as Russia was included in the process, the centre – being Europe – could 
set the rule. Including Russia was a problem, however. This thesis is of the opinion that a 
Russia that was too close to Central Europe was seen as a threat to peace. This is why the 
Austrians, Prussians, British and French tried to keep the Russians out of Poland. They did 
not manage, however. It is fascinating to see how Russia entered the heart of Europe as a 
consequence of the Napoleonic defeat, was thrown out again after the Russian Revolution 
and the end of the First World War, came back in as a consequence of Germany’s defeat in 
the Second World War, and threw themselves out again after the downfall of communism.
This problem of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in the European realm became less 
relevant as the world enlarged through imperialism and its demise. Through imperialism, 
Europe’s potential was turned outside, therefore allowing for a more or less peaceful 
episode inside nineteenth-century Europe itself. It was only through the rise of nationalism 
that Europe fell on its own sword at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Here we have yet another condition for a peaceful Europe along the lines of the ‘Holy 
Alliance’: a common ideology, meaning the legitimacy of the ruling parties, foremost the 
monarchies. We therefore witness throughout the nineteenth century – most notably 
in 1830 and 1848 – collective attempts by the five Great Powers to subdue democratic 
and nationalistic uprisings, although ‘liberal’ Britain hesitated about the need for and 
the wisdom of such repressive actions. As the collective security arrangement fell apart 
in the middle of the nineteenth century, nationalism ran out of control and democracy 
started its triumphal march to power. Those who had been excluded took over, and half a 
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century after the de facto demise of the Vienna system, Europe broke down, allowing the 
rest of the world to rob it of its central position in the world. Europe lost its hegemony, a 
hegemony that was still undisputed when the victors over Napoleon sat down to negotiate 
in order to preclude further war, but more importantly to safeguard their own interests by 
peaceful means.
Context
How shall we structure post-Napoleonic Europe? This was the central question that gave 
rise to the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815. An exhausted Europe needed a new order. 
What should the new order be and what should it be about? Or better still, to what extent 
will we restore the pre-revolutionary Europe, and how are we going to do this? One can go 
back into history a very long way in order to explain the Vienna context. For the purpose of 
this chapter, a brief description of the developments after the Peace of Utrecht 100 years 
earlier in 1713) suffices.
As discussed in chapter VII, Britain and Austria, as the winners of the Spanish War 
of Succession from 1701–1713, became the main beneficiaries of the Peace of Utrecht. 
France managed to keep most of its newly conquered territories, because of its early 
wartime successes, but the country was completely exhausted. French King Louis XIV 
had a family member on the throne of Spain, although Spain itself slowly but truly lost 
its role as a major player on the European scene. With the rise of Prussia and severely 
weakened by the Swedish invasions and its own shaky political system, Poland – the other 
flank power of Europe – was erased from the map at the end of the eighteenth century. 
Prussia, Austria and Russia swallowed its remains. However, Poland’s dissolution and its 
consequence would be one of the main issues at the Vienna Conference of 1814–1815. In 
the north, Sweden had lost its position as the hegemonic power in the Baltic, giving way 
to the Tsarist empire. The south witnessed the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, with 
Turkey still being the main threat to the Christian European order for most of the century 
(Black, 2010: 61).
As France was heading towards bankruptcy because of its inadequate political system 
and its inability to modernize itself, the political scene in Europe was changing dramatically. 
The roots of the Vienna Congress can easily be traced to the French Revolution of 1789 
and its Napoleonic aftermath, events that the congress sought to reverse. The French 
Revolution was not just an event upsetting the balance of power. Wars in (especially) 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were very much rulers’ attempts to acquire 
a dominant position on the continent, while other rulers sought to prevent this. In other 
words, many wars were dynastic wars, although they often wore the mask of religion to 
rationalize the war effort. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire added a 
new, more political, rationalization to the struggle for the balance of power: the overthrow 
of the crowned heads who ruled the continent. Revolution juxtaposed the ‘will of the 
people’ as equal, or even superior, to the legitimate powers outside the revolutionary 
areas. Napoleon sought to dominate the old elites with his own newcomers to the scene: 
himself; his family; and some of his marshals (Black, 2010: 138–149).
Revolution and Bonapartism did not disappear after the victory of the European 
Restoration. There were problems in getting rid of the idea of the ‘sovereignty of the 
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people’ in many of the ‘liberated’ countries where these ideas had taken root. As far as 
Napoleon is concerned, he had been beaten in the second battle of Leipzig in October 1813 
and also at Waterloo in June 1815 (during the last few days of the Congress of Vienna’s 
procedures), but he remained the nightmare of the negotiators and their negotiations. 
After all, apart from Britain, all of the victorious allies had at one time or another been his 
allies. This implanted mistrust among the allies, haunting the negotiations from the very 
start until the end. Moreover, in the period between Leipzig and Waterloo, Napoleon had 
not been thrown out of Europe completely, but was still sitting on the island of Elba and 
was still a potential ally for some of the powers, which mistrusted their newly acquired 
coalition partners. Europe was still in flux and every potential player still counted. As for 
the British, such flux seemed to be to their advantage, as long as it did not culminate in 
one of the parties obtaining too dominant a position and threatening to upset the power 
balance, thereby creating a new threat to the British Empire in waiting (Black, 2010: 138–
149).
Napoleon’s retreat from Russia in November and December 1812 marked the 
beginning of the end of French dominance over Europe. While Emperor Napoleon 
returned to Paris, Prussian General Yorck negotiated a truce with the Russians at 
Tauroggen, thereby removing Prussia as a stumbling block for France’s most dangerous 
adversary. It is interesting to note that this move by part of the Prussian military was not 
legitimized by Prussian King Frederick William III, who still felt loyalty to his ally Napoleon, 
notwithstanding the fact that he himself had been Napoleon’s enemy and forced into an 
alliance with France. From a political point of view, the Prussian king still feared Napoleon 
and was not too sure about the future course of events, but on 28 February 1813, he 
signed the Treaty of Kalisz with Russian Tsar Alexander I. At a later stage, this alliance of 
Prussia and Russia against Napoleon proved to be the nucleus of a coalition with Austria 
and Britain, joined by Sweden. As a consequence of this alliance, the Prussians had to 
give up a big part of their Polish possessions, a problem that would bedevil the Vienna 
talks, as the Prussians wanted to be compensated with Saxony, an ally of Napoleon. To 
the Austrians, such an exchange would be difficult to swallow as it would bring both 
Prussia and Russia closer to their country, so that Austria would then have to compete 
with Prussia for dominance in Germany, while Russia would become a competitor in East–
Central Europe. Both Saxony and Poland would later prove to be major diplomatic issues 
(Zamoyski, 2007: 195–196).
Frederick William III, King of Prussia, proved to be quite right in his doubts concerning 
the waning of Napoleon’s strength, for the emperor defeated the Prussians twice, in 
Lützen and Bautzen in May 1813. The Austrians, still neutral at the time, mediated the 
armistice of Pläswitz, followed by a less neutral stand when Austrian Foreign Minister 
Metternich concluded the Treaty of Reichenbach with Russian Tsar Alexander I on 24 June 
1813. Austria, which was technically still a French ally, decided to open negotiations with 
Napoleon. Metternich wanted to keep his options open, being wary to take sides while 
the overall situation remained unclear. He met Napoleon on 26 June 1813 at Dresden and 
on 10 July 1813 in Prague, resulting in Napoleon’s acceptance of Austria as a mediator, as 
well as of a suspension of hostilities between Prussia and France. Meanwhile, the British 
commander Wellington defeated the French in Spain at the Battle of Vitoria in June 1813, 
thereby threatening the southern border of France itself. For Napoleon, the odds seemed 
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to change in his disadvantage in August 1813, when he lost the battles of Grossbeeren, 
Katzbach and Kulm in Germany, although he was the winner at the Battle of Dresden. 
The Napoleonic Army’s strength was severely undermined by the loss of Napoleon’s most 
experienced soldiers during the Russian campaign. Although he managed to raise new 
armies of numerous soldiers, these men did not have the stamina to fight as successfully 
as their predecessors. At the same time, Napoleon had to watch his back in France, where 
monarchist and old revolutionaries became restless. The same happened in subdued 
countries like the Netherlands, where people resisted French conscription and economic 
exploitation (Schama, 1977: 611–645).
In October 1813 Napoleon won the first Battle of Leipzig, but lost the second in 
the ‘battle of the nations’ against the combined armies of Russia, Prussia and Austria, 
strengthened with German and Italian deserters from the French ranks. Napoleon 
thereafter retreated into France itself, while the allied monarchs and their diplomats met at 
Frankfurt to discuss the follow-up to the campaign. On behalf of the gathering, Metternich 
launched the Frankfurt Proposals (Zamoyski, 2007: 126–128), which would allow Napoleon 
to rule France within its natural borders. It should be noted that the allies were still quite 
forthcoming, as the ‘natural boundaries’ of France would allow the Napoleonic Empire 
to keep the left bank of the Rhineland, which was roughly the Rhineland occupied by 
the French after the First World War. After some hesitation from the French side, new 
French Foreign Minister Armand Caulaincourt accepted the terms set at Frankfurt on 
5 December 1813, but he did not receive an allied answer to this compliance because of 
British opposition to the Frankfurt Proposals.
In January 1814, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh – the British had been 
facilitating the anti-Napoleonic alliance with money from the very start – met Austria’s 
Chancellor Metternich in Basle. They discussed the succession of Napoleon, highlighting 
that the Frankfurt Proposal had lost their momentum. They agreed on some major issues, 
notably the British demand to exclude the question of maritime rights from the overall 
negotiations to be held in Vienna. Apart from a ‘just equilibrium’ on the continent, the 
British saw their freedom at sea as their second most important priority, if not the first. 
They did not want any intervention on their freedom at sea, as this would undermine their 
attempts to enlarge and strengthen their colonial empire. The day after their bilateral 
meeting, they travelled to France to meet Tsar Alexander at Langres. On 23 January 1814, 
the Austrians and Russians proclaimed a ‘General Alliance’. They called for a congress in 
Vienna and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in France. As a consequence, the 
war inflamed again and several battles were fought in eastern and south-western France. 
On 5 February 1814, the allies met at Châtillon in France (Zamoyski, 2007: 156–160), 
whose conference was only dissolved on 19 March 1814 after the allied offensive against 
Napoleon was finally successful.
On 9 March 1814 the allies signed the Treaty of Chaumont (Zamoyski, 2007: 166–168), 
which was published on 31 March when the allies entered and occupied Paris. In this 
treaty, the allies labelled themselves the ‘Grand Alliance’, also named the ‘Quadruple 
Alliance’, and the nucleus of the ‘Holy Alliance’ was proposed by Tsar Alexander one 
year later and signed by most continental powers, surviving for another twenty years. 
Chaumont was the first treaty in history that ruled that the parties had to act in the interest 
of peace in general. In Paris, the French negotiator and Foreign Minister to Vienna, 
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Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand Périgord, re-entered the stage. As mentioned earlier in 
this thesis, Talleyrand had been politically active during the Ancien Régime, the Revolution 
and the Empire – as Foreign Minister of Napoleon – and seized his chance by installing a 
provisional government in Paris. He was supported by the allies and, on 2 April 1814, the 
Senate voted to force the abdication of Napoleon. On 6 April 1814, the Senate adopted a 
constitution and offered Louis XVIII de Bourbon the throne of France. On 11 April 1814, 
the allies offered Napoleon the Treaty of Fontainebleau, in which he accepted Elba as 
his fiefdom. Napoleon ratified the treaty the following day, after a failed attempt to kill 
himself. After a fortnight, British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh signed parts of the treaty, 
signalling British hesitance about some of its provisions. On 9 May 1814, Russia, Prussia, 
Austria and Britain established a conference between them, where they negotiated on 
a proposal by Prussia’s Chancellor Hardenberg concerning the division of Europe, the 
overseas territories, the question of reparations by the French and the restitution of stolen 
objects. However, they could not reach an overall agreement and they decided to sign a 
peace treaty with France before tackling the issues to be resolved among themselves.
On 30 May 1814, the first Peace of Paris (Zamoyski, 2007: 197–203) came into being. 
In June 1814, the allies decided that with regard to the unresolved territorial questions, 
no military action should be taken. It is interesting to note here that, with the sidelining of 
Napoleon, there was a growing risk of an inter-allied war. This risk only disappeared when 
Napoleon escaped from Elba in 1815, an event that finally pushed the allies to finalize their 
proceedings in view of a common enemy. Napoleon’s return would then be the stalemate 
breaker, creating the ripeness that was needed to strike a deal. In summer 1814, however, 
four issues seemed to be unsolvable: the Rhineland, Poland, Saxony and the fortress city 
of Mainz. These problems were aggravated by the position of Tsar Alexander on Poland, 
when he visited London in summer 1814, which opened the option of an Austrian–French 
alliance, although in the end this threat to the alliance’s cohesion was averted in a London 
meeting of sovereigns, their ministers and their ambassadors. They decided on a date and 
a temporary agenda for the Vienna conference. However, the Russian stand also raised 
the possibility of a Russian–French rapprochement, which did not materialize thanks to 
strong pressure from Britain’s Castlereagh on Talleyrand in Paris on 8 August 1814. From 
July until September 1814, the heads of state, ministers and ambassadors trickled into 
Vienna, and on 1 November 1814 the Congress of Vienna started, although the British 
had proposed 15 August and the Russian Tsar had opted for 1 October. The Congress 
of Vienna was about to begin: ‘the last, and temporarily successful attempt at [the] 
preservation [of the Ancien Régime]’ (Hroch, 1993: 43). Although the road to Vienna was 
long, most delegates were not prepared for it.
Counterparts
The Russians were personified by Tsar Alexander I (Rey, 2012), an autocratic, imperious, 
generous, bullying and spiritual ruler, who thought of himself as an enlightened man whose 
destiny it was to bring prosperity and stability to Europe. As years went by, Alexander I 
became more spiritual, influenced by Baroness Julie von Krüdener (Rey, 2012: 491–492), 
and this made him even more inaccessible to his colleague negotiators than before. He 
saw himself as the liberator of the European continent, and in a way he was precisely that, 
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although he had been Napoleon’s ally for quite some time. He both admired and despised 
Napoleon.
It was difficult to negotiate with Alexander. Negotiations very much depended on his 
mood. Although he could easily be influenced, it was hard to steer him in the desired 
direction of a compromise. He had been educated in an enlightened way, but he had to rule 
over a feudal, theocratic country. In essence he lacked self-confidence, but compensated 
for this by acting in public in an overly confident way. In his private life, especially with the 
many ladies with whom he had liaisons, he could be very open and vulnerable. He was in 
need of attention and wanted to please others, while he could be rude one moment later, 
for example to the Tsarina, with whom he had a lukewarm and complicated relationship. In 
other words, Tsar Alexander I was not too predictable and, as predictability is an essential 
element of a stable negotiation process, this created problems in his dealings with the 
other negotiators. Although the Tsar had enlightened ideas, in the end he never brought 
them to materialization, and the weight of the Russian Empire in Europe and on the peace 
negotiations was a hot potato for his counterparts, especially for the representatives of 
smaller states.
Alexander’s entourage included the Polish Prince Adam Czartoryski, the most skilful 
Russian negotiator. Depending on the Tsar’s mood, Prince Czartoryski could be very 
influential, using his influence to get the Tsar to agree to as much Polish autonomy as 
possible, if not independence. Czartoryski’s relationship with Alexander was a complicated 
one, partly because he was in love with the Tsarina, and as time went by, the relationship 
between the prince and his master deteriorated. Another important advisor, and at a 
later stage minister and negotiator, was the Prussian patriot Karl Heinrich vom Stein, who 
had been born in Nassau and who fell out of favour with the Prussian king as he hated 
the French, while Prussia’s Frederick William III was of the opinion that an alliance with 
Napoleon would be beneficial for Prussia. While Tsar Alexander and his advisers tended 
to look at Turkey as the future prey of Russia, Stein sought to change their course in the 
direction of German confederation, which he hoped to unite after the Russians had freed 
it from French dominance and occupation. Both Czartoryski and Stein failed to convince 
the Tsar to create a unified Poland and Germany, as Alexander I did not see this to be 
in Russia’s national interest. Stein, however, laid the foundation of German unification 
by restructuring Prussia. The same is true for the Ionian diplomat in Russia’s service, 
Count Ioannis Capodistrias, who pleaded for Greek independence, did not get it, but laid 
the foundations for the Greek state that emerged fifteen years later, with himself as the 
first president. Furthermore, Count Charles Nesselrode played his – quite passive – part in 
the negotiation process as Russia’s acting foreign minister, at the time in competition with 
his predecessor Prince Nikolay Petrovich Rumiantsev (Rey, 2012: 67).
Count von Metternich (Sandeman, 2006), who was Austria’s Foreign Minister for 
39 years, was the nucleus of the Vienna Congress. His wait-and-see policy after Napoleon’s 
retreat from Moscow gave him the role of mediator, which he skilfully exploited. When he 
finally took sides, he managed to convince the allies to have the peace negotiations in the 
Austrian capital, giving him the opportunity to play a home match. One of the advantages 
of this was the opportunity to build an Austrian spy network, which was extremely 
successful in giving Metternich an information advantage. His spies were active – for 
example, as servants – in nearly all the foreign residences, including the Austrian court 
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itself. Metternich spied on his own emperor and empress. The only embassies that 
were difficult to penetrate were the British and the French. One of his disadvantageous 
character traits was his extremely high self-esteem. This blinded him in many instances, 
with so-called ‘egotiation’ – a negotiation process in which his ego gained priority over the 
interests of country and of the Congress – as a consequence.
As a counter-revolutionary, Metternich believed in the restoration of the old order. In 
that sense he was much more conservative, or actually reactionary, than Tsar Alexander I, 
who was Metternich’s headache. Metternich managed to implement his plans, which 
were not to the liking of the British, who feared unrest among the European populations, 
and rightly so. The people had sniffed freedom and political influence, of which they were 
again deprived. Metternich’s backward-looking policies resulted in resistance against the 
new old order, notably in the revolutions of 1930 and 1848. They also facilitated the return 
of Napoleon in 1815, and perhaps even the rise of nationalism that brought Austria to its 
knees in 1918. For the moment, however, Austria came out of the Napoleonic Wars as 
Europe’s power balancer, while remaining a vulnerable state because of its nationality 
problem.
Like all of the other negotiators in Vienna, crowned heads such as Russian Tsar 
Alexander I or Frederick VI of Denmark, and noblemen like the brilliant French negotiator 
Talleyrand and the Prussian envoy Wilhelm von Humboldt, Metternich had mistresses, 
of whom Wilhelmina of Sagan has been the most influential. He was in love with her and 
their tempestuous relationship distracted him from the affairs of state at crucial moments. 
Another mistress was Princess Catharine Bagration, with whom he had a child and who 
had been the Russian Tsar’s mistress as well. Metternich’s friend, Friedrich von Gentz, 
became Secretary of the Vienna Congress, which gave him – and thereby Metternich – the 
advantage of setting the agenda, reporting and drafting. Metternich managed a good 
relationship with his nominal superior, Emperor Francis I of Austria. Although Metternich 
staged many performances to entertain the Congress participants, with one reason 
being that it kept them busy and distracted them from the ongoing negotiations, Emperor 
Francis I did not fancy this ongoing and very costly circus. He actually threatened to 
abdicate if these feasts continued. After Austria’s defeat against France in 1809, Emperor 
Francis had to give his daughter Marie-Louise as the Empress of France and Napoleon’s 
wife in 1810, which hampered his freedom of action vis-à-vis his ‘ally’ and enemy Napoleon 
Bonaparte. Emperor Francis was a conservative man and suspicious of change, but loved 
by his people (Zamoyski, 2007: 313). This made it difficult for Metternich to manage him 
if change was needed, but which made life easier as he did not intervene in day-to-day 
processes.
The Prussian Chancellor, Baron (later Prince) August von Hardenberg, was the 
Prussian chief negotiator. Born in Hanover, he had therefore been in the service of George 
III, King of England and Elector of Hanover. He had to leave England, however, when his 
wife started an affair with the Prince of Wales that became public. Hardenberg became 
Prussia’s foreign minister and later its chancellor. He had to struggle with the Prussian 
military – which even mutinied against its political authorities and demanded a high price 
for Prussia’s switch from France to Russia, a price for which the negotiations did not 
allow. Although Hardenberg did everything that he could to defend Prussia’s interest, he 
was not seen as a very successful negotiator. His ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ demands on Saxony 
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as compensation for Polish lands nearly wrecked the Vienna Conference. Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, a Prussian academic and ambassador to Vienna, was Hardenberg’s ‘aide-de-
camp’. After Hardenberg’s death, he tried to gain the position of Chancellor, but the King 
did not grant it to him (Zamoyski, 2007: 536).
King Frederick William III of Prussia came with his sons to Vienna, where he played 
a more active role than Emperor Francis, but much less so than the Russian Tsar, who 
was his own chief negotiator, the only crowned head in the inner circle of day-to-day 
negotiation. After being forced to ally with Napoleon, King Frederick William III changed 
camps after his retreat from Moscow, although not immediately, and became a very loyal 
ally of the Russian Tsar. As Russian troops had occupied Prussia, he had no other choice, 
but it did bring him into a difficult negotiation situation and reduced his alternatives and 
his flexibility to zero. He was in fact a vassal of Russia until the end of the Congress of 
Vienna. Like Tsar Alexander, he turned away from liberalism as time went by, and by the 
end of his life he was a true reactionary. Apart from being enslaved by the Russian Tsar, he 
was – during the Vienna Congress – also enslaved by Countess Julie Zichy. The Austrians 
saw him as their main threat to Austria’s interests, because both Prussia and Austria were 
competing for dominance in Germany.
The British had been out of tune with continental Europe for a long time, and it took 
some trouble for them to become accustomed to the continental ways of life, including 
fashion. British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh headed the British delegation. 
Viscount Robert Stuart Castlereagh, later Second Marquess of Londonderry, was a figure 
with revolutionary ideas in his early years, and briefly an Irish patriot. He was seen as 
an honest man forced into dishonest proceedings. While Castlereagh saw Russia as a 
natural ally, Tsar Alexander I regarded Britain as his rival because of its maritime power 
and interests in the Mediterranean and Asia. Castlereagh tried to be a mediator, but he 
was fully drawn into the give-and-take of the Vienna Congress, including so-called ‘soul 
trading’: decisions taken about nations and minorities without consulting them. Souls 
were considered important, as their number was directly linked to the potential army 
that a country could field if needed. As Castlereagh had to deal with politics in Britain, 
at the beginning of 1815 he was briefly replaced as chief negotiator by Arthur Wellesley, 
Duke of Wellington, who then had to leave the negotiation table when Napoleon fled 
from Elba, before returning to Vienna after his victory at Waterloo in June 1815. The Duke 
of Wellington had an Irish background like Castlereagh, and – having been educated in 
France – had a good understanding of the French and their culture, which he liked, even 
after his battles against Napoleon. He warned the allies to distrust Napoleon, not the 
French people, and he fiercely objected to grave punishment of France, which would raise 
grief and endanger a peaceful Europe in the future. He was the British ambassador to 
France (Zamoyski, 2007: 347) when he had to replace Castlereagh in Vienna in early 1815.
Other British negotiators were as capable as their masters. George Gordon, Earl of 
Aberdeen, was only 28 years old and was the British ambassador to Vienna. Unlike many 
other British diplomats, Gordon realized how far the British government had been driven 
apart from mainstream European politics during the two decades of French upheaval 
and conquest. Like the other British participants in and around the Vienna Congress, he 
did not like the political intrigue that was so characteristic of the Vienna negotiations. 
Sir Charles Steward was the British ambassador to the Prussian court. He was a 
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soldier by origin and had served under the Duke of Wellington in Spain. His escapades 
in Vienna partly undid the image of the British as being of reasonably impeccable 
behaviour. As the British had their own servants in their embassy, Metternich’s police 
could not report much on them, apart from when some of them went outside to the 
whores. General Charles Murray, Earl of Cathcart, was also a soldier and represented 
the British at the Russian court. In Vienna, Murray suffered from the continental ways 
of political and diplomatic horse-trading, which he had in common with the other British 
negotiators. His signature is under the Final Act of the Vienna Congress. Finally, there 
was Richard Trench, Earl of Clancarty, who was the British ambassador to The Hague. All 
of the British negotiators, and Castlereagh above all, had to take into consideration the 
position and opinion of the British Prime Minister in London, Robert Banks Jenkinson, Earl 
of Liverpool, whose cabinet was heavily criticized by the British Parliament and – after the 
Battle of Waterloo – by the British population, which wanted harsh measures to be taken 
against France. Britain’s Prince Regent, the future King George IV, did not play a role of 
significance, primarily because of the parliamentary system that was in place in Britain.
France was only invited into the inner circle of negotiations after the discussion was 
well under way. Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (Bernard, 1973), France’s chief 
negotiator and minister of foreign affairs, had survived at least four regime changes in 
France and was still to survive another two. Some of the coups détat had been engineered 
by him; in others he had participated as a conspirator. Once a bishop of the Roman Catholic 
Church, although he had never preached (his family had bought the job to generate 
income for him, as they saw their limping son as incapable of earning a decent living), 
he developed to become a Machiavellian politician of the highest grade. Talleyrand’s aim 
was to save as much for France as he could – and as far as money is concerned for his 
own pockets as well – and he managed to maintain French territory after the Congress 
of Vienna as it had been before the Revolution, even a bit bigger. His farsightedness was 
combined with extreme pragmatism, his eloquence was merged with a creative mind, and 
his opportunism was coupled with a seemingly French legalistic approach, making him 
an example for diplomats even today. Nobody, however, is perfect, and his secret alliance 
with Austria and Britain nearly wrecked the Congress, which would have been to the 
detriment of France in the longer run.
Nevertheless, Talleyrand’s skill as a negotiator made him an enigma in the history of 
diplomatic negotiation. An example of his outstanding abilities is the way he managed the 
very difficult and important factor of trust. ‘Talleyrand [...] was not even trusted by his own 
constituents and even less by the king he was representing. However, in that case, he had 
outstanding technical skills and could show enough credibility in the arguments he used’ 
(Faure, 2012: 371).
Talleyrand, like Metternich and most other negotiators, had love affairs, such as with 
the Duchess of Courland and, during the Congress, with her daughter Dorothée, Comtesse 
de Périgord, but these liaisons did not distract him from the negotiation process. Dorothée 
helped him, one of the few unmarried man at the Congress, to stage his social life. His 
table became famous as he took the best cook in Paris, Carème, with him to Vienna 
(Bobot, 2008). Everyone wanted to attend his dinners, giving Talleyrand the best channels 
of influence that he could want. The French chief negotiator had several noblemen to 
assist him: an expert on German questions, the Duc de Dalberg; the Comte de la Tour du 
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Pin; and the Comte Alexis de Noaille. Finally we should mention Jean-Baptiste de Gouey, 
(later) Comte de la Besnardière, the French diplomat who worked with the Austrian 
diplomat Friedrich von Gentz to draft the final versions of the Final Act.
Another Frenchman, the Crown Prince of Sweden and Napoleon’s former Marshal, 
Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, had to act from the outer circle, together with the monarchs 
of the other middle-ranking states. His ambassador at the conference was Count 
Charles Axel Löwenhielm. Bernadotte opted to be the successor of Napoleon on the 
French throne, and for a very long time he had the staunch support of Tsar Alexander. 
However, Metternich and others wanted the Bourbons to be restored to the French 
throne, as they gave precedence to the principle of the legitimacy of the dynasties, for if 
they had not done so, other dynasties would also be in trouble in claiming dynastic rights 
to a country. In the end, Bernadotte had to give in, surrendered Finland to Russia – which 
Russia had already occupied – and received an unwilling Norway in return, to the 
detriment of Denmark, which had been an ally of Napoleon until the bitter end. Denmark’s 
King Frederick IV had the respect of the Congress of Vienna, contrary to Bernadotte, who 
was generally despised. However, this esteem did not help the Danish king, who was in 
a hopeless position, as he did not have the opportunity to leave the Napoleonic camp on 
time. Although the Congress of Vienna assured him of at least his own Danish territory 
and German Schleswig-Holstein, it took him until close to the end of the conference to get 
Russia’s Tsar Alexander to sign the Treaty of Kiel. Only after Frederick directly confronted 
the Tsar with his failure to sign, did the Tsar fulfil his obligation (Zamoyski, 2007: 388).
Of the many German monarchs and princes, and representatives of smaller states 
with noblemen as rulers, a few stand out. Although they were also in the outer circle, 
they could exert some ad-hoc pressure on the five main negotiators. King Maximilian I of 
Bavaria saw Prussia as his main adversary. He had married his daughter to Prince Eugène, 
Viceroy of Italy, who had to beg the Congress of Vienna for a fiefdom during its entire 
duration. King Maximilian had been the first of the German monarchs to join the alliance 
against Napoleon and he wanted to be rewarded for it. His claim to Mainz had been 
one of the thorns in the side of the conference. King Frederick I of Württemberg used 
the Congress of Vienna to eat and drink as much as possible. His son, the Prince Royal, 
future King William of Württemberg, saw the Vienna event as a chance to enjoy himself 
as well, although he prioritized women and dancing. Perhaps the biggest victim among 
those who were present at the conference was King Frederick Augustus of Saxony. Like 
the King of Denmark, he had supported Napoleon from the start, being afraid of Prussia 
and Austria at the same time. The Tsar was so angry at him that he wanted to go against 
the principle of legitimacy by wiping him off his throne. In the end this did not happen, 
but Frederick Augustus and Saxony only survived because of Austria’s fear of Saxony 
becoming part of Prussia, thus strengthening Prussia too much. However, as the Tsar 
wanted big chunks of Polish Prussia, Frederick Augustus had to cede the northern half 
of Saxony to his colleague in Berlin. Hardenberg and Humboldt demanded the whole of 
Saxony for a long time, and this became one of the conference’s seemingly intractable 
issues.
Finally, we should mention some negotiators of minor powers and minorities at the 
Congress of Vienna, although by no means a complete listing. These included Cardinal 
Ercole Consalvi, the Pope’s envoy; Joaquim Lobo da Silveira and António de Saldanha da 
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Gama, Count of Porto Santo, representing Portugal; and Spain’s envoy Don Pedro Gomez 
Havela, Marqués de Labrador, who wanted to restore as many Italian fiefdoms to Spain as 
possible. From the Kingdom of Sardinia came the Marchese di San Marzano and Count 
Rossi. The Marchese de Brignole-Sale represented the Republic of Genoa, but Genoa 
disappeared from the map as an independent country. There were representatives of 
minorities, such as Jewish leaders from Bremen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Prague and Lübeck, 
who pleaded for equality rights for the German Jews. As Metternich did not want to have 
the Jewish demands on the agenda, he ordered the police to expel them from Vienna. 
The Prussians and British supported the Jews, however, so they were allowed to stay, 
one reason (and perhaps the main reason) being the loans provided by the Jews to the 
rulers in their fight against Napoleon, for example from the British Rothschilds (Zamoyski, 
2007: 379).
Structure
Communications in Vienna were facilitated by the use of French – the language of the 
‘enemy’ – as the lingua franca, but of course a common language did not lead to common 
ground. From a procedural point of view, the Vienna negotiations were quite messy. This 
had to do with the structure–content dilemma. The structure of the conference would, of 
course, have a large impact on the way in which the parties were going to deal with the 
content. A well-regulated Congress of Vienna, with clear procedures and an opportunity 
for all to participate and to vote on the Final Act, would give the small and middle powers 
a very strong finger in the pie. Even then, however, they would have to reckon with the 
Great Powers, as is the case in the European Union. Although all EU member states are 
reasonably equal and although they all have a say, they cannot act if there are not at least 
two of the Great Powers in agreement with each other. Indeed, the power of the countries 
is, to a certain extent, reflected in the votes that they can cast in the Council of Ministers, 
but the very small and small states have, relatively speaking, more votes for fewer people. 
Even then, there is political reality, and the EU has clearly been structured around Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom, with Italy, Spain and Poland as a second circle. Also in 
the EU, we see a certain measure of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, but this is very much 
in the more informal negotiations – the bilateral, trilateral and back-channel, etc. Officially, 
nobody can be excluded, but countries can be out-voted.
A voting system would have been out of the question in the seventeenth, eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. It only became feasible in the twentieth century with the 
League of Nations. At the Congress of Vienna it was completely out of the question to 
limit sovereignty in any way, as this would undermine the system of formally independent 
states and the legitimacy of their rulers. Such a precedent would not only touch upon the 
small powers, which did not want to be vassals – although many of them were – but would 
also affect the Great Powers. After all, being a Great Power today does not guarantee your 
status for the future. The Polish example is a gloomy one, as it was once a Great Power 
that was completely eradicated, although the so-called ‘Polish Question’ was alive and 
kicking. Perhaps the fading of the Holy Roman Empire – actually Rome itself – could be 
seen as a warning to those who thought that great kingdoms would be there for eternity. It 
is telling that the downfall of the western and the eastern Roman Empires has never been 
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completely accepted. They linger on spiritually today as the Roman and Greek Catholic 
Churches. It is difficult even nowadays to imagine that vested powers might crumble, and 
the shock and the after-shocks of the relatively recent downfall of the Soviet Union and 
even of Yugoslavia have still not been fully digested today (Davies, 2011).
One of the signals for the compensation dilemma was Prussia’s struggle, mentioned 
earlier, to have as many ‘souls’ within its border as possible. One could image a system 
of weighing these souls – for example, is a Polish farmer more or less worthy than a 
Saxon? – and indeed, a statistical committee was established to try to refine the system 
of population counting (Dupont et al., 2005: 42). Yet without universally accepted norms, 
such a methodology could not work. Norms could not be universally adopted, because 
the Congress of Vienna did not have a procedure to allow for that. A universal system 
would endanger absolute sovereignty, as the Great Powers (especially) would be limited 
by it, and they, of course, wanted to keep their hands free, just as they still want today, 
although they are now much more fenced in than before. Only a system of exclusion could 
therefore work. The Great Powers decided over the middle and smaller ones, who were 
given influence but no powers. The Great Powers were equal among themselves, and in 
that sense there was already a veto system at the Congress of Vienna. Consensus among 
the ‘Big Five’ was needed, as it is needed today in the Security Council of the United 
Nations.
How did the Congress of Vienna tackle the problem of its own structure and what 
did it structure? In late August 1814, more than two months before the official opening 
of the conference, the representatives of the four main allied powers – the Quadruple 
Alliance – met in Vienna: in the first meeting, this was Metternich, Hardenberg, Nesselrode 
and Castlereagh. They decided on an ‘Inner Circle’ consisting of themselves, and several 
‘Outer Circles’ with a growing number of counterparts. The Inner Circle of Austria, Prussia, 
Russia and Britain would also be present in the other circles. In the first Outer Circle, 
France and Spain were added as Great Powers. As time went by, France – thanks to 
Talleyrand’s skills – would move to the Inner Circle, but Spain would ever reach there. 
As well as the Four and the Six, a ‘Circle of the Eight’ was created, adding Sweden and 
Portugal to the others. With that last Circle, all signatories of the first Peace of Paris, 
the treaty that laid the foundation for the Vienna Congress, were brought together in an 
institutional, although politically more or less irrelevant, setting. The more participants 
that the Circle had, the less important the issues with which they were going to deal. 
However, it was the Eight that were formally entitled to direct the conference, as they were 
the participants in the constituent first Peace of Paris treaty – the second treaty (Dupont 
et al., 2005: 70) was signed after Napoleon had been defeated at Waterloo.
In a meeting on 20 September 1814, Talleyrand questioned the authority of the Inner 
Circle of the Four to decide on questions that would involve the sovereignty of other 
nations. His argument touched upon the principle of legitimacy, and as this principle was 
the foundation of the whole exercise, the other powers could not neglect his reasoning. 
To Talleyrand, territorial issues could only be decided upon by the Congress of Vienna as 
a whole. His tactics delayed the official opening of the Congress and brought him into 
the Inner Circle on 9 January 1815, which was then referred to as the Five instead of the 
Four. It should be added that there were power-political reasons for the original Four to 
incorporate France. The British were of the opinion that a stable Europe would not be 
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possible without France; the Austrians needed France as a counterweight to Prussia; 
and the Russians could not do without France because of its maritime power to balance 
the British as much as possible, and also because France could become valuable to 
counterbalance Prussia or Austria in the future. Only the Prussians were against France 
being included, but they could not sustain their resistance for more than a few months. 
As soon as Talleyrand was on board, he dropped his wish to deal with territorial issues in 
the Congress of Vienna as a whole. None of the original Four regretted his opportunism 
on the issue.
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the three conference circles conferred on different 
topics: the most important ones were dealt with by the Four; the next of importance by the 
Six; and the leftovers by the Eight. The rest of the Congress of Vienna only participated 
on the issues where they were stakeholders, and this was done in committees, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter. What was the content with which the circles were dealing? 
The Four, and after four months the Five, negotiated the position of France, Poland and 
Saxony. As already mentioned, Poland and Saxony were connected questions that had to 
be solved in a package deal, and the trade-off was done just before Napoleon came back 
on the stage. The Four initially decided on procedures, but after the main procedure were 
established, it was the Eight that formally decided on them. Furthermore, the Eight dealt 
with the question of what should be done with Italy, Switzerland and Germany. Yet there 
were separate meetings of the Four/Five on Germany and Switzerland as well. Actually, 
the Five pre-negotiated all the main issues in informal bilaterals as well. For example, the 
issues of Spain and France were negotiated in a mainly bilateral fashion (Dupont et al., 
2005: 46–47).
However chaotic and ambiguous the rules of procedure were, and even if one could 
talk about official rules of procedure, they were a novelty to conference diplomacy in 
the sense that they established a structure consisting of circles and committees. The 
committees were meant to get all of the relevant countries involved, both for reasons of 
principle and practice. With the creation of the committees, those powers that could not 
participate in the core negotiations could be given some kind of legitimate place in the 
conference processes, which avoided – also through the adoption of France – further 
complaints about the hegemony of the Inner Circle.
The committees had specific tasks, dealing with specific issues. The following 
committees were installed: on Germany; Switzerland; Tuscany; Sardinia; Genoa; 
Bouillon (on the border between France and the Austrian Netherlands, now Belgium); 
on international rivers; the slave trade; statistics; diplomatic precedence; and, finally, on 
drafting the Final Act. The German Committee can be seen as the most important, most 
tricky and most emotional, as kings, princes, dukes, counts, barons and other noblemen 
depended on this committee for their survival, and on the question of how they would 
survive. The German Committee was also responsible for tackling the Jewish issue – that 
is, the rights of the Jews in Germany. As we have seen above, the Jews tried to retain the 
rights bestowed upon them by Napoleon Bonaparte.
Other conferences in the nineteenth century profited from the procedural innovations 
that were made during the Congress of Vienna. They learned from its successes and from 
its failures. The Vienna Congress’s construction tried to balance inclusion and exclusion 
in such a way that the number of decision-makers would be limited through exclusion, 
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thereby avoiding too much complexity. The Great Powers were kept on board through 
inclusion, thereby avoiding the risk of deciding on a Final Act that would not survive the 
Congress for more than a few years. The procedures thus assured a European political 
constellation that would survive until deep into the nineteenth century. The procedures 
therefore helped to build a forward-looking state system. Yet the content was mainly 
reactionary and backward-looking, and this undercut the effectiveness of the forward-
looking aspect. While the structure of the Congress of Vienna fostered institutionalization 
for the future, the content undermined it. It is therefore now necessary to turn to content 
by looking at the process of negotiation – in other words, the conversations between the 
main actors about their common and diverging interests and how they managed to make 
them converge into a single agreement.
Conversations
To gain a better understanding of the interactions of the contending parties, or 
counterparts, we will focus mainly on the Inner Circle, the Four and then the Five, and on 
their biggest headache: Poland. This understanding of the negotiation process is vital for 
a comprehension of the outcomes to which we will turn in the convergence section of this 
chapter. There is a legal reason for focusing on the Inner Circle, although being legal it might 
not be legitimate. The Treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814 (Zamoyski, 2007: 197–203) gave the 
mandate to the Vienna Congress to negotiate the issues to be settled after the Napoleonic 
Wars. Its article 32 invited all of the involved and relevant powers and parties to send 
their plenipotentiaries, and over 100 did so, including the Pope in Rome and the Sultan in 
Constantinople. However, a secret provision in the treaty limited the decision-making to 
the four members of the Quadruple Alliance. Although Portugal, Spain and Sweden were 
signatories of the Treaty of Paris, they – let alone the other participants – were not aware 
of this secret article. This created communication problems, despite the fact that using 
French as the single language of the Congress of Vienna facilitated mutual understanding, 
and expectations could not be fulfilled, which led to some bitterness among those who 
were excluded from the very heart of the process. Not being able to sit around the table 
severely hampered their influence, and as an unknown diplomat in Brussels said on the 
occasion of the UK’s unwillingness to help the euro countries out in 2012: ‘if you are not 
at the table, you are on the menu’.
The middle and minor powers had an opportunity to participate in committees, but as 
there were no in-between plenary sessions, their voices could not be heard in public. The 
only plenary sessions of the Congress of Vienna were the opening and closing meetings. 
Although there are very good political reasons for keeping the decision-making group 
as small as possible, it is still a strange fact that those who stood at the outset of the 
Congress of Vienna – being signatories to the Treaty of Paris – and who signed the Final 
Act were kept out of the decision-making process. When Talleyrand managed to move 
into the Inner Circle – as France from a power-political perspective could not be left 
outside – the resentment of the others was raised further. This would create problems at 
a later stage, as Spain did not want to sign the Vienna Final Act in the end, but this did 
not stop the Act from coming into being. One would expect consensus among the Eight 
to be a prerequisite for the Act to be legal, but as the principle of consensus among the 
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eight signatories of the Treaty of Paris was never literally stipulated as a precondition, it 
did not stop the others from overruling Spain.
How should we analyze the manoeuvring of the different actors involved? Even 
limiting ourselves to the Four/Five does not help much in gaining a better insight into the 
question of why the negotiation process resulted in the Final Act. The father of modern 
French diplomatic and political negotiation research, Christophe Dupont, gave it a try as 
far as the Polish question is concerned (Dupont and Audebert-Lasrochas, 2005: 46–47). 
How to deal with France was the main issue of the Vienna Congress, but this question 
was relatively easy to manage as long as Napoleon would not be involved. The Polish 
question, however, being connected to that of Saxony, was the toughest political problem 
with which to cope. In two interesting models, Dupont and Audebert-Lasrochas try to 
show the distance or proximity between the counterparts within the Inner Circle of the 
Five, and how and why their positions changed.
Castlereagh wanted an independent and strong Poland, as it was in the British interest 
to have a barrier against Russian and Prussian ambitions. Along the same line, the British 
supported the unification of the Northern and Southern Netherlands as a barrier against 
France and Prussia. As the others opposed the British position in August 1814, and as 
Talleyrand was moving closer to Russian Tsar Alexander I in June and July 1814 (with 
France not yet a member of the Five), Castlereagh felt isolated and invited Talleyrand to 
establish a coalition of Austria, Britain and France against Russia and Prussia. One thing 
to observe is the fluency of the negotiation process. It was all about power and the impact 
of the negotiators’ personalities acting within the boundaries of the circles, unless those 
boundaries hampered politics too much, in which case they did not matter at all. To 
construct a three powers’ arrangement was only possible with France on board. How 
reminiscent this is of the give and take in other (simulated) diplomatic realities (Sharp, 
1978). Only after a row between Austria’s Metternich and Russian Tsar Alexander did this 
coalition materialize. The agreement was made and remained a secret until Napoleon, 
upon his return from Elba, found the text in the archives of the French Foreign Office 
and sent it triumphantly to Tsar Alexander. The Tsar was not shocked. Castlereagh then 
tried to get Alexander – who was not aware of the secret treaty during that phase of the 
Congress of Vienna – to drop his plan to construct an ‘independent’ Poland with himself 
as king, as this resolve would only end up in an enlarged Russia, as it did. Castlereagh 
failed, however, to convince the Tsar. He tried again to change the Tsar’s mind, this time 
by applying pressure on him through a common front with Hardenberg and Metternich 
(Webster, 1931).
Metternich started off with a position close to Castlereagh’s: Poland should not 
become a part of Russia. His difference from the British position, however, was that 
the Austrians were very hesitant about an independent Poland, for two reasons. First, 
an independent Poland could be a weak and internally divided country and a hearth of 
political unrest in the heart of Europe. Poland had always been a country in which others 
than the ruling elite intervened in the affairs of the state. The Polish system of electing 
the king through councils of the Schlachta – nobles from very low to very high rank, 
and from very poor to extremely wealthy – was seen as a danger to political stability, 
particularly as these ‘elections’ could, and were, manipulated by other European powers 
to their own interest. The second objection can be found in the linkage with the Saxony 
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problem. As already mentioned, an independent Poland would mean that Prussia would 
lose even more of its eastern territories than if Poland was divided between it and Russia. 
As a consequence, the Prussians would demand an even bigger part of Saxony and it 
was not in Austria’s interest to lose such a rich, and therefore important, buffer state. A 
meeting between Metternich and Russian Tsar Alexander I on 31 October 1814 resulted 
in a temporary breakdown of their relationship. Although they had to remain on speaking 
terms for political reasons, the personal relationship deteriorated further, and at the 
beginning of 1815 the Tsar could not even stand the sight of Metternich, not only because 
of their differences of opinion, but also because of Metternich’s manipulating style, which 
was connected to rivalries between their mistresses, as well as mistresses they shared, 
such as the Princess Catherine Bagration (Zamoyski, 2007: 258–259) and therefore had a 
very personal dimension.
Talleyrand, for his part, also favoured an independent Poland. After all, Poland had 
been an old and trustworthy ally. Napoleon had resurrected Poland as his vassal state, 
the Duchy of Warsaw. France’s dilemma was the Saxon question. If Saxony was part of 
Prussia, Prussia would be so strong that it would be a threat to France. On the other 
hand, if Prussia did not get enough of Saxony in compensation, it would be compensated 
with more territories in the Rhineland, resulting in a strong Prussia directly bordering on 
France – an even less attractive prospect. Talleyrand, being realistic enough to see that an 
independent Poland would not be an option, opted for Polish partitioning as his second best 
priority – in other words, the status quo ante, as it was before the Napoleonic Wars. This 
was an important tactical move, as it is easier to converge on secondary priorities than on 
first priorities. It would not allow Prussia to gain too much of the Rhineland, nor of Saxony. 
Already in October 1814, the French plenipotentiary pressured Britain’s Castlereagh to 
join him in his resistance to the annexation – or partitioning – of Saxony. In the end, 
Talleyrand presented proposals to avoid the annexation of Saxony by Prussia on 19 and 
26 December 1814. Castlereagh and Metternich went along with this, with the conditions 
being laid down in the secret treaty of 3 January 1815, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
An important point is the awareness of the three negotiators of the position of the minor 
German powers. These powers also opposed the annexation or division of Saxony as a 
precedent that would endanger their own attempts to continue their rule over their own 
lands, and in view of their position in the future German Bund to come. This is another 
example of the non-watertight boundaries between the Inner Circle and the Outer Circle. 
The position of the German states strengthened the hands of the tripartite negotiators of 
the Inner Circle. It would have been unrealistic to take an anti-Prussian – and thereby anti-
Russian – stand if the other German states would not bandwagon with them. This was of 
the utmost importance for Austria, as it in fact meant that most German states preferred 
an Austrian umbrella, rather than Prussian, above their heads – a victory in its battle with 
Prussia for hegemony over Germany (Zamoyski, 2007: 432–436).
Prussia’s Chancellor Hardenberg took a very tough position on Poland and Saxony 
from the very start. The last thing that his sovereign Frederick William III wanted was a 
breach in the relationship with Russia. Prussia’s king was a staunch ally of Russian Tsar 
Alexander I, as he had been with Napoleon earlier. Keeping this alliance intact meant giving 
up more than half of the Prussian Polish territories – a loss of many souls. The threat of a 
weakened Prussia with an insufficient population to sustain its army in the future forced 
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King Frederick William III to demand compensation, primarily through Saxony, otherwise 
Prussia would be a victorious power that would not win anything from its sacrifices. The 
age-old competition between Prussia and Saxony encouraged the Prussians in their 
eagerness to annex it. Both rulers did not particularly like each other and would not be 
unhappy if their counterpart lost face, and if possible his throne. A very tough proposal 
by Hardenberg on 27 November 1814, demanding the annexation of the whole of Saxony, 
pushed the Five to the brink of war.
Tsar Alexander I, in the meantime, did not change his position at all. As stated earlier, 
he wanted an ‘independent’ Poland under his own rule: a Personal Union of Poland and 
Russia, just as he wanted a Personal Union of Finland and Russia, with himself as Grand-
Duke. He foresaw a liberal constitution for Poland, thereby materializing his beliefs in a 
liberated Europe that would neither be oppressed by its own rulers, nor by neighbouring 
countries. By following his scheme in Poland, Alexander I did not need to liberalize Russia 
itself – something that he wanted to avoid at all costs. While he saw Poland as a developed 
country with some kind of ‘democratic’ past, where an experiment with some rights for 
the people – meaning the upper classes – might work out fine, he saw his own country, 
Russia, as backward. Sharing power with others in Russia, a land without any tradition and 
experience of power-sharing (perhaps only the Cossack communities could be seen as an 
exception here) would only lead to chaos according to him, thus undermining his dynasty. 
Alexander’s ideas about Poland were ‘a bird in the sky’ and the other four negotiators 
were aware of it. After the Polish insurrections in the years to come, Tsar Alexander I had 
no problem in eliminating the liberal constitution, which was not actually liberal at all, 
indeed being one of the reasons for the ongoing Polish resistance against Russian rule. 
Soon afterwards, the Personal Union was discarded and Poland became an integral part 
of the Tsarist Russian Empire (Zamoyski, 2007: 532).
The negotiators defended their country’s interests and tried to get their own opinions 
through, which was not always the same thing. They kept an eye on the importance of a 
peaceful balance of power in Europe, as this was in the interests of all of them: a balance 
of power among them, allowing for the submission of the middle powers and, through 
them, of the many minor powers. This was seen as power-sharing under the maintenance 
of freedom of manoeuvre, which was quite a balancing act as they were all suspicious of 
the others.
The situation can be seen as competition and cooperation out of fear, both inside and 
outside the Inner Circle. Like today, there could be a sharp contrast between ‘playing for 
the public eye’ and the actual give and take. A famous example is the discussion between 
Napoleon and Metternich in 1813, at the time when Emperor Napoleon was back from 
Russia but had already returned to Germany as he was trying to keep his hold over it. 
Metternich went to visit Napoleon, offering Austrian mediation, as it was too early for 
Austria to take sides. The two men met in Dresden in Napoleon’s camp, trying to negotiate 
a new status quo. The conversations got nowhere and Metternich was about to leave, 
already with his travelling clothes on, when Emperor Napoleon asked him to stop by. 
Napoleon was in the same non-negotiable mood as he had been during their meeting 
earlier, complaining, shouting and threatening. He then ordered Metternich into a small 
room and became very friendly, accepting the Austrian offer to mediate without setting 
any conditions for it. They agreed to set up a conference in Prague, which occurred, 
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although nothing came out of it as the parties only used their meeting to mask further 
preparations for war. The time for decisions through negotiation was not yet ripe, as war 
still had the upper hand. Shortly afterwards, however, Napoleon was beaten at the Battle 
of Leipzig and negotiation ripeness was there to be exploited, without Napoleon however.
Convergence
Why and how did the main negotiators converge their contradictory stances into common 
positions? Chapter III of this thesis acknowledged six main reasons for this. First, 
there was a geographic need to deal with border issues and thereby with questions of 
sovereignty. These were the main questions with which the negotiators had to deal, and 
this also attached their countries’ interests to the position of all the states in Europe. 
The main negotiators therefore only included the major Christian European powers in 
their decision-making process. The question of territory was closely linked to that of 
population and therefore also to military strength. No power should become too small, 
nor one too big. At the same time, it was essential to respect the Middle Powers, as 
they played an important role in coalition-building. The Great Powers did not trust each 
other and therefore tried to create equilibrium of territory and population. A Statistical 
Commission was established to help with this, but the Commission’s efforts to introduce 
wealth as a factor as well – thereby softening the difficult problem of counting and shifting 
populations – and their proposals of balancing wealth with numbers of people were seen 
as too soft and unreliable (Dupont and Audebert-Lasrochas, 2005: 42). As the Great 
Powers therefore looked for equilibrium among them, they needed the Middle Powers as 
neutral buffers and – if needed – as potential allies. The Middle Powers – countries such 
as Bavaria, Württemberg, Hannover, the Netherlands, Sweden, Naples, Savoy/Sardinia, 
Tuscany, Portugal, and perhaps still the victimized Saxony and Denmark – had to help the 
Great Powers to keep the small countries in check. The Middle Powers were often strong 
enough to counter revolutions, but the small ones were prone to them.
This did not stop the Great Powers from installing some – not all openly accepted – zones 
of influence. Austria saw Italy as its zone of influence and managed to sustain this to the 
detriment of Spain, which lost much of its former status on the Italian peninsula. France 
regarded Switzerland and the Netherlands as its potential zones of influence. In order to 
be successful in the Netherlands, France had to help to break up the United Kingdom 
of the Netherlands. It managed to do so in 1830, when Britain no longer worried about 
France as it had done before and therefore did not resist when the United Kingdom of 
the Netherlands fell apart into more or less neutral (the north) and Francophone (now 
Belgium) parts. On the province of Luxembourg, formally part of the German Bund, a 
typical distributive fifty–fifty negotiation solution was reached: Western Luxembourg 
went to Belgium; and Eastern Luxembourg stayed in the Netherlands, but only connected 
with it through a Personal Union with King William I of Orange-Nassau. The Luxembourg 
issue surfaced almost half a century after 1830, when France’s Napoleon III wanted it, but 
Prussia’s Chancellor Bismarck would not allow it. Although the question did not lead to an 
immediate war between Prussia and France, it lingered on and contributed in the second 
half of the nineteenth century to further tension, culminating in the Franco–German War 
of 1870–1871, a war that upset the balance of power in Europe. This war finished off the 
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last arrangements put in place by the Congress of Vienna, unbalancing Europe in its wake 
and in due course igniting the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War.
A second reason for the convergence by the main negotiators is the systemic dimension 
– in this case the strength of the states and of the system made up by them. This study 
has already mentioned that the Statistical Committee had to inform the negotiators about 
population figures, thus allowing the Great Powers to remain the same in the future. Their 
interests converged on that in the end, but it was a tough fight and some of the issues 
could not be solved. Spain, for example, did not sign the Final Act, as it was unhappy with 
Austria’s position in Italy and the loss of Spanish possession there, particularly as the 
question of Naples could not be solved before the Congress of Vienna came to closure. 
The great systemic question of Poland and Saxony – both of which were important to the 
inner strength of at least two of the Great Powers and of the state-system of Europe as a 
whole – came to closure on 3 February 1815, which was relatively early in the process. It 
was clear that there would not be any contextual change on Poland and Saxony in the near 
future, so the Great Powers ended the ‘mutual hurting stalemate’ by taking the ‘enticing 
opportunity’ of compromising in such a way that nobody would lose face and interests. 
Poland thus became nominally independent, as Britain, France and Austria had wanted, 
but it became de facto Russian, as the Tsar demanded full control over it. The Prussians 
were compensated in the Rhineland, as the British wanted, while Saxony was divided into 
an independent (as Austria wanted) and a Prussian half, which was a nice combination of 
distributive and integrative bargaining, fifty–fifty solutions and package deals. The French 
got what they wanted as well: they could keep some of the minor territorial gains that they 
had made after the Revolution.
However, the conviction of the Great Powers – especially Austria’s Metternich – that 
the pre-Revolutionary order should be restored undermined their attempts to erect states 
with a strong and durable system. The old regimes had lost much credibility in the eyes 
of the European population and this meant repressing revolts all over Europe if needed. 
The Great Powers therefore had to act together in the future as well, and the Russian 
Tsar in particular believed that for such action a common system should be erected. To 
strengthen the European system as a whole, the Five formed the Holy Alliance at the 
initiative of the Tsar (Davies, 1996: 762–763). The other powers did not see much value 
in the Holy Alliance, just as the Great Powers did not believe too much in the League of 
Nations 100 years later, but they thought that it would do no harm to accept it. With or 
without such an alliance, the Congress of Vienna gave Europe a relatively long period of 
stability. The nineteenth century would indeed become one of the more peaceful eras in 
history (Taylor, 1954: xxi).
Part of that system leant on the colonies of the countries attending the Congress 
of Vienna. It was therefore important to take into account not only the situation inside 
Europe, but the wider world as well. The British had great difficulties with this. They 
were afraid that involvement by the Congress of Vienna into those external issues would 
limit their freedom of behaviour outside Europe, which was exactly the reason why they 
had gone to war on the continent in the first place: to prevent one of the powers from 
dominating and thereby threatening British commercial and political interests, both on 
the continent and beyond. The British therefore kept the colonial issues off the agenda 
and prevented the others from establishing a committee on colonial and maritime issues. 
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Under pressure from public opinion at home, however, they pushed for the slave-trade 
issue – but not slavery as such! – to be considered. The other powers agreed to this and 
a Committee on the Slave Trade was formed. It never came to real agreement, however, 
as the interests of powers such as Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and France did 
not – yet – allow for it. In other words, it was not possible to converge the interests of 
the stakeholders, as they were too far apart and as the British had already gained their 
first priority: no interference in blue-water and extra-continental territories. Losing one’s 
second priority in order to safeguard one’s first priority, and negotiating on what is not too 
important – and taking the risk of losing it – while avoiding any negotiation on one’s main 
issues – these proved to be excellent strategies, worthy of the British. No negotiation is 
negotiation. It should be added, however, that the British also pre-empted serious talks on 
the colonies through parallel informal bilateral negotiations with the countries from which 
they had taken colonies during Napoleonic times. In particular, the British struck a deal 
with their maritime arch-rivals the Dutch, to whom they returned Indonesia and supported 
in gaining the Southern Netherlands, while they could keep Dutch possessions in Africa 
(inter alia South Africa) and Asia (inter alia Ceylon) in this trade-off.
As a third dimension, it is relevant to look at the parties’ needs and to see how it 
was possible to find enough common ground between them. Earlier paragraphs have 
already partly dealt with the question of interests and positions. As none of the Great 
Powers desired to be the new hegemonic power of Europe – with the Russian Tsar as a 
potential exception to this –and as they all wanted a European system that would allow 
them to deal with their own interests without interference, there was a great potential for 
convergence. We saw with the Polish/Saxony example how the negotiators moved from 
their initial stances to converted positions through compromise (including distributive 
bargaining and distribution of spoils) and collaboration (including integrative bargaining 
through packages deals, trade-offs and value creation). This was a mixed approach that 
worked well to manage complexity, with ambiguity facilitating this process. The spoiler, 
however, was their mutual distrust, which pushed the Congress of Vienna close to the 
edge, especially on the almost intractable Polish issue. It might not be a coincidence that 
this question endangered convergence so much, because it was about one of the former 
Great Powers of Europe, whose dissolution in 1795 unbalanced Europe for a very long 
time, in a way until after the Second World War. The other former Great Power, Spain, 
was still around and therefore did not pose a real threat to the agreement. The Spanish 
question was dealt with during the conference, but it was not absolutely necessary for the 
balance of power to have the solution in the Final Act. Again, it might not be a coincidence 
that this Great Power issue could not be solved, and Spain was therefore not part of the 
Congress of Vienna’s agreement. Through the inclusion of France, no major interests 
were kept outside, and the interests converged, therefore avoiding the threat of an early 
collapse of the Congress of Vienna’s system (Davies, 1996: 763).
Dimension four is about the resources that were involved, which were partly discussed 
above when we wrote about the soul-trading, shifting populations around to please rulers 
and the Great Powers, and disregarding the wishes of the lower nobility and the ordinary 
population of those areas. We saw that attempts to value the potential of the different 
regions under scrutiny did not materialize, mainly because of a lack of ‘hard’ criteria, 
and partly because it was not in the interest of some of the powers to do so. Perhaps 
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it was also about perception. From early times onwards, rulers were used to looking at 
the extension and population density of countries as a token of their value. It was only 
later in the nineteenth century that this perception started to change as broader layers 
of the populace became involved in politics. Cities became ever more important and 
agriculture dwindled. City inhabitants looked much more at trade and industry as sources 
of power, and those who stuck to the traditional view of linking land to power lost their 
influence in the state system. At the same time, the expansion of Europe overseas diluted 
the tensions within Europe itself; the power struggle went on, but in the colonies. The 
colonies’ material resources replaced some of the resources in Europe itself, also helping 
to delink European territory and population as a power resource in negotiation processes. 
It is perhaps telling that the Great Powers of the Congress of Vienna did not really struggle 
with collective resources, such as waterways. The Committee on International Rivers fairly 
easily converged on the interest of the relevant participants at the Congress of Vienna.
The fifth dimension concerns the role of regulators: rules and regulations; and norms 
and values. With regard to norms and values, there was a lot of talk about them, but they 
were not prioritized at all. Norms and values were used as arguments, as tools in the 
defence of the Great Powers’ interests. They did not have much intrinsic value, and none 
at all for the British, French and Prussians. France – that is, Talleyrand – was a master in 
using principles to argue for his interests, but he dropped them without any problem if 
they became counterproductive to his intentions. This was perhaps also a little the case 
for the Austrians and Russians. As Austria was a potentially weak power, open to all 
sides for foreign intervention (although it thought that the threat of the Ottoman Empire 
could by now be discarded), some norms and values were of more than a propagandistic 
significance. ‘Ironic as it may seem, Metternich presaged Wilson (the US President who 
played such an important role at the Paris negotiations of 1919) in that he believed that a 
shared concept of justice was a prerequisite for international order’ (Kissinger, 1994: 79). 
The Russian Tsar did not need these principles. Indeed, they were actually a threat to 
his material interests as they could mean that he might have to give up some political 
influence to his underlings. Tsar Alexander really believed in his mission to enlighten 
and liberate Europe, and he made such a show of it, that he could hardly disband it. 
Actually, as he really believed in them in a spiritual way – not to be implemented, but 
to be admired – values and norms played some role in his posture. He went as far as to 
propose the creation of a European army, offering the Russian Army as its nucleus. It was 
striking, however, that Alexander I could also be very brutal and blunt, as were his soldiers. 
Meanwhile, as far as rules and regulations were concerned, we have already seen that 
the time was not yet ripe for them, as was the early part of the twentieth century. The 
international system was just too weak. The Congress of Vienna itself had hardly any fixed 
procedures and those that it did have were ignored if needs be. Still, it was the Final Act 
that provided Europe with some regulations that it had hardly had before, as those from 
Westphalia and Utrecht were washed away by the political currents of their time.
Finally, the sixth dimension is about the role of time as a boundary to the negotiation 
process. Did time help the convergence of the interests to come to closure? It did, but 
it had to be helped along. The negotiations had a tendency to drag on, and there was 
not an outside power to drive the Great Powers in the direction of a Final Act. The Great 
Powers knew that time was limited. If they went on spending their time on negotiation, 
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they would endanger the stability of their own countries. For Austria’s Metternich, it was 
not too much of a problem, as he played a home duel, but even Metternich had to reckon 
with Austrian Emperor Francis I, who became weary with the Congress of Vienna for 
social and financial reasons. The conference, with all of its festivities, cost much more 
than the money spent by the royals and their delegations, apart from the quite common 
habit of foreign delegations becoming indebted. Much of the money that they owned to 
the Viennese tenants and shopkeepers was never repaid, the same phenomenon that had 
been observed in Utrecht, Münster and Osnabrück. Who, in the absence of international 
private law, could force the foreign sovereigns to pay? As well as the political scandal that 
it would arouse, this repayment of debts was an issue that Emperor Francis I did not want 
to take upon his shoulders. The emperor was an old man, however, and his successor 
might be less malleable. The Prussians had to go home as there was much unrest in 
their army, unrest that eventually died down after Field Marshall Gebhard Leberecht 
von Blücher acted in a successful way at Waterloo, allowing the Duke of Wellington to 
win the battle. The Russians also needed to attend to their interests at home and – like 
Prussia – they had to integrate new populations into their realm. Russian Tsar Alexander I 
had been away for a long time, and although his administration was extremely obedient to 
him, he had to attend to his business. He became a little estranged from Russia through 
his long absence. He had enjoyed all the balls and the ladies in Vienna, had delighted 
in Paris and had seen London, for after all, he was not really of Russian descent. His 
German roots made him feel a stranger in his own country – understood abroad but not 
at home. This was perhaps one of the reasons why he surrounded himself with foreign 
administrators (mainly Germans).
For two negotiators, it was absolutely vital to go home (Zamoyski, 2007: 418 and 516). 
Castlereagh was summoned home in early 1815 by British Prime Minister Liverpool, who 
had grave political problems in the British Parliament. The prime minster was so much 
in need of his foreign minister that he sent the Duke of Wellington to Vienna to allow 
Castlereagh to return to London, which was when the Poland/Saxony issue was settled. 
France’s negotiator Talleyrand had to manage King Louis XVIII of Bourbon, who was 
destroying his relationship with his own population by giving in to ultra-royalist nobles 
who wanted an extreme restoration, undoing as much as possible of what the French 
Revolution and Napoleon had brought to the people. The French people, having smelled 
the potential of participation in political life, were not easy to convince of this reversal. 
This was on top of all the other material issues that had to be settled. When Napoleon 
came back from Elba, all French resistance to him melted away, like snow from the sun. 
All of the armies sent out against him by King Louis XVIII joined his course without 
exception, including the last and the biggest: the army under Marshall Ney. No shot was 
fired, and no person killed, but the French king had to flee and, with some difficulty, 
the British managed to convince him not to cross the Channel but to stay in Ghent. As 
far as Louis XVIII’s legitimacy was concerned, it was next to nothing. It is a wonder that 
the alliance put him back on the throne after Napoleon had been chased out again, but 
this was just to implement its principle of the legitimacy of rulers. Fifteen years later 
in 1830, the Duke of Orléans, supported by Talleyrand, successfully claimed the French 
throne. This was Talleyrand’s last regime change, and as a reward he became the French 
ambassador to London.
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The convergence of interests came to closure with the Final Act of the Vienna Congress, 
the drafting of which started just before Napoleon landed in southern France to start his 
march on Paris. The Final Act was signed on 9 June 1815, nine days before Napoleon was to 
be defeated at Waterloo. All of the countries participating in the Vienna Congress – apart 
from Spain, the Holy See and Turkey – were signatories. Following Napoleon’s abdication, 
the second Treaty of Paris was signed on 20 November 1815. It provided some changes 
to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, mainly to the detriment of France’s northern 
border. France had to pay reparations and allow an allied occupation force of 150,000 men. 
The allies were in pains not to punish France too harshly for its recent behaviour, as they 
did not want to undermine France’s role as a future balancer in Europe, although severe 
punishment was demanded by public opinion. Talleyrand was kept out of the negotiations 
between the Four, but was eventually invited in for a conference without negotiations, 
which were already concluded. Talleyrand and his two plenipotentiaries were excluded 
from the final decision-making. Britain’s Castlereagh, opening the meeting, spoke first 
to the Prussian plenipotentiaries, making it clear that no further argumentation would 
be allowed. This was an indication that Prussia’s inclination was to be much tougher on 
France, while Russia, Austria and Britain thought that this would be counterproductive 
in the long term. It also confirmed that the Prussians had been the most anti-French 
negotiators during the meetings of the Four/Five in Vienna as well, as they were the ones 
who felt most humiliated by Napoleon and in a way by their own king. In the meantime, 
Russian Tsar Alexander I had become disillusioned with conference diplomacy and had 
designed his own plans for eternal peace – including his dictum that all men should be 
treated like brothers – to be tabled in a different format by Tsar Nicholas II at The Hague 
Peace Conventions in 1899 and 1907, of which he was the initiator.
A comparison between ‘Vienna’ at the beginning, and of ‘The Hague’ at the end of the 
nineteenth century, favours Vienna over The Hague as far as effectiveness is concerned. It 
is true that the First World War precluded the Peace Conventions and The Hague Academy 
of International Law from being implemented (Hoogstraten, 2008: 131). The conventions 
themselves, however, came to hardly any conclusion. The problem of the 1899 convention, 
where 108 delegates from 26 countries convened, was the ‘ambivalence of the agenda, 
concerned on the one hand with peace by arbitration and on the other with the conduct 
of warfare’ (Tuchman, 1966: 251). However, ‘This was the first ever occasion on which an 
intergovernmental, in technical terms a “diplomatic” conference was accompanied by a 
great show of organized public opinion in its support’ (Best, 1999: 623). The convention 
decided to create a Permanent Court of Arbitration and called for a follow-up meeting. 
At the second convention in 1907, 44 countries sent 256 delegates. However, ‘Once 
more the nations found themselves committed to The Hague and intensely disliking the 
prospect’ (Best, 1999: 277). A Permanent Court of International Justice was discussed, 
but not accepted. While Vienna settled a war, The Hague could not prevent one. Perhaps 
the inclusiveness of the conventions, as consensus between all of the nations had to be 
reached, was one of the main factors for its unsubstantial outcome.
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In Conclusion
Inclusiveness and exclusiveness helped to get the work done at the Congress of Vienna 
in the early nineteenth century. The mass of the interested parties were included in the 
process through a series of festivities, but were excluded from the day-to-day decision-
making process. This ongoing process took place between the five Great Powers. To 
include all of the major powers into this process was one of the Congress of Vienna’s wise 
decisions, although it was not self-evident at the time. This inclusion had to do with the 
interests of most of the victorious powers, and with the negotiation skills of the French 
plenipotentiary, Talleyrand. At the very start, and at the very end after Napoleon’s defeat 
at the Battle of Waterloo, the French were excluded, but as they took full responsibility 
for the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna and the negotiation process leading up to this 
agreement, the Final Act was carried out by all five major European powers.
This Great Power inclusiveness gave the Congress of Vienna its forward-looking 
outlook and secured the survival of its accomplishments until the European revolutions 
of 1848. The Great Power inclusiveness in the Inner Circle of the Five, while excluding 
the smaller powers, gave the negotiators the opportunity to manage complexity, or even 
better to avoid complexity. It allowed for a rather smooth – be it ambiguous – bargaining 
process. The process involved playing chess with five parties and trying to forge majorities, 
although only a four-to-five stand-off could really be expected to wrench the isolated 
power into the agreement that the others wanted, and was achieved through political and, 
on a few minor occasions, through the threat of war.
An alternative process could have been to include more parties, but strict procedures 
plus strong presidents would then have been needed to facilitate this process. The world 
was not up to that at the start of the nineteenth century, as it was not a century later at 
the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which was even more exclusive than the Congress 
of Vienna. At a time when seventeenth- and eighteenth-century questions of precedence 
were still unresolved and were still a nut to be cracked, the instalment of fixed chairs 
was not workable. The countries would not be able to allow their counterparts to take a 
formally higher position; everybody had to be equal, at least in theory.
Procedure was still too much of a political issue. It often is today as well, but we have 
overarching international structures and organizations that have a mandate to deal with 
those issues. Leaving it to the individual countries would even be a problem in today’s 
world. Procedure also had to do with the perception of sovereignty and legitimacy, not 
only with power and equality. In an official sense, a breach of sovereignty was considered 
unacceptable, although it happened on a large scale when the Five thought that it was 
necessary, as on the ‘soul trade’ issue. Having the kind of organization that would have 
a mandate of its own, with powers to do what states would normally be allowed to do, 
was not imaginable for the Great Five. It all had to come from their consensus-seeking 
proceedings, without any possibility of out-voting anybody in the Inner Circle. The lack 
of internal procedures created great flexibility and opportunities, but grave technical 
problems at the same time.
 The importance of the Circles is mirrored by the number of times that these groups 
met. The Four/Five had 41 sessions, while the Eight, also signatories to the conference that 
gave Vienna its mandate and legitimacy, as well as the circle that had to ratify its Final Act, 
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met only nine times. The Five then consulted – and negotiated with – members of the Eight 
during these nine sessions, but they had bilaterals with them as well, and they met them in 
the committees on specific subjects. Spain, Portugal and Sweden were thus not completely 
neglected. One could say that they were partially excluded and partially included in the 
process. The fact that Spain refused to sign the Final Act, which strangely enough did 
not make the Act invalid, signals the danger of leaving some relatively important powers 
out of the process. However, if seven of the eight powers agree, what can the isolated 
party do? One might conclude that in the end the decision-making procedure of the 
Congress of Vienna was consensus, but consensus minus one could still be regarded 
as a forum that could make a legitimate conclusion. This was a lesson learned by the 
Conference (later Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later the 
OSCE) nearly 200 years later, when the issue of Yugoslavia had to be agreed. This issue of 
inclusion and exclusion is, of course, quite a dilemma, as the country that will resist until 
the end will probably be a main stakeholder, and excluding a stakeholder raises problems 
in implementing the agreement.
Excluding the vast majority of the stakeholders, who numbered approximately 200, 
could be seen as a bigger possible threat to the value creation of the Congress of Vienna 
and its sustainability over time. However, the Middle and Minor Powers of Europe were 
too dependent on the Great Alliance to be able to undermine the new old order. They had 
to cling to the Great Powers, as nearly all of these less-powerful countries were under 
increasing pressure from a growing middle class demanding more political influence, or at 
a later state political independence if they were from a sizeable minority. Monarchs were 
pressured by their own populace and had to cling together as an overarching European 
ruling class, severely weakened by the ideas of the Enlightenment and the American and 
French Revolutions, not to forget the smaller spontaneous rebellions such as those in the 
Southern and Northern Netherlands, which had swiped away their rulers even before the 
French had staged their own regime change.
It should be noted, however, that the old order from before the French Revolution had 
been restored de jure, but the Congress of Vienna de facto sustained much of the status 
quo of 1813 and not the status quo ante of 1789. So did most of the countries. The vast 
majority of the civil servants in the new United Kingdom of the Netherlands were people 
who served the Batavian Republic and then Napoleon. King William of Orange preferred 
those who knew how to direct a centralized state over those who wanted to go back to the 
old particularism and regionalism, the ‘Orangists’.
In his ‘Seven Lessons Learned from the Congress of Vienna’, Guy-Olivier Faure 
(Faure, 2004: 12–13) concludes that the lessons from the Vienna negotiations are still 
highly relevant today. First, the effectiveness of a negotiation correlates strongly with the 
amount of advance preparation on formula and detail. This is certainly true. It is striking 
that the parties to the Congress of Vienna were ill-prepared, and the same is true for 
the other great congresses in European history, as discussed in the preceding chapters: 
the Münster/Osnabrück conference in 1848; the Peace of Utrecht in 1713; and the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919. The effect of this in Vienna was a long search for common 
ground, which greatly undermined the effectiveness of the negotiation process and the 
durability of its Final Act, a Final Act that was basically a basket of different agreements, 
not the kind of Single Text that we know today (if any). Of course, today’s preparedness 
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for multilateral negotiations differs from country to country. In general, however, the 
meetings are well prepared and will often only materialize if the chances of success are 
more than 50 per cent at least. The pre-negotiation phase is often more important than 
the negotiation itself, especially in the European Union.
Faure’s second point in enhancing effectiveness is about the importance of 
information-gathering, be it before the meeting starts, or during the meeting itself. We saw 
that diplomats at the Congress of Vienna tried to gather as much information as possible, 
often in undiplomatic ways through secret police, festivities and mistresses. They were 
aware of the importance of information and it helped them to oversee the process. They 
did not have the problem that information could leak to a strong public opinion at home 
and they could thus be more focused than diplomats in the new millennium.
The third point is about division of labour within the delegation, which should be 
adequate. In some delegations at the Congress of Vienna, there was indeed a division of 
labour, especially in the delegations of countries with a populace that was used to voicing 
its concerns, such as Great Britain and France. It seems that the British delegation under 
Castlereagh, and later Wellington, had the best division of labour. Diplomats were on the 
same wave-length, at a distance steered by the London cabinet. It was more difficult 
for the French, as Talleyrand had to manage ultra-royalists within his team who were 
influenced by their constituencies back home, while King Louis XVIII was not able to 
discipline them.
For the three authoritarian monarchies to the east, there was not much of a team. 
Austria’s Metternich, in close cooperation with Gentz, did not allow for any aberrations, 
not even by his own emperor. Prussia’s Hardenberg and Humboldt had to get their own act 
together, as their king did not bother about the process, as long as it went in the desired 
direction. When it did not, the Prussians became extremely stubborn, and indeed nearly 
killed the Congress of Vienna’s process. As for the Russians, the Tsar and his delegation 
were personified in one actor: the Tsar himself. Of course, Tsar Alexander’s ambassadors 
and ministers did play a role, but they could not do anything without his permission and 
a de facto division of labour was out of the question. Did this mean that the eastern 
delegations were therefore less effective than the western ones? Not necessarily, as the 
advantage of mono-action created clarity, saved time and strengthened decision-making. 
The downside, however, was the character of the Tsar, who could be very unpredictable. 
For a stable negotiation process, predictability is of the utmost importance and present-
day processes are indeed more stable and more predictable – in general – than the 
Congress of Vienna. With all its ups and downs, Vienna was a rollercoaster.
Faure’s fourth point is to be soft on form and tough on which goals to achieve, which 
is in line with the ideas of Willem Mastenbroek that were mentioned in earlier chapters 
(Mastenbroek, 1989 and 2002), as well as with the profile of the average British negotiator 
(Meerts, 2012b). In other words, be soft on the software of negotiations (for example, 
relationships and exploration), and tough on the hardware, interests and power. For the 
Congress of Vienna, this seems to be true for all five main negotiators, except for the 
Russian Tsar, who could be unnecessarily rude, while giving away some of his goals too 
easily. For example, he gave in without any ado on the idea of putting Napoleon on Elba.
The fifth point is to prepare concessions carefully and to time them well. The impression 
of the Congress of Vienna is that concessions were often not prepared and not timed, 
215Chapter VIII:  The Nineteenth Century: Inclusiveness and Exclusiveness
leading to unnecessary mayhem. Diplomats nowadays will dig into the likeliness of their 
counterparts conceding on certain issues, while already asking themselves what they 
might give them in return. In long-lasting processes, like those in the European Union, 
the diplomats know perfectly well what the balance of concession is and when the time 
is ripe to strike the deals. The balance of interests in the EU changes slowly over time, 
but in general there are hardly any structural changes. On security, for example, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands are pro-Atlantic, joined by Portugal; France and 
Spain are pro-continental, joined by Germany; plus there are powers such as Poland and 
Italy who try to keep the balance between the two.
The countries’ positions are quite predictable, so concessions can be timed, and 
normally they are done at the very end of the process. Sometimes the concession kills 
that process, but as everybody knows that time is just a tactical device and not many want 
to derail the process, they normally succeed in solving the problem. Here we see a huge 
difference between ‘Vienna’ and ‘Brussels’. Its root cause is the difference of organization 
between the two: ‘Vienna’ was under-organized; ‘Brussels’ is over-organized.
The sixth point, Faure states, is that when involved in multilateral negotiations with 
coalitions, it is easiest to start by stating what one refuses to do. It is quite clear that 
this was very much the way in the Congress of Vienna. Actually, they were hardly able 
to move from ‘no’ to a ‘yes’, something that we still notice today in negotiations with 
representatives from countries south-east of the city of Vienna. Starting with a ‘no’ might 
be easy indeed, but perhaps it is too easy. It often gives rise to ‘positional bargaining’. It 
would therefore be better to start in a positive way by indicating options for convergence 
and stressing potential common ground. If stating demands, these should be linked to 
an indication of the trade-offs that one is willing to concede, provided that one’s main 
priorities are met. As noted above, however, to bargain secondary priorities is often much 
easier than primary, implying that the negotiator will have to be very aware of his or her 
priorities.
Ambiguity is of the essence, as stated in point seven. Ambiguity helps the negotiator 
to manage complexity and to circumvent contradiction. This was true for Vienna and 
remains true today. Comparing the negotiations at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
and those in the twenty-first century, however, shows that there was more tolerance for 
ambiguity 200 years ago. The Congress of Vienna was as ambiguous as it could be, and 
not always in a constructive way, and this was broadly accepted by the negotiators. It 
served its purpose, which was one of the reasons why we had a Final Act at all. In today’s 
world, ambiguity is much less tolerated, as it undermines control. Control is the password 
for conference diplomats in the new millennium.
The Congress of Vienna was chaotic, but because of its construction in several 
layers of influence, its relative power balance within the Inner Circle and the relatively 
wide common ground among the Great Powers, it did reach a substantial outcome, an 
outcome that created stability, as well as laying the foundations for a lot of instability 
to come. Nevertheless, the system of the Congress of Vienna did prevent another pan-
European war in the nineteenth century, although it could not prevent the world wars in 
the twentieth century.
Serious attempts had already been made to guarantee a more stable Europe. Already 
before the Vienna Congress, Britain and Russia had agreed in 1805 on three principles to 
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stabilize the continent: small states should be united in some kind of regional federation; 
an acceptable law of the nations should be established; and an international arbitration 
authority should be created in order to mediate disputes between states. In addition, 
the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont ruled that ‘the signatories were obliged, even after a treaty 
of peace, actively to promote an international peace’ (Gruner, 1993: 24). ‘Vienna’ had a 
positive effect on peace and stability in Europe, or at least on the balance of power among 
the powers. Notwithstanding local uprisings and wars, the balance among the sovereigns 
was largely maintained for seven decades after Metternich lost control: ‘The European 
balance worked untrammelled in the seventy years between the fall of Metternich and 
its several repudiations by Lenin and Wilson’ (Taylor, 1954: xxi). This did not mean, 
however, that ‘Vienna’ could be seen as the beginning of a series of effective international 
conferences to secure the peace: ‘The Great Coalition was thus finally dissolved; the 
Concert of Europe had disintegrated, the Holy Alliance had succeeded in destroying the 
Quadruple Alliance, the Conference System had failed’ (Nicolson, 1946: 271). Vienna 
did not yet provide the world with a ‘conference system’, which came into being at the 
very end of the nineteenth century with – as a first step – the Convention for the Pacific 
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CHAPTER IX: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: 
REPUTATION AND 
‘EGOTIATION’
Depending on the circumstances, the negotiator’s character, personal preferences 
and emotions can take precedence over the interests of the stakeholders and their 
representatives. In such a situation we might talk about ‘egotiation’ instead of ‘negotiation’, 
meaning that the ego of the negotiator is an obstacle to effective representation of 
interests (Meerts, 2010: 28–29). Here we do not mean ego in the Freudian sense, but in 
the political sense: the self-image and the prestige of the negotiating politician or diplomat 
and, by extension, of his or her country. In certain situations, protecting self-image and 
prestige will be seen as more important than the object of negotiation. Protection of the 
leader’s ‘face’ and of the country represented will take priority over the needs and the 
interests of the state, or even of the negotiator (Faizullaev, 2006), while it will induce 
secrecy as ‘representatives will prefer closed-door bargaining if reputational concerns are 
sufficiently strong’ (Stasavage, 2004: 681).
By analyzing the role of leading personalities, this chapter will first look at 
seven turning-point conferences in the twentieth century, after which it will briefly profile 
fourteen leading negotiators who did not take part in these meetings. This cannot and 
will not provide us with a comprehensive study of ‘egotiation’ in the last century, but it 
will provide us with some indications of the effects of personality on the processes of 
international negotiation in recent times (Faizullaev, 2006).
It is postulated that politicians are power-brokers, people who want to gain power 
and to use it as a tool in controlling others, thereby harvesting profits for themselves 
and for their party. In order to do this, they need to have a positive self-image, while they 
strive to be respected by others, either through doing well or through fear. Legitimacy, in 
whatever form, will make the wielding of power more effective, and a prestigious leader 
will have no insurmountable problems in governing his or her people. Prestige is therefore 
indispensable, but prestige will have to be defended against those who want to damage it. 
This in turn might lead to situations in which upholding prestige becomes more important 
than defending specific material interests. Prestige can thus be defined as an immaterial 
interest that can have both positive and negative effects on striving for material profits. 
Behind the façade of prestige sits the ego of the politician, and we can postulate further 
that the more powerful the leader, the bigger his or her ego, and the bigger the impact 
of his ego-state on the negotiation process. This chapter will therefore focus on some of 
the most powerful negotiators of the twentieth century, trying to discover the ‘egotiation’ 
effects of their behaviour.
Although ‘egotiation’ has been defined as a phenomenon connected to personality, 
one should not overlook the dynastic and state dimension of the term. Dynasties and 
states have a reputation. They have some measure of prestige and defending this prestige 
is important, as it will help the dynasty or the state to assert its position in the world and 
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thereby facilitate the defence of its material interests. The dynasty or the state thus has 
an ‘ego’ as well, including its positive or negative impact on the processes of international 
negotiation. Thus, for instance the decision of US President George W. Bush in the 
aftermath of 11 September 2001 to help the Northern Coalition of Tajiks and Uzbeks to 
drive the Taliban out of Kabul can be seen as a rational action that was aimed at destroying 
the protectors of al-Qaeda. However, it can also be seen as a show of American force, 
along the lines of ‘we will not let our reputation as the most powerful country in the 
world be damaged by a bunch of terrorists’. Furthermore, it can be looked upon as old-
fashioned revenge, and finally as an ego-based decision by the president, who felt that his 
prestige and ‘face’ were at stake. In short, both the American people and the president 
were outraged, so action had to be taken, particularly as action orientation is a dominant 
feature of American societal and political culture. This action might, and indeed did, lead 
to a situation of entrapment that was not in the interest of the United States, nor beneficial 
for the well-being of non-terrorist segments of the Afghan population. It resulted in ‘an 
international conflict for the sake of pointless goals – national prestige or the vain glory 
of a ruling elite’ (Joll, 1982). Perhaps the reaction was not pointless, but the process and 
outcome were.
The seven conferences are characterized by the limited number of real decision-
makers. The wheeling and dealing is done by the most powerful, surrounded by other less 
important negotiators, as well as their advisers. One of the negotiations that is examined is 
de jure multilateral (Paris in 1919), but de facto trilateral. Another (Munich in 1938) is de jure 
a four-party negotiation, but de facto bilateral. We then have a true trilateral negotiation 
(Yalta in 1945) and four bilateral meetings (Vienna in 1961, Beijing and Moscow in 1972, 
and Geneva in 1985). The chapter will examine why self-image and prestige – the software 
of negotiation – took precedence over the hardware, and what the consequences of this 
were for the negotiation processes in which they played a decisive role.
The multilateral case is the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the First World 
War, which led to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Of all the negotiators, this chapter 
will focus on the main three – Georges Clemenceau of France, Lloyd George of Britain, 
and Woodrow Wilson of the United States – although it will not completely disregard 
the others. George Clemenceau was the President of the Paris Peace Conference and 
all substantial negotiations took place between him and the other two political leaders. 
Although the Prime Minister of Italy, Vittorio Orlando, was an integral member of the 
core group of negotiators – the Council of Four – he never played an important role and 
even left the conference before it was over. The chapter will also ignore people like the 
Japanese Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi, the Romanian Prime Minister Ion Bratianu, and 
the Chinese Prime Minister Lou Tseng-Tsiang, as they were outside the actual decision-
making. Although others were very influential as advisers, including John Maynard Keynes 
for example, they were not the real decision-makers and are therefore also omitted from 
this discussion. It is interesting to observe, by the way, that most important multilateral 
conferences of the past two centuries were actually negotiations among a very limited set 
of actors. This was true for the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, and Paris in 1919, while 
today we have a UN Security Council of only five parties.
The bilateral and trilateral cases are: Munich in 1938, with Britain’s Neville Chamberlain, 
France’s Édouard Daladier, Germany’s Adolf Hitler and Italy’s Benito Mussolini; Yalta in 
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1945, with Britain’s Winston Churchill, US President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet Premier 
Joseph Stalin; Vienna in 1961, between US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev; Beijing and Moscow in 1972 between US President Richard Nixon 
and China’s Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union’s Leonid Brezhnev, respectively; and 
between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva 
in 1985. The impact of ‘secondary negotiators’ such as US National Security Adviser 
and (later) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and China’s Zhou Enlai will, of course, be 
taken into account, as their behaviour has probably been even more decisive in reaching 
an outcome than that of the official decision-makers. While the Paris Conference was 
selected for examination because it was the most important bilateral conference of the 
twentieth century, and the one with ample information about personalities, it was also 
of course the closing conference of the First World War. We could also, like Kalevi Holsti 
(Holsti, 1991), have selected another multilateral conference, namely San Francisco, 
where the United Nations were founded, as the League of Nations were created in the 
aftermath of Versailles in 1919. However, there are far fewer documents available on the 
personalities, while the San Francisco Conference itself was a mere consequence of much 
more decisive negotiations, such as those in Yalta. The bilateral and trilateral cases were 
chosen because of their connection with the Second World War (opening and closure) 
and with the Cold War (at the start, in the middle and towards the end).
We realize the shortcomings of such a limited number of conferences, all of which more 
or less centre on Europe, as well as such a select group of leaders from the traditional 
Great Powers of the world. However, it has nevertheless been extremely difficult to distil 
the characteristics of each personality from the available records and biographical details 
of the pivotal people. The emotional side of their behaviour is thoroughly underexposed, 
let alone their actions, which could be labelled as being the consequence of the projection 
of their self-image and the defence of their prestige, which run counter to the material 
interests of their countries and even of themselves. While participants in negotiation 
seminars will easily recognize the concept of ‘egotiation’, as they have experienced this 
problem in their own dealings with political leaders, it is extremely difficult to prove it from 
the existing literature. After all, it is not only about the character and the behaviour of the 
negotiator, but very much about his or her actions during the negotiation process.
It is from novels that we learn more about the psychological side of the relationship 
between the leaders and the ensuing bargaining processes. For example, a good example 
of the psychological dimension can be found in Tolstoy’s famous novel Hadji Murád 
(Tolstoy, 2003: 58):
The eyes of the two men [the Avar/Chechen rebel leader Hadji Murát and the 
Russian General Vorontsóv] met, and expressed to each other much that could 
not have been put forward in words, and that was not at all what the interpreter 
said. Without words they told each other the whole truth. Vorontsóv’s eyes said 
that he did not believe a single word Hadji Murád was saying, and that he knew he 
was and always would be an enemy to everything Russian, and had surrendered 
only because he was obliged to. Hadji Murád understood this, and yet continued 
to give assurances of his fidelity. Vorontsóv understood this also, but nevertheless 
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he spoke to Hadji Murád in the way he considered necessary for the success of 
the war.
This is a good example of the contrariness of ‘egotiation’, where the material interests 
of both parties take precedence over their feelings, while keeping their sense of honour 
intact.
Closure of the First World War
The Paris Peace Conference had to create a new order for Europe and thereby for the 
world (MacMillan, 2001; Sharp, 2008). Between January and June 1919, negotiators from 
all over the world, excluding those who had been defeated in the First World War, gathered 
in Paris to settle the war issues and to lay the foundations for a more stable system 
of international relations than the ‘Balance of Power’ of the nineteenth century. Like at 
the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, there was no prepared agenda, nor a procedure 
upon which all of the interested parties agreed. Although the Paris negotiators were 
aware of the shortcomings of the Congress of Vienna because of the very disorderly 
way in which that conference had developed, they nevertheless made the same mistake 
of incomplete preparation. The Paris Peace Conference was not institutionalized, unlike 
the League of Nations that it produced, let alone the United Nations that we have 
today, or the African Union, European Union, Association of South-East Asian Nations, 
Organization of American States, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Whatever the 
differences between these international organizations, with the European Union being far 
more institutionalized than the African Union, they at least have a fixed set of rules and 
regulations, thereby protecting the negotiation processes inside their institutions against 
too much volatility.
The Paris Peace Conference had to do without this, with the consequence of great 
ups and downs. On 13 January 1919, the representatives of France, Britain, the United 
States, Italy and Japan formed the ‘Council of Ten’ (also referred to as the ‘Supreme 
Council’) as it had two representatives from each of the states, namely the government 
leader as well as the minister of foreign affairs. In March 1919, the negotiations became 
more difficult and more intense, and the Supreme Council reduced itself to the ‘Council 
of Four’, consisting of US President Woodrow Wilson, and Prime Minsters Clemenceau of 
France, Lloyd George of Britain and Orlando of Italy. Prime Minister Orlando did not play 
an important role, however, and the real negotiations became truly trilateral. The Council 
met on a daily basis, using English and French as their languages of negotiation and 
French and English were also decided upon as the languages of the official documents. 
Not only were the ministers of foreign affairs of the four countries kept at bay, but so were 
the Japanese and their head of delegation, Marquis Saionji Kinmochi, a former Japanese 
prime minister. The rest of the negotiators of other concerned states had to wait until they 
were invited into the triangle to state their wishes and to try to negotiate them, although 
they were not allowed in as decision-makers. Therefore, the personalities of the ‘big three’ 
were the only ones with a decisive impact on the negotiation process (Sharp, 2008).
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The Outer Ring
The most concerned of the other countries, besides those represented in the ‘Supreme 
Council’, were the countries of the Central Powers that had lost the war: Germany; Austria 
and Hungary; the Ottoman Empire; and Bulgaria. The most important of these, Germany, 
was seen as the real evil and therefore kept out of the discussion until the very end. The 
Germans were in no way involved in the negotiations, and were given a document to sign 
during the concluding weeks of the conference, with hardly any possibility of changing it. 
The victors were a little more forthcoming to the other defeated members of the Central 
Alliance. One of the former allies of the victorious Entente, Bolshevik Russia, was also kept 
out and had anyway no inclination to join the negotiations with the ‘capitalist’ countries 
of the West. Poland and Romania, however, profited from the West’s fear of communist 
Russia, by having their claims rewarded in order to create a bulwark against the emerging 
USSR. The other successor states of the former Austrian–Hungarian Empire also fared 
well: Czechoslovakia; and Yugoslavia (that is, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes). Belgium and Greece could take their spoils and so could the British Dominions, 
South Africa, Australia, and to some extent Canada. China, Ireland, the Arabs and the 
Zionists were basically ignored, as were others, such as the Latin American countries and 
Siam (now Thailand) (MacMillan, 2001: 5).
Several of the representatives of these countries in the outer circle, however, were 
reasonably influential, partly because of the need of the big three to have a second layer 
of involved states to help to stabilize the whole process. Big powers need middle powers 
to help control the smaller powers. The middle powers will then ‘borrow’ power from the 
dominant nations, disciplining the host of small states in the international system. Of the 
six countries that were allied to the ‘Victorious Three’, Poland was first, as it was after all 
the only major power in Europe that had been washed from the map more than a century 
before, but that now had to perform an important function in the post-war system as 
a buffer between Germany and Russia. Whatever the Allies wanted with Poland, Polish 
General Josef Pilsudski created his own reality by defeating the Red Army outside Warsaw 
in August 1920, and thereby creating a large Poland including substantial Ukrainian and 
other minorities. Romania sent Ion Bratianu to Paris, a chief spokesman for the ideal 
of a greater Romania. Bratianu managed this by blackmailing the Allies with the Soviet 
threat, as well as by creating new realities on the ground, as Poland did. He was backed 
up by the assertive Romanian Queen Marie, who travelled to Paris to court the Big Three. 
The Czechs, who now controlled the heartland of Austria–Hungary’s industrial potential, 
could easily take the spoils as well: Hungary’s Slovakia; and Ruthenia. The Czech leaders, 
Eduard Benes and Thomas Masaryk, managed to build a democratic state in the heart 
of Europe – quite an exception. The charming and diplomatic Benes, representing the 
Czech Republic in Paris, was helped enormously by the delays in decision-making, which 
gave his country the opportunity to annex regions with large Hungarian and Ukrainian 
minorities (MacMillan, 2001: 240–242). Austria, which was completely dismembered, 
remained alive as an orphan that was cut off from the ‘German Fatherland’ until the 
Second World War, when it tried to settle its identity, with two civil wars as a consequence.
Although at odds with each other, the Serbs – represented by Nikolá Pasic – and 
the Croats – by Ante Trumbic – were overtaken by realities when Prince Alexander 
of Serbia proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, including Bosnia, 
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Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo, and occupying the Banat in the process. Hungary 
became independent, sent the communist leader Béla Kun to Paris, but lost most of its 
territory in the wars against Romania in 1919, just after the end of the so-called ‘Great 
War’. Alexander Stamboliski, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, did what he could in Paris, 
but Bulgaria was diminished to its core, be it less savagely than in Hungary. The Greeks, 
who sent Prime Minister Venizelos to Paris, managed to keep the territories that it had 
conquered during the war, expanding even to Eastern Trace and Smyrna, which were lost 
when Ataturk drove them out of Turkey a few years later. The Ottoman Empire, which 
collapsed like Austria–Hungary, successfully regained its lost territories in Anatolia, 
Kurdistan and Trace after the Turkish war of independence. China, which was represented 
by Prime Minister Lou Tseng-Tsiang, refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, as the former 
German territory of Shandong – occupied by the Japanese – was not returned to the 
Middle Kingdom. China was the only participating country that did not sign.
Belgium received minor compensations for its enormous losses in lives and goods, 
and the Dominions remained in the British Empire, but received a higher status and were 
allowed separate membership of the League of Nations. Some of the Dominions, such as 
South Africa and Australia, could expand their reach, being enlarged with former German 
colonies as ‘trust territories’.
Germany, meanwhile, was a special case (MacMillan, 2001: 492–493). It lost its 
colonies, its fleet, big chunks of its territory, and it had to pay huge reparations. Count 
Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau led the German delegation at the signing ceremony at 
Versailles on 29 April 1919. The delegation was kept waiting for several days before it 
received the terms, and had only a few days to respond. The Diktat was born.
The Inner Ring
There were, of course, others inside the delegations of the Big Three who exerted influence 
on their leaders, although the overall impression remains that French Prime Minister 
Georges Clemenceau, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and President of the 
United States Woodrow Wilson were much more influenced by their own personality and 
the personality of their co-decision-makers than by their foreign ministers, advisers, or 
minute-takers, etc. Before turning to the personalities of the main decision-makers, the 
seven most important players in the inner circle around the Supreme Council will have 
to be listed in alphabetical order (Duke International Security Conference, 2005: 1–10): 
Alfred Balfour, member of the British delegation and foreign minister during the Great 
War, was seen as having a thoughtful demeanour that proved a balance to Lloyd George’s 
boisterous, charismatic style. Count Macchi di Cellere, the Italian Ambassador in 
Washington DC, who worked closely with President Wilson, tolerated no disrespect, 
whether by action or by word, towards his country or its representatives. Edward House 
was the most important and loyal adviser to US President Wilson, and worked well with 
Clemenceau and Balfour, but felt that Wilson could not effectively administer negotiations 
and agree to peace successfully. He strongly discouraged the President’s decision to 
attend the conference and had hopes of leading the American delegation in Paris himself. 
John Maynard Keynes was the leading economist of the British Treasury Department, and 
saw Wilson as the only person with the moral authority to save Europe from another self-
destructive war. Robert Lansing was former US Secretary of State to President Wilson, 
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and also wanted to be head of delegation, making President Wilson and Colonel House 
suspicious of his motives, which tainted their relations through the rest of the conference. 
French Foreign Minister Stephan Pichon’s most important asset was his diplomatic skill, as 
he was skilled at finding points of agreement between negotiating parties and at gaining 
favourable compromises. Finally, Baron Sidney Sonnino, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, 
had little belief in the concept of the League of Nations or any other Wilsonian ideals, and 
had an extremely negative attitude towards the French.
Of the main decision-makers, French Prime Minister Clemenceau, who presided over 
the conference, will be discussed first. A provincial French medical doctor and shrewd 
negotiator, he was nicknamed ‘the Tiger’. It was said that ‘he comes from a family of 
wolves’, which did not mean that he was estranged from his own feelings, as ‘when he 
heard that the Germans had agreed to an armistice […] he put his head in his hands and 
wept’ (MacMillan, 2001: 38–39). Clemenceau’s main drive was the interests of France and, 
above all, his hatred of the Germans, which had been kindled by the Franco–German War 
over 40 years earlier. This hatred obviously blinded him to solutions that might not later 
have sparked the resentment of the Germans, which was one of the main inducements 
of the Second World War. As Machiavelli once said, a statesman should always avoid 
creating resentment among his adversaries. This obsession with his eastern neighbour 
made Clemenceau open the Paris Conference on the day of the anniversary of the 
coronation of Wilhelm II in Versailles and to close it with the formal signing of the treaties 
in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles, where the Prussian King had been crowned Emperor 
of Germany in 1871. His hatred also induced Clemenceau to occupy the Rhineland and 
the Saarland and to demand enormous reparations, which caused the economic downfall 
of the democratic Weimar Republic with its unstable coalition governments. He ignored 
voices in the French government against these measures, including from one of his young 
assistants in that government, Jean Monnet. The time was not yet ripe for cooperation, 
just for competition, or, better, domination and oppression.
Clemenceau was politically isolated, so he had to rely on himself and his closest friends. 
He did, however, have a good relationship with the French military and the French press. 
His frictions were with parliament. The newly elected Chamber of Deputies of the French 
National Assembly was hostile towards him, as he kept the parliamentarians out of the 
peace talks. His main struggle, however, was with France’s President Raymond Poincaré. 
Clemenceau and Poincaré disliked each other intensely. According to the President, 
Prime Minister Clemenceau was a ‘Madman […] vain man’ (MacMillan, 2001: 40), as he 
wrote in his diary. Clemenceau’s relationship with his two direct co-negotiators was not 
too bad, but was not too good either. Wilson and Lloyd George had much more contact 
with each other than with Clemenceau. Lloyd George saw the French prime minister as 
being a ‘disagreeable and rather bad tempered old savage’ (MacMillan, 2001: 43). For his 
part, Clemenceau mistrusted Lloyd George, seeing him as unreliable, while he regarded 
Wilson as a naïve man whose ideas about self-determination would produce a powder 
keg in the new Europe. Although Clemenceau presided over the negotiation sessions with 
authority, he could turn savage, as he regularly did if the negotiations reached stalemate. 
He literally created hurting stalemates by shouting and storming out of the negotiation 
room. Whether this was pure tactic, or indeed a genuine emotional rage, is unknown, but 
it could have been both.
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Lloyd George seemed to love devious methods. ‘He was a politician of formulae 
rather than principles, […] quick-witted and voluble – the septuagenarian Clemenceau 
lamented ‘si je pouvais pisser comme Lloyd George parle’ – his adroitness in debate was 
sharpened by long practice and by unconcern for self-contradiction’ (Pearton, 1993: 73). 
One is tempted to link this to the opinions about British negotiation style: highly effective 
but quite unreliable, and perhaps therefore so successful in reaching the desired results 
in the British interests. While training British civil servants for their presidency of the 
European Union, trainers observed the British diplomatic way of pragmatically dealing 
with the process of international negotiation, while striving without much scruple for 
an outcome that is favourable to the United Kingdom (Hemery and Meerts, 2006). The 
British prime minister seemed to fit into his English culture perfectly. The question then 
arises of to what extent his attitude was a personal or a cultural characteristic. As was 
observed with Clemenceau, the answer is probably both. Lloyd George was not quite 
aware of the European issues and shared this lack of awareness with the British main 
negotiator at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, Lord Castlereagh. He was careless 
with appointments, could be quite ruthless in attempts to prevail over others, was of 
a domineering character, and had a problem in personal bonding. At the same time, 
however, he could be extraordinarily persuasive and charming – again, the true stereotype 
of the typical British diplomatist. During the negotiations, Lloyd George tried to balance 
Wilson and Clemenceau, and when asked whether he thought he had been successful, 
he answered that he thought he had done well, being seated between ‘Jesus Christ and 
Napoleon’.
According to ‘Napoleon’ (that is, Clemenceau), Lloyd George was ‘devious and 
untrustworthy’, ‘shockingly ignorant’, while ‘all arguments were good to him [Lloyd George] 
when he wishes to win a case and, if necessary, he uses the next day arguments which he 
had rejected and refuted the previous day’, while to Wilson, Lloyd George simply ‘lacked 
principle’ (MacMillan, 2001: 41, 43 and 48):
He was a politician of formulae rather than principles. He preferred oral to written 
agreements. He did not command universal trust, […] had an unconcern for self-
contradiction. He made decisions on grounds of authority to act at once […] His 
greatest weakness, namely the lack of detailed background in foreign affairs […] 
led him blithely to discuss the problem of Silesia in the belief that he was settling 
the fate of a province in Asia Minor (Pearton, 1993: 73).
(That villayet was obviously Cilicia in south-eastern Turkey, rather than Silesia, the region 
in Central Europe.) His short-sightedness did not preclude his far-sightedness, however: 
‘after the [signing] ceremony, Lloyd George commented presciently that “we shall have to 
do the whole thing over again in 25 years at three times the cost”‘ (Reynolds, 2007: 30) – he 
was exactly right. Like President Nixon and Henry Kissinger in their dealings with the 
Soviets and the People’s Republic of China, Lloyd George did not consult the Foreign 
Office, which – just like in the cases of Nixon and Kissinger – boomeranged, as serious 
oversights could not be corrected by the experts. In conclusion, ‘He was universally 
respected for his boundless energy and strong work ethic, but his bluntness and sharp 
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tongue endeared him to few people. Nevertheless, he was very popular among the British 
people and politicians of both parties’ (Duke International Security Conference, 2005: 3).
Finally, we come to Woodrow Wilson, perhaps the most complicated of the three 
main negotiators (Schulte Nordholt, 1992). He was seen as a hypochondriac professional 
academic, and as having a hard time understanding the Realpolitik of the epoch. His most 
important contribution was the (in)famous fourteen points, including the creation of a 
League of Nations of which the United States was not going to be a member. He was an 
idealist, who thought of himself as being morally right. According to Clemenceau, ‘talking 
to Wilson is something like talking to Jesus Christ. In public Wilson was stiff and formal, 
but with his intimates he was charming and even playful. He was usually in perfect control 
of himself, but during the Peace Conference he frequently lost control of his temper’ 
(MacMillan, 2001: 15 and 26):
He became mesmerized by the strength and neatness of the phrases that he 
devised. […] He regarded himself as a prophet designated to bring light to a dark 
world. Yet, if we read again the tremendous sermons that he delivered during 
1918, we shall find in them the seeds of the jungle of chaos that today impedes and 
almost obliterates the processes of rational negotiation. He failed to realize that 
the public is bored by foreign affairs until a crisis arises; and that then it is guided 
by feelings rather than by thoughts (Nicolson, 1998: 85 and 87).
Meanwhile,
His spiritual arrogance, the hard but narrow texture of his mind, is well illustrated 
by his apparent unawareness of political reality coupled with distressing 
awareness of party reality (and public opinion, and therefore) [...] his sensitiveness 
to press criticism, and especially to ridicule. As happens with most theocrats, 
Woodrow Wilson was a solitary and exclusive man (Nicolson, 1933: 199–201).
Lloyd George had his own problems with Wilson. Although he had much more 
intensive contact with Wilson than with Clemenceau, this was for reasons of interests, 
not of personality: ‘Lloyd George felt that ultimately, he could always do business with 
Clemenceau, but Wilson’s insensitivity and dogmatism made him absolutely impossible in 
negotiations’ (Pearton, 1993: 86).
Wilson’s aim was to avoid another world war, but his concept of world peace did 
not last and did not work. The idea of self-determination, which was not even clear to 
Wilson himself, did spark a series of minor conflicts during the interbellum period. Self-
determination is not at all equivalent to independence, but to the masses and the politicians 
who manipulated them, it was interpreted as such. Perception determines reality, and so 
many conflicts were born. Why independence for some and not for all? Wilson’s own 
interpretation of self-determination, being the right of peoples to decide on their own 
form of government, was not concrete enough to preclude any other vision that might 
be at odds with it. Wilson was far from being straight in the implementation of his vision:
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On reaching Paris, President Wilson quickly decided that by ‘diplomacy’ he had 
not meant ‘negotiation’, but only the results of that negotiation, namely treaties. He 
decided that the Phrases ‘openly arrived at’ and ‘in the public view’ were relative 
only and contained nothing that need deter him from conduction of prolonged 
secret negotiations with Lloyd George and Clemenceau […] The general public, 
however, […] continued to assume that by ‘diplomacy’ was meant both policy and 
negotiation. This is perhaps the most confusing of all fallacies that we owe to 
President Wilson (Nicolson, 1998: 85–86).
Finally, we come to the fourth member of the ‘Supreme Council’, the Italian Prime Minister 
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. A professor of Law, diplomat and politician, Orlando had striven 
for Italy to leave the bloc of the Central Powers and join the Entente. In doing so, Italy 
suffered severe losses, but gained South Tyrol, Trieste and some other minor territories. 
This was perceived as a great injustice and gave rise to problems with Yugoslavia about 
Istria. As Orlando did not get what he wanted, and as his government was weakened 
beyond measure by his failure to get what he wanted, he left the conference in April 1919. 
Orlando saw himself and Italy as a victim of the Big Three: ‘I am indeed a new Christ [...] 
and must suffer my passion for the salvation of my country’ (MacMillan, 2001: 306). He 
allowed Italy’s conservative Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino to play an important role in 
Paris and he resigned as prime minister before the signing of the Treaty. Orlando later 
supported Mussolini’s rise to power and was connected to the Mafia during his entire 
political career.
As the Germans were left out of the actual negotiation process, there is not much to 
say about the role of ‘egotiation’ on their part. We do know, however, about their anger 
as a consequence of humiliation. They obviously perceived the hatred on the side of the 
entente. ‘Brockdorf-Rantzau [the German chief negotiator] [...] chose to remain seated 
[...] He began by registering the victor’s intense and passionate hatred for the vanquished’ 
(Mayer, 1968: 767). The other power to be left out, the Soviet Union, was ‘neither ally nor 
enemy. [… T]his regime was feared not because it ruled just then over a powerful nation, 
but because it was the carrier of highly contagious ideas’ (Mayer, 1968: 285).
Opening and Closure of the Second World War
To categorize negotiations on the basis of the number of participants is useful, but also 
difficult. It is useful because the number of participants has a great impact on the flow of 
the negotiation process: the more actors, the more complexity, but also the more richness. 
The struggle with complexity is the main issue in multilateral bargaining. How can one 
manage the chaos? One needs good procedures, rules and regulations, effective chairs, a 
strong secretariat, and negotiators who are well aware of the organization’s culture to set 
the boundaries and inner structure of the conference, etc. The management of complexity 
might be the main skill that negotiators of conference diplomacy have to possess; their 
advantage will be the choices that they have. Multilateral negotiation does generate 
many obstacles, but a lot of opportunities as well: multi-party, multi-issue, a multitude of 
problems as well as solutions, plus partial solutions for the power problem. It is, after all, 
easier to counterbalance the power of the powerful if many of them are present. Coalitions 
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will ease the differences in strength and give the weaker parties a tool in playing the 
strong off against each other. The advantage of bilateral or trilateral bargaining is its 
transparency and speed. Multilateral negotiations tend to be slow, although there might 
be more assured outcomes. Bi- or trilateral negotiations could be speedy, but there might 
be more less-assured outcomes. It is also more difficult to deal with the power problem, 
but procedures are less of an issue and the directness allows for more personal influence. 
In bi- or trilateral negotiations, as well as in multilateral negotiation, much remains the 
same as well: the question of mandates, and the relationship with the constituency, etc.
This chapter postulates that the smaller the circle of negotiators, the greater the impact 
of power and personality. What, however, about prestige? What about ‘egotiation’? One 
could expect them to be more of a problem than in multilateral negotiations, because the 
negotiators are, after all, more directly connected in small forums. The counter-argument 
would be that the defence of prestige, and thereby the risk of ‘egotiation’, is less if the 
negotiator is not exposed to many colleagues, let alone to public opinion. This is why 
secret and back-channel negotiations are often the preferred mode. It is also less because 
it is much easier for negotiators who operate in small groups to influence each other and 
thereby to put a limit to the tendency to ‘egotiate’. The downside is groupthink. The risk 
of groupthink is much bigger than in multilateral negotiation processes. Although the 
number of parties does influence the people, power structure, flow of the process and 
the product of their work, it remains difficult to link this fully with maximized-party and 
minimized-party negotiations. After all, talks between two, three, four or five negotiators 
are essential for progress in multilateral meetings. While we have to characterize the Paris 
Peace Conference as multilateral, we also saw that in reality it was very much a trilateral 
process. However, this trilateral negotiation also had multilateral aspects, as advisers in 
the Inner Circle were quite involved and influential, actors in the Outer Circle did exert 
some influence, and the constituency back home – as well as public opinion – was part of 
the overall flow as well. In other words, bi- and trilateral negotiations have a multilateral 
dimension and multilateral talks are dependent on bi- and trilateral meetings within them. 
It seems, however, that the essence of the process of international negotiation can only 
be handled in groups of up to five actors, which we might label as the ‘core caucus’ of the 
negotiation.
Munich, 1938
The Munich negotiation process can perhaps be termed the mother of catastrophic 
negotiation processes. It was seen by Western leaders as a huge mistake: Britain and 
France selling out Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler, and thereby opening the road for German 
hegemony of Eastern Europe up to the borders of the Soviet Union. This is true, although 
the question remains of what the alternatives would have been. Adolf Hitler himself was 
not as happy with the outcome of the Munich conference as one would presume:
[ ] er wollte [ ] alles, was ihm vorschwebte, zu seinem Lebzeiten schaffen. Er hatte 
keine Zeit. Das Münchener Abkommen, in dem Freund und Feind mit Recht einen 
märchenhaften Triumph Hitlers sahen, empfand er selbst geradezu als Niederlage: 
Es war nicht nach seinem Willen gegangen, er hatte aus der Hand Englands und 
Frankreichs entgegennehmen müssen, was er lieber mit Gewalt genommen hätte, 
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und er hatte Zeit verloren. So erzwang er 1939 den Krieg, der ihm 1938 entgangen 
war (Haffner, 2011: 125–126).
(Hitler wanted to implement his ideas during his lifetime. He was in a hurry and he would 
have preferred to start the war in 1938 but the Munich Agreement prevented this).
Hitler felt restrained by the Munich agreement and was taken by surprise by the peace 
efforts of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain:
By the summer of 1938, Hitler was convinced that the Czech problem had to be 
resolved by war: this had become for him a test of personality. At the same time, 
across the North Sea, a mirror-image situation was developing: for Chamberlain 
the search for peace had become almost an ego trip’ (Reynolds, 2007: 41).
Chamberlain’s determination to be successful and to save Britain and the world from 
disaster had its root in his family history. His father, Joseph, was one of the heroes of 
liberal politics in the nineteenth century, although he never became prime minster. The 
son wanted to do better than the father and he was ready to take the necessary risks 
for that, in competition with his half-brother Austin: ‘As the marginal man in this fiercely 
proud family, Neville would always be less than human if he did not sense a chance to 
outdo his father and his brother in the battle for reputation. [… He] was always measuring 
himself against his father and brother’ (Reynolds, 2007: 50). In order not to be hindered 
in his endeavour concerning Adolf Hitler, he ignored his Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, 
who resigned because he felt by-passed. Chamberlain’s personal mission took off, and 
nobody could stop him but reality. He began to over-estimate himself and told his sisters: 
‘now I have only to raise a finger and the whole face of Europe is changed’. Acknowledging 
the publication of H.A.L. Fisher’s new History of Europe in March 1938, he replied: ‘At 
the present moment I am too busy trying to make the history of Europe to read about it’ 
(Reynolds, 2007: 49).
Without consulting the British Foreign Office, Chamberlain offered to visit Hitler 
in his residence ‘the Berghof’ on the Obersalzberg above the town of Berchtesgaden, 
although the German Foreign Ministry had been fully engaged through its Foreign 
Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop from the very first moment. It was an unprecedented 
step, to go to the wolf’s lair, and Chamberlain did not even take an interpreter with him. 
Dr Paul Schmidt, interpreter of the German Foreign Ministry, acted as interpreter. This, 
of course, could and did lead to miscommunications, as Chamberlain could not check 
on Schmidt’s words. At first he did not even receive a transcript of the minutes made 
by Schmidt. The talks lasted for one day and were a mere exchange of opinions and 
arguments. They nevertheless raised expectations of a peaceful solution, as Hitler showed 
his readiness to discuss the contentious issues in something that looked like a dialogue. 
As history showed later, however, this dialogue was not for real; nor were the follow-
up talks in Bad Godesberg. This second encounter was anyway much grimmer than the 
first. This time Chamberlain took his First Secretary Ivone Kirkpatrick, who spoke German 
fluently. Hitler did make some minor concessions, but in reality the British were eaten 
on the spot and Hitler got what he wanted on the question of the Sudeten Germans. The 
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meeting did not give any reason for optimism, and ended in an icy atmosphere (Reynolds, 
2007: 75–80).
As a next step, Chamberlain proposed a four-power meeting, with the Italians and the 
French also present. This was very much welcomed by Italy’s Benito Mussolini (known as 
the Duce), who feared that a German invasion of Czechoslovakia would further upset the 
balance of power between the Hitler’s Third Reich and Mussolini’s fascist Italy. Hitler thus 
invited the Duce, Prime Minister of France Édouard Daladier and Chamberlain to come 
to Munich. This was the third time in a row on German territory, and the Czechs were 
not invited. At the end of the meeting, Chamberlain and Hitler held a bilateral meeting 
about the issue of Anglo–German relations in the future, whose resolution was reluctantly 
undersigned by Hitler. It stated that ‘We are resolved that the method of consultation 
shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two 
countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of 
differences and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe’ (Reynolds, 2007: 95). The 
meetings were prepared amateurishly and in that sense there is not much of a difference 
from the Paris Conference discussed earlier in this chapter, or for that matter the Congress 
of Vienna in 1814–1815. There were no briefing papers, no position papers, no planning, no 
strategy and no profiles of the main negotiators – nothing of the kind. In such a situation, 
the danger of so-called ‘salami tactics’ being used by the other side is immanent. Without 
overall planning, it is difficult to trace the trade-offs, and one side might walk off with the 
biggest part of the cake because it got more in every distributive bargaining, precluding 
integrative win–win outcomes. ‘In short, Hitler was a much more effective negotiator 
than Chamberlain, but he never wanted to negotiate, whereas Chamberlain, a less skilled 
tactician, got what he really wanted – peace not war’ (Reynolds, 2007: 99). In other words, 
Chamberlain’s need for a settlement was much greater than Hitler’s, and by being the 
‘demandeur ’, he had to concede much more than his opponent. Chamberlain never openly 
regretted his solo tour, but he was entrapped in his own process: ‘this melancholic and 
“physically broken man” (p. 434) persisted in his stubborn defiance and legendary self-
righteousness to the bitter end’ (Bátonyi, 2007).
What about the personality and the position of Adolf Hitler? While Chamberlain 
had a short-term plan of preventing war, Hitler had a long-term strategy: dominating 
Europe in his lifetime (Reynolds, 2007: 100). In order to do this he had to swallow Austria 
and Czechoslovakia in a peaceful way in order to be able to attack Poland and thereby 
dominate the whole of Eastern Europe up to the Soviet border. The final goal was to 
conquer Russia, but in order to do so, he had to subdue France first in order to overcome 
the classic German dilemma of a war on two fronts. Britain, it was thought, would then 
be so isolated that it would have to accept German hegemony over Europe – actually, it 
would be more apt to say to accept Hitler as the hegemon. For Hitler, the German people 
were merely tools in his conquest and the fulfilment of his second aim: the destruction of 
the Jewish people on the European continent. After the German failure to take Moscow, 
Hitler’s dream of a pan-European Third Reich dominated by the ‘Germanic race’ withered 
away, leaving him with his second target: to sweep away the ‘Semitic race’. He thought 
in terms of peoples, not of states. Actually, he destroyed the German state-system, 
in order not to be bothered by laws and institutions. Everything should circle around 
‘der Führer ’, and thus the state had to wither away, like in Marxism, but for reasons of 
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autocracy, not of equality. He was a criminal, political Darwinist, with a complete lack of 
empathy – unable to make intimate friends among men and women – who did not allow 
for much of a compromise. His tool was war, not negotiation. Like Chamberlain, he grossly 
overestimated himself until the bitter end (Haffner, 2011: 13).
Yalta, 1945
While Munich stood at the beginning of the Second World War, Yalta marked the end. 
This exclusive trilateral negotiation by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), Soviet 
Premier Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill can be seen as the real 
closure negotiation of the Second World War. Although the Potsdam Conference in July 
and August 1945 was the last wartime summit, it did not change the foundations laid in 
Yalta in February 1945. The leaders’ personalities played a prominent role:
Of the three, Roosevelt probably had the greatest strengths and the least coherent 
conception of how to utilize them. Roosevelt was […] jaunty, self-possessed, 
confident, cheerful and capable of inspiring trust and affection. [However,] he 
held no well-defined or sophisticated world view […] Roosevelt saw himself as a 
realistic Wilsonian (Buhite, 1986: 11–12).
Moreover,
The President was a ‘feely’ politician, operating on a blend of intuition and 
experience, and his approach shaped his views of both Hitler and Stalin. FDR 
knew Germany well, or at least the Kaiser’s Germany before the First World War. 
Speaking to [US] senators in January 1939, Roosevelt described the German 
leader as a ‘wild man’, ‘walking up and down the room for hours on end’, ‘pounding 
the table and making speeches’. ‘We should call him a “nut”‘. The contest between 
Roosevelt and Hitler became very personal, whereas Churchill’s animus was 
directed at German militarism and autocracy (Reynolds, 2007: 108–109).
This brings us to Churchill:
Churchill’s world view rose from his concern that a single power, regardless of 
its ideology, might dominate the European continent. [He was] a man of great 
courage. […] especially his ability to use the language, stood unequalled among 
his countrymen […] What he possessed in learning and eloquence, he lacked in 
patience. He would be terribly impressed with his own performance, and then 
become bored, refuse to hear responses […] A better negotiator than Roosevelt, he 
was still surprisingly ill prepared. While voluble and emotional, at the same time he 
was insufficiently persistent. Churchill also suffered bouts of extreme depression, 
which tended to immobilize him. Many men of great prominence, whose aggressive 
behavior allows them to perform brilliantly toward opponents, turn their hostility 
inward once a foe is vanquished or an issue resolved. A man of massive ego […] 
‘Of course I am an egotist’, he said to Clement Attlee. ‘Where do you get if you 
aren’t?’ He had the egotist concept of leadership (Buhite, 1986: 14–16).
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As for Stalin, it has been observed that ‘Joseph V. Stalin [ … était] un homme parvenu par 
les moyens les plus pervers au sommet de la puissance et n’y ayant pas trouvé ce qu’il en 
attendait, un homme totalement désabusé’ 1 (Laloy, 1988: 15). Moreover,
Stalin’s style was that of recluse. The author of a psychological portrait of Stalin 
suggests that he was the quintessential paranoid personality. A vain, power-hungry 
man with a keen sense of his own inferiority, he harbored intense jealousies and 
a mean, vindictive spirit, […] mastering the art of manipulating people and laying 
them off against each other for his own benefit (Buhite, 1986: 17).
In addition, ‘Although Stalin had a sharp mind and a prodigious memory, he had always had 
an inferiority complex about his lack of formal education; he was also deeply xenophobic’ 
(Reynolds, 2007: 115). ‘His greatest strength in Yalta lay in the Russian contribution to the 
war effort and the positioning of the Soviet forces’ (Buhite, 1986: 18). It was much more 
Roosevelt than Churchill who wanted to keep Stalin on board the alliance, also because 
Roosevelt still believed at Yalta that he needed the Russian war effort in the Pacific to 
underpin the American struggle against Japan: ‘Yalta est donc l’effort ultime de Roosevelt 
pour préserver l’entente avec l’URSS ’ 2 (Laloy, 1988: 9).
During the meeting, Stalin had the advantage of being on his home front, while 
Roosevelt in particular had to travel a long way and suffered increasingly from his weak 
health. Even Churchill arrived worn out by the long war years:
Summitry requires quick wits and mental stamina. Arriving at Yalta, neither Churchill 
nor Roosevelt seemed to be at their best. Both he and Roosevelt listened intently 
to Stalin. Churchill watched the Soviet leader even when his words were being 
translated. […] Conference diplomacy is about resolving differences through an 
interlocking set of compromises and trade-offs, in which no party gains everything 
but all get something and concede something. This is what happened at Yalta. 
Over the first two days, the Big Three brought most of the diplomatic issues to the 
table. From Wednesday, February 6, the deals began to be made (Reynolds, 2007: 
122–125).
The atmosphere seems to have been amicable, but the Soviet leader’s position precluded 
many of the decisions that were taken. The facts on the ground were decisive, but this did 
not mean that emotions were absent:
Of the two leaders [Roosevelt and Churchill], Churchill was more hard-line and 
often highly emotional. The only point when Roosevelt lost his cool was when 
1 Author’s translation: ‘Joseph V. Stalin [… was] a man who had by the most perverse means reached 
the summit of power and, not having found there what he was expecting, was a totally disillusioned 
man’.
2 Author’s translation: ‘Yalta is thus Roosevelt’s ultimate effort to preserve the Entente with the 
USSR’.
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Stalin protested about peace feelers made by the German army in Italy to US 
emissaries in Bern. […] He was furious – face flushed, eyes flushing (Reynolds, 
2007: 150–151).
Roosevelt’s answer to Stalin was, according to Churchill, ‘about the hottest thing I have 
ever seen so far in diplomatic intercourse’ (Reynolds, 2007: 151). It worked, because Stalin 
withdrew his complaint: ‘Stalin was indeed a skilful negotiator, letting the others do the 
talking and saving his succinct remarks for the right moment. Nevertheless, Churchill’s 
more bombastic approach should not be underrated: it wore down the other two over 
France and German reparation’ (Reynolds, 2007: 159). Nevertheless, after Yalta his 
sometimes undiplomatic behaviour pushed him slowly but truly to the sidelines:
When in July 1954 Churchill sent a message to Moscow, without consulting either 
the President [Eisenhower] or his own Cabinet, suggesting a bilateral ‘friendly 
Meeting with no agenda’, he was rebuffed by both Malenkov and Eisenhower. 
From then onwards, the pressure from colleagues for his resignation was never 
relaxed (Blake, 1998: 99).
During the Cold War
To negotiate during the Cold War was not an easy task. With the threat of nuclear 
destruction, both the USSR and the United States became increasingly aware of the 
necessity to start talking, to create a safety net in case of unintended escalation and 
the danger of unleashing their nuclear arsenals. While it was feasible during the First 
and Second World Wars to have a victorious party (not to belittle those wars’ disastrous 
consequences), a Third World War would certainly end in catastrophe for all of the parties 
concerned: a lose–lose outcome. Negotiation, then, was the only way out. The first case in 
this section deals with a very difficult, but serious, attempt to bridge the gap between the 
two superpowers. It failed. The second and the third cases were already more successful 
and opened the road to the fourth case, which was indeed a success. Although a very 
precarious and bumpy process, it laid the foundations for the end of the Cold War half 
a decade later. With this, the chain of events that started with the Balkan Wars at the 
beginning of the twentieth Century came to an end with the inner-Yugoslav/Balkan War 
resulting from the implosion of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia – one century 
from a Balkans to Balkans crisis, with negotiation processes trying to prevent, manage 
and end the use of violence as an instrument in international relations in and around the 
European continent.
Vienna, 1961
US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev were the egos 
clashing at the summit meeting in Vienna in 1961. Khrushchev appeared to be the dominant 
figure in their encounters, being much more experienced than Kennedy. Actually, this 
took Kennedy by surprise and the Soviet leader exploited his situational advantage in a 
very skilful way by turning the negotiation into an ideological show of force. Khrushchev, 
from Ukrainian peasant ancestors and lacking serious formal education, appeared to be a 
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ruthless negotiator, confirming the stereotypes about Russian bargaining styles (Meerts, 
2009c: 4–8):
Khrushchev retained a huge inferiority complex about his lack of education 
and culture and was always alert to condescension, real or imagined, at home 
and abroad. Stalin, too, had such a complex, but Khrushchev was not as good 
at concealing it. Nor, unlike his patron, could Khrushchev control his explosive 
temper: within seconds he could shift from good humor to foul-mouthed abuse. At 
their first meeting in Geneva in 1955, the Soviet leader seemed a frankly ‘obscene 
figure’ to the elegant, urban Macmillan [the UK Prime Minister], who wondered if 
‘this fat, vulgar man, with his pig eyes and his ceaseless flow of talk’ could really 
be the head of a great country’ (Reynolds, 2007: 169).
Khrushchev’s attitude was one of the reasons for his split with Mao Zedong (Reynolds, 
2007: 170), and it gave John F. Kennedy a very hard time.
Kennedy, a believer in negotiation as a tool in international relations, also saw the 
limits of this instrument. His famous saying that one should never negotiate out of fear, 
but nevertheless never fear to negotiate, is a case in point. Kennedy had a complicated 
family background. Like Chamberlain, he had to struggle with a dominant father-figure, 
Joseph Kennedy, and an elder brother who was meant to be a politician but who died 
at too young an age, while his other brothers were groomed to play an important role 
in US politics as well. Given the Irish and Roman Catholic background of the family, 
there were also aspects of emancipation involved, perhaps not as much as in the case 
of Khrushchev – after all, Kennedy did attend Harvard Law School – but nevertheless. 
According to Thomas Mongar, ego structures are of two basic types, namely ‘satellizing’ 
and deviant. ‘Satellizing’ occurs when a child is intrinsically valued, but Mongar adds:
Alternatively, if the child thinks he has been extrinsically valued, he will protect 
his omnipotent self-image (and) will attempt to increase his capacity to perform 
to meet the burden of vastly inflated aspirations. Kennedy’s ‘ego profile’ is almost 
a perfect representation of the deviant structure. Deflation of aspiration was ruled 
out because of the neurotic pressures for achievement from the family. The only 
remaining alternative was a massive effort to inflate his performance capacities, 
which required a strategy of managing the symptoms of his neurosis and turning 
his weaknesses into competitive assets (Mongar, 1969: 206–208).
Notwithstanding – or perhaps because of his chronic back problems – Kennedy managed 
to become US President. Mongar gives us one clear example of ‘egotiation’: ‘Kennedy’s 
value choice in the Cuban missile crisis […] was conceived as an attempt to restore his 
self-esteem rather than to correct an implausible disequilibrium in the nuclear balance 
of power’ (Mongar, 1969: 225). Perhaps Mongar is exaggerating, as there were of course 
many other variables involved and it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure their relative 
weight, but his insights are nevertheless useful food for thought.
In May 1961, Bobby Kennedy, John’s younger brother, had a preparatory back-channel 
meeting with Georgi Bolshakov from the Soviet Embassy in Washington DC, a close friend 
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of Khrushchev’s son-in-law. Events then started to roll, partly managed through official 
diplomatic channels by US Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn Thompson and his Soviet 
counterpart Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov, and partly through the aforementioned 
back-channel, trying to overcome the two main obstacles: Berlin and Vietnam:
Each leader was going with his own list of priorities and with a confidence that, 
if he played it tough, the other man would come around. Each had fundamental 
blind spots about his adversary. The world has moved a long way since the days of 
Hitler and Chamberlain – communications had been transformed and information 
was much fuller – yet the psychological barriers to summitry were much the same 
(Reynolds, 2007: 199).
The summit took place in Vienna from 3–4 June 1961. On the first day, Kennedy and 
Khrushchev met in the residence of the US Ambassador to Austria, surrounded by their 
staff. They exchanged ideological arguments about communism and capitalism, a debate 
in which the Soviet leader was much more versed that the President: ‘the [US] ambassador 
was shaken that Kennedy seemed to be taking one hit after another from the Soviet 
leader. In an effort at rational discussion, the president had ended up on the defensive in 
an ideological argument, even conceding that the Bay of Pigs had been a misjudgment’ 
(Reynolds, 2007: 203). On the second day, they met at the Soviet Embassy in Vienna. No 
progress was made and emotions rose, for example with Khrushchev’s comparison of the 
death toll of the USSR and the United States during the Second World War. A face-to-face 
bilateral meeting – with only interpreters present – did not bring any progress.
Beijing and Moscow, 1972
Approximately ten years later, US President Richard Nixon was preparing for summitry 
with both Chinese leader Mao Zedong and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev. ‘Nixon 
entered office and was being pressured by the Congress and the media to turn rapidly 
to arms control negotiations with the Soviets’ (Kissinger, 1994: 716). The Americans had 
learned from Vienna, and they prepared much more thoroughly through back-channel 
preparatory talks, in which US Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, played a decisive role, 
a role in which he himself was perfectly aware. In the run-up to the Moscow meeting, 
the Americans strengthened their position enormously by creating a ‘best alternative 
to a negotiated agreement’, the alternative being talks with Beijing before the Moscow 
summit was due. It was vital that the back-channel talks with the Chinese would not be 
leaked to the Soviet Union. Kissinger therefore had to act without consulting the US State 
Department. He flew to Pakistan and from there, in secret and with only a few security 
men, to Beijing. As in the case of Chamberlain’s flight to Berchtesgaden to meet with Hitler 
in 1938, Kissinger did not take an interpreter with him. Kissinger conferred with Chinese 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai for seventeen hours. He was duly impressed by the cultivated 
Zhou.
As we now know, Zhou was treated by Mao as his round-the-clock diplomatic 
factotum, forced at times to grovel even more basely than Gromyko did before 
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Khrushchev. In 1972 Mao denied Zhou treatment for bladder cancer lest his 
premier outlive him, and even refused to pass full diagnosis’ (Reynolds, 2007: 240).
They decided that Nixon would fly to Beijing for a meeting with Mao before his summit 
in Moscow. The Kissinger mission upset the Russians so much that Nixon’s hand in his 
negotiations with Brezhnev was substantially strengthened – one of the reasons why the 
Moscow meeting became a success.
Nixon was an unemotional and tough ‘Real Politiker ’. Nevertheless, like any other 
human being, he has an Achilles’ heel: jealousy. As it was in US interests to make the 
trip to Beijing known to the Soviets, Kissinger talked to the media extensively, taking the 
credit for the meeting with Zhou Enlai. President Nixon was furious and decided that he 
would not allow Kissinger the same media attention in the case of Moscow: ‘Still chafing 
at Kissinger’s self-promotion, Nixon stressed on numerous occasions during the flight 
that no one else must be in view when he and his wife descend from Air Force One. Just 
to make sure, a burly Secret Service agent blocked the aisle after they landed’ (Reynolds, 
2007: 243). Nixon negotiated with Zhou Enlai and paid a courtesy visit to Mao Zedong. So-
called ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ was born. However, as the US State Department was only 
involved at the very last moment, while Secretary of State William Rogers was kept out of 
the talks with Zhou Enlai, Kissinger made two serious mistakes. He agreed to a wording 
in the final communiqué that was detrimental to Taiwan. He therefore had to renegotiate 
the communiqué, which could have been avoided if China experts had been involved in 
the drafting. Nixon was not amused.
Such a mistake was made again in the final joint statement after the Moscow meeting 
with Brezhnev, a few months after Beijing. Kissinger met Brezhnev in Moscow on 21 April 
1972. Again, the US State Department had been left in the cold, but it was drawn in a little 
when Nixon finally flew to Moscow to talk to Brezhnev. The Soviets managed to slot the 
term ‘peaceful coexistence’ into the final communiqué, an ideological term that Kissinger 
did not value, as it meant a continued struggle between communism and capitalism and 
a final victory of the first made possible by the avoidance of war. The Kremlinologists of 
the US State Department were not allowed to participate in the drafting and so could not 
correct the text.
US Secretary of State William Rogers felt that Kissinger was ‘deceitful, egotistical, 
arrogant, and insulting. Kissinger felt that Rogers was vain, uninformed, unable to keep a 
secret’ (Reynolds, 2007: 246). Moreover,
Shortly thereafter, we got our first taste of Henry Kissinger’s backchannel 
diplomacy. […] Kissinger had effectively repudiated our initial […] proposals even 
before we offered them, telling [Soviet Ambassador to the United States] Dobrynin 
that if the Soviet Union preferred something more limited, he would be happy 
to entertain it. Knowing in advance the delegation’s proposals were not backed 
at the top, the Soviets lost nothing by stalling. Weakness at lower levels is not 
that serious; those positions can be overruled. But weakness at the top leaves no 
recourse (Nitze, 1989: 309).
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Interestingly enough, Kissinger was not very fond of Rogers either, and perhaps he 
shared this view with Nixon: ‘Nixon said, Rogers was one of the toughest, most cold-
eyed, self-centered, and ambitious men he had ever met’ (Kissinger, 1979: 26). Actually, 
Kissinger blamed the Nixon administration, and thereby Rogers, for sabotaging back-
channel negotiations: ‘in the Nixon administration, the bureaucracy developed great skill 
at both leaking good news prematurely to gain credit and releasing bad news in a way that 
focused blame on the President’ (Kissinger, 1979: 25).
Dobrynin himself had a more positive vision than Rogers on back-channel diplomacy, 
although he saw its limitations:
There are certain requirements for the confidential channel to be effective. It has 
to be permanently available, and its immediate participants must possess a certain 
level of diplomatic and political experience and knowledge. Above all, the channel 
should never be used by any government for the purpose of misinformation. Of 
course, a diplomatic game is always being played, but deliberate misinformation is 
always inadmissible, for sooner or later it is going to be disclosed and the channel 
will lose all its value (Dobrynin, 1995: 94).
This can be summarized as: secrecy to the outside world, but no cheating to the inside 
world; which is good for the relationship between the negotiators, and bad for their 
relationship with their colleagues back home.
Kissinger found Brezhnev to be:
[…] very forceful, extremely nervous, highly unsubtle, quite intelligent but not of 
the class of the other leaders we have met. Brezhnev, as much as Nixon, wanted 
to portray himself as a political virtuoso and take political credit for the eventual 
agreement. For his part, Nixon was struck by Brezhnev’s physical presence and 
sheer ‘animal magnetism’. [… As] Kissinger put it in his memoirs, ‘Given Nixon’s 
feelings about who should get the credit, I doubt that he would have agreed if 
we had proposed [to bring the arms control delegations to Moscow to work in 
conjunction with the summit]. We shall never know because I did not put forward 
the idea, not uninfluenced by vanity and the desire to control the final negotiation.’ 
Time magazine had made [Kissinger] and Nixon joint Men of the Year for 1972, 
much to the president’s fury. Even Kissinger begged the editors not to do it. If 
Watergate had not exploded, Kissinger might well have been a casualty of Nixon’s 
jealousy in the second term (Reynolds, 2007: 250, 268, 272 and 277).
Other personalities were involved, of course, such as President Nikolai Podgorny, Prime 
Minister Alexei Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on the Soviet side, but they 
did not play a decisive role.
On 22 May 1972, Nixon landed in Moscow for his summit with Brezhnev. They met 
alone, with interpreters but without Kissinger. Members of both delegations were to be 
included later. The atmosphere changed from moment to moment, like a rollercoaster, 
but in the end the two leaders arrived at a common understanding on matters such 
as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and basic principles governing relations 
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between the two superpowers. Furthermore, they signed six bilateral agreements. Thus, 
‘The Moscow meeting was not seen as a contest between victors and losers, but as an 
understanding from which both sides gained’ (Reynolds, 2007: 274).
Geneva, 1985
‘Reagan believed that relations with the Soviet Union would improve if he could make 
them share his fear of nuclear Armageddon’ (Kissinger, 1994: 768). In November 1985, 
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan met in Geneva at 
a summit where they insulted each other, but also built a unique chemistry between 
them, as well as between their teams: ‘The emotional outbursts had exposed each man’s 
deepest convictions to the other and this would never have happened except at the 
summit’ (Reynolds, 2007: 393). This negotiation in Geneva foreshadowed the end of the 
Cold War. Ronald Reagan was a Cold War-monger, but he was averse to nuclear weapons 
and wanted them out of the international security arena. Mikhail Gorbachev needed an 
end to the arms race with the Americans, as he needed the money for restructuring the 
Soviet Union and putting an end to its stagnating economy. Moreover, he feared a new 
arms race because of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the so-called ‘Star Wars 
Program’. Just because Reagan did not believe in mutual assured destruction (MAD), 
he wanted to build a missile defence system, and this threatened the credibility of the 
Soviet potential to retaliate in the case of a US nuclear attack (Reynolds, 2007: 346). Both 
sides therefore had good reasons to negotiate and they did so in Geneva, starting on 
19 November 1985 in Fleur d’Eau, where the Americans hosted the first session. The next 
day they met on the grounds of the Soviet mission. The two leaders had long face-to-face 
bilateral fireside talks, keeping their delegations at arm length. Although they had grave 
problems on content, their personal relationship evolved in such a way that they became 
tenacious about solving the problems between the two superpowers, if not right away, 
then at least in the future. They cooperated in forcing their delegations to make headway. 
For example,
[Reagan] concluded that earlier leaders had not accomplished very much. So he 
suggested, with Gorbachev nodding in agreement, that the two of them should 
simply say ‘To hell with the past – we’ll do it our way and get something done.’ 
When an angry [US Secretary of State George] Schultz interrupted coffee to 
complain that [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy] Kornienko […] was 
blocking agreement on parts of the joint statement, Gorbachev said smilingly to 
Reagan: ‘Let’s put our foot down.’ Each took his delegation aside. In fact the Soviet 
Leader leaned harder on his staff to sort things out (Reynolds, 2007: 381).
They both saw summitry as a process, not as a one-time event.
Gorbachev came from humble origins, but contrary to Stalin and Khrushchev, he had 
enjoyed an advanced education. He had, however, experienced traumatic events in his 
childhood. His grandfather suffered under the Stalinist purges, although he was a good 
and loyal communist. His father and elder brother were sent to the Front to fight the Nazis, 
and his brother never returned. Although Gorbachev was a true believer in Marxism–
Leninism, he was pragmatic by nature (Gruyter, 1993). It was this attitude that brought him 
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close to Reagan, who was a pragmatic politician as well, notwithstanding his seemingly 
ideological conservative utterances. Reagan, with an optimistic view of life, was a team 
player. He thereby avoided the ‘egotiation’ mechanisms that bedevilled egotist loners such 
as Nixon and Kissinger. In an analysis of the speeches of Reagan, Walter Weintraub found 
that:
As indicated by the high ‘we’ score [in his speeches], Reagan is the consummate 
team player, the chief spokesman for a group that reached consensus on the 
issues under discussion. Leaders of revolutionary movements use ‘we’ frequently 
and it’s clear that Reagan sees himself very much as the head of a conservative 
crusade. He rarely took credit or blame for his administration’s success and failures 
(Weintraub, 1986: 294).
The personalities of the leaders set a series of summits in motion, melting away the 
Cold War. It is important to note that the extraordinary understanding between Reagan 
and Gorbachev was quite exceptional. Reynolds notes that Reagan himself highlighted the 
importance of their special chemistry in his memoirs:
In Moscow, Gorbachev told Nancy Reagan that he and her husband had ‘a certain 
chemistry,’ adding: ‘It’s very rare.’ The president agreed, writing in his memoirs: 
‘Looking back now, it’s clear there was a chemistry between Gorbachev and me 
that produced something very close to friendship.’ [… However,] most leaders 
find it difficult to disentangle their country’s national interests from their personal 
political goals. Yet it is essential to intuit these needs and goals, and it is even 
more vital to understand the other leader as a political animal, rather than merely a 
newfound ‘friend.’ The ultimate question, more political than diplomatic, is whether 
the leader feels that in the last resort he can afford to walk away empty-handed 
from the summit. Summitry is predicated on the idea that better personal relations 
can yield diplomatic benefits. This makes most leaders reluctant to have an open 
row at the summit [… Nevertheless,] lower-level negotiations between specialists 
are […] essential; they also allow the leader room to repudiate what has been 
tentatively agreed (Reynolds, 2007: 396 and 429–431).
In Conclusion
This chapter has observed the roles of political leaders in six negotiations around and 
during three major – mainly European – conflicts: two ‘hot’ wars in the first half of the 
twentieth century; and one ‘cold’ war in the second half. It focused on the negotiation 
behaviour of fifteen world leaders: US Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, 
John Kennedy, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan; Soviet leaders Joseph Stalin, 
Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev and Michael Gorbachev; British Prime Ministers 
David Lloyd George, Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill; as well as French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau, the German Führer Adolf Hitler and the Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai.
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All of these leaders were strong characters, partly steered by the interests of their 
countries, and partly directed by their own personality and ego. In all of the cases, their 
personality weighed heavily on the negotiation process and its outcome. The egos of 
Wilson, Nixon, Stalin, Chamberlain and Hitler often overruled the interests of their country. 
Wilson was too idealistic and self-centred, caught in his own inflexible ideas. Nixon was a 
realist, as well as the victim of his narcissistic self-image and jealousy. Stalin was caught 
in his suspicion of others and the necessity to survive them. Chamberlain, wanting to do 
better than his father and his brother, entrapped himself in his dealings with Hitler and 
turned a blind eye to reality. Hitler decided that he alone would rule Germany and Europe, 
if not the world, during his lifetime, and was ready to sacrifice 60 million people, as well as 
his own country, in order to reach his two egotistical aims: the destruction of Bolshevism 
and Judaism (Haffner, 2011).
Roosevelt, Kennedy, Brezhnev, Churchill and Clemenceau tried to balance their ego-
system and the defence of their reputation with the interests of the country that they 
represented. Roosevelt had problems in being an effective negotiator because of his 
health, like Kennedy, but in order to make reality manageable, he turned a blind eye 
to Stalin’s cruelty. Kennedy was driven by his will to succeed in spite of his health, and 
to outmatch his father and brothers. Although he approached international politics in a 
rational way, he entrapped himself in the Cuba crisis because of his drive to show that 
he was a strong leader. Brezhnev was a power politician, but his love of luxury made 
him sensitive to blackmail. Churchill, also a power-broker, was nevertheless propelled by 
his own ideas, and had difficulties in listening to other opinions. Clemenceau defended 
the interests of France in a very skilful way, but his hatred of the Germans led to grave 
consequences for France’s future.
Reagan, Khrushchev, Gorbachev, Lloyd George and Zhou Enlai gave precedence to 
the interests of their state over their own ego, although this was often a struggle. After all, 
becoming a world leader means having the incentives to become it, with one of the main 
drivers of this inner process being self-esteem and a strong ego-system. Reagan, being a 
realist on the basis of a strong conservative and anti-communist sentiment, was pragmatic 
enough to deal with his arch-enemy in a constructive way. As a team player, he allowed 
credit to go to others than only himself. This spirit also allowed for the chemistry between 
him and Gorbachev. Gorbachev knew that he had to take certain crisis steps in order to 
avoid the Soviet Union from falling into oblivion and he thereby endangered his reputation 
at home. Khrushchev helped to save the world from nuclear disaster, swallowing his 
pride and prejudice. Lloyd George was a pure example of a British pragmatic politician, 
unbothered by his own ego or his own principles, if any. Zhou Enlai had the same 
inclination, which made life difficult for him, given the ideological environment in which 
he had to operate. It did not earn him too many credits from his boss, the great helmsman 
Mao Zedong.
Each and every negotiating leader described in the paragraphs above had a strong 
ego, but the impact of their egos on the negotiation process varied. What did not vary, 
however, were the strong footprints that they each left on the processes and the outcomes 
of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations in which they were involved. This stamp was 
stronger at home than abroad. They all had to defend their positions against critics in their 
constituencies, particularly the democratic leaders, of course, but also those representing 
242 Diplomatic Negotiation
authoritarian and even totalitarian regimes had to take into account potential rivals. They 
also had to depend on support at home in order to prevent their downfall. They therefore 
had to work from a position of strength, and this strength had their ego-system as its 
backbone. How could they convince others if they were in doubt about themselves? Some, 
like Chamberlain and Kennedy, did doubt themselves – and perhaps this was the case with 
Hitler and Stalin as well – so they had to compensate for this by acting in an overconfident 
way. It should be noted here that the ego question is, of course, not the only indicator for 
their behaviour. Former UK Minister of Foreign Affairs and neurologist David Owen takes 
us one step further. He explains their behaviour from the angle of mental and physical 
health (Owen, 2008).
Alfred van Staden wrote that leadership in modern times – and especially in modern 
democracies – is an increasingly difficult task to fulfil (Van Staden, 2008), one of the 
reasons being the growing role of the public and social media. As populations become 
better educated and have the means to voice their concerns, leaders have a problem in 
forcing their will – and thereby their ego – on national and international politics. Another 
reason is globalization and the multi-polar system that is on the rise. This will make 
leadership increasingly uncertain and will therefore hamper leaders’ effectiveness in 
negotiation. This is because, on the one hand, it is vital for negotiation to flow unseen by 
public opinion before they are made and the agreement has been reached, and, on the 
other hand, because of the competition between more and more leaders with relatively 
small power asymmetry, which complicates the option of drawing negotiation processes 
to a successful closure. Finally, it is their own representatives who can limit the grip of the 
leader on the negotiation process and its outcomes:
[…] the agent is able to weaken the principals’ incentives to control in order to 
promote the successful accomplishment of the delegated task, in casu negotiating 
an international agreement. An agent who wants to weaken the control incentives 
of its principals in order to avoid involuntary defection and a loss of face vis-à-vis 
its negotiation partners at the international level can strategically make use of the 
mechanisms that are established by the principals to control the agent during the 
international negotiations’ (Delreux and Kerremans, 2010: 372).
If these trends can be projected into the future, we can expect political leaders to have less 
influence on negotiation processes and the ensuing agreements. On the negative side, 
this will lead to less-effective – or no – outcomes as a consequence, but on the positive 
side it will limit the impact of the leader’s ego on the bargaining process. It will diminish 
unpredictability and it will stabilize the process. Yet a perfect equilibrium makes it hard to 
push for results in crisis situations where strong and powerful leaders are the ones who 
make the difference, who can break the ‘mutual hurting stalemate’ and work towards the 
‘enticing opportunity’, even in ‘a soft, stable self-serving stalemate – from which neither 
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CHAPTER X: THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: STRUCTURE AND 
NEGOTIATION
The European Union (EU) was selected as the case-study for the twenty-first century in 
order to demonstrate the connectedness between negotiation and structure. ‘European 
Union is the result of institutional, legal, political, economical and cultural construction 
that took place in the second half of the (twentieth) century’ (Puscas, 2013: 9). As a mode 
of European unification, the European Union is a good example of an international actor 
channelling negotiation processes in an optimal way. ‘The EU is perhaps the extreme case 
of a strong institution that should shape negotiation behaviour among members’ (Odell, 
2010: 625). Compared to other collective international actors, the European Union is a 
strong transnational organization with unique international and supranational features 
(Van Staden, 1996: 12). This strength has an impact on negotiation processes and their 
closure. It has a strong legal system with the Court of Justice of the European Union with 
powers to enforce compliance on the EU member states. Its institutions have their own 
role to play and cannot be ignored. The Union’s architecture consists of a wide range 
of actors, issues and thereby processes, with consequences for the EU’s citizens, their 
governments and those of other countries in Europe and the world (Naurin and Wallace, 
2008).
This chapter analyzes the character and characteristics of some of the key internal and 
external negotiation processes of the EU, as they have been influenced by the strength of 
the organization. It looks in particular to negotiation processes among the member states 
in and around the European Union’s main institutions: the European Council; Council of 
Ministers and its subdivisions (as well as the Council Secretariat); the European Parliament; 
and the Commission. Special attention will be devoted to the role of the Presidency of the 
first two institutions. The chapter will then try to answer the question of to what extent 
context and process affect further successful negotiations and fruitful outcomes.
Years after the European Union sprang out of the Second World War, in different 
stages and with a growing number of member states, until it received its present name 
under the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, which was amended by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
Ripeness in negotiation is often created by crisis and the Second World War can therefore 
be regarded as the final wake-up call for Europe. Bilateral relations were not enough 
to secure peace and prosperity. It was therefore in the countries’ interest to take the 
negotiations further than in the past to the multilateral and even the supranational level. 
This change of context was facilitated by the threat of the Soviet Union and the United 
States’ support in protecting and restructuring the old continent – through Marshall Aid 
and NATO – as well as by the growing willingness of the Germans to apologize for their 
crimes and the increasing readiness of the victims to live with the Germans in harmony. 
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After all, as analyzed in the preceding chapter, negotiation is also about emotions, values 
and norms.
Uniqueness and Strength of the Organization
‘The European Union is a unique entity – neither a classic intergovernmental international 
organization nor an ongoing diplomatic negotiation’ (Lodge et al., 1998: 289). It has 
created different decision-making regimes dependent on the policy domains at issue. 
In general, the community method applies to all issues related to the internal market. 
Foreign and security policy stands out as the classical domain of intergovernmental 
cooperation, with member states retaining their veto power on all substantive subjects 
(Nugent, 2010). The EU, in turn, is dependent on ‘negotiations as a mode of reaching 
agreements on, and implementing, common policies’ (Elgström and Jönsson, 2005). 
The enigma of the EU process hinges on characteristics that distinguish it from other 
international negotiation processes. The more it develops itself, the more we can hope 
for better cooperation among its members and thereby for more effective negotiation and 
vice versa. ‘Intelligence enhances mutual cooperation in the quintessential situation in 
which its benefits can be foreseen. A society that gets smarter, then, may be a society that 
becomes more cooperative’ (Pinker, 2011: 662).
First, the chapter will discuss the intertwining of national and international 
negotiation processes, as ‘the EU mainly governs through inter- and transgovernmental 
negotiations and political competition between states and regions’ (Börzel, 2010: 191). 
Another characteristic of the EU negotiation process, which it shares with other strong 
international organizations, is its continuity. Third, the number of issues dealt with in the 
Union and the consequences of its decisions for the member states are incomparable to 
other international regimes. Fourth, an important characteristic of the Union is that this 
coalition of states is more homogeneous than most of the other international negotiation 
groups. The Union’s negotiation process is based on more than a community of interests; it 
is also a community of values within a legal framework. This framework is the fifth element 
distinguishing the Union from other international institutions.
These building blocks distinguish the negotiation processes in the European Union 
from negotiation processes in other international settings, although the overall tactical 
advice for multilateral negotiators also applies to EU negotiators (Lang, 1994: 210–211). 
Assured outcomes are frequent in EU negotiation processes, partly because of mechanisms 
such as supranationality and the continuous nature of the process. Compared to, for 
example, environmental negotiations, the level of ‘unavoidability’ is incomparably higher 
(Sjöstedt et al., 1993: 303). The nature of the outcomes is overwhelmingly positive, while 
this is by no means evident in other negotiation processes, where international economic 
relations are predominant (Zartman, 2000: 327). The implementation of these outcomes 
and the strength of the EU institutions in enforcing compliance are much greater than 
in, say, negotiations on the environment (Sjöstedt et al., 1994: 233). The ability of the EU 
negotiation process to work as a continuous upside-down cascade (Zartman, 2003: 180), 
where one level facilitates progress on a higher level of negotiations, sets it apart from 
the regular patterns of international negotiation processes. It is a system of ‘multi-level 
governance’ in a ‘dense institutional framework’.
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How does the European Union manage to be such a relatively strong organization 
today? According to William Wallace, ‘The EU system, through the intensive interactions 
of transnational and trans-governmental networks that now characterize it, has become a 
collective system of governance, resting on overlapping elites’ (Wallace, 2005: 491). Hosli 
and Arnold add to this that:
The European ‘relative preference for homogeneity’ among EU member states [...] 
might be explained, for example, by a gradual process of socialization of these 
states into patterns of EU policy-making, ‘learning’ the culture of negotiation 
within the European Union, and the gradual development of similar expectations 
regarding EU  ntegration (Hosli and Arnold, 2010: 617).
The EU can thus be seen as the sui generis pinnacle of the developments described and 
analyzed in the previous chapters of this thesis.
In the academic world, a multitude of theories have been used to explain the – so 
far – growing integration of (Western) Europe and its downsides (Cram et al., 1999; 
Hale et al., 2013; and Tallberg, 2010). The trend towards further integration and 
institutionalization has a positive influence on the effectiveness and thereby the use of 
negotiation as an instrument in international relations, as was stated in Chapter III of this 
thesis, but cooperation will not be enhanced automatically.
According to Jeffrey Lewis,
[…] those institutional environments which code higher on a set of four independent 
variables [...] that is, are highly insulated from domestic audiences, transact with 
wider scope, high interaction intensity, and/or maintain a high density of norms 
and group standards [...] exhibit more robust patterns of cooperative negotiation 
(Lewis, 2010: 648).
Concerning the Council of the European Union, Lewis concludes that more intense 
cooperation has developed over time, as ‘the Council’s institutional environments have 
[...] instilled intrinsic collective preferences for cooperative negotiation’ (Lewis, 2010: 
660). Brian Hocking expands on the intensity factor by stating that a ‘dominant theme 
in diplomatic change which has considerable significance in the EU policy milieu is the 
compression of time and space’ (Hocking, 2004: 97). On the same note, it could be stated 
that ‘intensified cooperation leads to a greater understanding and the creation of a shared 
system of values and norms’ (Meerts, 2001: 8–9), although it is a slow back-and-forth 
process (Meerts, 2012: 614–617).
The Role of the Negotiation Process
Negotiations are a vital instrument in integrating Europe. ‘Negotiations are central to the 
functioning and dynamic development of the European Union. Negotiation is seen as 
the predominant policy mode and the main source of the EU’s successful functioning’ 
(Lodge et al., 1998: 293). Protecting the negotiation process by creating – through that 
248 Diplomatic Negotiation
very process – an institutional framework that enhances the effectiveness of diplomatic 
negotiation is the very essence of the Union:
Negotiations are ubiquitous in the European Union and essential to its functioning. 
Virtually every EU activity was set in motion through a process of negotiation. 
Moreover, in one way or another, these negotiations include every type of actor in 
the EU, including most notably the governments of the member states, the Union’s 
supranational bodies, and national parliaments, but also civic associations and 
industry lobbies, at least informally. Given that the EU was born as a voluntary 
association of sovereign states, one could even describe negotiations as a 
behavioural manifestation of the EU’s fundamental identity (Dür, Mateo and 
Thomas, 2010: 615).
It has been argued that the European Union is ultimately a negotiated system (Dür and 
Mateo, 2010a). Negotiations are the main tool in shaping the institutions and regulations 
of the Union. Negotiation is the life-blood of the Union. One has to analyze it to understand 
why the Union has been, and will be, forged in a certain way. The Union, after all, is like 
a group of one-cellular beings (states) that give up part of their autonomy to create a 
stronger and more potent organism that will serve all. The Union adds value; the whole of 
all the member states is more than the sum of the products of the individual units shaping 
the EU. Whether this should be done through supranationalism or intergovernmentalism 
or a mixture of the two is another matter. The point is that negotiation is the instrument 
that the constituent parts use to solve the problems that block their coming-together.
The negotiation process in the European Union is a multilateral process of an 
international nature with supranational elements. The process is sandwiched between 
national and international negotiation (Putnam, 1988). There is more control than in 
international negotiation processes, but less than in national processes. Diplomats are 
present on the scene, like in other international negotiations, but civil servants have slowly 
but truly become the dominant force, like in national negotiation (Meerts, 1999). In other 
words, this is a system in transition. It is also in transition in another way. While traditional 
bilateralism is on the way out through the front door, as it is dominated by the multilateral 
EU processes, new bilateralism is coming in through the back door as a way to deal with 
the ever-growing complexity of the multilateral interactions. Bilateral negotiations and 
lobbying are needed as a means to keep the machine going. The more formal institutions 
and regulations are created, the more informal tools are needed.
The European Union as a process of international negotiation can survive only if a 
certain quantity and quality of outcomes are reached. Unless effective outcomes to the 
negotiation process are assured, the building will collapse. While in other international 
negotiation processes, open-endedness – while not preferable – is often unavoidable 
and for a certain length of time acceptable, this is much less the case in European Union 
negotiations. No increase in the number of decisions to be taken means an actual 
‘decrease’ in the Union, and without progress in the integration process, the EU might 
slide into disintegration. The Union’s negotiation process is therefore of relatively greater 
importance than negotiation processes in other international bodies. Although it does 
not have the same importance and intensity as national negotiation processes, the EU 
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process is of more general value than negotiation processes between states. The EU 
negotiation process can be characterized as having an in-between position.
Characteristics of the EU as a Negotiations Arena
‘EU negotiations are multilateral, multi-issue, recurrent, sometimes informal, subject to 
a distant shadow of the future, and complicated by the fact that some of the institutions 
within which they occur are also negotiators in their own right’ (Dür, Mateo and Thomas, 
2010: 617). According to Perlot, EU negotiations are characterized by consensus-
seeking behaviour, issue linkage, specific and diffused reciprocity, as well as the 
predominance of the shadow of the future (Perlot, 2011: 14). Moreover, because of the 
supranational character of vital segments of the European Union, the EU negotiation 
process can be positioned halfway between national and international negotiation. 
It contains more assured outcomes than in international processes, but fewer than in 
national bargaining. It is more centralized and controlled, for example, because of the 
existence of the European Commission, being the guardian of the treaties, than other 
international negotiation processes. Yet at the same time it cannot match the consistency 
of the internal negotiation processes of well-functioning national states. However, as this 
chapter will show, such national negotiation processes are often of an extremely complex 
nature, and the coordination of internal priorities is one of the main problems faced by 
the EU member states in shaping their own EU negotiation processes. It should be noted 
that the supranational character of the Union indeed has a clear impact on the nature 
of the EU process, but it should not be forgotten that major parts of the EU negotiation 
processes are still of an intergovernmental nature, particularly foreign and security 
policy. This intergovernmental dimension, however, is of a more integrated nature than 
in other international organizations. Because of the very close cooperation among the 
EU member states and the existence of supranational actors inside the Union who also 
exert a great deal of influence on the intergovernmental negotiation process, even this 
part of the process can be seen as unique in the world. Both the supranational and the 
intergovernmental facets of the EU provide for a negotiation process where outcomes are 
more secure than in other international forums.
The Union’s democratic dimension is another aspect that helps to distinguish 
EU negotiation processes from others. Indeed, in ‘regular’ international negotiation 
processes, the people play only an indirect role through governmental and non-
governmental institutions. In the European Union, democratic actors – like political 
parties – are involved in the negotiation process at the European level, but their 
influence is to date quite limited. Furthermore, there is a growing involvement of national 
parliaments through yellow and red card procedures, which can both further and hamper 
the functioning of the Union. The impact of the Union’s representative organs on the 
processes of negotiation has the effect in general of complicating matters. However 
necessary from an ideological and democratic point of view (as all EU member states are 
democracies), this political dimension does not always help to further effective processes 
and assured outcomes. On the contrary, many perceived assured outcomes have not been 
achieved because of interventions by politicians – interventions that were often motivated 
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by national interests that worked against the common European good. The EU process 
could thus be seen as more puzzling than the ‘normal’ international negotiation processes.
While international negotiation processes are defined here as inter-state processes 
(that is, between sovereign actors), the peculiarity of the EU process is its mixed character. 
Sovereign actors are playing a role that is even more important than that of EU bodies such 
as the Commission and the European Parliament, but there is a distinct interplay between 
these two kinds of international actors: the states; and the EU institutions. An example 
of such a dense negotiation process between states and supranational or international 
institutions cannot easily be found anywhere else in the world, and the result is a unique 
process of negotiation in which the states have lost most of their power monopoly. Through 
this ‘enhanced interaction’, EU member states and European institutions are negotiating 
their deals in a multitude of forums in negotiations that are characteristic of EU processes.
The classical Westphalian situation whereby sovereign actors negotiate on a 
voluntary basis is partly gone in a European Union where a substantial part of sovereignty 
is pooled in the EU institutions. States cannot act at will – with the exception of the 
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) – as they have lost the majority of their ‘freedom to 
decide’ in negotiating certain issues. In other words, BATNAs (that is, ‘best alternatives to 
negotiated agreements’) are often absent (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 1991): if matters are on 
the agenda, then the alternative of non-negotiation is no longer present. ‘Classic’ theories 
do not hold here, and only active pre-negotiation might provide states with something 
like a BATNA instrument. Even this, however, is hardly true anymore. Essentially speaking, 
the fact that the EU and its member states share sovereignty in the core areas brushes 
the BATNA issue aside and enhances the possibility of assured outcomes – or perhaps 
we should say ‘unavoidable outcomes’. A major exception here is the negotiations on 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). In this arena, the negotiations are essentially classic international interactions 
where BATNAs are of importance.
The European Union is a rich resource of negotiation options and opportunities 
for coalition-building (Van Schendelen, 2004: 17–34). On the one hand, this provides 
negotiators with a multitude of options and alternatives that enhances their power 
positions. On the other hand, it obscures their opportunities because of its ambiguity. 
Much of the negotiation process in the EU is ultimately about the creation of legislation 
as a consequence of political prioritization. To set clear priorities, however, negotiators 
will have to clarify their strategies, and to be successful in implementing these strategies, 
negotiators will have to master the complexity of the process, not least in dealing with their 
constituencies (Putnam, 1988). As processes are more complex within EU negotiation than 
in other international bargaining processes, highly professional negotiators are needed.
Countries are therefore creating a new layer of negotiators between diplomats 
and national civil servants, and between generalists and specialists. This new type of 
negotiator, a specialist in Public Affairs Management, could be instrumental in managing 
the complexity of the European negotiation process. As these negotiators have roles that 
are specifically linked to the very nature of EU negotiation, their operations will facilitate 
European integration through negotiation. The growth of European unity is not only 
shaping a new institution on the world stage, it is also creating a new kind of international 
negotiator and a new kind of international negotiation process.
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What happens at home is vital for understanding the EU negotiation process 
(Van Keulen, 2004: 35–50). It all starts with insight into the negotiation processes within 
the member states of the Union – the coordinating negotiation processes at the domestic 
level. The EU bargaining system is characterized by extraordinary procedural complexity 
in a heterogeneous playing field that is suffering from increasing politicization. There 
is procedural clarity at the negotiation table, but not between the different levels of 
negotiation processes. This is because of the unclear separation of powers within the 
Union. Although the EU is a complex combination of institutions that should support 
negotiation processes, the connection between these processes is ambiguous because 
of the unclear linkages between the platforms on which the negotiations take place 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001). A horizontal overview is therefore difficult, thus complicating 
the possibilities for diagnosing effective package deals among different policy areas.
Vertical insights are also hard to obtain, as the pace of the dossiers is extremely unequal. 
While some dossiers will make it to the highest levels of EU negotiation platforms, the vast 
majority will be settled at mid-level platforms, obstructing the opportunities for remaining 
dossiers to be included in package deals. Package deals are therefore more dependent 
on the availability of still-negotiable dossiers than on the most effective linkages (Bal, 
2004: 131). While this lack of clarity is an obstacle to the creation of clear-cut national 
strategies for effective negotiations in Europe, it can also be seen as an opportunity 
for the negotiators. It would be extremely difficult for negotiators to be effective if they 
had to follow strict procedures that were laid down by the home front, as there are so 
many unpredictabilities in the EU negotiation process. They would simply lose too much 
flexibility. The impossibility of rigid mandates being constructed by the ministries back 
home therefore provides EU negotiators with the flexibility that they need to cope with any 
surprises in the process on which they are working.
Meanwhile, more and more players from different institutional levels are entering 
the arena – not only through enlargement of the European Union, but also through 
the participation of a growing number of regional governmental, non-governmental, 
public- and private-sector organizations (Van Keulen, 2004: 45). Confronted with the 
problem of a not-entirely level playing field in Brussels and problematic prioritization 
at home, the EU member states are clinging to negotiation procedures concerning 
their own coordination practices, which can no longer cope with the complexity of the 
EU negotiation process. The ministries of foreign affairs, which were traditionally the 
coordinators of national EU policies, are overwhelmed by the multitude of actors and 
issues in the EU negotiation processes. We have here a clear distinction between EU and 
other international negotiation processes: a quantitative difference with qualitative effects 
on the bargaining among negotiators, as well as the growing importance of national civil 
servants on a terrain that is the traditional domain of the international civil servant – that 
is, the diplomat.
Another differentiating factor between ‘regular’ international negotiations and 
EU negotiations is the impact of politics. As most EU issues are of an internal and not 
international nature, parliamentarians and other politicians tend to meddle in the 
processes managed by the professional negotiators. This, although positive from a 
democratic point of view, obscures the transparency of the negotiation processes at hand. 
While diplomats are trained to look for compromises and collaboration, politicians are 
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often striving for polarization and competition (Nicolson, 1998). In many cases, political 
intervention therefore creates obstacles to the integrative negotiation that is needed to 
obtain the desired outcomes of these processes.
Member States in the EU Negotiation Process
The role of the member states might be less prominent than non-EU negotiators often 
assume (Langenberg, 2004: 51–70). As EU negotiators are aware, there are only limited 
possibilities for influencing EU negotiations, and states have to operate within strict legal 
limits in these areas. Strategic planning is therefore of paramount importance. This brings 
up the point of qualified majority voting (QMV), a decision rule that has increasingly 
been applied as a tool for making progress in EU negotiations. Without this instrument, 
the European Union would not have been as successful in decision-making as it is today. 
However, the fact that countries can be out-voted puts a great deal of pressure on their 
negotiators. Coalition-building is one of the answers in this context, as is a change in 
attitude. Negotiators will have to show an increased willingness to accept compromises, 
something that is not too common among the actors entering the EU negotiation scene 
after a new round of enlargement.
Actors in the EU negotiating process are not only bargaining on their needs, but also 
on their common and opposing values. It should be noted that values do play an important 
role in EU negotiations. One might describe the bargaining process as an exchange of 
commodities, but one might also point out that the underlying values should not be 
overlooked. These values are the objects of the trading process, as well as influencing 
it. A modest clash of EU civilizations within Europe is one of the characteristics of the 
EU negotiation processes, such as the cultural differences between the northern and 
southern member states and those from Central Europe. These differences express 
themselves in the languages used by the negotiators. In many plenary sessions of 
EU Council working groups, the countries north of the River Rhine speak in English, while 
those from within the former Roman Empire use the Latin language that we call French. 
Moreover, what may be seen as ethical in the eyes of a Swede may be unethical in the 
perception of a Greek.
EU member states operating in the EU Council of Ministers have different approaches 
to the process of EU negotiation, not only because of differences of interest, but also 
because of differences in structure (Bal, 1995; and Bal, 2004: 127–142). In addition 
different negotiation styles, or the ‘software’ of negotiations, can be observed. These 
different styles are not so much a consequence of differences in national culture as a 
result of national political and bureaucratic structures. For example, the French structure 
produces effective coordination combined with a reasonable amount of freedom for its 
well-educated and skilled negotiators. The German system, however, makes life quite 
difficult for its negotiators. The federal mode obstructs efficient and coherent decision-
making at the national level, which leads to constraining German negotiators in their 
deadlines in Brussels. The British are – in general – well placed for negotiation, as 
they combine a pragmatic and flexible attitude in the negotiation process with a tough 
defence of their interests. Spanish negotiators seem to be more effective than their Italian 
colleagues, mainly because of the strength of their bureaucratic organization. The larger 
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EU member states share their potential for dealing with the whole range of EU issues in a 
balanced way, while the smaller member countries – because of the relative smallness of 
their governmental apparatus – are forced to follow more of a single-issue strategy.
Most EU governments have relatively limited options for influencing EU negotiation 
processes, with the large ones a notable exception (Tallberg, 2010). As far as the future 
is concerned, this room for individual needs will diminish further because of the growing 
importance of the EU institutions, as well as the rising number of member states because 
of the Union’s enlargement process. Strategic planning and the effective use of tactics are 
therefore important in pushing for the needs and values that the individual states want to 
fulfil. As mentioned earlier, coalition-building is one of the major options here, but this will, 
in turn, dilute the individual actor’s position (Dür and Mateo, 2010a; Guggenbühl, 2013). 
This is a strange paradox: a particular position can be successful only if it is compromised 
upon before the actual bargaining process starts. From the perspective of the common 
good, this is a wonderful instrument for forcing partners into a given frame, but for those 
that want to uphold the priorities set by their governments, this dynamic is problematic, 
to say the least. Prioritizing is important, however, as it will help the individual country to 
get its act together. After all, how can it concede, if it does not prioritize? On the other 
hand, in intense negotiation processes such as those in the EU, where negotiators get to 
know each other and sit around the table together for years, the negotiators are forced 
to acknowledge the specific needs of their counterparts if they want their opponents to 
respect their own specific interests. In other words, although there is an ongoing give-
and-take process, certain specific interests are respected and will not be out-voted, as 
this would damage the very integrity of the countries involved. Negotiators can be open 
to a smooth process of conceding and obtaining only if they feel safe, and they will only 
feel safe if they can place trust in the ability and willingness of their colleagues to take into 
account their core interests and values.
The EU member states organize themselves into coalitions. These coalitions ‘entail 
the pooling of power and resources by the constituent parties in pursuit of a desired 
outcome’ (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2011: 561). The coalitions can be based around the 
north–south cleavage (rich–poor, but primarily Germanic versus Latin cultures). There is a 
supranationalist–intergovernmentalist axis; an Atlanticist coalition versus a continentalist 
coalition; there are free-traders versus protectionists; and big versus small countries. 
Because of the euro crisis, the North–South divide seems to be of importance, and even 
then its salience is limited: ‘no clear cleavage lines can be discerned in EU decision-making, 
except for a moderate North–South division’ (Hosli and Arnold, 2010: 617). It should be 
noted that these coalitions are becoming more fluid over time, thereby enhancing flexibility 
and instability simultaneously. All of these cleavages are cross-cutting: one country is 
always part of more than one ‘structural’ alliance, and there are countless numbers of 
different coalitions on different dossiers. The effect of these coalition patterns is twofold: 
they both slow down and stabilize the EU negotiation processes. They also constitute a 
negotiation arena that, while securing both European and national interests, does not 
enhance the strength of the European Union as a global actor.
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Procedures of the EU Negotiation Process
What kind of negotiation does consensus decision-making involve? This is an important 
topic for the European Union, as the decision-making procedures have an enormous impact 
on the negotiation processes and their outcomes (Heisenberg, 2004: 93–110). The impact 
of QMV in the Council of Ministers has been discussed before, but the question remains 
as to what extent QMV itself affects the negotiators versus the ability of negotiators to 
use it as a threat while consensus, in practice, remains the rule. One problem with the 
procedures in the EU is that they are often different from one issue-area to the other, 
thus limiting transparency and enhancing complexity. It should be noted that consensus 
decision-making is also the rule in areas where QMV is allowed. One reason for this is 
the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, a package deal whereby countries try to avoid 
using their veto while at the same time trying not to invoke actual voting. Negotiating until 
general satisfaction is reached has thus become the reality in EU bargaining.
A major difference between EU and non-EU negotiations is the common understanding 
of EU negotiators that: EU decision-making is a non-zero-sum process; that the 
Commission is the agenda setter – with the European Council as the major body for strategic 
decisions – and will therefore enhance the possibility of coordinated solutions; and that 
the existence of the Court of Justice of the European Union guarantees implementation of 
the decisions agreed upon by the member states. An additional factor is the long-standing 
influence of these understandings on the negotiation process and, as a consequence, on 
the development of an EU negotiation culture with characteristics that cannot be found 
elsewhere. This evolution of cooperation creates an integrative bargaining process in 
which non-cooperation and tit-for-tat tactics are rare. As negotiators meet each other 
on a day-to-day basis, EU negotiations are more personalized than other international 
negotiations. This, in turn, creates a chemistry that furthers integrative bargaining, just as 
the collective gathering of information shapes a common referential frame.
The enormous number of issues in the EU negotiation processes provides negotiators, 
in principle, with numerous possibilities for package deals, thereby facilitating integrative 
outcomes. As we have seen, however, there are several obstacles on the package-dealing 
horizon that obscure the negotiators’ view. Package deals sometimes work within one and 
the same dossier area if the deadline is approaching. Package-dealing between dossiers 
is not really feasible, with the exception of trade-offs at the highest political level (Ball, 
2004).
Institutions in the EU Negotiation Process
The intergovernmental and supranational institutions of the European Union play 
their own intricate game (Beach, 2004: 71–92). How negotiations were structured and 
conducted mattered in terms of the supranational actors’ ability to gain influence in 
IGCs. The EU member states often needed the supranational bodies as facilitators in 
reaching agreements. Although a non-supranational body, the Council Secretariat has 
been especially influential in this respect, which has to do with its expertise, as well as 
the fact that it is often ahead of the member states as far as information is concerned. Its 
skills are needed by the EU member states’ negotiators who, especially those from the 
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smaller powers, often lack the apparatus to match their opponents. They may alternatively 
use the facilities of the Secretariat, which in turn creates a power base for the Council. 
Furthermore, trust plays an important role. The legitimacy of the Secretariat puts it in 
a central role as a neutral broker that can be trusted and will therefore be used by the 
players. The European Commission, however, has not always had the trust of the other 
actors, because it is a player itself, with its own interests to defend. As the Commission 
compensated for this lack of trust by taking extremist positions, the effect has been a 
further loss of legitimacy and therefore of influence on the negotiation processes in 
the intergovernmental conferences (Beach, 2004: 90). It could generally be stated that 
the more complex bargaining processes are, the more institutions are needed to guide 
negotiators through the ‘forest’.
EU member states are consequently becoming more dependent on the institutions 
that they have created, and they will therefore invest them with more possibilities for 
influencing the EU negotiation processes. By creating a power base for the common 
institutions, albeit an informal power base, the common good of the EU may be furthered, 
but the individual bargaining positions will still suffer. As we have seen before, EU member 
states already have a diminishing range of options at their disposal because of the growth 
in the number of participating countries and the decrease in consensus-making in favour 
of the increasing use of QMV to decide the outcomes of EU negotiation processes. This 
not only applies to the regular bargaining processes, but also to those outside the normal 
patterns of EU decision-making, such as the IGCs. This does not mean, however, that 
inter-state negotiations are on the way out. On the contrary, as the multilateral process 
becomes more complex and more difficult to manage, bilateralism is on the rise. Countries 
will compensate for their lack of grip on the formal processes by being more active in the 
informal circuits, such as lobbying. This will facilitate the European Union’s negotiation 
processes, but it could also enhance ambiguity and will water down transparency. This 
would create more difficulties for individual actors to establish effective strategies, so that 
they would have to turn to allies and institutions to compensate for their own negotiating 
weakness.
However, the institutions might still play an important role, but the trend towards 
strengthening them seems to be over. The exception is the European Parliament, not 
only as a consequence of the extension of its power because of the Lisbon Treaty, but 
also because of a self-propelling dynamic. The United Kingdom has always been anxious 
about too strong a European Union curtailing its traditional freedom of manoeuvre, but 
in the wake of the euro crisis, other ‘northern states’ – such as the Netherlands and even 
Germany – are becoming slowly but truly more Eurosceptic. The Netherlands, citing the 
failed ‘Maastricht Proposal’ in the early 1990s, is now one of the more hesitant countries 
as far as further integration and enhanced supranationalism are concerned (Van den Bos, 
2008: 377). For the process of EU negotiation, this growing distrust in the European Union 
implies less assured outcomes in a relatively weakened Union. Whether this is good or 
bad is debatable. According to Louise van Schaik, ‘more EU unity can be beneficial for the 
EU’s effectiveness, but can also provoke a negative reaction from negotiating partners. 
The EU acting as a bloc may cause irritation’ (Van Schaik, 2013: 192). In other words, a 
cohesive European Union might strengthen its influence over non-EU negotiations, but 
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perhaps also be weakened. Increased cohesiveness and acting as a bloc could therefore 
diminish its negotiation effectiveness.
The Presidency in the EU Negotiation Process
Although the Presidency is not an institution of the European Union, it seems relevant to 
discuss it before this thesis turns to the formal institutional framework (Schout et al., 2004). 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has enjoyed a semi-permanent President 
of the European Council – the highest political level of the European Union, with a term-
in-office of two-and-a-half years and the option of one extra term of the same length. 
The first President of this kind, Belgium’s former Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy, 
understood how to play his role: he seems to be in the background, avoids ‘egotiation’, but 
is as influential as necessary from behind the curtains. Timing is essential, as is knowing 
when to pull and when to push, and trying to stay out of the limelight as much as possible 
in order not to irritate the European heads of state and government unnecessarily. As 
the European Council represents the EU, the President contributes to the stability of the 
Union and to the effectiveness of its negotiation processes. Its role was already growing 
under the old system of the rotating Presidency: ‘the Presidency has evolved into the 
most important institutional mechanism through which EU governments reach efficient 
bargains’ (Tallberg, 2008: 201). The semi-permanency of the position was expected to 
stabilize the Union further, thereby facilitating more assured outcomes of EU negotiation 
processes. Another novelty stemming from the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of the 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as the permanent chair of 
the EU Foreign Affairs Council. Former European Commissioner for Trade and British 
parliamentarian Catherine Ashton was the first chair-holder. This role will also help to 
enhance cooperation and thereby further EU stability, as the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presides over the Foreign Affairs Council of 
the European Union.
The old system of rotating country chairs – every six months – is still in place as 
far as the other decision-making levels of the Union are concerned. These chairs still 
play an important role in the EU negotiation processes, as they did at the time before 
the installation of the semi-permanent Presidency. One important duty of the chair is 
to guarantee the continuity of, and progress in, the negotiations on the various agenda 
issues. The country holding the rotating Presidency has a moral and political obligation 
to be successful during its six months in office. Failures shame the country, which holds 
responsibility for guiding the Union through its official term. National honour, and therefore 
the political position of the leader(s), is at stake. This is a strong incentive for a country to 
invest plenty of energy into its period of Presidency. It is important to be successful and to 
avoid crisis situations as much as possible, as they might lead to failure. The consequence 
of this is that countries holding the rotating presidency often adopt a risk-avoidance style, 
as risk-taking presidencies have – so far – not been very successful. Hobby-horses can 
be a serious obstacle to effective leadership in the negotiations chaired by the country in 
charge (Guggenbühl, 2004: 171–198).
The chairing country still has an important role to play, especially when the other 
actors fail. To be effective, planning is essential. Most countries prepare seriously for 
their term, and broad layers of the bureaucracy are trained in understanding the issues 
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at hand and in dealing with them in an effective way. Pathfinders are sent out to gather 
information in EU capitals in order to obtain a thorough insight into the perceptions of 
the other EU member states concerning the issues that will be dealt with in the next 
half year. During its term in office, the chairing country must keep in mind that technical 
chairing is just not enough. Maintaining order will not – by itself – lead to progress in 
the negotiation process. So-called ‘corridor work’, informal talks, mediation initiatives 
between opponents, performing well with the other institutions of the European Union, as 
well as pleasing public opinion in member states, are all activities that can help the chair 
to be seen as effective. Some findings of effective EU chairing behaviour will be presented 
under ‘Unilateral Lessons for Chairing’ in chapter XI.
The European Council in the EU Negotiation Process
Negotiating European policy in the European Council – the multilateral negotiation 
between the political leaders of the EU countries plus the Presidents of the Council and of 
the Commission, and (depending on the agenda) the High Representative and an individual 
minister or commissioner – is EU negotiation at its highest level (Werts, 2008). This is both 
because of ‘the elevated status of its participants and the important nature of the matters 
that come before it’ (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 45). The European Council can be 
regarded as ‘a sort of Board of Directors of the EU’ (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 46), with 
the task to enhance ‘mutual understanding and confidence between governments of the 
EU Member States’ (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 48). This most important negotiation 
arena of the entire EU, which meets at least twice every six months, is the platform for the 
final political decision-making in the European Union, and thereby its instrument of last 
resort in conflict resolution. Its decisions are almost always taken by unanimity (Buonanno 
and Nugent 2013: 46). Here, the negotiation processes come to an agreement, or failure. 
This is the place of an ongoing struggle, partly created by the occasional malfunctioning 
of the Council of Ministers and by the working methods and proceedings of the European 
Council itself. One side of the problem is that too many issues are not finalized by the 
ministers and end up on the table of the heads of state and governments. Too many ‘low-
political’ topics have to be dealt with at too high a political level. This mismatch has to 
do with the risk-avoidance attitude of the lower political and diplomatic strata. As well 
as the problem of the leaders being swamped, there is the question of languages. As the 
European Union grows, so too will the number of languages in use (Van Grinsven, 2004: 
127–142).
More perhaps than on other negotiation levels, the personal qualities of the leaders in 
the European Council have an impact on the negotiation process, as was highlighted in 
Chapter IX of this thesis. After all, the leaders are vested with a great deal of power and are 
therefore highly ‘relevant’ people. Character always counts, and some research seems to 
indicate that, within the EU, character differences among negotiators have a greater impact 
on negotiation relationships and processes than culture. But for those who represent the 
states at the highest levels, personal characteristics may be even more relevant than for 
other representatives. Earlier in this thesis, we saw the impact of people liking or disliking 
each other on the relationships between leaders, and therefore between the member 
states. This had nothing, however, to do with political colour. There have been German 
Bundeskanzler who were able to work very well with French presidents of a different 
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political inclination while having no chemistry with presidents of the French Republic 
who were politically close to them. Other elements influencing mutual relationships are 
the power of the countries involved (size, population and economic performance), as well 
as the constitutional position and seniority of the leader. However, although the bigger 
EU member states play a dominant role ‘small member states have enjoyed considerable 
influence over decision outcomes in the European Union’ (Thomson, 2008: 255).
The Council of Ministers in the EU Negotiation Process
The Council of Ministers is – together with the European Parliament – the legislature of the 
European Union. The Council and the Parliament can be seen as the two houses that have 
to co-decide on EU legislation (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 49–54). If in disagreement, 
they have to negotiate a common position. Negotiation and mediation in the EU Council of 
Ministers are important processes in view of the key role that the institutions have to play 
as concession-making machinery (Elgström, 2004: 111–126). The highly institutionalized 
character of bargaining in the Council is of importance here. Agenda-setting and 
initiating, the impact of procedures (including voting rules) on negotiation behaviour and 
coalition-building, different mediating roles, and the effect of the institutional context on 
the negotiation process are vital ingredients in understanding the EU menu. Consensus-
seeking behaviour and problem-solving approaches in EU bargaining are characteristic 
for the European Union, because there is a perception on the part of member states that 
the EU will provide them with mutual efficiency gains on the basis of common values. As 
far as negotiation is concerned, it is easier to accept a proposal by majority vote than to 
amend it; the Council adopts a Commission proposal – the de facto single negotiation 
text for the Council of Ministers – by QMV, but can amend it only by unanimity. For the 
Commission, therefore, agenda-setting is a power resource, as is the prerogative to 
withdraw its proposals, but this only counts for cases outside the domain of the High 
Representative for External and Security Policy: ‘the Council of Ministers’ decision-making 
and negotiation style is institutionally unique’ (Heisenberg,  2008: 273).
Since the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, a qualified majority consists of 55 per cent of the 
member states, representing 65 per cent of the population, although there is a transitional 
period and CFSP plus CSDP are largely exempt from it (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 49–
54). In those EU areas where QMV is possible, constructive negotiations are imperative. 
Negotiations are primarily problem-solving exercises rather than the construction of 
minimal winning coalitions. Countries that are sure to be out-voted will normally go with 
the flow. Furthermore, there is a long-standing Council of Ministers’ norm to avoid (out-)
voting as much as possible. In practice, consensus is the rule, voting is a last resort, thus 
negotiation gains in importance. Package-dealing, facilitated by existing cross-cutting 
cleavages and different coalitions depending on the dossier at hand, is the major tactical 
device that is used to obtain agreements.
As far as coalition-building is concerned, which is after all a device for structuring the 
process, the emphasis is more on process coalitions than on voting coalitions. ‘Practice 
teaches us that member states usually opt to pool their voices and to delegate authority 
to one or more EU negotiator(s)’ (Delreux, 2011: 5). Furthermore, the Commission plays 
a role both as a facilitative and a preventive mediator, removing as many obstacles from 
the negotiation process as possible, while the chair is more of an ad-hoc mediator. These 
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mediators are not completely neutral; they have their own particular agendas. Some 
impartiality is needed, however, and this is one of the reasons why the chair of the Council 
and the leader of the delegation of the chairing country are always different individuals.
Ministers of the Council constitute the Policy Forum of the European Union, which is 
the central negotiations arena, although not the highest one. It meets in ten formations: 
General Affairs; Foreign Affairs; Economic and Financial Affairs; Justice and Home Affairs; 
as well as Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; Competitiveness; 
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy; Agriculture and Fisheries; Environment; and 
Education, Youth, Culture and Sport. Beneath this lies a system of committees, the first 
of which is COREPER 2 for the Permanent Representatives of the Member States (that 
is, ambassadors) and COREPER 1 for their deputies, and then a whole range of working 
groups where the preparatory negotiations take place (De Zwaan, 1995; Beyers and 
Dierickx, 1996).
Connected to the Council of Ministers is the Council Secretariat: ‘the Council 
Secretariat plays an important [...] role in ensuring the efficiency of intergovernmental 
Council decision-making’ (Beach, 2009: 234). The Secretariat is also an important support 
for the European Council and the European Parliament.
The European Parliament in the EU Negotiation Process
The EEC Treaty gave the European Parliament purely advisory and supervisory powers 
(Carter, 2011: 221). Through Treaty amendments in 1986, 1993, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1999 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Parliament became a true EU institution 
with legislative powers. In the context of the ordinary legislative procedure, which in the 
past was labelled the ‘co-decision’ procedure, a Conciliation Committee was installed in 
which the Council has to negotiate with the Parliament if it turns down its amendments. It 
should be noted here that 85 per cent of legislative proposals are decided upon without 
the need to conciliate with the Council. Of the remaining 15 per cent, one-quarter of its 
amendments are accepted as proposed, while another one-quarter are withdrawn, so 
in approximately half of the 15 per cent of contentious issues a negotiated compromise 
has been reached (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 56). The European Parliament now has 
a formal role in the EU negotiation system, while it scrutinizes the Commission and the 
Council within this system. It also has a role to play in the enlargement procedure, so its 
powers have grown so much that EU member states, the Council of Ministers and the 
European Commission include the Parliament and the positions of its parties into account. 
As a consequence, the European Parliament has become a party in the EU negotiation 
processes.
As the European Parliament is a political institution that is fragmented into political 
groups, this enhances the democratic level of the European Union, but it also politicizes 
the negotiation processes, which is not always helpful for closure. After all, Parliament has 
its own internal negotiation processes, with log-rolling and legislative agreements in full 
session (Hix, 1999: 79), and thereby adds a new level to the EU negotiation process. The 
negotiation position of Parliament is still weakened, however, by several flaws (Nugent, 
2010: 211–212). It does not have full legislative powers as it lacks the right of initiative, so 
the Council of Ministers still often decides ‘in principle’ before Parliament has spoken. 
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Moreover, the Council does not consult it on all legislative matters, and it does not need 
to be consulted on Commission legislation.
Although the European Parliament is still not a ‘proper’ assembly like the national 
ones, it has become an important player in the negotiation process (Nugent, 2010: 241). 
The Parliament has also broadened its influence to the EU’s external relations and its 
management: ‘the European Parliament was able to co-negotiate the making of [the 
European External Action Service] and to create a structured relationship between the 
High Representative and the EEAS that enables extended parliamentary oversight of the 
institutional setting of EU external relations and diplomacy’ (Raube, 2012: 79).
The Commission as the Initiator, Implementer and Broker
The European Commission is the impartial element in the system of the European Union. 
It has to defend the EU’s interests as a whole. It is supposed to be the motor of European 
integration, of which it is the initiator and day-to-day driver (Buonanno and Nugent, 
2013: 39–60), the epitome of the community method. The Commission’s President has 
an important role to play in the other institutions of the Union, but he lacks a privileged 
position in the realm of CFSP and CSDP, where the governments have the initiator’s role. 
The Commission does not have a leading role in transgovernmentalism, but through 
issue-linkage, as well as through the High Representative, who is part and parcel of 
the Commission as its Vice-Chair and Commissioner, but it is nonetheless influential in 
this area. The Commission also acts as mediator and broker and it has strong executive 
functions, having close to 30,000 civil servants at its disposal. It is at its best with issues 
where its power is grounded in the Treaty of the EU, in QMV issue-areas, and in cases 
where EU member states are of the opinion that issues have to be solved at the EU level, 
or quarrel among themselves.
These executive functions include developing administrative laws, overseeing the 
implementation of EU policies by the national governments, and checking their laws, while 
in some cases it can implement EU policies directly in the national context. Furthermore, 
the Commission has a leading role in the process of enlargement of the European Union. It 
is the spin in the web of preparatory negotiations within the European Union. For example, 
towards the EU applicant countries there is hardly any room for negotiation left, once the 
European Council has given the green light for accession talks on the conditions of the 
‘chapters’.
The Commission’s negotiation power within the Union stems from its information 
advantage, its prerogative to set the agenda through impact assessments, to withdraw its 
proposal, and to take judicial steps against member states and the European Parliament. 
Its external power stems again from being better informed than the member states, 
plus it can exceed its mandate while the member states will be hesitant to criticize the 
Commission about this for fear of weakening the European Union’s power in the eyes 
of non-EU negotiating powers. The Commission can further strengthen its position in 
external negotiations by convincing the member states that they have to speak with one 
voice. ‘Yet, the overrepresentation of Europe in many international institutions would 
further exacerbate if the European Union managed to increasingly “speak with a single 
voice” by way of more competences or coordination’ (Gstöhl, 2009: 403).
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EU Enlargement and External Negotiations
The European Union’s external policy is quite effective in negotiations with candidate 
members:
An applicant first has to be declared as an official candidate, which requires that 
the country satisfies the political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria. Then, it 
has to adopt and implement the acquis communautaire, the whole body of the 
European Union rules and regulations in force (Kibris and Bac, 2011: 399).
According to the Copenhagen Criteria from 1993, later amended at the European Council 
in Madrid in 1995, the new member state will have to be a European country with stable 
state institutions, respecting democratic principles, human rights and minorities. An 
applicant state should have a functioning market economy that can meet competition 
at the European internal market, and it has to adopt the acquis communautaire and 
apply it accordingly. Even with these seemingly objective criteria, the perceptions of the 
parties in the enlargement process can differ substantially and will therefore influence the 
negotiation process (Smolinski, 2010).
The prospect of EU membership can decisively influence other countries, even on 
issues that are not relevant for accession. However, it loses part of this grip after a country 
has become an EU member state:
It is interesting to note that the EU effect is strongest in the stages before countries 
actually become members. When countries have incentives to reform, in order to 
be deemed acceptable for membership, the EU leverage may be strongest. Once 
countries actually become members, Brussels has far less direct influence on 
countries’ behavior (Gray, 2009: 946).
Fedor Meerts and Thassos Coulaloglu came to the same conclusion while comparing 
the compliance of Estonia, Romania and Ukraine to the EU’s demands (Meerts and 
Coulaloglu, 2012: 306–327). Estonia and Romania were much more willing to work with 
the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) than was Ukraine. However, after accession they often 
prevented certain EU proposals in the domain of human rights from being transformed 
into proposals to be tabled at the OSCE.
Negotiating enlargement is a very special element in EU negotiation processes 
(Landau 2004: 199–216). The negotiation processes of the European Union with applicant 
states – and the internal negotiations that go with it – are of lasting importance, even after 
the recent extension of the EU with Croatia, for this will probably not be the last country 
to join. Other states, such as the remaining western Balkans countries of (in alphabetical 
order) Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia might follow. Given 
the present phase of ‘Eurosclerosis’, this might take a long time, while the accession of the 
official candidate country of Turkey might never happen, either because of ‘fatigue’ on the 
side of the Union, or perhaps more likely on the Turkish side.
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With the growth in the number of EU member states, any external negotiations will 
be more difficult to deal with in terms of alternatives to the positions already taken by 
the Union. These positions will become more rigid than they are today, especially if 
external negotiations are about issues that will have a profound impact on the EU. The 
higher the stakes and the larger the Union, the less flexible the position it will take in 
negotiations with outside actors. This could seriously complicate its dealings with, for 
example, its transatlantic partners, and the inflexibilities could add to the present rift that 
has arisen as a result of different political aims and strategies. This process can already 
be observed when one looks at the difficulties experienced by the Council of Ministers 
in compromising on its negotiation outcomes to reach consensus with the European 
Parliament. After internal negotiations, no space is left for further give-and-take. The 
bottom line has been reached. For candidate members it will anyway be more difficult to 
accede, as the demands from the EU side have been raised dramatically as a consequence 
of the accession experiences of the last decade (Phinnemore, 2011: 257).
President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso has stressed the 
importance of Europe playing a global role, noting that this could only be realized if 
the European Union acted in a united fashion (Giegerich, 2010: 197). The EU’s external 
negotiations are multi-level, as are the internal ones. Here we will focus on a few important 
realms, first of all the European Neighbourhood Policy. This initiative from 2003 is a case 
of reaching out to minimize some of the negative consequences of enlargement (Gower, 
2006: 73), to lower the need for states to become EU members and to attempt to stabilize 
the regions around the Union. Another level is the negotiation processes with advanced 
industrialized countries (for example, the G7), with advanced and advancing countries 
(the G20), and with developing countries (for example, the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
group of states – the ACP). The EU also participates in the negotiation processes with the 
UN institutions and the UN family, for example in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(Young, 2003). The result of all this is enormous complexity, one reason being that the 
internal and external processes of the EU’s negotiations are becoming intertwined. Thus, 
‘In an age of global markets and communications, it is more than ever apparent that 
the internal and external development of the EU are inseparable, and that the processes 
of internalization and externalization [...] cannot be avoided (Smith, 2011: 244). This has 
the consequence of a growing linkage between internal and external EU negotiation 
processes, creating ever more complexity.
CFSP is one of the most difficult terrains of European policy-making, as it has to be 
done by consensus. The effectiveness of the EU’s external role is hampered by this painful 
internal negotiation process, notwithstanding the attempt to harmonize and centralize by 
appointing a High Representative with powers both inside and outside the Council and 
the Commission, with her own diplomatic apparatus by means of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), which is staffed by diplomats of the EU member states and 
Commission officials under the authority of a head of delegation (Drieskens, 2012: 57). 
It is an innovative development: ‘For the first time in diplomatic history, a non-state actor 
has created its own foreign service composed of both a central administration in Brussels 
as well as external delegations abroad’ (Petrov, Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2012: 1). 
After a difficult start, the EEAS is slowly but truly taking shape, but European Union 
diplomacy is still in its infancy and lacks coherence, unity and effectiveness. Nevertheless, 
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the EU has a role to play and this role is quite special. As Karen Smith states, ‘the EU 
may not be so unique in its choice of foreign policy objectives, but the way it pursues 
them does distinguish it from other international actors’ (Smith, 2003: 199). That is to say, 
the EU is peaceful and legalistic, it has institutionalized dialogues, including the promise 
of membership – in principle at least – and supports non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Of course, many countries in this world also pursue this, but not so much in a 
grouping with others as is done within the European Union.
To measure the EU’s influence on the global system of negotiation processes is, however, 
hard to measure: ‘The difficulties in determining whether a desired change has been the 
result of an EU policy as distinct from other actors or factors are not inconsequential’ 
(Keukelaire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 336). Moreover, ‘In practice, the EU’s challenge 
consists of pushing for the most ambitious margin within the realm of realistically possible 
agreements (while working towards upgrading the ambitious scope of this realm, inter alia 
by means of coalition- and bridge-building)’ (Groen, Niemann and Oberthür, 2012: 187). 
In order to respond to this challenge, unity will have to be accomplished, yet this is the 
EU’s most painful process, where it often fails. The most notable example of this was at the 
Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change of 2009: ‘The failure to speak with one voice [...] 
weakened the EU’s position in front of the international community and gave the chance 
to other actors to claim for leadership (especially the US)’ (Fernandez Martin, 2012: 205).
Michel Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen have analyzed the external relations of the EU as 
a three-level game in which the ‘win-set’ – that is, the bargaining range – is shrinking as 
the negotiations are conducted on a higher external level. They see the ‘win-set’ as being 
quite large between the individual EU member states, smaller at the internal EU level and 
smallest in the international arena (Knodt and Princen, 2003: 57). This vision is in line with 
the work of the father of ‘two-level games’, Robert Putnam, who determined the ‘win-sets’ 
on three levels as well, although not connecting them to the European Union, which did 
not exist in its current fully blown version at the time. On the first level, the strategies of 
the negotiator were of essence; on the second level, the institutions; and on the highest 
level, the preferences and coalitions (Putnam, 1988: 442).
One way to create a bigger ‘win-set’ in the EU’s negotiations with outside powers is 
to strengthen the corps that deals with its foreign policy: the EEAS. This could be done 
through collective training, but, according to Simon Duke, this training should be content-
driven, while ‘inculcating an esprit de corps [...] should not be the primary purpose of 
any training design or execution’ (Duke, 2012: 114). David Spence, on the contrary, is in 
favour of training to further a sense of ‘Europeaness’ among the negotiators representing 
the Union: ‘Until the European Union’s diplomats and European national diplomats “sing 
a song from the same hymn sheet”, diplomatic effectiveness will be a hard call’ (Spence, 
2012: 133). ‘Yet, the overrepresentation of Europe in many international institutions would 
further exacerbate if the European Union managed to increasingly “speak with a single 
voice” by way of more competences and coordination’ (Gstöhl, 2009: 403).
Strategies and Tactics in EU Negotiation Processes
Andreas Warntjen distinguishes four modes of decision-making that are employed by 
EU member states and institutions (Warntjen, 2010: 655–679). The first mode is distributive 
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bargaining: ‘In this mode, actors aim to elicit as many concessions from their negotiation 
partners as possible, while making as few as possible themselves’ (Warntjen, 2010: 667). 
The second mode is cooperative exchange, or trade-offs and package deals, which 
are also labelled integrative bargaining or value creation. The third one is norm-guided 
behaviour: ‘Through a process of socialization, actors internalize norms which become 
part of their identity and prescribe appropriate behaviour for certain types of situations’ 
(Warntjen, 2010: 670). This mode can also be named ‘Brusselization’, as the dynamics of 
the processes in Brussels force negotiators to adjust and thereby become more ready to 
wheel and deal. Warntjen’s final mode is deliberation: ‘deliberation establishes through 
truth-seeking discourse what “the right thing to do” would be’ (Warntjen, 2010: 670).
What factors determine the choice of strategies and tactics? Stefanie Bailer suggests 
that voting power, economic size and domestic constraints create the context in which 
negotiators have to operate (Bailer, 2010: 743–757). Negotiators will look for opportunities 
to form coalitions to strengthen their power, they will lean on the institutional power 
that they have and use skilled negotiators who are well informed, working on as many 
levels and with as much frequency and reciprocity as possible in order to create optimal 
effectiveness and defend the interests of their country or institution. Madeleine Hosli and 
Christine Arnold add to this the following observation: ‘Negotiations on the European 
Constitution are found to be determined less by general transnational left–right divisions, 
but cleavages according to the length of EU membership and the size of the EU member 
states’ (Hosli and Arnold, 2010: 615). Whether this is a rift to be found in other EU contexts 
remains to be seen, but it does indicate what kinds of factors the EU negotiator has to 
struggle with in attempts to bridge gaps through strategies and tactics.
Thomas Risse and Mareike Kleine look at strategy and tactics in EU deliberations 
from a different angle (Risse and Kleine, 2010: 708–726). They ask themselves ‘[w]
hich institutional scope conditions are conducive to arguing to prevail in multilateral 
negotiations and, thus, to affect both processes and outcomes?’ (Risse and Kleine, 
2010: 711). They propose five conditions that will strengthen the chances of persuasion 
as a tactical tool in EU negotiation. The first proposal is that the likelihood of arguing 
leading to persuasion will be enhanced in situations of uncertainty. To them, uncertainty 
will be generated, among other things, by institutional settings, which favour overlapping 
identity roles. Second, they state that a transparent negotiation will also be conducive 
to persuasion, especially if the negotiators are uncertain about the preferences of their 
constituency. Third, if they are more aware of the preferences of their audiences, they will 
prefer secretive negotiations. Fourth, arguing will lead to persuasion if expertise and moral 
competence buttress institutional norms and procedures. Finally, the neutrality of the 
chair will help to persuade the other negotiators through argumentation. However, after 
studying the 1996–1997 Intergovernmental Conference and the Treaty of Amsterdam, as 
well as the European Convention starting in 2002, Risse and Kleine could not find enough 
indications to support the above-mentioned proposals.
Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo have attempted to set the stage for future research 
by clarifying the question of whether negotiators will employ tough or lenient strategies 
and tactics (Dür and Mateo, 2010b: 680–693). They hypothesize that those who are 
powerful and not eager to reach an outcome as they are in a position of loss, and/or have 
recently acceded to the Union (in other words, they are not yet ‘Brusselized’), will opt for a 
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hard bargaining approach. Those who are from a collectivist culture, however, and have a 
diplomatic tradition that stresses consensus, will be more inclined to use ‘soft’ bargaining 
strategies and tactics. They signal the problem of proving this through empirical research, 
as access to interviewees is often difficult (Van Es, 1996: 275–284; Meerts 1997a; and 
Elgström and Jönsson, 2005). Moreover, the problem of researchers having access to 
actual negotiation processes and the negotiators themselves was already noted in the 
first chapter of this dissertation.
Heather Elko McKibben approaches the issue from another angle. She analyzes 
strategic and tactical behaviour on three axes: high versus low politics issues; zero-sum 
versus positive-sum issues; and the salience of the domestic issue, as well as in cases 
of the polarization of issues (McKibben, 2010: 694–707). She hypothesizes that states 
are more likely to adopt ‘hard’ bargaining strategies when they are negotiating over high 
politics issues, when the negotiation takes place in the context of an intergovernmental 
conference (IGC), when the issues are of a foreign and defence policy nature, if they 
are zero-sum in nature, redistributive, distributive of quotas or commitments that must 
sum to some fixed amount, and if the issues are domestically (that is, electorally) salient. 
‘Soft’ bargaining strategies can be expected if the valuation of issues is different for the 
negotiation partners, if the issues are very complex, if the set of issues is positive-sum in 
nature, and if they are on the level of low politics.
Daniel Naurin also undertook something comparable to this. He launched a survey 
among representatives of all the EU member states, making a distinction between arguing 
and bargaining. Naurin regards arguing or deliberation as a kind of soft integrative 
explorative bargaining, while bargaining itself is seen as much more distributive behaviour. 
He found that ‘deliberation seems to be present during less politically heated conditions 
[... but this was] substituted by bargaining when the process came closer to a sharp 
decision-making stage’ (Naurin, 2010: 33).
The Future of the EU Negotiation Process
The EU started as a confidence-building measure between the French and the German 
Federal Republic after the Second World War. Both countries wanted, through an economic 
arrangement (the European Coal and Steel Community), to prevent another war in Europe 
by creating a stable and secure situation, with economic benefits as a spin-off. Germany 
and France needed neutral partners to help them forge a durable balance, so Italy and 
the three Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) stepped into 
the process. This multilateral framework for international negotiation has been expanding 
ever since. The Union has also enlarged its membership.
The European Union is broadening in two ways: by multiplying its policy areas; and 
by the number of partners to be integrated. New countries have entered the EU in several 
waves: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973); Greece in 1981; Portugal and 
Spain in 1986; and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. The fifteen members then decided 
to accept ten new members in 2004: Cyprus; the Czech Republic; Estonia; Hungary; Latvia; 
Lithuania; Malta; Poland; Slovakia; and Slovenia. In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania entered, 
while Croatia followed in 2013, with Iceland the next in line (although Iceland suspended 
accession negotiations in September 2013). Turkey has been a candidate member for a 
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long time already and preparatory negotiations for its membership are continuing, but 
actual membership is not foreseen and might never occur because of developments in 
Europe and Turkey alike. The EU may end up with some 35 states in the first half of 
the twenty-first century by absorbing the remaining countries of the western Balkans, 
although (as stated earlier in this chapter) this will be a slow process because of the 
ever-tougher membership conditions as a consequence of rising xenophobia in the Union, 
which is fed by an economic crisis, corruption and underdevelopment in the candidate 
countries, as well as the growth of minorities within the member states. Nevertheless, 
some see a need for further enlargement encompassing all of the countries in Europe 
apart from Russia (De Zwaan, 2013).
The EU is not only broadening its horizons, but is also deepening its cooperation 
in two ways: by covering more and more aspects of the categories that it sees as its 
domain; and by strengthening the EU institutions. The supranational elements such as the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice are 
being strengthened, as are the intergovernmental bodies such as the European Council of 
heads of states and government leaders, the Council of Ministers and the whole range of 
working groups and committees that are served by negotiators from the public and – to 
a far lesser extent – the private sector. It also forces itself to integrate further. By taking 
the decision to have the Eurozone countries – a European Monetary Union with the euro 
as the common currency – the EU speculated on the future. Knowing at the turn of the 
millennium that not all of the conditions could be met to have a stable monetary zone, 
it trusted in the shadow of the future, but did not foresee the American banking crisis 
and its consequences for Europe. Becoming entrapped, the Eurozone countries decided 
to move forward by creating a common European Banking Union to be supervised by 
the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, as well as a European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism. The negative developments were thus used for a positive purpose, if one 
values further integration into a political union through a banking union as positive.
How strong will the EU be, internally and externally? According to Casper van den Berg,
[…] power is increasingly shared across multiple levels of governance rather 
than centered just at the national level, power is increasingly shared between 
state actors, semi-state actors and non-state actors, […] institutional relations 
are increasingly determined through negotiations and networks [… and] the 
strictly hierarchical and top–down ordering of levels of governance is decreasing 
in importance, in favor of relatively more equal power distribution between tiers of 
governance (Van den Berg, 2011: 371).
The EU negotiation process might become so complex that it may, in itself, be an obstacle 
to further integration, a phenomenon that can be observed on a global scale as well 
(Hale, Held and Young, 2013). At the same time, however, the possibilities for integrated 
solutions will be on the rise. The result could be a new balance, where the EU will continue 
to grow as a system and a process that will be larger than the sum of its parts. At the 
same time, there will be important issue-areas where the convergence of interests will 
remain extremely difficult, such as foreign and security policy. This disparity could develop 
in terms of an internal and an external position of the Union. Internally, more power and 
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possibilities will be generated. Externally, the Union may remain what it is today, or may 
even regress slightly: a coalition that cannot get its act together.
Alain Guggenbühl, in an interesting contribution to The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 
attempts to predict some patterns of multilateral decision-making by reviewing trends 
in the ‘Culture of Negotiation in the European Union’ (Guggenbühl, 2013: 21–47). He 
postulates that the ‘negotiation patterns of general consensual cooperation are likely 
to remain unaffected by the Lisbon Treaty as their logic has persisted over previous 
enlargement and institutional changes to the voting system. Even the forthcoming 
enlargements of the European Union should keep these trends’ (Guggenbühl, 
2013: 27). Intensification of the trend of interested consensus-building can be expected 
(Guggenbühl, 2013: 32), for example, because of ongoing mechanisms such as ‘circular 
barters’, ‘log-rolling’ and ‘diffuse reciprocity’. Under the influence of the Balkan countries, 
it is expected that ‘negotiations among member states (are) becoming influenced to a 
greater extent by political rationalities protecting fundamental domestic values. This could 
lengthen deliberations and deal-crafting in the Council’ (Guggenbühl 2013: 37). The role 
of the Presidency will be more valuable, but if the Presidency does not fulfil that role, a 
‘Directoire’ of the larger member states is likely to guide a multi-tiered European Union 
(Guggenbühl, 2013: 42). As a fifth trend, ‘the Council’s diplomatic culture is predicted 
to intensify in order to absorb the wider global interests and political rationalities of the 
negotiations’ (Guggenbühl, 2013: 45).
Concerning these wider global interests, the question can be asked of whether a 
greater grip by the EU on its international relations might help it to represent and defend 
these global interests more effectively. Some experts comment that ‘in practice, the EU’s 
challenge consists in pushing for the most ambitious margin within the realm of realistically 
possible agreements’ (Groen, Niemann and Oberthür, 2012: 205). The problematic word 
here, of course, is ‘realistically’. If the EU overestimates itself while ambitiously striving 
for the best possible outcome, it might lose face if these ambitions cannot be fulfilled. 
Striving towards an enhanced role for the EU in the world might be supported by further 
integration and enlargement of the Union’s competencies in its external negotiations.
However, a recent study:
[…] has demonstrated that it is too simple to assume that more EU competence 
in external relations will automatically result in more EU unity and negotiation 
effectiveness. Just expanding EU legal competences and imposing a supranational 
EU external representation may not lead to the EU becoming a more effective 
negotiator (Van Schaik, 2013: 209).
This seems to be true for other international organizations as well. Expanding competencies 
is not enough, not even for powerful blocs like the European Union. Equally important 
is the question of how negotiators are organizing themselves. The poor performance of 
the representatives of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in trade 
negotiations with the EU was mainly because of ‘their own disarray […] In other words, 
judicious agency still matters, particularly for small states’ (Vickers, 2011: 195). In the 
area of CFSP, a pragmatic solution for the European Union might be for member states 
to agree – without changing the formal rules – to consensus minus a tiny minority. If the 
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overwhelming majority decides to act, a small minority should not be allowed to block a 
decision on external action (Van Staden, 2013: 56).
In Conclusion
Negotiation processes in the EU are very divergent. Daniel Thomas and Ben Tonra 
tried to wrap it all up by distinguishing between seven modes of policy-making and 
their consequences for negotiation (Thomas and Tonra, 2012: 27). The first mode is 
competitive bargaining as a consequence of the veto threat, thus coming to closure by 
the lowest common denominator: deadlock or non-decision. The second and sixth modes 
are log-rolling, originating from reciprocity, and ‘Europeanization’, emerging from 
the internalization of EU norms, which are both concluded by a rather indeterminate 
agreement. The third mode is cooperative bargaining, originating from the application of 
EU procedural norms resulting in median compromises. The fourth model is normative 
entrapment, under the influence of substantive norms and policy commitments, creating 
a policy outcome that is consistent with prior commitments. The fifth is ‘Brusselization’ 
as a consequence of the socialization of EU elites and because of the expanded authority 
of Brussels institutions. All of these outcomes are highly formalized vague compromises. 
And last but not least, the seventh model is identity formation, which originates out of the 
definition of self and distinction from others, resulting in agreements that are consistent 
with the common narrative of the parties.
The European Union’s negotiation processes that are analyzed in this chapter on the 
twenty-first century might be sufficient for managing the common and diverging interests 
of the EU countries in the first quarter of this century. After that, however, they may 
hamper further integration in the multi-level governance system that we call the European 
Union. Some argue that the complexity of the process will anyway lead to ‘gridlock’ (Hale, 
Held and Young, 2013), while others (Kibris and Bac, 2011) are of the opinion that it is 
‘not the numbers of members per se but whether they have diverging interests’ (Kibris 
and Bac, 2011: 400). Regardless, by its inherent nature, the EU negotiation process 
has – and will have – an enormous impact on the workings of the national negotiations 
within its own member states, as well as on international negotiations at the global level. 
The classic international negotiation processes as we have known them since the mid-
seventeenth century will change dramatically because of globalization and regionalization, 
as is the case with the European Union.
The individual EU negotiator will probably become an even more important asset as 
the process becomes ever more complex and non-transparent. If this is true, the inevitable 
conclusion is that the European Union and its member states will have to invest more in 
the human dimension, for example by transforming the current, very modest, European 
diplomatic programme into a fully fledged training curriculum, or even establishing a 
European negotiation academy for diplomats and other civil servants. Such an academy 
would at least have the advantage of being able to enhance the level of the negotiations, to 
familiarize the new breed of EU diplomats and civil servants with EU-specific negotiations, 
to create a network within the group, and, most importantly, it might help to create a 
European diplomatic professional culture. Creating one professional culture will have a 
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positive effect on the stability and effectiveness of negotiation processes (Sjöstedt, 2003: 
245).
There appears to be a need to harmonize policy-producing organizations, most of 
them ministries. Negotiation will be smoother if the institutions involved are more or 
less comparable in structure. This may also encompass the creation of uniform EU-
coordination agencies in all of the EU member states, either as part of ministries of foreign 
affairs, or as separate ministries of European integration. It should be added, however, that 
separate ministries could create more bureaucracy, and experiments with this in some of 
the aspiring member states have not shown very positive results to date.
It seems to be unavoidable that the larger EU member states will have to take special 
responsibility for the efficiency of the negotiation process through enhanced cooperation 
among them, even in a formal sense. They already work much more closely together 
than their sometimes hefty disagreements on issues such as CFSP might suggest. More 
guidance for the EU by the major EU powers will, of course, demand a better cooperative 
process between the three (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) or the six (France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, plus Italy, Poland and Spain) major players in concert 
with the Commission, the Parliament, and the smaller EU member states in the Council 
of Ministers.
It might be that the member states of the European Union can hardly escape further 
integration of EU negotiation processes if they want to survive in the world outside Europe, 
however euro-sceptical their populations might be. Yet it could also be true that the EU 
cannot escape globalization of the process of international negotiation and will have to 
adapt to this trend by taking more responsibility in the realm of conflict resolution through 
international negotiation. After all, the European Union negotiation process may be an 
enigma, but it is very much a part of the overall negotiation processes that are needed to 
run world affairs in a peaceful and effective way. Negotiation is thus a central element in 
international relations, deserving attention from practitioners and theoreticians alike. The 
role of the diplomat will be scooped out, but diplomacy will stay. It will continue to fulfil 
its function ‘as a practical mode of conducting international relations, as a “torchbearer” 
[…] and as a “thinking framework” about international politics’ (Bjola, 2013: 19), even 
in the European Union. What can we expect from the EU as a player in its own right, 
especially in global politics? According to Jan Rood, for the EU to play an effective role 
in global politics, it should become more coherent in its external actions, should have a 
common vision and strategy, and should take responsibility and lead where applicable, 
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CHAPTER XI: SIMULATING DIPLOMATIC 
NEGOTIATION
Diplomatic negotiation processes can be simulated to provide the analyst with further 
insights into their character and conduct (Zartman, 1982: 9). Analysts in diplomatic 
negotiation have a problem as far as the observation of reality is concerned. This 
was elaborated upon in the first chapter of this thesis, where the cleavages between 
practitioners, researchers and trainers were discussed. Observing a simulated process 
can therefore be of great help. A simulation is an artificial structure that mirrors reality 
as much as possible, allowing the process of negotiation to be analyzed. In principle, 
people act in simulated processes as if they are negotiating in reality. In that sense, the 
process is as realistic as it can be. The characteristics of negotiation still apply. This is why 
university professors are often satisfied by analyzing the performance of their students, 
as was shown at the inaugural meeting of the Netherlands Negotiation Network (Meerts, 
2009a: 17). However, simulations and games can also be useful to instruct the wider 
public in the usefulness and the mechanics of negotiation processes, for example through 
board games like ‘Diplomacy’ (Sharp, 1978), which can also be used for scientific analysis 
(Falger, 1994: 269–284) or just for political/historical entertainment (Meerts, 2008a).
Simulating is a technique of studying and experiencing processes and systems 
if reality does not allow for such experiments. Moreover, it is about a dynamic model, 
not a static one (Lipschits, 1971: 11). The source for modern simulation techniques has 
been war-games, allowing the military to experiment without inflicting damage on people 
and the environment. Chess can be seen as the oldest war-game, as a metaphor for 
war, allowing players to practise strategy and tactics on a limited scale in limited time. 
Since the 1950s, social scientists have been experimenting with various representational 
techniques in the study of international relations (Winham, 2002: 466). War-games can 
be divided into rigid and free variants. The free variants could also be labelled role plays. 
The simulations described in this chapter can be classified as role plays that allow for 
an analysis of diplomatic negotiation processes. These simulations can be very close or 
very far from reality. Being close to reality, and especially present-day reality, will help 
participants in such exercises to understand the game and therefore to negotiate as 
realistically as possible.
Conditions for the creation of a viable role-play simulation (Meerts, 1989: 135) of 
international negotiation processes are:
1. Selecting relevant issues that will probably not be resolved by the time the game will 
be played;
2. Writing a scenario and individual instructions on the basis of an internet search, 
foreign policy documents, journals, newspapers and interviews with policy-makers;
3. Introducing the simulation through lectures and literature, as well as by applying short 
exercises to prepare participants for the overall game;
4. Participants can be asked to write position papers, which will be discussed before the 
actual simulation starts;
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5. These position papers can be used to inform other delegations about the content of 
the positions, which allows strategy and tactics to be prepared;
6. Debriefing on process, people and positions, and if possible comparing the content of 
the final outcome with a real-life document (Meerts, 2009d: 663–665).
It should be noted that it is important to distinguish between different types of participants 
who are in need of different kinds of simulation exercises (Meerts, 2002: 456). To be 
effective, it is necessary to prepare the simulation game through exercises on aspects 
such as negotiation effectiveness and style, culture and non-verbal behaviour, strategy 
and tactics, and bilateral and multi-party bargaining (Meerts, 2014a). The additional 
advantage of simulated diplomatic negotiation processes is their value in preparing 
diplomatic actors for the real negotiations in which they have to defend the interests of 
their countries. Because of its characteristics – learning by doing without the damaging 
effect of a failed negotiation in real-life bargaining – simulations function as an invaluable 
asset in training diplomats (Crookall, 1987; Stein, 1988; Boomen et al., 2001; Hemery, 2005; 
Movius, 2008; Mans, 2010; Meerts, and Schalker, 1986; Meerts, 2012a, Mühlen, 2014).
For this chapter, three angles have been chosen in order to gain some insight into the 
viability and use of role-play simulations in understanding diplomatic negotiation processes 
and negotiators’ behaviour. One angle is the role of the chairperson in such a process, as the 
chair is one of the main actors in diplomatic negotiations, helping to bring them to closure. 
The first part of this chapter thus analyzes the chairperson’s role in simulated processes 
and in reality. The second part is on bilateral negotiation. This simulation exercise is of a 
special kind, a so-called ‘table-top exercise’, normally used in serious war-gaming, and in 
this case as a tool to experiment on processes to detect – illegal – underground nuclear 
testing. It was developed by the staff of the Preparatory Committee of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna. By simulating the process, 
inspectors can be trained for real expeditions, the outcome of which will be reported to 
the Council of the CTBTO as a basis for their negotiations on decisions to be taken against 
perpetrators. The third part of the chapter presents a so-called ‘Hexagame’, which was 
developed by staff of the Clingendael Institute to confront diplomats and scientists of the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague with the 
consequences of their decision-making in the five years after the simulated situation.
UNILATERAL LESSONS FOR CHAIRING1
The chairperson in multilateral negotiations is an important factor in diplomatic negotiation 
processes, although the role of presiding officers should not be overestimated. According 
This section on ‘Chairing’ is based on Meerts (2009b), with additional insights 
from training sessions aimed at preparing UK and Polish diplomats and 
civil servants for their EU Presidencies with John Hemery in 2004–2005 and 
Wilbur Perlot in 2009–2010.
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to Kaufmann, the importance of a chairperson’s role is dependent on his or her experience, 
intelligence and grasp of the rules of procedures, the homogeneity of the actors in the 
negotiation group, as well as the chemistry between the chair and the secretariat, the 
rapporteur, etc. (Kaufmann, 1996: 71). The role of the chairperson is, of course, different 
according to the context in which he or she is operating. In the Security Council and the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, the chair has hardly any power and influence 
outside regulating the meeting in an orderly way. In the European Union, however, 
chairpersons do have some power and influence, and not only the President of the 
European Council, but also the rotating chairs of working and other groups. The first part 
of this chapter will therefore focus on the role of the chairperson in the European Union, 
as she or he has a more important role to perform than in other international forums. 
It should be noted that this disquisition could have been undertaken in the preceding 
chapter, but as it is such a specific topic based on direct observation, it was decided to 
integrate it into this chapter dealing with the behaviour of chairs and negotiators.
In a 2006 issue of The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Jonas Tallberg analyzed the 
function of the chairperson in the European Union in managing the agenda, brokering 
deals, as well as representing the negotiation party to outside groups (Tallberg, 2006: 
121–140). Tallberg focused on the chairperson’s power resources: privileged information 
and procedural control; the options for the chair to exploit the chairmanship for private 
gains; and the positive and negative effects of the formal institutional environment. 
Tallberg concluded that the chairperson plays a vital role in multilateral negotiation 
processes as an instrument in managing complexity, as he or she is able to draw on their 
inherent legitimacy. In the journal’s same issue, Ole Elgström summarizes some of the 
major characteristics of the EU chair: Presidencies sometimes have difficulty in taking a 
leading role; chairpersons-as-leaders prefer to act as entrepreneurial leaders; if they are 
defending their own interest they stress that this need is also in the EU’s interest; while 
they will be criticized if they do not live up to the norms of being the chairperson, although 
this will not have long-term consequences (Elgström, 2006: 193). Also in the same issue, 
John Hemery and Paul Meerts conclude that their training of diplomats and civil servants 
for the United Kingdom’s EU Presidency showed that thorough preparation is absolutely 
essential, as is the ability to handle time and procedures effectively, while individual 
and common interests will have to be balanced carefully (Hemery and Meerts, 2006: 
206–208). As the chairperson has a central role in simulated diplomatic negotiations, this 
sub-chapter will further analyze its role.
What is it like to be an effective chairperson of international negotiations? Although 
there is literature on chairing meetings, publications on effective leadership of international 
multilateral bargaining are in very short supply. However, as EU member states feel that 
it is important to train diplomats and civil servants in preparation for their country’s next 
EU Presidency, there have been some recent attempts to gain a better understanding 
of effective chairing in an international context. For example, the College of Europe, 
the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) and the Clingendael Institute 
have organized large-scale training session to give EU negotiators a more thorough 
insight into target-oriented chairing. These seminars have revealed many important 
aspects of negotiation chairing, as the participants were people with great experience 
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in EU negotiation processes. The seminars involved introductions on the subject matter, 
discussions, workshops, simulations and debriefings.
The following issues came out of the discussions. Effective chairpersons should 
prepare thoroughly. The chairperson must know the subject matter as well as the 
participating countries’ positions, and must analyze these so that they are able to identify 
common ground. Ideally, the chairperson should have a draft agreement in his or her 
pocket before the negotiation starts. Knowing the positions is not enough. Information on 
the needs, bottom lines, possible concession patterns and specific problems concerning 
the negotiators’ home front will help greatly. The chairperson should understand what 
the real problems are, who is going to negotiate, and how the negotiation might develop. 
The ‘how’ is very important indeed. During the planning phase, the chairperson will need 
to think about his or her main strategies and the tactics that go with it. Knowing the 
procedures is, of course, an important point, but knowing how to handle them effectively 
is even more important. In addition, of course, the chair will have to communicate – or at 
the very least have – a thorough understanding of the agenda.
During the face-to-face stage, the chairperson will need to manage the agenda in a 
subtle way. He or she must be firm in sticking to the agenda points, without becoming 
too rigid. The chairperson must show impartiality and fairness. In the European Union, 
this is achieved by separating the chair from its country’s position. A state delegation 
will represent the interests of the country, while the chairperson remains impartial. This 
implies, however, that the delegation cannot separate itself too much from the chair, 
which has a moderating effect on its position.
Chairing in the European Union
In the European Union, the chairperson of the working groups will need to rely heavily 
on the Council Secretariat for support. In other forums, the creation of a ‘friends-of-the-
chair’ caucus is often a vital element for success. To start a meeting by giving the floor 
to these ‘friends’ creates a cooperative atmosphere that is instrumental in setting the 
stage for a collaborative negotiation process. Managing time is vital. The chairperson 
will usually have to instigate a first phase of exploration to search for options that might 
lead to a synergetic and integrative outcome. This puts a lot of strain on the chairperson, 
who will have to see to it that the process moves in a certain direction, while at the same 
time avoiding premature outcomes that might forestall the agreement of more effective 
package deals. Setting clear objectives, having a good ear, using effective communication 
and keeping an eye on possible changes are vital in the context of the negotiation to keep 
the process under control. The extent to which pulling and pushing tactics are effective 
tools in any situation is the prerogative of the chairperson. An assertive chair is certainly 
an asset, but a bulldozing president is a nuisance to the negotiations – impartiality creates 
the legitimacy that the chairperson needs to be accepted as an honest-broker.
As negotiations move in the direction of an outcome, the chairperson will need to 
strike a balance between his or her own interests and those of the collective whole. It 
has already been noted that impartiality is important. However, complete neutrality leaves 
the interests of the country represented by the president virtually undefended. During 
the United Kingdom seminars, participants played the Clingendael ‘Pentagame’ in which 
277Chapter XI: Simulating Diplomatic Negotiation
they had to rotate into the chair every twenty minutes. This proved that chairing could be 
a serious obstacle to effective negotiating. In one of the games, all of the chairs pushed 
forward the possible package deals like hot potatoes, delaying decision-making until they 
were relieved of the chairmanship. The effect of this was failure to reach a collective 
decision. In other words, the fear of losing too much in terms of individual interests through 
being responsible for a collective outcome blocked that very outcome. This created an 
interesting dilemma, as it implies that there will be more assured outcomes if chairpersons 
can legitimately maintain reasonable resistance to attempts to undermine their national 
interests. Complete neutrality is therefore just as damaging as one-sidedness. This raises 
the question of fairness and effectiveness and how these should be defined in connection 
with assured and unassured outcomes.
Participants learned that it was vital to hold the chair when the process was getting 
close to ripeness and that they should be able to take a strong national position again at 
the time of decision-making – thus avoiding being the chairperson at that moment. As 
this was not always possible, countries with extreme positions ran into difficulties. They 
therefore tried to push more moderate state representatives into the chairpersonship at 
the decisive moment. They also learned that a chairperson still has to protect his or her 
own interests without becoming unfair – this fine-tuning was of vital importance, both to 
effective chairing and effective negotiating, as they had to be merged within the behaviour 
of one person.
Four stages could be observed in chairing simulations of international negotiations: 
(1) the chairperson has to set the stage; (2) options must be explored in relationship 
to countries’ positions; (3) the ‘pre-decision stage’, where packages were made ready 
for decision-making; and (4) decisions are finally hammered out into agreements. These 
stages should be observed, or the negotiations will end in mayhem with outcomes not 
being secured.
It can thus be stated that the chairperson is a negotiator with a specific role, or, 
to put it another way, a chairperson has the dual role of negotiator and mediator. His 
or her task is, first, to take responsibility for a collective process that will end with an 
acceptable outcome. To perform his or her role well, the chairperson will need to be fair. 
Fairness involves a substantial degree of impartiality, but at the same time, the chair has 
a responsibility to his or her own country or organization, the home front, so the interests 
of that party should not be too greatly neglected. As in mediation, impartiality is vital, but 
neglect of self-interest is fatal. The chair will thus need to balance these two contradicting 
roles using processes and procedures to maintain an acceptable equilibrium, and getting 
parties and people to accept him or her as the pilot of the negotiation process. Chairing 
an international negotiation process is mediating while negotiating. The chairperson is a 
mediating negotiator.
Representing both national and collective needs in a balanced way also depends, of 
course, on the nature of the processes and the procedures of the platform on which these 
negotiations take place. In the United Nations Security Council, the chairperson really has 
to combine collective and individual interests. The same is true for the EU Council Working 
Groups, but here at least a second representative will speak up for the chairperson’s 
country position so that the president does not need to do that him or herself. In other 
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international organizations, chairpersons are drawn from the ranks of international civil 
servants and can therefore be more independent as leaders of negotiation processes.
All negotiations in international organizations and all multilateral conferences are 
chaired by member state representatives or supranational officials who have mandates to 
manage the agenda, structure the deliberations, and broker agreements. Yet the existing 
literature offers no coherent explanation of the sources of this institutional practice and 
its effects on negotiation outcomes (Tallberg, 2002: 2). It is indeed striking that literature 
on chairing negotiations is virtually absent, although we know of some insights (such as 
Lang, 1989; Kaufmann, 1996; Guggenbühl, 2004; and Meerts, 2005a).
Effective Chairing
Four elements of effective chairing can be distinguished, and chairpersons operate at 
each of these levels, which run parallel during the whole process of negotiation: managing 
substance; procedure; process ; and behaviour. Although all four dimensions will have 
to be managed at any one time, there is a certain shift in intensity as the negotiation 
evolves. Procedure is a main issue at the beginning of the meeting (what are the rules 
and regulations?) and at the end (are we deciding by unanimity, consensus, or simple or 
QMV?). Managing the process pops up at regular intervals, especially if the negotiation 
becomes tense, for example, if a crisis is imminent. While the management of procedure 
and process is mainly done in and around the plenary sessions, people management is 
very much a question of lobbying. Chairpersons will have to be available to negotiators 
before, during, after and around the negotiation process. Issue management has to be 
done at all times, of course.
Managing substance is the aim of the negotiation process – the negotiations are 
conducted in order to achieve an outcome. For the chairperson, it is essential to have 
a thorough knowledge of the dossier with which he or she is dealing. The history of 
the issues has to be understood by the presiding officer, who will have to be capable of 
explaining the dossier’s background to those negotiators who are new to the process. To 
acquire such a thorough knowledge, the chairperson will have to work closely with the 
secretariat of the conference and/or working group that he or she is managing.
Planning is of the utmost importance. It should be noted that effective planning can 
be done only if the chairperson is aware of the priorities of the countries involved and the 
possible concessions that they will be willing to make. Without understanding the rank 
and order, the chairperson will never be able to set a relevant agenda. As the negotiation 
process moves on, the chairperson should divide the substance into digestible parts – to 
put together bits and pieces into acceptable packages – and to know what to throw out if 
certain sentences appear not to be negotiable.
Understanding the problems and possibilities regarding substance gives the 
chairperson a chance to do some ‘preventive’ guidance. He or she should try to move 
unnecessary obstacles if possible, preventing any loss of face on the part of the national 
delegations on the substantive issues relevant to them. One of the major issues here is the 
need to have a thorough understanding of the position and interests of the chairperson’s 
country.
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Chairpersons have to coordinate their own delegation but should not identify with its 
needs. Chairpersons have to be fair, but their complete neutrality cannot be expected. 
After all, the chairperson’s own delegation should not be defenceless, but the delegation 
should also be aware that it cannot take a very outspoken position without undermining 
the legitimacy of its fellow compatriot who is chairing the meeting.
It is understood, however, that it is much easier for chairpersons to be impartial 
if the interests of their delegation are close to the common ground of the negotiation 
(Tallberg, 2002: 31). This is why chairpersons from powerful countries are often not as 
effective as those from smaller countries that have less of a conflict of interests. Denmark, 
Finland and Ireland thus did a much better job in their roles as rotating Presidents of the 
European Union than France, Germany and Italy. It is difficult to strike a balance between 
the distance that a chairperson should take from the position of its own government: too 
far out weakens a chairperson’s position, making it impossible for the chair to fall back 
on its own national delegation, but too close a relationship provokes interventions by 
the chairperson’s government, leading to micromanagement by the home front – that is, 
bureaucrats meddling in the negotiation process and thereby, perhaps, hampering it.
Mastering procedure means being very well aware of the rules and regulations of the 
organization and the conference over which the chair is presiding. Here, the secretariat 
steps in again. After all, its members have a thorough and continuous insight into the 
procedures and their effectiveness. The chairperson will have to be firm, especially at 
the outset of the negotiation process, in implementing the procedures that have been 
decided upon. Yet at the same time, the chairperson has to be flexible in implementing 
them – assertive, but not unnecessarily bureaucratic. Culture plays a role in adherence 
to a strict or loose procedure. The chairperson will have to take into account that in some 
cultures procedure is not considered to be a very important facet of the negotiation process; 
it might even be seen as an obstacle to a smooth process. In other cultures, however, 
procedures are essential for saving the face of the chairperson and the negotiators. 
Rituals play a role in avoiding risk, which is especially important in collectivistic societies.
The stronger the institution, the more outspoken its rules tend to be. Paradoxically, 
however, the more integrated the organization, the less the need exists for strict rules. The 
continuity of the negotiating body, and the standards and values that it develops, create 
mutual understanding among negotiators, making life easy for the chair. Negotiators then 
‘automatically’ adhere to the rules. There is no need for the chairperson to impose them. 
Trust also plays a role here: the more trust, the fewer rules are needed to protect the 
negotiators and the negotiation process. On the other hand, the procedures can be seen 
as a tool for the chairperson to use to compensate for a lack of trust.
Finally, there is the point of the decision-making procedure, which is different from 
organization to organization, and which has a decisive impact on the outcome of the 
negotiation processes. If unanimity or consensus is the rule, it will be difficult for the 
chair to reach substantive outcomes. If (qualified) majority voting is the decision-making 
procedure, however, the majority can outvote the minority, although the chairperson will, 
most of the time, conceal this by stating that he assumes that there is consensus. Those 
who are aware that they will be out-voted prefer not to show this to the public, so we 
then have the shadow of the vote: when there seems to be consensus, but it has been 
forged by the threat of an overruling majority. The chairperson can hence more easily 
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push for substantive outcomes. We also have mixed systems here, of course, as applied, 
for example, in the United Nations Security Council.
Managing the process is itself one of the best tools that chairpersons have at their 
disposal for reaching assured outcomes. If the chairperson mismanages the process, 
fruitful outcomes are hard to reach, so they have to be conscious of the most effective 
sequence of that process. If certain issues are decided upon too early in the process, 
more effective package deals might be blocked. Sub-optimal outcomes will be the result. 
Chairpersons thus have to allow for a stage of exploration, and culture comes in again 
here. In some cultures (such as Japan), the give-and-take is seen as a dangerous part of 
the process. The chairperson thus has a special task to protect the face of the negotiators, 
to be aware of so-called ‘salami tactics’ and the development of an entrapment situation. 
They also have to ensure that the process will be even-handed.
Management the end-game might be the most difficult job facing a chairperson. They 
have to use insight, knowledge and intuition. Is the time ripe for decision-making, is there 
a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (push) and a ‘mutually enticing opportunity’ (pull)? It is 
essential for the chairperson to keep an eye on the context of the negotiation process. It 
is all a matter of timing, but political developments may also further or hamper progress 
of the process. Here, again, the availability of the chairperson is essential, both inside and 
outside the actual process of negotiation.
Managing behaviour assumes that the chairperson should have some psychological 
competence and therefore diplomatic skills. The style of the chairperson is important 
here. Does the chairperson have an action-oriented style, or perhaps process-oriented, 
people-oriented, or idea-oriented? Can they adapt their overall style to the situation in 
which they find themselves? The same is true for their leadership style. Are we dealing 
with a dominant, avoidant, accommodative, compromising, or collaborative chairing style? 
And again, can the chairperson adapt his or her leadership style to the circumstances? 
The chairperson will have to develop formal and, especially, informal relationships with 
negotiators and also with their own delegation and the authorities back home. The 
atmosphere of the negotiations will have to be influenced by the chairperson in a way that 
will enhance the chances of a successful process. Being emotional is counterproductive, 
but not being empathetic will not make for a favourable climate in the negotiations either. 
The behaviour of the chairperson will be characterized by the different roles that he or 
she performs. Jonas Tallberg distinguishes the roles of a chairperson as representing the 
negotiation group, as an agenda-seller, and as a broker/mediator (Tallberg, 2004). The 
chairperson will have to be fully committed to the task, but over-commitment can be a 
burden for the group. Again, a balance will have to be struck.
Finally, the behaviour of the chairperson will have to be characterized by their ability to 
apply the most effective techniques. For example, a Dutch chairperson once applied the 
technique of writing a draft of his own as an informal alternative to the official text, which 
was marred by thousands of brackets. He said that every change was welcome, but only 
after consensus. Brackets were not accepted. After a few weeks, negotiators replaced the 
official text with the chair’s informal draft as a final document. A less effective technique 
is the preparation of a final draft in consultation with only some of the negotiators. This 
raises suspicions among those who are left out, thereby lowering trust in the chair (Hauck, 
2005:8).
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BILATERAL LESSONS FOR PRACTICE2
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet been ratified by a 
sufficient number of countries and thereby cannot be implemented. However, experts and 
diplomats should already prepare for the moment when the treaty will come into force as 
an internationally accepted instrument of control. Training on this topic will allow them 
to take action immediately. If they only start to deal with the matter once the treaty has 
been ratified, costly time will be lost, and time is of the essence in dangerous nuclear 
circumstances. In order to prepare for this situation, a simulated inspection mission to a 
simulated country was thus developed, as the actual process cannot yet be experienced. In 
essence, the process is bilateral: between the CTBTO (the not-yet ratified Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization) – which is only a Preparatory Committee at the 
moment – and a host country that is suspected of violating the treaty by illegally exploding 
a nuclear device underground. The simulation exercise, which was named ‘Table-Top 
Exercise’ as it is played in different scenarios around a table onto which a map of the area 
has been projected, is a negotiation between an inspection team on the one hand and an 
inspected team of the country in question on the other, a so-called ‘on-site inspection’. 
Although the negotiation is bilateral, there are, of course, internal negotiations in each of 
the two teams. A control team acts as game master.
The effectiveness of the CTBTO’s on-site inspections not only depends on the 
willingness of states to comply, but as much on the CTBTO and its auxiliary staff’s methods 
of implementation. Inspectors therefore need both human and technical means to gather 
relevant information that will assist in making a decision on whether the CTBT has been 
violated. As far as people are concerned, one of the most important skills at their disposal 
is that of bargaining (Melamud, 2013: 401–417).
Negotiation is a process of moving from A to B in a situation where parties have 
common and opposing interests at the same time. The effectiveness of parties will first of 
all be determined by the balance between the converging and diverging needs of actors 
involved. If they have a broad overlap of interests, the ensuing process will be rather 
effective and convenient. In such a case, parties will have to approach the negotiation 
process as much as possible from a cooperative perspective. Such an approach is 
expected to be the normal case during inspection if the Inspected State Party (ISP) 
has nothing to hide. But different situations may arise depending on the ISP’s security 
requirements or the wish to hide non-compliance with the treaty. Competitive behaviour 
would unnecessarily poison the atmosphere and thereby the process of give and take. If 
the Zone of Possible Agreement between the parties is small, and their needs are sharply 
opposed, parties will have to choose a much more dominant initial stand, from where they 
can try to use the negotiation process to come closer to each other.
Common ground between the parties in situations where CTBT violation is suspected 
will be small by definition. It will also be quite artificial. The principal, and perhaps the 
only, common interest that the ISP and the Inspection Team (IT) will have is the need 
This section on ‘Bilateral Practice’ is based on Meerts and Melamud (2014).
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(or will) to finish the inspection as fast as possible and get the IT out of the ISP’s territory. 
There might not be any overlap of interests at all. Common ground, then, will merely be 
the fact that countries will be obliged to comply with the CTBT. In other words, what 
binds them together is a legal framework, not a material need, although one might add 
to this line of reasoning that compliance is in the interest of parties involved with an eye 
to the future. All states that are parties to the treaty have a need to be protected against 
a surprise nuclear attack by any other side and they therefore see a need to stick to the 
agreements made in the framework of the CTBT. Nevertheless, there are aspects of a 
so-called ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ involved. While parties might have a long-term interest in 
compliance, they could have a short-term need to compete. Negotiations in the context 
of the CTBT are anyway by definition of a distributive nature, and hardly of an integrative 
one. Win–lose elements are dominant; the win–win axis will be quite weak and will have 
to be strengthened through the bargaining process itself.
As well as the problem of opposing interests, a second factor in table-top simulated 
bargaining is power imbalances. We can distinguish two kinds of power imbalances: 
structural; and situational. Some countries have many more power resources than others 
and it might be much more difficult to force great powers to comply than small ones. 
Smaller powers are so dependent on the bigger powers that, because of the fear of side-
punishments, they might give in to fair on-site inspections. If these minor powers create 
too many problems, however, and if the major powers see on-site inspections (OSI) in 
these countries as a priority, non-CTBT issues can be used to force a lenient attitude 
towards OSI. This means, however, that pressure would be more or less absent if the 
suspected state party is a major world power, for just as the UN Security Council can 
condemn countries’ actions, this is difficult if it concerns one of its own permanent 
members. However, even small states have a lot of situational powers in cases of on-
site inspection. After all, they control the situation on the ground and have ample room 
for manipulation, which is partly allowed by the treaty itself. The treaty is, of course, a 
compromise in itself and has some in-built constructive ambiguity, which necessitates 
reaching an agreement on the ground through negotiation between the IT and the ISP.
The third factor complicating OSI bargaining is the nature of the parties involved. This 
occurs already during the bargaining stage in the Executive Council, which is the official 
body to approve an inspection, and relates to the state requesting the inspection and the 
state that it seeks to inspect. What is their state structure, and which societal, political and 
bureaucratic culture is dominant? Does the state party have internal problems, for example 
with minorities that are a majority in the country demanding inspection? Or does the 
inspected party act as a kin-state for a minority in the country requesting the inspection 
in order to control its neighbour on illegal testing? Regimes do matter. It will be more 
difficult to inspect an unwilling authoritarian state than a democratic state. The means 
to apply pressure on a dictatorial state are far less than in cases where public opinion 
and the parliament of the state party can be pressurized. On the other hand, it will take 
more time for a democratic country to decide on its politics concerning an OSI request 
than for a democratic state structure, especially if minority rights in the inspected region 
will have to be taken into account. Another point here is the question of  (con)federalism 
or centralism. The state structure of the democratic state will also have an impact, and 
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culture of course. In societies where avoiding uncertainty is an issue, the mere demand of 
on-site inspections can be perceived as an offence and loss of face.
This issue of OSI bargaining very much concerns the people on the ground, both for 
the inspected party and within the IT. Some cultures are much more open than others, 
and this will make a substantial difference for the IT. But the IT is multi-party as well, 
being a multinational/multicultural team, whereas the ISP team is of a uniform structure 
and approach, which may contribute to power of the ISP team over the IT. Different people 
from different societal and professional cultures will have to work together and so far 
this has been one of the main problems for on-site inspections. The inspection is thus 
very much a two-level game and it might well be that internal coordination of the IT will 
pose more problems than cooperation with the host country that is the ISP. Perception 
determines reality and different views might create both synergy and miscommunication. 
Moreover, conditions on the ground might be very tough and will therefore put a lot 
of pressure on the IT. Tensions could arise, blocking effective negotiation and therefore 
efficient inspection. Inspections are not only haunted by geographic and weather 
conditions, but because of the conditions established by the CTBT, time and staff are 
limited. As a consequence, inspectors will have to deal with a lot of stressors and cultural 
divergences tend to become a major problem in stressed situations.
A fourth factor enhancing the problems of effective negotiation in an OSI context is the 
nature of the equipment to be used. This material aspect is of great importance. Without 
the instruments necessary for OSI, inspectors cannot do their work and will fail to collect 
the relevant data that may help in finding out whether there has been compliance with the 
CTBT. The instruments used are of a highly sensitive character and the ISP might oppose 
importing these machines for the inspection based on diverse reasons, reservations and 
national interpretations of the treaty provisions. Moreover, a logistical nightmare might 
arise if the infrastructure of the ISP is so weak that safe transportation of vulnerable 
machinery is made extremely difficult, particularly as the suspected test will probably 
be in a very rough and remote area. Material aspects also include the inspectors’ living 
conditions, as they are often forced to live under difficult circumstances, which can have 
a very negative impact on the atmosphere of cooperation within the IT. Moreover, the ISP 
could try to make conditions as harsh as possible.
The Nature of Negotiation in an OSI Context
Negotiations are generally characterized by four overriding dimensions. Effective 
negotiators should, in principle, avoid mixing up these dimensions, as this will distort 
their efficacy. We can compare this to playing simultaneous chess with at least four other 
players. Someone who plays simultaneous chess should not mix up the situation on one 
board with that of the others, unless this will give him certain advantages – there are 
always exceptions proving the rule. The four strata are: procedures (rules and regulations); 
processes (flow and direction); the party (including people); and the product (outcome 
and substance). The strata in turn are delimited by six boundaries: geographic borders; 
systems; needs; resources; regulators; and time.
OSI negotiations are basically of a bilateral character, although there are multilateral 
aspects involved. The IT and its host will have to deal with each other on the ground. 
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The distance between their needs and positions will therefore impact on the negotiation 
itself. It seems self-evident that the two parties will have much more problem in reaching 
agreements if their aims are polarized, or if they are involved in a distributive bilateral 
negotiation, while it will be much easier if their needs and aims converge and negotiations 
take place in an integrative environment. We might postulate that an ISP that has tested 
a nuclear device will negotiate in a much more competitive way, while a country that did 
not test such as device will be quite cooperative. This does not need to be true, however, 
as an ‘innocent’ state might still have to hide other issues – or is offended by the call for 
inspection – and will therefore be as combative as a ‘guilty’ state party.
In OSI negotiations, procedures are of utmost importance. Some of these procedures 
have been determined by the state parties that formulated the CTBT, but many of them are 
still undetermined. Post-agreement negotiations between state parties on an operational 
manual are still incomplete. Even if these negotiations were finalized, they cannot possibly 
foresee all of the practical problems that may arise during actual inspection. This implies 
that parties on the ground will have to agree to certain procedures that have not been 
foreseen. This might not only lead to practical negotiation problems about procedures 
between the IT and the ISP, but could also raise issues between the inspectors themselves 
and between the officials of the inspected states. As all of them are accountable to their 
superiors and as these superiors are mandated by their leaders, they have to operate 
in a complex multi-level, multi-actor, multi-power and multi-political context. In that 
situation, they have to set priorities. One such priority is to have agreement on workable 
conditions, thus implying that parties will have to agree on certain procedures that state 
parties did not – yet – agree on or simply did not think about. In other words, many rules 
and regulations will have to be invented on the spot. Inspectors are thus working in a 
less regulated context than we would expect. On the one hand, this creates uncertainty 
and risk. On the other hand, it creates opportunities to solve problems without external 
mingling. It is clear that the absence of solid procedural agreements will greatly hamper 
effective OSI, but a procedural bureaucratic overload would have the same negative 
impact on effectiveness. We could conclude that procedures have to be set, but should 
be flexible at the same time.
Processes within the procedural context will be highly vulnerable to distortions 
if the distance between the parties is very wide. In other words, a distributive bilateral 
negotiation will be much more difficult to handle than an integrative one. Win–lose trends 
in OSI negotiation are a threat to the mission’s success, and win–win outcomes cannot 
easily be reached. As already noted, the character of OSI tends to foster competitive 
behaviour, even if the ISP did not break the rules. Loss of face is an issue here, as well 
as national interests, as things might be found that the country does not want to show to 
the outside world. This can even be something as simple as the inadequacy of the host 
country’s bureaucrats to deal with the inspection team, or the living conditions of the 
nation’s population.
A process that is hampered by a small zone of possible agreement between the 
parties, or perhaps even the lack of such a zone, will demand excellent negotiation skills 
on both sides of the line. The need for compromise and compensation is evident. Creative 
negotiators can try to bridge the gap by exploring alternative options and acceptable half-
way solutions. They might even have to forge package deals if trade-offs are the only way 
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to create an artificial zone of overlap. Without these aqueducts, the water will not flow and 
the process will go nowhere.
To complicate matters, several processes might develop at the same time. The 
multilateral context of this basically bilateral process will generate problems, but also 
options. It adds to the complexity of the negotiation process, where actors are striving 
for practical solutions. The slow flow of the negotiation process might frustrate them and 
have an impact on the climate of the negotiation. Processes therefore have to be taken 
seriously, as they are the means that we have to materialize what we want. Too much 
focus on the end-game and not enough feeling for the process itself might be a source of 
ineffectiveness and failure.
Inspectors are not diplomats. Inspectors are professionals who want a technical job 
to be done. But in cases of obstructed negotiation processes, the skills of diplomats are 
needed. Diplomats, however, are found in headquarters, not in the field. Irritations between 
the negotiators on the ground might spoil the effectiveness of the negotiation process and 
create tensions between the parties and within the parties. Leadership is then needed, but 
leaders are – in these situations – chosen because of their professional know-how or their 
country of origin. Inspectors are also selected because of this. This does not necessarily 
turn them into people who can deal with the emotions involved in polarized negotiation 
processes. They are there to do something, not to talk endlessly and fruitlessly. Cultural 
differences become involved. People will have to struggle with a host-country culture that 
is different from their own, but also with intercultural problems within their inspection 
team. The host country has an advantage here, as their receiving team will normally be 
culturally homogeneous, not only on societal culture, but also on bureaucratic culture. 
Yet there is a positive side to the nature of the inspectors’ profession: technicians tend 
to understand each other. Professional culture often bridges the societal–cultural divide. 
Inspectors are part of teams who are steered by different parties with different interests, 
perceptions, intentions, structures and power, but these parties collide. There is also a 
moderating factor here. Parties might want to obstruct the process and have a short-term 
interest in this. However, in the long term they probably have an interest in the compliance 
of their partner states, otherwise they would not have signed and/or ratified the CTBT. We 
have the short-term/long-term dichotomy here, meaning that OSI negotiations might be 
bedevilled by prisoner’s dilemma – or even ‘chicken game’ – features. We might conclude 
here that it would be wise to have some people in the inspection teams who are versed 
in negotiation, as diplomats are, although their endless talk could also be an obstacle to 
further progress.
Product, then, is an outcome of the inspection and of the processes of entry and 
post-entry negotiation. After all, we are negotiating about substance and about issues, 
as we are aiming at certain results and solutions. Countries do not want to allow nuclear 
testing because of the threat to peace, security and stability (as well as health risks) in the 
region, and in the globalized world. In essence, there are three possible outcomes. The 
first is when the negotiations have been successful but no test has been found. As was 
noted earlier, this does not necessarily mean that a nuclear test has not been done. The 
team might simply not have found it, perhaps a question of its own (lack of) effectiveness. 
The second outcome is when the negotiations could have been partially successful: some 
things could be negotiated; some not. An imperfect outcome of the negotiation process 
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will probably have a negative impact on the inspectors’ effectiveness in finding what they 
are looking for. This is certainly true for the third possible outcome of failed negotiations. 
It is therefore absolutely vital to avoid complete failure of the OSI bargaining process, as 
this will result in the failure of the whole mission.
This point highlights the importance of successful OSI negotiations and therefore 
the importance of training inspectors for negotiation, as undertaken in regular seminars 
on negotiation techniques and table-top exercises in training for effective searches, in 
combination with negotiation strategy and tactics. We can also look at product from a 
different perspective. Table-top training is a product in itself. The fact that exercises take 
place anyway and that CTBTO staff are active in this field helps to create a CTBTO product, 
which in itself might foster efforts to create a de facto CTBTO reality. By taking action, 
the still non-formal organization gets a face and a place in the world of international 
organizations. We might therefore summarize by saying that a successful outcome of OSI 
negotiations is a prerequisite for a successful field mission.
Negotiations, and therefore OSI bargaining, are limited by several restrictive factors. 
Getting into the to-be-inspected state is the first factor. The geographic border issue 
is thus – after preparation logistics – the first step in the OSI negotiation processes. 
The state’s sovereignty is the first problem to be encountered. The tension between 
competition and cooperation in international relations very much comes to the fore in this 
first stage of the negotiation process. It is a question of control, whereby the host country 
can dominate the ‘guests’ that they will have to receive. On a positive note, the geographic 
border is a clear first benchmark, helping the inspectors to focus and therefore to deal 
with issues that might later be an obstacle if not confronted head-on at the very beginning. 
Refusal to allow the inspectors into the country will probably create international upheaval 
and can therefore be used by the inspection team as a motor to mobilize powerful CTBT 
state parties, which might then pressure the to-be-inspected country to comply. On a 
negative note, a row over the border question might reveal dissent among the CTBT 
powers and could fortify the position of an unwilling host. It might show to the world the 
second hurdle in trans-boundary bargaining: the weakness of the international system, 
both concerning states and organizations. However, it could also reveal flaws in the host 
country’s behaviour, resulting in the host country believing that it will have to put up a 
smokescreen and try to sabotage the inspection team’s entry in order to hide dirty policies 
within its own territory that are not necessarily related to the nuclear issue. It thus seems 
advisable to prioritize the entry negotiations, while keeping lines of communication to the 
home front intact in order to prevent the inspection from falling apart under international 
tensions.
On interests and needs as a problem in negotiation, we should note that a lack of 
interest by the international community will be a serious hurdle in OSI bargaining. If this 
problem cannot be overcome by political mobilization by the requesting state, the whole 
mission will be doomed. Efforts made in the preparatory diplomatic phase are therefore of 
the utmost importance. It is up to the diplomats, perhaps with some pressure from the OSI 
professionals, to prepare the ground for successful OSI negotiations. These interactions 
will be partly bilateral, but probably predominantly multilateral. The more need exists to 
take action, the better it is for the OSI team, as pressure on the potential host country will 
mount. On the other hand, if the to-be-inspected party also has a strong interest in keeping 
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the OSI at bay, the whole process of negotiation will become a nightmare. Here, a weak 
need to stop the mission is desirable, while a weak push from the international community 
could result in no inspection at all. The international community’s resources play a major 
factor if an OSI mission is to be implemented. How much power does the international 
community have over the potential host country? And how powerful is the host? It is 
clearly much easier to deal with weak states than with strong, so power differences are 
an important issue, as are the resources that the OSI team has at its disposal: good 
equipment; good expertise; good people; and good support, etc. One might conclude that 
needs and resources construct the frame in which the OSI team will have to operate, but if 
the context is not favourable, the hurdles of border and system cannot be overcome either.
Finally, there are the limitations of incomplete and insufficient rules and regulations, 
as well as shortage of time. International law is the outcome of international political 
and diplomatic negotiation processes. Depending on the states’ needs, the international 
community can or cannot lean on a strong system of international agreements. 
Power comes into play again here. Strong states might have less need for a coherent 
international multilateral framework than weaker states. This could be a serious problem 
for the inspection team, as already noted, but it also gives the IT room for manoeuvre, 
as it can avoid becoming a puppet on a string. Time is a problem by definition. In OSI 
situations, there is always a lack of time. This runs counter to one of the important lessons 
of negotiation theory and practice: enough time is of the essence in having an effective 
negotiation process in order to explore options, forge workable relationships and create an 
atmosphere of joint problem-solving. There does not appear to be a way to solve this time 
problem, apart from being well prepared in cases of a suspected nuclear test. Yet being 
well prepared is difficult as long as the international community as a whole is unwilling to 
see the CTBT process as a political and security priority and to pay the price for this. On 
a more positive note, limited time available could also pre-empt efforts to block the OSI 
mission from starting to do its job. Diplomacy has a tendency to avoid risk, so it might be 
good to surprise the diplomats and politicians with quick action, as OSI teams will have 
to speed up in cases of suspected nuclear testing. We may therefore conclude that the 
absence of strong regulations and ample time is a problem indeed, but can equally be a 
positive incentive in order to conduct a successful OSI negotiation process.
Training for On-site Inspection Negotiations
Training negotiation skills is best done by interactive means. Inspectors are nominated, 
selected and trained based primarily on their technical know-how; this usually does 
not include negotiations’ experience. To this end, the CTBTO has developed a range of 
so-called ‘table-top exercises’ as a special form of role-play to train inspectors in entry, 
field and exit negotiation.
Lecturing is of little help in enhancing insights into negotiation processes. Some 
lectures will have to be given to introduce the field of negotiation theory and practice, the 
issues and cases to be dealt with, as well as to cover the debriefing of the exercises. The 
trainer will have to confront both theory and practice; they go hand in hand. Without any 
theoretical framework, the exercises will lose their significance, and there is currently quite 
a lot of literature on negotiation. However, these introductions and debriefings can only 
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be effective if they are undertaken in an interactive way. This is all the more true for the 
sessions assessing events during the exercises. Through interaction, people will – when 
in the field – remember what they learnt in class. Lectures often go in one ear and out 
the other, but experience will be accumulated in the brain and the body. Participants will 
have to learn about themselves, their own reactions, negotiation skills, style, character 
and culture. The saying goes that it is more important – and more difficult – to understand 
your own culture than the culture of others.
This section will look first at theory and research, and will then focus on training 
methodologies and structure, exercises and simulations, and expectations: what can we 
expect from training OSI inspectors in negotiation procedures, processes, parties and 
products?
Theory on negotiation processes poses a few problems for the kind of negotiations 
with which we are dealing in CTBT OSI. There is a lot of theory on bilateral bargaining, 
but this is very much focused on private-sector issues. Bargaining between and among 
states, and moreover in a highly technical and politically sensitive environment, has not 
been studied widely. Moreover, this kind of research – if it has been done – fits very much 
in the Anglo-Saxon line of thinking, which could be difficult for inspectors from China, 
Latin America, Africa or Southern Asia to appreciate. Additionally, we are confronted 
with the problem of the so-called ‘iron circles’ – that is, researchers and theoreticians 
tend to ignore training as an area in which they might test their thinking, while the gap 
between researchers and practitioners has not effectively been bridged so far. Therefore, 
in preparing for table-top exercises and the follow-up field missions, the exercise 
constructors have to draw on their own experiences, expertise and common sense. They 
have neither many theoretical tools at their proposal, nor much research to underpin their 
simulations and games. Nevertheless, we can learn something from role-play practices 
and teaching methodologies.
A table-top exercise (TTE) is essentially a role-play in a geographical and technological 
context. It is clear that this kind of training could profit from further developments in 
serious gaming. Computer games for individual training could contribute to the TTE. At 
the same time, however, the value of direct human interaction cannot be underestimated, 
especially because of the cultural impact on OSI negotiations. For role-play and simulation, 
it is essential to package them in an educational context. A game in itself has little value 
if it is not thoroughly introduced and debriefed. In principle, an exercise should be easy 
to understand but complex in its process. Although participants have to be framed in a 
certain context, they should at the same time be their own master in the sense of having 
the necessary space to use their own expertise and creativity and to be stimulated to do 
so. Creating awareness could be seen as the main goal of the TTE, taking into account that 
the ‘students’ are usually high-level experts who might tend to overlook the human factor 
in these technical – and in the end political – processes. The system used by the staff of 
the CTBTO, a broad teaching framework encompassing a range of short exercises, has 
been proven effective on several occasions and under different circumstances.
In order to train inspectors to deal with procedures in an effective way, the first 
condition is to have good knowledge of them. Here, neither teaching nor training suffices. 
The participant will have to study the manuals. This presupposes not only a manual upon 
which the countries agree, but also a manual that is consistent and, above all, transparent. 
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As a second step, the training team will have to integrate procedural questions into the 
workshop and the exercises, while remaining aware that they should not dominate too 
much, as processes, people and product will have to get enough ‘air to breathe’. To 
navigate processes means training the inspectors in the uncertainties and opportunities 
of negotiation. A few short exercises to prepare them for the TTE will normally be very 
useful, such as a short exercise on distributive (win–lose), another on integrative (win–
win), a third on mixed (prisoner’s dilemma), a fourth on multi-party (the ‘Pentagame’ or 
‘Hexagame’) and a fifth on bilateral negotiations between delegations (two-level game). 
On ‘managing people’, some insight into the inspector’s own behaviour will have to be 
trained through a quiz on the question of the ‘effective negotiator’ (skills), negotiation 
style by means of self-assessment exercises (subconscious behaviour), non-verbal 
leaks by pointing them out on video (unconscious signalling), and culture (societal and 
professional) by means of group and class discussions. As far as ‘product’ is concerned, 
this has to covered in debriefing sessions of the TTEs themselves, where specialists point 
out the degree of closeness to reality of the agreements reached.
Short exercises of a focused nature will thus have to precede the TTE, geared to 
gaining a better understanding of specific negotiation characteristics on dimensions such 
as procedure, process, people and product. These short exercises would ideally have 
to be ‘loaded’ with content that is relevant to the inspectors, as the aim is ultimately 
to make inspectors aware of their own strengths and weaknesses. These one- or two-
week interactive seminars are very relevant both for recent and experienced inspectors. 
Indeed, the higher the level of the participants, the higher the level of the seminar. 
These programmes can only be run successfully by CTBTO experts, preferably staff who 
work on the issues on a daily basis and have had an opportunity to train themselves by 
repeatedly organizing workshops and seminars like these, in combination with outsiders 
who have a good eye for human behaviour and the intricacies of negotiation. For trainers 
and organizers, a sound intuition for the political environment of CTBT issues is of great 
additional value in order to avoid political hiccups, which are the greatest threat to a 
successful training programme.
CTBTO Table-Top Exercises: What Are They About?
As the CTBT OSI regime was studied and exercised after the establishment of the 
Preparatory Commission for CTBT, it became clear that negotiations are going to be 
conducted on a daily basis and on different levels between IT and ISP personnel. This led 
to the understanding that negotiation is yet another, additional, tool for the inspectors to 
use during an inspection. Since the primary criterion for selecting experts as members of 
an inspection team is their scientific expertise, it also became clear that they should be 
trained in the use of negotiation techniques.
Unlike other organizations that have an ongoing routine inspections’ regime including 
an in-house inspectorate that can be called in for training any time, the CTBT inspection 
regime does not include such mechanisms. There is thus a need to study and experience 
the negotiation environment and strategy of the inspection team through exercises (like 
other inspection parameters). The CTBTO’s Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) has 
conducted such exercises and training through the years as table-top exercises conducted 
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in the office or a field simulation of the inspection process. Integrative Field Exercise 
IFE08 was the first major OSI exercise during which negotiations between the IT and the 
ISP were conducted under an almost realistic scenario. The issue of OSI negotiations 
was studied previously through a scenario-based table-top exercise that was planned to 
reveal specific negotiation road-blocks that may occur during an OSI.
The difference between TTE and diplomatic role-play (DRP) has to do with the use 
of maps as a focal point in TTE. TTE comes close to so-called ‘geofiction’: a simulation 
exercise in a non-existing geographical framework. The fundamental difference between 
the two is the reality factor. TTE tries to get as close to reality as possible, but uses a 
‘fantasy’ map in order to avoid political problems. Geofiction does not care too much 
about reality, as it tries to cater for creativity, not for technical experiments. Nonetheless, 
technical aspects are most important, as options and alternatives have to be discussed as 
a possible solution to a stand-off.
In TTEs, the variant of strong opposing views and scarce connecting middle ground 
is the preferred option, first because it will be close to reality, and second because a 
test under extremist circumstances will be more useful than a moderate laboratory 
situation. From the point of view of training, it is also a better opportunity for the trainees 
to experience and study such cases in a non-field environment in order to avoid other 
pressures that are part of field life.
A TTE may be conducted over a few days, in which the participants have to study 
the material provided, ‘conduct’ simulated activities, view and analyze results, build a 
good team atmosphere, and write reports and recommendations. Time compression 
hence needs to be applied to fit inspection days into the exercise time-frame, so each 
calendar day of the exercise may cover approximately two to three inspection days. This 
compression poses some practical problems, because administrative activities – such as 
writing reports – occupies real time that cannot be effectively compressed.
The exercise team members are selected so that the team will mirror the complete 
IT’s composition as much as possible, including the IT’s leader and sub-team leaders. The 
team is provided with a dedicated room containing all of the required facilities, including 
a network of computers with a station for each sub-team and for the team leadership.
The team conducts its work independently within general time-lines that are determined 
and controlled by the control team. At the end of each exercise day, a debriefing session is 
conducted by the control team with all of the participants.
Although the control team is not supposed to interfere with the conduct of the 
‘inspection’ as proposed by the IT, the actual conduct of the exercise is based on a strict 
timetable with carefully planned injected events, in order to utilize the available time and 
to accomplish results. Planned time pressure is also imposed on the IT, so that at times it 
has to end segments of activities within a required time-frame, whether the goals are fully 
achieved or not. The exercise process is complicated, as the participants have to operate 
in a compressed time-frame on many occasions. While field activities are not actually 
conducted, the time for any phase of the inspection is compressed. Time compression 
is required because of the resources provided for a training activity, although – as 
already noted – many actions, such as decision-making or report-writing, can hardly be 
conducted in a reduced time-scale. This creates pressure and requires participants to 
finish some tasks in an unrealistically short time. For some of the tasks, however, the 
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allotted time-span can be extended, based on the control team’s decision about the 
importance of the specific inspection stage. The control team supervises the inspection 
timetable by issuing messages to all participants about the clock and date change to 
indicate the progress of inspection time.
A scenario-based TTE environment is a safe setting in which the requirements of the 
field activity can be anticipated and simulated. It is the most effective way, in addition to 
the actual field exercise, to prepare participants for the OSI process. The scenario of the 
exercise is aimed at exercising specific or all inspection phases, such as preparation of 
the initial inspection plan, point-of-entry (POE) procedures, negotiations with the ISP, 
inspection activities, or report writing.
A main scenario is developed by the control team in two parts: one for the IT; and 
one for the ISP. The ISP’s scenario includes details known only to the ISP, which will 
influence its conduct and cooperation with the IT. All background official documentation 
is prepared by the control team and attached to the scenario, including relevant maps. 
A series of case studies and special tasks are developed to cover all periods and phases 
of the inspection process to be played during the specific TTE. Special events, such as 
weather reports, accidents, failures of equipment, etc., and data to represent information 
collected by the IT are also prepared by the control team and will be injected into the main 
flow of the TTE at selected occasions.
The daily routine of the exercise, as supervised by the control team, includes 
presentation of the case-study by the control team to all participants; allocation of time for 
preparation and study, followed by decision-making and simulated activities; interaction 
of the IT with the ISP, as required; interaction with the control team; and daily team 
debriefings.
During all of the case studies, the way of working within the IT is basically the 
same. During the first preparation round, the IT leadership, supported by its team, tries 
to identify the main issues/problems of the specific scenario. Possible strategies for 
negotiations are then discussed, and these strategies are based as much as possible on a 
‘scientific approach’. During the ongoing negotiations, the IT – as well as the ISP – retires 
for deliberations whenever it seems necessary. Nominated rapporteurs collect comments 
during the exercise and summarize them into one IT report. This report is presented and 
discussed during the final session on the last day of the TTE.
The methods and techniques of the TTEs draw from military experience. Armies 
conduct such exercises with actual maps and simulated enemy in order to study actual 
plans for possible future activities without the need to mobilize battalions and regarding 
areas that are on enemy territory. It is recognized that CTBT OSI activity is in many ways 
similar to a military manoeuvre, and therefore the idea of using TTEs arose in a natural 
way. TTEs were also conducted in a bilateral format before the conclusion of the CTBT 
between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to study modalities and problems 
with the process.
CTBTO Table-Top Exercises: What Happened and Why?
The first TTE conducted by the CTBTO’s PTS occurred in 1999 in order to study the OSI 
process. More than 40 national experts from ten states that were signatories to the CTBTO 
participated in this TTE, functioning as either the IT or ISP, and many observers from 
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other states followed the exercise. The second TTE conducted by the PTS was aimed 
at studying the functioning of the Operations Support Centre for on-site inspections, 
with fifteen participants from ten states. These exercises were conducted in the Vienna 
International Centre.
The third exercise (TTE-3 in 2003) was dedicated to case studies focused on the 
negotiation processes during an OSI. TTE-3 was based on an overall scenario describing 
an OSI situation, as triggered by a request from an imaginary state party. The exercise 
included seven case studies of specific negotiation situations that may occur during 
an OSI, involving sixteen experts from twelve states, and was hosted by the Russian 
Federation and conducted in an institute near the town of Snezhinsk in the Urals. The 
exercise was planned and managed by a control team (CT) that also participated as the 
ISP team during the exercise. The IT was composed of selected experts nominated by 
states signatories. Half a day was dedicated for each of the seven case studies, including 
the role-play and a debriefing session at the end of each case. The balance between 
the use of OSI technological expertise and negotiation processes under the treaty’s 
provisions was a main objective of the TTE-3. Negotiation and technical skills were 
exercised and technical solutions were reached by varying negotiation methods. The 
importance and complementarity of both aspects was highlighted during the exercise. 
Proficient negotiating was recognized as an important tool that needs appropriate training 
to support it just as much as other inspection activities.
The special issues of the seven case studies mainly covered problems of access created 
by limitations imposed by the ISP. The technical details of each case, which were irrelevant 
to the next case study, were put aside, but the experience and lessons learned about 
behaviour and the methodology of negotiating access to an ISP were utilized. Together 
with the evaluators and observers, participants discussed these lessons immediately after 
each case study.
The conspicuous use of such immediate lessons was evident already after the first 
case study, which was an example of a strong positional negotiation style based on the 
decision of the nominated team leader. The negotiation process became confrontational 
at some points and caused a change in the participants’ behaviour into more cooperative 
conduct for later case studies.
The case included managing access by the ISP to a military training area, especially 
to the boundaries of a restricted access site (RAS). As time is of the essence for some 
inspection technologies, especially for seismic measurements, and referring to its rights 
provided by the CTBT, the IT tried to gain access to at least the boundaries of the RAS 
earlier than the planned end of the military exercise as declared by the ISP. The ISP’s 
minimum suggestions of two escorted IT members to visit the RAS boundary and the 
explanation that full access would be granted at a later time were refused by the IT as 
unsatisfactory. The IT’s leadership for this case nominated two members of the IT as legal 
advisers, who conducted intricate legal discussions on treaty provisions with the ISP. After 
long, and occasionally very confrontational, negotiations between the IT and the ISP, no 
agreement was reached; nor was access to the RAS boundaries concluded.
The second case study dealt with over-flight issues. The over-flight, which is a CTBT 
obligatory activity, introduced the problematic of transparency. Whereas the IT’s wish is 
to view quickly most of the inspection area by sending a visual inspection team on an 
aircraft, the ISP has its reservations about viewing some areas that are not relevant and 
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where a major military exercise is being conducted. This was a good example of how 
integrative negotiations – combined with technical skills, as well as readiness by the IT 
and the ISP to accept ‘out of the box’ solutions to overcome limitations exceeding CTBT 
regulations – can create a ‘win–win’ situation. The negotiation process was accomplished 
by breaking up the problem into smaller issues and starting with the easiest problem, 
before continuing with more complicated problems. At the same time, building mutual 
confidence showed that this approach gives the best results.
Another case study dealt with a secret construction site that is not related to a possible 
nuclear explosion site, but the IT cannot clarify this fact without some sort of access being 
allowed.
Yet another case covered gaining entry to uranium mines that happen to be inside the 
inspection area as defined by the mandate of the inspection team. These mines belong 
to a private company, so there is a legal lengthy procedure that the ISP needs to conduct 
even in cases when it wants to help the inspectors to enter the mine for inspection; for 
the IT, any delay may look, of course, like an effort by the ISP to hide or cover up illicit 
activity. This case illustrated that even with the most willing ISP, inspection activities 
may be restricted because of health and safety concerns, or long legal procedures to 
allow inspection activities conducted on private property. In a logical continuation of 
previous case studies, the IT again divided the overall negotiation package into a set of 
sub-packages, which were negotiated in a logical order or at the time when a specific 
situation arose. Some unusual technical proposals were also made leading to agreement 
on modalities for continuing the inspection.
As the exercises proceeded, the participants learned the importance of avoiding 
confrontational situations and the value of break-out discussions by experts on 
a specific technical issue, or by the two team leaders on their own, without their full 
team’s participation. The lessons learned from the case studies illustrated that, in order 
to achieve the best results from an inspection, the IT has to conduct negotiations in a 
clear, focused, positive and friendly manner in order to enhance cooperation and may 
shrewdly utilize ‘external pressure’, for example by reporting to the Director-General at 
headquarters, when required. The first case study’s failure made it clear that the IT should 
minimize legalistic debates over interpretations of the treaty’s text, and recitation of the 
other party’s duties, etc. Discussions that are focused on technical and operational issues 
are more likely to be resolved to the IT’s satisfaction. The overarching lessons learned 
from TTE-3 illustrate that the IT depends very much on the cooperation of the ISP, because 
the ISP has ultimate control over what the IT may or may not do.
The CTBTO’s next TTE, with 21 participants from 21 states, was conducted in Vienna 
and was focused on a specific phase of the inspection, namely the transition from the 
initial to continuation period. This phase demands negotiations that are both internal to 
the IT and external with the ISP.
A special exercise was conducted as part of the training cycle for the experts due to 
participate in the major OSI exercise that was conducted in September 2008 (IFE08, as 
mentioned earlier). This TTE covered the entire inspection process and was preceded by 
training on soft skills such as negotiations, team-building and decision-making, in which 
24 participants from fifteen states and the PTS participated. After a training session on 
leadership and negotiation aspects, they participated in a four-day TTE that covered the 
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full inspection process (IC-15, from 14–17 October 2008). The 24 trainees were divided 
into two inspection teams, which played the same scenario specially designed for this 
exercise. The ISP role was played by the same experts for the two ITs. Results at each step 
were compared during a joint daily debriefing. It was interesting to see how the working 
methods and atmosphere were different in the two teams, based on the team leader’s 
personality and experience, and on the personal composition of each team. Nonetheless, 
the final results of the TTEs were very similar for the two teams.
TTEs are being used routinely as part of the OSI regime that has been developed by 
the CTBTO and also as part of different training activities conducted by the organization. 
The TTE-3 in the Urals included a few cases simulating OSI negotiations, and more TTEs 
have been conducted since then as part of the development of the CTBT’s OSI regime and 
the CTBTO’s training process. A special TTE was also conducted outside of the CTBTO in 
a very special setting.
In order to embark on a book on CTBT(O) negotiations, the PIN program of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) organized a conference in 
June 2009 in Laxenburg, Austria, to discuss different contributions to the proposed book 
(Melamud, Meerts and Zartman, 2013). In order to give the participants to the conference 
a good idea of the CTBTO problematique on the ground, the authors of the particular 
chapter on OSI (Meerts and Melamud 2013) presented their classic TTE to their colleagues 
and organized it with them. This was a special moment in the conference, when all of the 
participants were suddenly drawn into the subject through interaction, and also helped to 
create an even more cooperative atmosphere.
The conference members were divided into two delegations: one representing the IT; 
the other the ISP. Instructions were given to both the teams, as well as to the individual 
members of the delegations. Both parties had a team leader plus a number of ‘experts’, 
while the chapter’s authors acted as game masters and observers. After 45 minutes of 
preparations (or rather, internal negotiations), in which heated internal debates took 
place, notably in the IT, external negotiations lasted for another 45 minutes, followed 
by 45 minutes debriefing and discussions. In the middle part – the actual negotiation 
process – the two teams of twelve people each declared their positions and demands, 
and exchanged arguments and exhibits. This bilateral process of negotiation could be 
characterized as quite distributive, like haggling at the marketplace, although using 
diplomatic terminology.
It was a polarized and tense exchange of views, which could even be described as 
emotional: an IT that was short of time; and an ISP buying time. The heads of delegation 
were chosen by the game masters in view of their experience and knowledge. It was 
expected that both would have enough of a ‘helicopter view’ to produce a realistic and 
interesting process, and so they did. Ambassador Jaap Ramaker from the Netherlands, 
who had been the last chair of the CTBT negotiations in Geneva from 1993–1996, headed 
the ISP team, and Rebecca Johnson of the United Kingdom, Director of the Acronym 
Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, opposed him as head of delegation of the CTBTO’s 
IT – two different temperaments with equal subject knowledge and negotiation skills. 
A very intriguing – and probably extremely realistic – process unfolded, which was a 
learning experience for the participants, observers and the game masters.
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Although the teams were asked to avoid procedural discussions and to focus on the 
subject matter as much as possible, more than half of the negotiation time was lost because 
of a prolonged procedural struggle. A ‘fight’ over the explanation and interpretation of 
things that were or were not allowed during the upcoming inspection period dominated 
the first half of the negotiation and bedevilled the second half. This was not coincidental; 
everybody recognized it as a strategy used by the ISP, and the flow of the bargaining 
process clearly showed that it was extremely difficult for the IT to break through the ISP’s 
defences. The rules and regulations of the CTBTO and its Manual – which is still under 
consideration in reality – clearly give the high ground to the state to be inspected. It is 
thus quite easy for the ISP to use procedural issues to postpone discussions on content.
This avoidance strategy provoked escalation, which did not really foster an integrative 
bargaining process. While the ISP had a pulling strategy from the start, the IT had – because 
of its time problem – no choice but to implement a pushing approach. In this situation, it 
was more difficult for the ‘offensive’ party to stay balanced than for the ‘defensive’ party. 
Positional bargaining characterized the process, although some useful integrative aspects 
were inserted into the second half of the interaction by a group of experts of both parties, 
which had reached agreement on a few important issues during their break-out session. 
Being experts, so not being too bothered by the political process enfolding between 
the two teams, it was not too difficult to bridge some rifts. Obviously, the back-channel 
negotiations did not suffer from the loss-of-face problems with which the delegations in 
the ‘plenary’ session noted above were confronted. However, these positive results forged 
by the expert group could not (yet) turn the negotiation process into a problem-solving 
process. Slowly but surely, the issue-specific power of the IT shifted to the ISP, with no 
substantial results at the end of the bargaining process.
The lesson from this section is therefore that the CTBTO’s rules and regulations do 
not – at least not in the context of this TTE – allow for enough space for the inspection 
team to have a successful negotiation on on-site inspection with the inspected state party.
MULTILATERAL LESSONS FOR PRACTICE3
Post-agreement negotiation was extensively dealt with in the book Getting it Done, 
edited by Bertram Spector and William Zartman (Spector and Zartman, 2003), which 
provides us with interesting lessons for theory and practice, foremost on stability. With 
this book in mind, a simulation was created to test the impact of process, stages and 
stakeholders, as three of the five stability factors mentioned in the book (Spector, 2003: 
272–292). The occasion for this simulation was the tenth anniversary of the creation of the 
OPCW, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Krutzsch and Trapp, 
1999; Yepes-Enríquez and Tabassi, 2002; Kenyon and Feakes, 2007). The Nobel Peace 
Prize 2013 was awarded to the OPCW for its work on the monitoring and destruction 
This section on ‘Multilateral Lessons’ is based on Meerts (2007), with the 
support of Wilbur Perlot.
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of chemical weapons. Its role in the Syrian crisis can be seen as a catalyst for this 
decision by the Norwegian Nobel Committee. At this anniversary conference, 70 chemical 
weapons experts – participants in the jubilee academic conference, whether diplomats or 
scientists – played a tailor-made, future-oriented, negotiation exercise to raise awareness 
about the impact of multilateral negotiation processes. In addition, the game served to 
speculate on likely outcomes of such processes in the coming five years on the basis of 
carefully designed realistic scenarios.
The game, like reality, reflected the struggle among nations in defence of their national 
interests, striving to create the common good of the collective interest as they go along. 
The exercise functioned as a vehicle to deal with global political complexity on a security 
issue of utmost concern to the world as a whole. Participants, diplomats and academic 
experts in the field bargained in five parallel workshops, where they represented six 
OPCW member states, one from each continent: the United States of America; Brazil; 
South Africa; China; Russia; and France. These countries were selected on the basis of 
their regional distribution and their relevance to the OPCW. They can also be perceived 
as representing the position of other states, which could not participate in the exercise as 
more than six parties creates unsolvable complexity and thereby destroys the game. The 
topics to be discussed were seen among experts as relevant to the OPCW in the coming 
decade. Just as in reality, national and collective interests had to be balanced within the 
framework of an already existing regime, based on a legal framework.
The negotiations were based on a fact-sheet consisting of twenty contentious sentences 
of a single diplomatic text. In theory, these were the bracketed parts of a simulated single 
text. Parentheses were shown, and agreed text was left out. Participants had to decide 
whether a sentence would be included in the text (see Table 1 below). Each sentence was 
connected to value points, which indicated the priority of that part of the diplomatic text 
to the state represented in the table. The scores therefore naturally differ per country, 
while the texts are identical for all delegations. The game is, of course, an abstraction: 
first, because there are many other countries with many different opinions; and second, 
because the positions of countries in certain discussions have to be estimated and this 
is not necessarily in line with reality. Input by OPCW experts over a six-month period did, 
however, guarantee that substance came as close to reality as playable.
Substance
The following issues were under discussion:
• Destruction of chemical weapons after 2012: According to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), all chemical weapons declared by the states parties have to be 
destroyed no later than ten years after the CWC came into force – that is, by 29 April 
2007. The deadline can be extended by a maximum of five years, but there are no 
provisions for any further extension. The OPCW will have to find a solution if, as is 
likely, chemical weapons’ destruction by some states parties will not be completed by 
29 April 2012, in the absence of a clear-cut prescription in the CWC. Decisions need 
to be taken on a possible role for the UN, the setting of a new deadline, permanent 
inspection of the remaining storage facilities and subsidies for the destruction of 
chemical weapons by CWC states parties.
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• Universality, international cooperation and assistance: Universal adherence is a core 
principle of the CWC. Experience from an OPCW Action Plan to promote universality 
has shown that some states face political and technical hurdles (such as enacting 
legislation and establishing a national authority) before they can pass ratification/
accession through their parliament. The CWC also contains mechanisms to attract 
states to join it, including promises for enhanced international cooperation in such 
areas as chemical defence or other peaceful uses of chemistry. On the other hand, 
it makes regulations/restrictions for exports of scheduled chemicals to non-parties. 
The OPCW planned to decide on trade sanctions regarding exports of Schedule 3 
chemicals to non-CWC parties, but it was not agreed upon. Decisions need to be made 
on sentences dealing with stopping exports of Schedule 3 chemicals to countries that 
did not ratify the CWC, which should be offered assistance for capacity-building, and 
states parties should have access to protective equipment and technology, and a High 
Commissioner for Universality should be appointed.
• Industry: The focus of OPCW inspections has so far been on chemical weapons’ 
destruction (75 per cent of inspection resources). As chemical weapons’ destruction 
progresses, more attention is being paid to industry inspections. The following 
categorization of chemicals plays an important role: Schedule 1 includes high-risk 
chemicals with very few legitimate uses. There are restrictions on production, uses 
and trade, and there is systematic verification; Schedule 2 are medium-risk chemicals, 
for which there is modest industrial production, with regular on-site inspections; and 
Schedule 3 are low-risk chemicals, basic industrial products with many applications 
and large production volumes, for which there are random inspections.
In addition, chemical plants producing certain organics (so-called ‘other chemical 
production facilities’ – OCPFs) are covered under a random inspection scheme, because 
some of them (perhaps 10 per cent) can be used for the production of scheduled 
chemicals. The CWC uses a number of concepts for the selection of chemical plant 
sites for inspection, including unpredictability, risk to the CWC, equitable geographical 
distribution, and – for OCPFs – also information available to the Technical Secretariat 
and proposals by states parties (based on principles yet to be agreed upon). Decisions 
have to be made on the number of inspections, geographical spread of the inspections 
and possible sanctions against companies that refuse to be inspected. It is also 
possible to decide that no changes are needed.
• Challenge Inspections: Challenge inspections (CI) are a CWC mechanism to resolve 
concerns about non-compliance. A CI can be requested by a state party anywhere on 
the territory of another state party (irrespective of whether the location was declared, 
undeclared, military, civilian, or secret), at any time, on short notice, and there is 
no right of refusal. The Executive Council can block a CI, but only if the request is 
frivolous, abusive, or outside the scope of the CWC. The ISP is under an obligation 
to provide access to the challenged facility; it can manage access in order to protect 
secrets that are unrelated to chemical weapons. CIs have not yet been invoked and 
states parties instead use bilateral mechanisms to clarify non-compliance concerns. 
Decisions need to be taken on making CIs a regular feature starting this year, on the 
evidence needed to ask for a CI, and whether or not CIs are a measure of last resort. 
It can also be decided that CIs will not be mentioned in the final text.
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• Organizational Issues: The CWC requires states parties to implement a range of 
measures in support of CWC implementation (national authority, legislation and 
regulations, standing arrangements for inspections including two-year multiple-entry 
visas, and declarations on a range of matters). There have been severe delays by some 
states parties in implementing these measures. At the same time, some states parties 
have been slow in reaching out to their industrial, scientific and technical communities 
to explain the CWC’s requirements. Decisions need to be taken on possible sanctions 
against state parties not granting two-year standing visas for inspectors, publication 
of a CWC summary, nor publishing codes of conduct. Also in this section, it is possible 
to conclude that no changes are needed.
Rules of the game
Words and points were fixed, but they could be traded and interpreted. As perceptions 
were different, based as they were on country instructions and individual assessments, 
competition and cooperation ensued, and their collision created different negotiated 
realities. Some sentences were mutually exclusive – for example, how can ‘Challenge 
Inspections must become a regular feature starting this year already’ logically speaking 
go together with ‘Challenge Inspections should not be mentioned in our final single text’? 
Some other sentences could clearly be combined in packages. However, the hottest 
discussions in the negotiations were on issues where some parties were of the opinion 
that combinations could be made, while others contended that it was not in their interest 
to have these trade-offs. As we will see later, this resulted in different outcomes in different 
groups. All of the delegations representing the same country in different negotiation 
forums (multiple OPCWs, so to say), sometimes represented by one and sometimes 
represented by two negotiators, had identical instructions. However, as the people were 
different in character and skills, and as the chemistry in each sham ‘OPCW’ varied, these 
multilateral negotiation processes produced different outcomes.
The value points formed the participants’ mandate (see Table 1). Participants could 
only see their own mandate and not the mandate of the other countries. We can now easily 
see that for the United States, ‘OPCW will appoint a High Commissioner for Universality’ 
is more important than for China, but the actors in the simulation had to find out by using 
arguments. Mentioning the points, or showing them, was in principle not allowed. The 
only exception was the chairman, who knew every mandate. This also reflects reality, in 
which the chair prepares the meeting thoroughly and discusses the different topics with 
the delegations. Values ranged from 40 points plus to 40 points minus, an indication of the 
importance of certain sentences. The United States, Russia and China could earn and lose 
more points than Brazil, South Africa and France, since they have more at stake. Not all of 
the countries are equal, and the points give a more or less realistic picture of the positions 
of countries, although of course in an extremely simplistic manner.
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Table 1 Total Matrix and Optimal Solution
Optimal solution USA Russia China South 
Africa
Brazil France OPCW
DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
AFTER 2012
       
Should be considered by the UN if not comple-
ted by 2012
25 20 15 -5 -5 20 70
Destruction will still be possible until 2017 40 20 -15 -5 -5 10 45
Only with permanent inspection team 
presence at all remaining chemical weapons 
storage facilities (CWSFs)
-30 -30 5 20 10 0 -25
CWC states parties will subsidize the destruc-
tion of chemical weapons where needed
15 40 15 -5 15 10 90
UNIVERSALITY, INTERNATIONAL CO-
OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE
       
Countries that did not ratify will not receive 
schedule-3 chemicals anymore
-30 5 5 -20 0 10 -30
Countries that did not ratify should be offered 
assistance for capacity-building
20 10 10 30 20 15 105
State parties will have full access to chemical 
weapons’ protective equipment and 
technology
5 15 20 30 20 5 95
OPWC will appoint a High Commissioner for 
Universality
30 10 0 -10 10 20 60
INDUSTRY        
The number of on-site inspections of chemical 
industries will be doubled
30 -10 -15 -25 -10 5 -25
Inspections of chemical industries are to be 
spread evenly over all member states
20 10 -20 -30 -20 5 -35
Refusal to be inspected will be followed by 
sanctions against companies
25 -15 -25 -30 -15 0 -60
No changes are needed -10 10 10 10 5 15 40
CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS        
Challenge inspections must become a regular 
feature starting this year already
10 -25 -30 -40 0 30 -55
Challenge inspections are only allowed if 
there is enough evidence at hand
-20 5 25 25 15 -20 30
Challenge inspections are a last resort only to 
be applied in extreme cases
-5 15 25 25 15 -10 65
Challenge inspections should not be men-
tioned in our final single text
-30 10 -10 25 0 -40 -45
OPCW ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES        
Sanctions should be imposed against state 
parties not granting two-year standing visas 
for inspectors
10 -10 -30 -40 -10 0 -80
Parties should widely publish a CWC summary 
in chemical labs and industry
40 20 10 -5 0 10 75
Parties should publish model codes of pro-
fessional conduct to ensure compliance with 
CWC
40 0 5 0 0 15 60
No changes are needed -30 -10 0 20 20 -25 -25
         
TOTAL 180 165 120 90 90 90 735
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As already mentioned, participants had to negotiate the future of the OPCW on the basis 
of their different instructions. They were free to accept any outcome as long as it was 
within their mandate, meaning that overall they had to score zero points or more. After 
all, successful international negotiations can be described as a process in which the sum 
at the end should be greater than the parts. In other words, by fighting over national 
interests, the international result is created. The harder the fight, the less likely it becomes 
that the multilateral interest will be the winner. In the OPCW game, the result for the 
organization is calculated by the sum of the total of each country at the end of the game. 
Table 1 shows the optimal solution, the best result for the OPCW, but as we will see later, 
only one of the five groups playing the game reached this optimal solution. In the optimal 
solution, a total of eleven decisions are taken (marked in bold in the table above).
Perception determines reality. How participants deal with their own mandate is one 
thing, but how they perceive the other’s mandate is quite another. It is difficult to be 
satisfied with one’s own result if others seem to gain more, and of course the other way 
around. Concessions are easier to make when the feeling exists that everyone have to 
make painful choices. Sensitivity for the signals of other players can influence the flow of 
the game immensely, both positively and negatively. On the one hand, ‘winning’ becomes 
easier; on the other hand, the signals might distract from what really matters, one’s own 
outcome and that of the OPCW. It is possible that in the given time of 90 minutes of actual 
negotiations, no outcome is possible in the game, not because anyone was actually below 
zero, but because of a feeling of relative deprivation. In the case of the OPCW, every group 
had an outcome, but the struggle between the different countries was clearly not the 
same for each group, as we will see later.
Processes and Outcomes
The five groups were negotiating in different spaces, which were parallel and independent 
from each other. In group II, the chairman asked every country to state their position within 
the category ‘Destruction of Chemical Weapons after 2012’. Starting the round with South 
Africa, delegations varied little. South Africa and Russia, for example, only mentioned two 
of the four sentences explicitly. Russia said nothing about ‘only with permanent inspection 
team presence at all remaining chemical weapons storage facilities’, which was very 
important to them, considering the minus 30 in their mandate. The full position of Russia 
on this sentence did not become clear until the very last moment, allowing the United 
States to do the work of keeping the sentence out of the declaration.
In later rounds, the participants’ openness increased. The cards came out onto the 
table, and possibilities for consensus became visible. This was further enhanced by an 
excellent chairman, who in his summaries after every round only focused on positive 
statements. He closed discussion on certain sentences, avoiding a situation in which all is 
decided when everything is decided, or an all-or-nothing discussion. Although in theory 
it is possible for a country to come back on a single decision before the negotiations 
are closed, in reality this is difficult to do without losing a great amount of respect and 
prestige.
The atmosphere during the negotiations in group I was constructive. There was no 
conflict between the United States, China and Russia. This may have been caused by the 
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fact that the United States seemed distracted, and lacked a clear strategy. Russia and 
China had the impression that they were doing quite well in the negotiations and strong 
statements were not necessary. Whether deliberate or not, at the end of the game the 
Americans had everything perfectly under control. By scoring 180 points, they not only 
had the second best result of the five USAs, but the group as a whole had reached the 
optimal solution. The results for the OPCW were at its maximum with 735 points. The 
results of all the different groups can be seen in Table 2 below.
Table 2 Results of the Different Groups
Group USA Russia China South 
Africa
Brazil France OPCW Number of 
decisions
I 140 145 135 95 95 80 690 10
II 180 165 120 90 90 90 735 11
III 160 140 110 70 80 100 660   9
IV 230 165 85 35 60 100 675 13
V 145 130 80 80 70 70 575   8
Group I took one decision less than the optimal solution. It could not come to an agreement 
on ‘destruction will still be possible until 2017’. Group III could also not reach consensus 
on this sentence and also excluded from the text ‘challenge inspections are only allowed 
if there is enough evidence at hand’. Group V took the fewest decisions and got the worst 
result for the OPCW as a whole. In comparison to the optimal solution, group V could 
not reach consensus on ‘should be considered by the UN if not completed for 2012’, ‘the 
OPCW will appoint a High Commissioner for Universality’ and ‘challenge inspections are 
only allowed when there is enough evidence at hand’. Finally, group IV took two decisions 
more than the optimal. It made the eleven decisions, as identified, but also included from 
the category Industry that ‘the number of on-site inspections of chemical industries will be 
doubled’ and ‘inspections of chemical industries are to be spread evenly over all member 
states’. It did this while also concluding ‘no changes are necessary’ in the same category.
The differences between the groups are striking. The amount of time was the same for 
each group, as well as preparation time. The groups were similar in composition, showing 
a balance in diplomats and scientists. There was still, however, a difference of 90 points 
between the United States in group I and the United States in group IV. The same groups 
also saw the strongest difference between South Africa (95 and 35 respectively), China 
(135 and 85 respectively) and Brazil (95 and 60 respectively). From this, it is easy to 
conclude that the United States was very dominant in group IV. A participant from group 
IV commented that ‘the US was really absorbed in their role and was very strong’. It might 
also be concluded that South Africa was relatively weak in this group. At some point, the 
group was even below 0, and only by taking out ‘challenge inspections must become a 
regular feature’ did they reach 35 points.
Group IV took thirteen decisions and actually took two decisions that were illogical 
in the eyes of the makers of the game. This is by no means a bad thing. Many multilateral 
negotiations end with a declaration that has somewhat contradictory sentences. That 
this is not a good thing for the OPCW is reflected in the points, which are lower than the 
optimal solution. What is more interesting is why this happened, since it was not necessary 
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for participants to get a result above 0. In fact, it pushed China, South Africa and Brazil 
much lower, Russia remained the same, France was marginally better off, leaving only the 
United States as the real benefactor and probably also as propagator.
In group V it is remarkable that only eight decisions were taken. Here it seems that 
South Africa was strong. As the only country opposing a High Commissioner, it was also 
the only country to profit from the decision, but the group should have exchanged it with 
the sentence about evidence on challenge inspections. Everybody would then have been 
better off. That such an exchange was not made, perhaps because of time pressure, shows 
that decisions are not always rational, or perhaps it is better to call it bounded rationality 
and rational ignorance (Van der Linde 2005: 244). On the basis of the information to the 
negotiators, the participants made the most rational decision available to them, just as in 
reality, people judge on the basis of personality, culture, perceptions and group process 
whether they can be satisfied by a certain outcome.
The role of the chairman is of great importance. Not surprisingly, the chairman of 
group II (which had the optimal solution) said that it had been rather pleasant for him. 
The chairman of group V, meanwhile, said that group V first did the ‘easy ones’ and then 
the ‘difficult ones’, which might explain why the trade-off between sentences was difficult 
to do.
Comparable Games
In recent years, some more of these number-games have been developed. One authentic 
one simulated a European Union Council Working Group trying to reach consensus on 
six issues concerning an external crisis in the Mediterranean (Meerts, 2009d: 656–657 
and 661–662). Participants who see six boxes, each of five issues, perceive six possible 
outcomes: one in each box. Those who think outside the box, however, will find nine to 
twelve possible decisions. The greater the number of in-between outcomes, the better 
the individual scores of the countries, as well as the collective score of the European 
Union. By negotiating individual interests, the countries are deciding upon the collective 
value of the European Union. In this so-called ‘Pentagame’, the five delegations drafting a 
single ‘text’ were France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and Sweden, with Sweden 
as the spoiler in a clearly biased situation, as different countries had different stakes 
and could therefore expect very different individual results – unequal but fair. In other 
words, an equal outcome would not be the most effective result for the European Union 
as a whole. As the countries’ stakes are different, so should be their rewards. As a six-
country modification, this version was used to prepare British and Finnish diplomats and 
civil servants for the EU rotating Presidencies of their respective countries. Variants were 
also created in which this problem was dealt with in the context of the United Nations 
Security Council, with the actors being China, France, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. In the NATO Defence College, a complete make-over 
was created by having six countries negotiate on a crisis in the fictitious island of Janubia, 
while simplified versions with fewer actors and fewer issues were also made available.
In order to train Iranian diplomats at the School of International Relations (SIR) of the 
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a variation on the Caspian Sea was initiated, in which 
the Caspian’s five littoral states were haggling on five issues ranging from the legal states 
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of this sea/lake to energy, pollution, security and shipping. A total of 60 young attachés 
played the game in six parallel groups, with two people per delegation. One interesting 
outcome was that those who saw that Iran’s interests were met by others’ concessions at 
a later stage of the game created good outcomes for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Those 
who did not see the trade-offs and were stubborn in serious negotiations at the beginning 
of the exercise did not score well for their country. Here, the Iranian diplomats playing the 
Russians, Kazakhs, Azerbaijanis and Turkmen did better than those representing Iran. The 
lesson was thus that if Iran waits too long before stepping into the Caspian (Khazar Sea) 
negotiations, the Russians will get their former republics on their side, thereby isolating 
Iran. This came very close to reality. As a negotiation is to give something in order to get 
something, concessions will have to be made in order to enhance profits. If no conceding 
takes place, no rewards can be expected, and a potential win–win negotiation will then 
turn into a win–lose.
More recently, versions for Kosovo and Afghanistan were developed. These are really 
zero-sum games, in which reaching consensus is almost impossible. As a way out in 
the Kosovo game, you could also try to get the United States, the European Union and 
Russia to reach agreement, and then try to force Serbia and Kosovo into the solution. In 
the case of the Kosovo game, which was played in Amsterdam by participants from the 
general public, people became really angry at some of their opponents. Emotions flared 
up. The contrary happened to a group of experts from the OSCE in Stadt Schlaining in 
Austria. Although Serbs and Kosovars were participants in the course, they dealt with 
the exercise in a very professional way, looking for the best options on the basis of their 
estimated national interests. In the Afghanistan version, meanwhile, two women playing 
the Taliban suddenly stood up from the table because it was prayer time. They asked their 
brothers from Pakistan to join them. A few minutes later they were negotiating together 
in a bilateral side-meeting, leaving the other participants flabbergasted and increasingly 
angry. The EU asked the US, which had just become chairman, to discuss with the Taliban 
that this was not a proper way to act during negotiations. At least 30 minutes later, with 
roughly half of the game time left, the atmosphere was ruined, really ruined. The US and 
the EU on the one hand and the Taliban on the other were actually making covert negative 
remarks about one another in every other sentence. No agreement was reached in the 
end. A revised version of the game, which was played as a test by the Senlis Council in 
Paris and performed in an international conference in Canada a few weeks later, ran 
much more smoothly and produced realistic outcomes of a possible peaceful process for 
dealing with Afghanistan’s future.
In Conclusion
This chapter dealt with simulated processes as a tool in analyzing diplomatic negotiation 
processes. Simulations, if well prepared and well implemented, will create a context allowing 
negotiation processes to be as realistic as possible, thereby allowing negotiation research 
to get a better understanding of behaviour and process in cases where observing real 
diplomatic negotiation will not be possible. Diplomats and international civil servants tend 
to work in secrecy, as this will allow them to reach outcomes unhindered – perhaps – by 
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their own mandates, their parliament, the media, public opinion, and of course by actors 
excluded from the negotiation process, such as negotiators for other countries.
This chapter first dealt with the chairperson as an important player in real-life and 
simulated inter-state negotiation processes. The chairperson has to balance needs, 
observe different phases in the process, understand and influence the people, and use 
the procedures in an effective way. If negotiation is about giving something in order to 
get something, chairing is to navigate somewhere to get somewhere. To what extent the 
chairperson has to be neutral is an open question, which is perhaps also influenced by 
cultural perception. In one of the discussions in preparation for the UK rotating Presidency, 
the participants declared that in their opinion a chairperson had to be fair – whatever 
that implies – while the trainer, being Dutch, thought of effective chairpersons as being 
‘neutral’.
Second, this chapter analyzed simulated bilateral negotiation processes that are 
relevant for controlling – illegal – nuclear tests. The chapter describes and discusses 
so-called table-top exercises (TTE). The objectives of all these TTEs were twofold: one is 
training staff through experience in a simulated environment; and the other is study and 
development of the methodology of conduct of an inspection. The TTEs were therefore 
planned to include situations that may arise during an inspection, to be tackled by the 
multinational group of expert participants trying to find how the situation can be solved. 
Various negotiation styles and techniques should be presented and exercised during a 
TTE. Special cases developed for training can cover specific issues such as connectedness 
between factors, human interaction in a multicultural environment, the use of specialized 
equipment, and the geographical environment.
Lessons were identified to be learned and implemented in the training programme 
for inspectors. This procedure is especially important for the CTBTO, since its verification 
regime does not include routine inspections and exercises are the only way to advance 
understanding of procedures and the training of inspectors. Although other verification 
regimes have routine inspections through which they may accomplish the two objectives 
mentioned above, these characteristics of a TTE also make it useful in other international 
organizations that can use such exercises for the same objectives. This may be true for the 
OPCW, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or the fight against terrorism, etc. 
Trainees may be confronted with specific situations that are important for their training, in 
a simulated environment instead of sending them unprepared to inspections. This method 
can replace a number of lectures that describe such situations.
This experience illustrated clearly that the simulation’s control team should not always 
expect the specific development of a case study. It became obvious that the scenario of 
case studies leaves enough space for the inspection team to come up with different ways 
for proceeding than the control team has envisaged. It was accepted that it is good to 
leave such latitude for the inspection team and not to limit its flexibility. Such a programme 
requires the control team to be composed of experts in the different OSI technologies, 
who need to be alert and ready to improvise based on the basic scenario as needed. Using 
TTEs helps participants to understand the intricacies of negotiations on the ground, while 
it opens opportunities for research in understanding which scenarios might develop in 
a given situation, thereby supporting the preparation of actual field negotiations. TTEs 
deepen the understanding of a negotiation process that has not yet happened in reality, 
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as the CTBT is not yet operational, nor will it be operational in the short term, while 
powers such as the United States, China, Iran and Israel refuse to ratify it and while the 
international climate for ratification is deteriorating. Simulation has to replace reality for 
the time being.
In the third section, a simulation of multilateral negotiation processes on the control 
and destruction of chemical weapons tried to draw lessons for future negotiations on 
these issues. The experiences with the OPCW and other comparable international Hexa- 
and Pentagames show that people matter, even if they are firmly boxed into a stringent 
regime in which interests are the dominant factor. Although negotiators were framed 
in the same context of fixed substance and fixed priorities, their individual differences 
produced substantially different outcomes. These different results were the consequence 
of their ability to be creative, to have different perceptions and therefore assessments.
These, in turn, were based on differences in character, style, expertise, assertiveness 
and perhaps culture. Interpretation of the text made the difference. Apart from individual 
human drives, there is also some form of chemistry in the group negotiation, as well 
as the factor of the president’s ability to do a good job. The outcomes of the OPCW 
exercises reflect this impact of the individual negotiator and group dynamics. They show 
the interrelationship between the number of decisions and the level of the scores. Yet this 
connection is not perfect: outcomes depend on differences in packaging and some trade-
offs will not be as effective as others. The factor of value creation is therefore as important 
as the number of policy decisions made.
However, is it possible to conclude the most likely outcomes of OPCW negotiations 
in the coming five years, within the grid of subjects and country positions created by the 
authors of the ‘Hexagame’ and choices made by the participants in the five negotiation 
groups? This has indeed been the case. If we take the subjects that all five groups in the 
OPCW simulation exercise wanted to integrate into the fictitious negotiated text – that is, 
the overall consensus –we can conclude that the following decisions can be expected to 
be taken in reality:
1. CWC state parties will subsidize the destruction of chemical weapons where needed;
2. Countries that did not ratify the CWC should be offered assistance for capacity-
building;
3. State parties will have full access to chemical weapons protective equipment and 
technology;
4. No changes are needed concerning on-site inspections of chemical industries;
5. Challenge inspections will be a last resort, only to be applied in extreme cases;
6. Parties are advised to publish widely a CWC summary in chemical labs and industry;
7. Parties are advised to publish model codes of professional conduct to ensure 
compliance.
Finally, two more decisions might be expected, although they are less likely to be taken 
as we have consensus-minus-one between the groups: the UN should become involved 
if the destruction of chemical weapons was not completed in 2012; and the OPCW will 
appoint a High Commissioner for Universality. It is less likely, however, that the OPCW 
will accept destruction of chemical weapons after 2017, and it will implement challenge 
inspections only in cases where enough evidence for illegal activities is at hand, as only 
three of the five pretend OPCWs reached consensus on these two issues.
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As far as the contribution to stability is concerned, in the sense of process (stages) 
and stakeholders as factors assuring implementation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, it was found that they indeed worked as a stabilizing factor. The process, 
as designed, forced parties to acknowledge the questions on the agenda. The stages 
in this process– exploring, parking and deciding – helped to push things forward. The 
stakeholders, meanwhile, were forced to address the issues on the table, resulting in 
a number of decisions for implementation, as described above. However, the process 
also provided an opportunity for procrastination. The stages could be used to slow down 
progress by focusing as much as possible on exploration and parking, thus leaving ample 
time for decision-making. The stakeholders moreover had the means – consensus was the 
rule – to frustrate the outcomes that they did not like.
Although outcomes were indeed produced, they could not be regarded as being 
very substantial. The chemical weapons negotiations, as embedded and institutionalized 
in the OPCW, are indeed highly stabilized by process, stages and stakeholders, but to 
the extent that they slow down decision-making and tend to freeze it. Stability seems to 
foster stagnation in this respect. Negotiations take place, but at a pace endangering the 
effectiveness of the CWC’s implementation. In that sense, the OPCW is both an opportunity 
and an obstacle to banning chemical weapons from the world. Yet the organization at 
least provides us with the tools to contain the dangers of chemical warfare and terrorism 
as much as politically possible. The Syrian case has recently shown us the importance 
of the OPCW in protecting civilians against the use of poisonous weapons. The Syrian 
crisis that started in 2011 and the Syrian government’s compliance with the international 
treaties highlighted the political relevance of the OPCW and brought it out of the shadows 
in which it has been hovering for several years.
The exercise, as discussed in this chapter, is yet another instrument in simulating a 
diplomatic negotiation process and enhancing insight of its flow, helping negotiators to 
prepare for future negotiations by getting a better understanding of possible scenarios and 
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CHAPTER XII: SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has propagated a holistic view on negotiation as a means to understand 
and reform the subject, thereby strengthening its viability as the main tool of global 
governance and conflict resolution in the twenty-first century. The dissertation thus 
distinguishes itself from other studies of international/diplomatic negotiation processes, 
since most are focused on specific issues and problems in international negotiation 
processes. Furthermore, this thesis has attempted to explain some international political 
developments in the past, present and future by analyzing the negotiation processes 
shaping them. Ultimately, this dissertation is very much about the interconnectedness 
of process and context, in defining the diplomatic negotiation process as the essence of 
getting things done in world politics and governance.
International negotiations, in the sense of inter-state or diplomatic bargaining, are one of 
the tools to be used in conflict management – if they can be used at all, because, as we 
saw in the first chapter, a situation should be ripe for negotiation and the negotiation 
should be ripe for a result. In numerous cases, negotiation cannot be expected to work, 
and other phenomena such as avoidance (neglect), violence, or the threat of violence 
(domination) arise. As this thesis noted, there is also a stalemate that does not lead to 
solutions, but at least to putting an end to, or avoiding, the use of force, although the threat 
of force will remain: ‘peaceful coexistence’. Furthermore, there is a close interrelationship 
with other mechanisms, such as adjudication and warfare. These two latter instruments 
in conflict situations in international relations are both an alternative and a supplement to 
negotiation processes.
As a supplementary factor to the process of international negotiations, adjudication 
and warfare can be used to enhance assured outcomes in those negotiation processes. 
International negotiation has, by definition, a less assured outcome than national 
negotiations. In national negotiations, a third party can force an outcome, when needed, 
and this is indeed often required, because a state cannot start negotiations with other 
states if the internal process does not produce a mandate for that state’s negotiators. 
Transnational negotiations – for example in strong regimes such as the European 
Union – will produce less assured outcomes than in national negotiations, but more 
guaranteed results than in international negotiations, such as the WTO, the OSCE, or the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In some cases, the use of force as a tool in 
an ongoing negotiation process can help to push the opponent to the table. Adjudication 
might have the same effect: villains might feel so anxious about the threat of a penalty by 
a court, in or outside The Hague, that they feel inclined to negotiate. However, as we have 
also seen, it can bring them to non-negotiation, as they prefer fighting over peace in case 
they might become the ‘victim’ of justice the moment when peace has been implemented.
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As an alternative to negotiation, adjudication and warfare can be applied in situations 
where negotiations are not chosen, or are not seen as a workable tool, or are not desirable to 
the states involved in the conflict. There must be something to negotiate about, something 
to negotiate on, and something to be satisfied with. Adjudication can replace negotiations, 
as can arbitration or mediation, but so can warfare. At the same time, it should be noted 
that both adjudication and war will, as a rule, be supplemented by negotiation processes: 
adjudication, because we have to negotiate the (international) laws that judges will or 
will not apply; and warfare, because we have to negotiate its consequences. Negotiation 
stands at the beginning and at the end of these phenomena, but it can also be used as a 
tactical device within adjudication and warfare.
Peace, security and justice can be outcomes, as well as tools, and as well as sources 
of international negotiation processes. They are sources of negotiation because peace, 
security and justice cannot be decided in isolation from the context.
The moment that peace, security and justice are in place, negotiations are needed to 
create the framework for their effective implementation. The very instance when they are 
established, they need refinement through negotiation or by other means. Post-negotiation 
is needed in order to clarify perceptions, to decide on details, and to protect the subjects 
and objects of the negotiation outcomes. Negotiations are furthermore used as tools in 
unfolding processes of peace, security and justice. Once these are established, bargaining 
will take place in order to solve tactical issues, to ensure the success of the peace process, 
the security arrangements to protect it, and the judicial system to ensure it. Last but not 
least, the negotiation processes are the sources of peace, security and justice, which can 
be regarded as the outcomes of the processes of international bargaining.
The approaches to this in negotiation literature are quite different, although taken 
together they provide quite an accurate picture of the essence and evolution of the 
international or diplomatic negotiation process. Quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
supplement each other by counting what can be counted and arguing what cannot be 
quantified. In negotiation literature, two main schools can be indentified: the European – 
that is, the predominantly qualitative French school from the sixteenth century onwards; 
and the more or less quantitative American – that is, the US school in the twentieth 
century. It seems that these two schools are converging in the twenty-first century.
This leaves us with an unbalanced academic community, which hardly ever considers 
Asian, African and Latin American approaches to negotiation. Scientists working on the 
question of why an outcome is the result of a specific negotiation process are influenced 
by their cultural background. The only solution for getting a balanced view will then 
be to pool many people’s perspectives from many parts of the world. Apart from this 
global broadening, there will have to be a fundamental deepening. Research is limited 
to indirect observation through interviews, surveys, literature and sometimes through 
the participation of practitioners in academia. Direct observation is hardly possible as 
politicians, diplomats and other negotiators will not allow it. This problem is inherent to 
negotiation research, but this does not mean that it should not be tackled again and again.
The conclusion of the first chapter is thus that negotiation research has to become more 
participative, inclusive and relevant. It brings to the fore the idea that researchers should 
participate in real-life negotiation processes, adopting as many practitioners as possible, 
and that the circle of researchers should be widened by including colleagues from non-
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Western cultures. At the same time, more attention should be given to bridging the gap 
between research and training in order to modernize seminars and simulations, which too 
often are a repetition of well-known concepts and not enriched by new research findings.
The Nature of Diplomatic Negotiation
The next chapters in this thesis look into the characteristics of diplomatic negotiation and 
its development; the relationship between the process and its context; the relationship 
between the usage of words and weapons; and the relationship between the process and 
the applied strategies and tactics generating entrapment.
As discussed in the second chapter, the importance of good and effective relations 
between states is increasing. Diplomacy as a profession can no longer handle all this 
extra work, with the result that diplomats are being outflanked by politicians, fellow civil 
servants, journalists, businessmen, and even researchers. It has become common to speak 
of governmental (thus not only diplomatic) and non-governmental negotiations, which 
try to take on diplomatic allure as ‘track-two diplomacy’ or even ‘multi-track diplomacy’. 
Diplomats must thus make themselves more competitive to survive. The result is a 
paradoxical situation. Diplomats have lost their monopoly of diplomacy, but at the same 
time are needed more urgently than ever. They have to function with greater effectiveness 
in a more limited area, increasingly acting as specialists and not as people who know 
everything and can do everything. The diplomats’ speciality is, of course, communication, 
but the question remains in what areas? The constant factor is the necessity to use 
international negotiation as a means to regulate the increasing interdependency of states. 
With this in mind, diplomats should be used in negotiations that break new ground, thus 
leaving the usual inter-state negotiations to their fellow civil servants.
In this way, diplomats can function as specialists in negotiations that do not yet have 
clear confines. They would then have three tasks. First, they would engage in secret 
pre-negotiations to explore issues and positions, at a stage before the politicians can 
reveal their views. This requires resourcefulness, discretion, persistence, objectivity, 
organizational ability and tact, in addition to knowledge. Their second task is to assist the 
politicians who are conducting the negotiations. This requires strategic insight, political 
judgement, objectivity and organizational skills. The third task is that of a trouble-shooter, 
helping to handle all the problems that arise during the implementation of agreements 
reached during the negotiations. The diplomat needs to be able to take action, to be 
pragmatic, and to have patience and strong nerves. It would be best to have diplomatic 
negotiators who can be used in more specific and non-routine inter-state negotiation 
areas.
Diplomatic negotiation will increase in importance as a means for states to find 
peaceful solutions to differences, whereas the role of the diplomat in these negotiations 
will diminish. The question is whether the term ‘diplomatic negotiation’ will remain 
appropriate. For several reasons it will. Within the broad international negotiation areas 
(in which individuals, groups, organizations, companies, local and regional government, 
etc., are active over the borders), there is still a need for a distinct term for negotiations 
between states. It would be possible to use the term ‘inter-state negotiations’, which 
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is more specific than ‘diplomatic negotiations’. As mentioned above, the diplomat will 
no longer be the dominant player, but diplomacy – with its rules that regulate activities 
and communication between sovereign states – remains important in regulating the 
negotiation processes between countries. The diplomatic guidelines give the limits and 
norms, the rules and modalities. The term ‘diplomatic negotiation’ will therefore remain 
valid. Its form and content will change, but that is hardly surprising in the continuing 
evolution of diplomacy.
The conclusion of chapter two is thus that the differences in status and mechanics 
between diplomats and other public-sector negotiators should be diminished in order to 
create one – more or less homogeneous – workforce in order to facilitate the development 
of stronger and more effective negotiation processes. All public-sector negotiators working 
in the arena of external relations would basically become ‘diplomats’, and as issues become 
more global they would therefore be more effective in coordinating them and advising their 
decision- makers as to ‘what should be done’.
The third chapter discussed the linkage between context and process, stating that the 
boundaries or limits limitations of the process have a restraining, but above all a useful, 
function in diplomatic negotiation processes. These limits or boundaries help to guide the 
process in the desired directions. Unbounded negotiation processes in a competitive and 
rather unstructured world – because of sovereignty – will have less assured outcomes and 
will therefore be less effective. Regimes have therefore been created to channel the flow 
of negotiations towards closure, as was illustrated in the second part of this dissertation.
Another important conclusion of this study is the insight that – looking at the coming 
decades – regime negotiations can only play an effective role in creating stability and 
progress in international relations if:
- Problems are negotiated at the appropriate level;
- Problems are negotiated within the appropriate regime;
- Relevant actors will be included;
- Actors deal with regimes within a broader framework of bilateral negotiations;
- Stimuli will have to be used in an effective way.
The last point is important. Sometimes, or perhaps quite often, internal and external 
drives and changes are not used to create more negotiated regime effectiveness. Yet 
there are always, of course, reasons for this. Thus, for example, the Cyprus issue – which 
has haunted the international community over recent decades – could have been resolved 
by using the external stimulus of EU enlargement. However, the position of one of the 
member states, in this case Greece, blocked this opportunity, although one can ask the 
question of whether Greek and Greek-Cypriot long-term interests would not be better 
served by having stability on Cyprus. Here, short-term considerations might have been an 
overriding reason for not using the external impetus.
Negotiation is one of the main tools – if not the most important – that enable states and 
other organizations to create order in today’s world. Channelling negotiation processes 
through regimes will, as a rule, enhance their stability and effectiveness. In order to survive, 
negotiations need regimes and regimes need negotiations. Yet this will only manage to 
structure the cooperation between parties if those actors are in balance with themselves 
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and with their partners and opponents. It is a natural phenomenon to seek to restore 
imbalances. Negotiation within, between and around regimes can help this to materialize. 
Negotiations help to create the cradle that they need in order to grow and survive.
Political interests are slow to adapt to their environment. It is therefore feared that 
states’ proactive negotiation policies will not be enough to create an international 
environment that can cope effectively with the problems ahead of us. Unavoidably, natural 
and man-made challenges will be required to move states forward in the direction of more 
need-integration and value creation. This is of course a paradox. Regimes are needed in 
order to deal with challenges, which are in turn the incentives of regime creation and 
adaptation. This is how mankind developed and there are no reasons to believe that it will 
be different in the future. Negotiation is its tool, but it must stand a chance. It must have 
an opportunity to be used and this can only be the case if disaster and development will 
go hand in hand in a negotiable way.
The conclusion of chapter three is that context is decisive in understanding what kind of 
negotiation process is applicable in a given situation, while the creation of context through 
regime-building greatly helps to add value to negotiation as a device of decision-making 
and conflict management. Organizations are the bodies that channel negotiation processes 
in the direction of outcomes. They compensate for insecurity, which is one of the greatest 
threats to effective negotiation processes. While stabilizing the processes, they might also 
hamper their flow as a consequence of bureaucracy and concentration of power resources.
Chapter four analyzed the role of entrapment in steering diplomatic negotiation 
processes in a – most of the time – undesired direction. Entrapment processes are 
characterized by factors such as choice, uncertainty, investment and repetition. They 
occur at different levels – for example, the intrapersonal, interpersonal, national and 
international dimensions. Factors that influence entrapment processes are planning, 
information, communication and control. On the basis of a case study, chapter five drew 
four lessons on how to avoid entrapment.
Entrapment is both a danger to watch out for and an opportunity to be seized. As with 
almost everything in international relations, it has both a darker and a positive side. Using 
entrapment on oneself is a very interesting phenomenon. People who are afraid of doing 
something may trigger a process that they know will lead to their own entrapment. They 
know that they need results in the long run, and they know that immediate decisions are 
psychologically unacceptable to them. A slice-by-slice ‘salami process’, however, would 
be something that they could deal with psychologically. They therefore deliberately force 
themselves into taking the right decisions by embarking on a process of entrapment.
The same is true of countries. Populations are often unwilling to accept tough 
measures. Their governments are therefore unwilling to direct their delegations to go in 
the preferred direction. The delegation leader, however, seeing that a particular course of 
action is required, but unable to convince his or her superiors of this fact, may very well 
lead the delegation into entrapment on purpose to let ‘fate’ decide. The ‘salami’ character 
of entrapment in international negotiations is therefore something of a two-edged sword, 
and can be wielded like that by the effective diplomatic negotiator. Even the EU can thus be 
used as a self-entrapment strategy: if a government has to do something that is unpopular 
with its people, it can simply point to ‘Brussels’ as a way to let itself off the hook.
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For the negotiator to avoid entrapment, it is first essential to have a clear mandate 
connected to transparent and effective flows of information. Second, it is important 
to have a realistic estimate of the strength and the intentions of the other party. It is 
therefore vital to develop an encompassing strategy, combined with a clear time-frame. 
A third component is to check assumptions, including assumptions about the value and 
the character of the relationship with the other party. The final instrument for avoiding 
entrapment is to be well connected with your own constituency, especially with those 
who hold the power.
The conclusion of chapter four is that entrapment processes can undermine and undo 
rational decisions, as well as the problem that different negotiators might have different 
rationalities that are often of a more emotional nature than they themselves are aware – in 
short: negotiation is sometimes a rational process for sometimes irrational reasons. New 
leaders can end the processes of entrapment by turning them upside down. This has to be 
done in a step-by-step way and patience is of the essence. ‘Disentrapment’ is an effective 
exit strategy, but it will take a lot of time. As entrapment is engagement, it can also have 
positive effects on conflict management through negotiation, as it might lead to ripeness 
and thereby to closure.
Chapter five dealt with the interrelationship between warfare and negotiation, between 
war and words. It postulated that both are tools of conflict management and might thereby 
be seen as two sides of the same coin. War ends by negotiations, war is often accompanied 
by negotiations, and in many cases war is the outcome of a failed negotiation process. 
If wars end with an inclusive peace negotiation – that is, a process in which all warring 
parties are included – it might foster a relatively peaceful longer-term future (as did the 
Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815). However, if the peace settlement is exclusive, meaning 
that interested parties are excluded from the peace talks (as with Paris and Versailles in 
1919), the chances of peace holding for more than a short period are slim.
A crisis is a risky situation and risks therefore have to be taken into account. Yet 
war is risky in situations where control will not be possible. A war will either be lost, or 
it will linger on in guerrilla warfare. Even if one is victorious and the opponent can be 
controlled, the damage done to oneself, one’s allies and the long-term relationship with 
opponents could overshadow the fruits of victory. The opponents should not be forgotten 
here, as the enemy of today could be needed as a friend in the future. Negotiation is risky 
if it provides the opponent with an opportunity to buy time and prepare for exactly the 
opposite outcome for which your own party is striving. An offer to negotiate can be seen 
as a sign of weakness, stiffening the enemy’s resolve and creating loss of face in one’s own 
coalition. Negotiations can legitimize the counterpart’s position, thereby undermining the 
credibility of their opponent. Yet overall, the consequences of war are so grave that words 
are often to be preferred. In the end, the risks of war are greater than those of words, so 
the best risk management is to use words and wars in a connected way, giving priority to 
the one that will most diminish risks in the context of the crisis that one faces.
The fact that more violent conflicts reach closure nowadays through negotiation and 
mediation might have to do with the build-up of regimes between the seventeenth and 
21st centuries. While international organizations only came into being in the twentieth 
century, the attempts to create regimes and to stabilize international situations through 
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long-term agreements can clearly be seen as time passed. There is obviously a connection 
between this context and the diminishing of war between states, highlighting again the 
situational character of diplomatic negotiation processes, yet the ever-rising costs of 
war through modern technology, both in human suffering and material loss, are also a 
contributing factor. Another reason for the mounting damage that can be inflicted is the 
sheer fact that more national and international institutionalization and interdependency 
also enhances the vulnerability to destruction.
The conclusion of chapter five is thus that negotiation is a more effective instrument 
of conflict resolution than warfare, and it should therefore be the preferred instrument in 
conflict situations. Yet in order to use it as a tool, it might first be necessary to change 
the context by other means, while understanding that under these conditions negotiation 
might be very unpleasant and difficult. In these circumstances, conflict negotiation can be 
regarded as war by peaceful means, which often has to call in mediators to bring the parties 
together and to steer them in the direction of a peaceful outcome. However, mediation and 
negotiation can also postpone the violence, which might recur in a more disastrous way.
The Conduct of Diplomatic Negotiation
The following five chapters – from chapter six to chapter ten – study cases in five different 
centuries from five different angles: long-term consequences of peace-settlements, the 
behaviour of negotiators on different levels of negotiation, the inclusion and exclusion of 
negotiation parties, the weight of personalities, and the institutional setting.
Chapter six focused on the question of conclusion, meaning the closure of the diplomatic 
negotiation process and the effect of the agreement on war and peace in the future. 
It distinguished between backward- and forward-looking outcomes. Backward-looking 
agreements settle a conflict; forward-looking negotiations might solve it. The negotiation 
case study used for the seventeenth century was that of the Peace of Westphalia, which 
put an end inter alia to the Thirty Years’ War in Germany and the Eighty Years’ War in 
the Netherlands, and constructed a new conception of sovereignty. The Westphalian 
conference can be seen as the first attempt to negotiate an international regime that 
enables countries to protect their inter-state negotiation processes, thereby enhancing 
their effectiveness as an alternative to warfare. The chapter looked at the parties and their 
positions, the procedures they used and the processes they launched, how the negotiators 
navigated these processes and the consequences for the future.
This was de facto an interconnected process of bilateral negotiations resulting in 
several treaties, of which the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück were the most salient. 
The processes were running in parallel, some were running faster than others, and they 
were connected through informal meetings between negotiators of the different bilateral 
consultations. Most bilateral negotiations were mediated and the mediators had quite a 
decisive influence on the course of the negotiation processes. The question of ripeness 
is of interest here.
The most important initiator of the process was the Pope, although he might have 
been expected to be the one who would resist the most, as such a process would mean 
indirect recognition of the Protestant countries. As negotiation is a question of priorities, 
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the Pope initiated the talks out of fear that the Ottoman Empire would overrun Christianity, 
an early example of an external threat being a unifier. Besides, he wanted the Catholic 
states to stop annihilating each other. In order to deal with his constituency, the Pope 
declared afterwards that this peace was a peace of the devil, although one had to accept 
the current factual situation. This is an early example of dealing with the constituency in a 
two-level game, whereby the home front is more of a problem than the external adversary.
Another interesting phenomenon is that of today’s enemy, who might be your friend 
tomorrow – and conversely, your ally of today could be your problem in the future. 
Understanding this, the Dutch not only negotiated a peace agreement with their enemy 
Spain, but also mediated a peace between their friend France and Spain. This was in order 
to leave the Southern Netherlands in the hands of their former and now weakened enemy, 
as they were afraid of a strong ‘ally’ (namely France) on their direct border.
The Peace of Westphalia also created an instrument for the future, a kind of regime in 
a nascent state, in statu nascendi. It gave Catholic France and Protestant Sweden the right 
to intervene in Germany if civil war broke out again.
The conclusion of chapter six is that negotiating favourable outcomes can best be 
done in a pragmatic way, only referring and sticking to principles if these are instrumental, 
whereby it is of the utmost importance to foster positive longer-term consequences of 
the negotiated agreement: in such a case negotiation can forge a situation that allows for 
advantageous negotiations in the future. The forward-looking character of the Westphalia 
Peace Agreements had to do with the ripeness of the conflict after 30 and 80 years of 
warfare. Westphalia installed regimes, notably a new mode of sovereignty, that stabilized 
the situation in Europe, thereby creating room for diplomatic negotiation as an instrument 
of conflict resolution.
Chapter seven dealt with navigating the negotiation process during the peace talks 
at Utrecht in the eighteenth century. These negotiations were seen as another turning 
point in the evolution of peace negotiations, as they terminated the first global war. As in 
the Peace of Westphalia negotiations, another attempt was made to secure future peace 
through agreements that would allow the countries to settle future conflicts within a more 
or less agreed framework of norms and values. Like Westphalia, the negotiations were 
connected in bilateral talks, or, as labelled in chapter six, translateral negotiations. And like 
in Münster and Osnabrück, the negotiators were members of the nobility, negotiating in 
French (in Westphalia both Latin and French were used as lingua franca). The negotiators 
had to defend different interests, but they had common values and, again like Westphalia, 
they possessed a lot of space to negotiate. Their rulers were far away and did not interfere 
in the who and how of the negotiation process; they only cared about the what and where.
An interesting aspect of this negotiation is the pre-negotiation phase, which set the 
context of the peace talks and actually decided on its outcome before the conference 
had even started. The major powers, France and Britain (a change of government in 
Britain appeared to be decisive for the start of pre-conference talks), made a separate 
pre-negotiation deal, thereby de facto excluding their allies from the most decisive part 
of the process. Unlike the Peace of Westphalia in the seventeenth and the Congress of 
Vienna in the nineteenth centuries, the majority of the countries were kept outside the 
core decision-making process, like in Paris in the twentieth century. However, Utrecht was 
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a pre-emptive strike and the other countries officially were present at the conference and 
officially did participate in the negotiation processes. Interestingly enough, the Dutch had 
the chance to conclude a separate peace with the French, but they let it pass. In the end, 
the Dutch appeared to be the biggest losers of the game.
Chapter seven also compared the Peace of Utrecht with two other peace conferences 
on Dutch soil, Nijmegen and Ryswick, and focused on the behaviour of the negotiators, 
comparing it with ideas about effective negotiators nowadays. Two sources were used 
for this: the perception of a high-ranking Dutch negotiator; and those of a high-standing 
Dutch trainer of negotiation techniques. In essence, little has changed in the last three 
centuries. Secrecy and manipulation were more valued than today, while precedence and 
protocol were extremely important. The main difference from conference diplomacy in 
the twenty-first century is, of course, the lack of technical means, such as information 
networks and fast transportation, as well as the lack of regimes and structures. In fact, it 
was a conference with hardly any multi-party decision-making. This created big problems 
for efficient and effective decision-making.
The conclusion of chapter seven is thus the importance of the pre-negotiation stage 
as a determinant of negotiation outcomes before the conference starts, but also the effect 
of a game-changer, such as a new government because of parliamentarism. The two-
level game thus appeared to have an enormous impact: negotiation keeps an eye on the 
constituencies of the parties. As in the previous and the following chapters, it was noted that 
the diplomatic negotiators shared a common language, values and norms, while they could 
work in seclusion, which helped enormously in reaching closure.
Chapter eight was about participation in the negotiation process and the effects of 
inclusiveness and exclusiveness. The case study was the Congress of Vienna at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century – the first multilateral peace conference, though 
not all-inclusive. As a consequence of the Vienna negotiations, the so-called Concert of 
Europe emerged, a conference system seeking to ensure the stability of Europe. It was 
made up of all of the major European Powers (including defeated France). The Concert of 
Europe may be seen as the first international regime.
Managing complexity is the essence of multilateral diplomacy and this complexity 
was something relatively new to the participating countries. Knowing that they could not 
effectively negotiate with dozens of parties at the same time, and lacking the procedures 
and means to handle this, it was decided to deal with the main issues in a ‘pentacratic’ 
setting (that is, with five powers). Nevertheless, the Congress of Vienna showed all the 
signs of chaos and ineffectiveness. Notwithstanding several preparatory conferences, 
planning was lacking, negotiators distrusted each other, and on several occasions the 
peace conference threatened to deteriorate into war between the ‘allies’.
The tactic of keeping the middle and minor powers away from the table had the 
consequence that they had to be kept busy with balls, operas, and all kinds of other 
festivities and services. These recreational – and sometimes procreative – events had the 
important side-effect that Vienna could be regarded as a huge networking opportunity. 
Much more than in Münster and Utrecht, networks dominated at the Congress of Vienna. 
As a consequence, information streams came into being, leading to both misinformation 
and information-gathering. The Austrians used the opportunity to install a wide network 
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of spies in almost all of the residences, with Austrian Chancellor Metternich even spying 
on Austria’s own emperor and empress. Negotiation and information went hand-in-hand, 
and a forerunner of twenty-first century spying networks like the US National Security 
Agency was born, although one should also not underestimate the role of spies and 
information-gathering and exchange during previous diplomatic negotiation gatherings.
The method of exclusion and inclusion worked well in the sense that substantial results 
were obtained, establishing a stronger framework for the future than in the two foregoing 
conferences that were dealt with in chapters six and seven. This framework of going 
back to pre-revolutionary times by postulating legitimacy as the central feature for the 
future can be regarded as the birth of the first viable regime regulating the relationships 
between the allied countries and their former opponents. The method of exclusiveness 
thus resulted in inclusiveness as the outcome of the congress, which secured a relatively 
peaceful nineteenth century.
The conclusion of chapter eight is thus that a well-organized conference is of great 
value for effective negotiation. For negotiations to be successful it is advisable to have a 
group of strong countries taking the lead, using middle powers to control the small powers, 
while the presence of political leaders seemed to be an obstacle to efficiency. Diplomats 
need structure and space to be effective negotiators. On the negative side, the exclusion 
of certain constituencies – notably new social and political players such as liberals and 
nationalists – haunted the history after Vienna and undid many of the results that had been 
reached by the negotiators. As the outcome frustrated evolution, it became one of the 
incentives for revolution, and evolution is a more fitting context for diplomatic negotiation 
than revolution.
Chapter nine, which discusses negotiations in the twentieth century, addressed the issue 
of political negotiators’ reputations and the effect on the diplomatic negotiation process 
in six case studies, all of which were connected to warlike situations. In the aftermath 
of the First World War, the first global international regimes in the form of international 
organizations were established. These inter- and supranational organizations truly helped 
to protect and stabilize diplomatic negotiation processes, thereby greatly adding value to 
negotiation as an alternative to warfare. The first case was the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919, which concluded with the Treaty of Versailles, thereby putting an end to the 
First World War. Already with the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, political negotiators 
had been entering the stage, but they were diplomats at the same time, not the ones 
who took the final decisions (with the exception of Russian Tsar Alexander I). During the 
twentieth century, however, politicians – as heads of state – were often the decision-
makers at the highest level. On the one hand, this restrained the diplomats’ freedom to be 
creative in finding compromise solutions; on the other hand it slowed down negotiations, 
as the political leaders had few incentives to give in to their equals, particularly as the 
most important political negotiators were representing democratic states and had to take 
their constituencies into account. The ever-growing importance of the constituencies 
created new complexities.
The chapter then analyzed the personalities of the political leaders negotiating before 
and after the Second World War with the cases of Munich and Yalta. The negotiation 
behaviour of Chamberlain and Hitler might have been rational in the face of their countries’ 
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interests, but they themselves were under the influence of strong emotional considerations, 
although they might not always have been aware of it. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin were 
perhaps much less governed by their sentiments, but they all had a reputation to defend, 
thus influencing their negotiation behaviour to quite a large extent.
This chapter furthermore examined three case studies connected to the Cold War: 
negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev; those between Nixon and Brezhnev and 
Mao Zedong – including the back-channel talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin and 
Zhou Enlai, respectively; and finally, the negotiations between Reagan and Gorbachev. It 
concluded that these leaders’ personalities, as well as the personal chemistry between 
them, had a decisive influence on the course and outcomes of the negotiations. Yet not 
only were the relationships between the leaders of importance, but a kind of two-level 
game also came to the fore here. The clashes between the leaders and their mandated 
chief negotiators had an impact on the processes as well.
The conclusion of chapter nine is that negotiation is not only about interests, but also very 
much about the character and experiences of the negotiators. In fact, these factors play an 
even more important role if the negotiator is powerful. The more powerful the negotiator, the 
more often his or her personality will have an impact on the process and the outcome of the 
negotiation. The defence of the negotiator’s reputation has both an emotional and a rational 
component, as a negotiator with a positive image will be able to exert more influence on 
the process, while his or her self-image will sustain the negotiation’s effectiveness as well. 
‘Egotiation’, however, the situation in which the actions of the negotiator override the interest 
of the country, will have a negative impact on the outcome of the negotiation process.
Chapter ten analyzed the relationship between organization and negotiation in 
the European Union. The EU may be considered the most integrated international/
supranational organization to date, the pinnacle of four centuries of attempts at regime 
construction. Looking at the constellation of the Union, an attempt was made to unravel 
the intricacies of the internal and external negotiation processes. Although much is known 
about the Union generally, and a host of literature has been written on its functioning and 
policies, little is available on the processes of negotiation. This is a paradox that might 
have to do with the complexity of this intergovernmental and supranational regime, but 
it could also be the consequence of a problem that was signalled in the first chapter of 
this study: the very limited possibilities for negotiation researchers to be part and parcel 
of the EU’s negotiation process. Yet, there are opportunities for surveying, while some 
practitioners are willing to talk and to write. Still, discussing the negotiation issue with 
academic specialists, it is striking how little is known about what is happening within 
boardrooms and conference halls as far as processes are concerned.
It is clear that different rules within the different EU structures result in different 
kinds of intensity in the negotiation process. The status of the forum is also of great 
importance. At the highest level, that of the European Council, package-dealing is more 
frequent than at lower levels. Difficult issues are pushed from beneath up to the top 
echelons, which can oversee the possible trade-offs that cannot be made between 
lower-level officials. Although all EU member states are included, there is some tendency 
towards exclusion at the preparatory level. The most powerful member states can indeed 
dominate, notwithstanding their need to create pacts with the middle and minor countries. 
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Something of ‘Utrecht’, ‘Vienna’ and ‘Paris’ is thus still present in today’s European 
negotiation processes. The President of the European Council, the High Representative, 
the Council Secretariat, and last but not least the European Commission help to limit 
the hegemonic tendencies of the major powers, thereby stabilizing and facilitating the 
negotiation process.
However, the day-to-day negotiation machinery is the Council of Ministers and its 
Working Groups, including COREPER, the Parliament as a co-legislator, the European 
Commission as the initiating, executing and controlling force, as well as the European 
Court as a guardian of the Union’s legislation. Around this construction, there are myriads 
of networks, IGOs, NGOs, regional and local authorities, and many others, adding to the 
complexity and perhaps to gridlock. The whole of this body politic is too extensive to allow 
for much space for formal negotiation processes. Formal negotiation processes are, of 
course, vital and are a daily reality, but progress is made in the corridors, before and after 
the meetings, and in informal talks between the different formal and informal layers.
The conclusion of chapter ten is thus that a strong regime enhances the effectiveness 
of diplomatic negotiation, while too much complexity might lead to gridlock, which can 
be avoided through informal negotiations. The more formal negotiation arenas abound, 
the more important informal negotiations will be; the more informal negotiations there 
are around, the less transparent the EU negotiation process will be. For the moment, the 
European Union is the last stage in attempts to enhance the effectiveness of diplomatic 
negotiation through regime-building. As the European Union deepens and stretches out, it 
has to cope with growing complexity, while it remains in need of more and more effective 
diplomatic negotiation processes as the life-blood of the Union.
Chapter eleven dealt with three cases about the conduct of diplomatic negotiation 
processes, not through the ages, but through simulation. As already stated, it is difficult to 
observe the process of negotiation and the behaviour of the negotiators. Simulation might 
therefore be part of the solution to gain insight, as actors in the process tend to behave 
in a natural way, as if they were bargaining in reality. In principle, the negotiation will not 
be different, but some artificiality cannot be denied. This is probably not because of the 
‘players’, but very much because of the ‘game masters’ who are setting the scene, which 
can come very close to reality.
The first case study concerned the chairperson as such. What do we know about the 
role of chairpersons and what kind of lessons can be drawn concerning their effectiveness? 
The main conclusion is that chairpersons have to act situationally, as negotiations are 
situational by nature. Depending on the phase of the process, the chairperson has to 
guard the procedure and the agenda, direct the negotiators towards a fruitful discussion, 
help them to select the issues to be decided upon later, facilitate informal discussions and 
negotiations, act as a mediator or even as an impartial negotiator in the decision-making 
round, while pushing things towards closure if negotiators have difficulties in reaching 
outcomes.
The second case study was a so-called ‘table-top exercise’ to understand negotiations 
‘on the ground’. In implementing agreements, it is often necessary to conduct post-
agreement negotiations on the spot. By putting the negotiators in different situations, 
their ability either to negotiate entry to where they have to check on implementation, or 
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to ward off ‘intruders’ by skilfully using arguments and circumstances without breaking 
a treaty’s rules and regulations, can be tested. While it is absolutely necessary to have 
negotiators who are experts in the field, it is not good enough to let them deal with the 
issues at hand without the help of generalists who see the bigger picture. Tunnel vision 
will make the whole endeavour ineffective.
The third case study was of a ‘Pentagame’ (a number-game with five parties), in 
which the overall context was given, but it was then up to the players to optimize or 
maximize their profits. This exercise brought several professionals together: politicians; 
diplomats; civil servants; consultants; scientists; and others. As they were not defending 
their real interests, they could wholeheartedly focus on the negotiation process, which 
produced interesting moments and outcomes, while they could converse without their 
usual burden. The exercise also provided insights into future available options, thereby 
helping negotiators to prepare effectively for the upcoming rounds of post-agreement 
negotiation processes.
The conclusion of chapter eleven is thus that simulation can be a helpful surrogate in 
cases when researchers and others cannot be present at real-time negotiation processes, 
as simulation deepens insights, while it facilitates experiments to enhance the effectiveness 
of the process and the people. Negotiation is a reality game and can therefore be easily 
simulated in order to further the understanding of negotiation itself. Simulations will 
give diplomatic negotiators a chance to practise their skills in a safe laboratory context. 
Chairpersons who could not ask participants in real negotiations to assess them can now 
learn from their actions. Specialists who are unaware of the importance of networking 
in negotiation can now practise it. High-level specialists and ambassadors who have to 
be careful in exploring future situations with their colleagues will now be able to discuss 
them. Finally, simulations can be used by researchers to compensate for the problems that 
they encounter in being kept out of real diplomatic negotiation processes, as noted in the 
first chapter of this thesis. In short, simulation exercises provide an accessible and safe 
space for learning and experimentation.
Cross-Cutting Findings
In addition to the conclusions that are related to the specific chapters, some more general 
conclusions can be drawn from previous observations cutting through the selected case-
studies.
This thesis sees the process of diplomatic negotiation as the most effective and 
efficient tool in inter-state and inter-organizational relations. Much evidence was collected 
to support this proposition. The dissertation asked the question of how to further the 
use and usefulness of diplomatic negotiation in order to limit destructive tendencies 
in international politics. It presents insights that will hopefully help to evaluate these 
processes as an instrument in dealing with contradictions among the parties that are 
shaping world affairs: parties with both individual and common interests sitting around 
tables that separate and connect them. However, as noted above, those who are not at the 
table will be on the menu.
Diplomatic negotiation is therefore between cooperation and competition. It is vital 
for the future to enhance the cooperative element in negotiation and to diminish the 
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competitive side. However, politics are characterized by strife and competition is not 
only there to stay, it has the healthy function of avoiding monopolization as well. Looking 
at diplomatic negotiation as a global system, as a pathway to govern the world and its 
inhabitants, it seems sensible to strengthen it without suffocation. Striving for balance 
between context and process through further regime-building, while keeping the arteries 
of the process as open as possible, might be of help in providing the world with reasonably 
good state and inter-state governance.
The proposition of this thesis, that international/diplomatic negotiation can only be a 
viable alternative for warfare if countries can exercise a certain amount of control over their 
internal and external opponents through regime-building, has been discussed and analyzed 
throughout this manuscript: first in Part I on Nature; and second in Part II on Conduct. The 
focal point in the first part was the connection between process and context, the balance 
between war and words, and the quite recent phenomenon of more violent conflicts being 
decided through negotiations than through victories. The second part focused on the 
question of to what extent the cases signalled a more stringent control through rules and 
regulations, networks and constructions.
‘Münster’ showed that rulers legitimized foreign intervention in order to keep the 
peace in the Holy Roman Empire of German nations. ‘Utrecht’ indicated the duty of the 
constituents to prevent future wars through unilateral or collective actions. ‘Vienna’ 
created a more or less permanent alliance of the greater powers collectively to hold the 
peace. ‘Paris’ tried to solve the problem of future threats of war by subduing the collective 
enemy for as long a time as possible. ‘Brussels’ managed to do away with internal wars 
by integrating a growing number of countries in one balanced construction through an 
international and supranational approach, thereby establishing a negotiation monopoly in 
the management of internal and external cooperation and competition.
Outside and between these regimes, violence remains a problem. There is no 
negotiation monopoly because of the relative weakness of global institutions like the 
United Nations Security Council, although negotiation has become a more important 
tool in conflict management and resolution over the centuries. On a regional scale, the 
progress of cooperation – and thereby of negotiation – has been uneven. There has been 
a growing hope for regional institutions to compensate for the lack of decisiveness on a 
global scale. For the moment, however, the European Union seems to be an enigma – an 
exception to the rule that regional organizations are hardly more effective than more 
encompassing regimes.
States remain the domain of negotiation, although they are enhancing their capacity 
for international negotiation as an alternative to warfare, because of growing economic 
interdependency, diplomatic institutionalization and the progress in international public 
law. The fabric of international cooperation, however, remains vulnerable and dependent 
on ripeness situations, as international regimes are often still too weak to create 
negotiated ripeness. Negotiation has become a viable instrument of decision-making, but 
in crisis situations it is still often more of an auxiliary instrument. The turning point where 
diplomatic negotiation will be strong enough to make wars redundant is still to be reached 
and might never come, notwithstanding the growing strength of diplomatic negotiation 
over the centuries.
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As emphasized in this study, diplomatic negotiations start with the actors who initiate 
the process. Actors have three choices: to do nothing; to pull back; or to push forward. In 
other words, to freeze, to flee, or to fight. These movements are mainly determined by the 
factors inside and outside the context in which the actors operate. Inside or outside, three 
main factors play a role in the decision of actors to act: interests; values; and power. There 
are also three main phases in the negotiation process itself, as a consequence of these 
actions and factors: exploration; selection; and decision. These phases are embedded 
in pre- and post-negotiation processes. As diplomatic negotiation is an instrument in 
managing international relations in such a way that problems can be solved in peaceful 
ways, it will have to be effective as a tool in international governance and conflict 
resolution. By effectiveness, we mean managing actors, factors and processes in such 
a way that outcomes can be reached at the lowest possible costs. Managing sovereign 
countries is problematic, unless – as has been stated above – there is a certain measure 
of control. This control can be exerted through over-arching international regimes.
Actors
Since the seventeenth century, the state has developed into an ever-stronger actor in 
diplomatic – that is, inter-state – negotiation processes. While in the seventeenth century 
the state was a tool in the hands of dynasties, with the exception of England and the 
republics, it progressed to become an instrument in the hands of the people, represented 
by their parliaments. However, in more than half of the world’s nations today, the state is 
a de facto tool of oligarchic or authoritarian elites, while some – presidential – dynasties 
still govern. These internal differences have an impact on the two-level games in the 
negotiation process.
Public opinion plays a major role in democracies – and therefore parliament, the media, 
and public and private sectors – in the conduct and decision-making of negotiators. 
To sell negotiations to their own people is often a major – and unsolvable – problem. 
Negotiators from semi- and non-democratic countries will have to struggle less with their 
constituency, as they have more control over them. Control is thus a major element in 
dealing with internal pressure: the more control over the home front, the more effectively 
political negotiators and their agents can conduct their negotiation with external parties. 
This was dealt with in the chapter on negotiation and warfare.
One of the most important findings of this thesis is that the creativity of the diplomatic 
negotiator is in danger, and thereby his effectiveness. Although the rulers were absolute 
in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in some cases also in the 
twentieth and even now in the twenty-first century, the space for their agents – and thereby 
for their ability to reach outcomes in a creative and human way – has been shrinking. The 
ambassadors of the seventeenth and eighteenth century were thus in a way ‘Brusselized’ 
already. Nobles with common values using a lingua franca that they all understood, in an 
age when nationalism was not yet a serious issue, had more influence on the outcomes 
than their rulers, who mainly decided on the formulas, but hardly on the details.
During the nineteenth century, rulers begin to intervene more and more in the day-
to-day negotiation processes, while in the twentieth century, politicians started to play 
a more and more dominant role in the actual negotiation process. This development 
was facilitated by increasingly effective means of transportation and communication. 
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Political negotiators can easily jump over the tables around which their agents try to fix 
the international problems of their countries, and these diplomats and civil servants can 
be scrutinized and controlled in a much more effective way than in the past. Furthermore, 
secrecy is an important element in successful negotiation, either direct or back-channel. 
In foregone ages, secrecy was much easier to uphold than either today or in the future. 
Bureaucracies and intelligence agencies can now penetrate the table. The media are much 
more effective than in the past, as democracy demands transparency, and transparency 
in turn is needed to establish and maintain legitimacy, at least in democratic countries. 
All this gives rise to a less effective diplomatic negotiation process, thereby weakening 
negotiation as a tool in the conduct of international relations.
Factors
The assumption that interests are the dominant driver in international negotiation processes 
was borne out by the cases that were analyzed in this study. Thus, situations of diverging 
and common interests are suitable for negotiation processes. The more diverging the 
interests, the more competitive the actors will be. Conversely, the more common ground 
the actors share, the more cooperative behaviour we can expect. Intra-institutional 
negotiation will often provide a framework and a level playing-field where the clash of 
interests will be less harsh than in extra-institutional environments. The chances for 
assured and mutually beneficial outcomes will therefore be enhanced. As well as interests 
as such, the question of stakes and priorities will modify the weight of the interests.
One example of this can be found in a comparison of the negotiations in Münster, 
Utrecht, Vienna and Paris, as analyzed in this study. In Münster the parties were so 
exhausted that this ripeness facilitated much common ground and thereby substantial 
outcomes, which not only closed the past wars in an effective way, but also gave rise to 
new forward-looking regimes that are still relevant today. Utrecht, on the contrary, was a 
deal made by the victors and left many of the negotiating parties unsatisfied: the common 
ground was quite uncommon. As a consequence, new wars broke out and the conference 
was not much more than a pause between wars, although the peace agreement did settle 
issues and does have an effect that lingers on to the present day, albeit in a negative 
way. Issues remain painful for those that lost, such as Spain – Gibraltar remains a bone 
of contention. Meanwhile, Vienna showed common ground because of the existence of a 
common enemy: Napoleon Bonaparte and the French Revolution. The main reason why 
there was an agreement at all, and an agreement that more or less stabilized Europe, was 
a new regime that came shortly after Vienna: the Holy Alliance. Subsequently, Paris was 
the consequence of a victory by the allies, not of ripeness for all the parties. The victors 
were exhausted and this forged common ground among them, but Germany remained 
outside the efforts to create commonality between the parties. As a consequence, 
the excluded party took revenge 30 years later, something that had been foreseen by 
negotiators already towards the end of the Paris peace talks.
Values and norms are embedded in culture and culture’s impact on negotiation is 
very diverse, but in general one can distinguish between societies in which negotiation 
is part of daily life and those where people tend to pay a fixed price. In the first type of 
society, the exploration phase will take much more time to conclude than in the second. 
However, in inter-state negotiation, negotiators from the latter type of negotiation culture 
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are often much more willing to start a negotiation process than those from the first type. 
This is because of the enormous importance of values and face-saving in the first type. 
The paradox is that while members of those cultures are more ready to bargain in the 
marketplace, they are at the same time much more hesitant to give in while operating at 
the diplomatic level.
Values play a decisive role in international negotiation. Values are often overshadowed 
by the role of interests, but they can be as meaningful. In Western negotiation research, 
the emotional dimension has been underestimated for decades. Nevertheless, values are 
present in both ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ negotiation arenas. In the West, they take the form 
of, for example, the defence of human rights principles, the advocacy of good governance, 
and the promotion of democracy. In the East, it is much more about reputation, pride and 
honour: face-saving. Negotiating about interests is more open to trading than bargaining 
about values. Values are non-negotiable (at least in principle) and can thereby be a major 
obstacle to effective negotiation, especially if they are connected to personal or group 
identity.
This was the topic of the chapter on reputation and ‘egotiation’. This chapter illustrated 
the importance of ‘face’, even in Western culture and even with ‘rational, purposeful 
politicians’. The point was made that issues of non-material interest could have very 
negative consequences for the negotiation processes, as with the cases of Chamberlain–
Hitler and Krushchev–Kennedy. The character and posture of the negotiators had a 
positive effect in the Gorbachev–Reagan relationship. In the Stalin–Roosevelt–Churchill 
triangle, things were of a more mixed nature, as was also the case with Nixon–Brezhnev–
Mao. The role of ‘egotiation’ was notable in the internal negotiating situations: the rivalry 
between Nixon and Kissinger; and between Mao and Zhou Enlai. These competitive 
relationships in a way posed more problems for reaching viable negotiation outcomes 
than the interactions with the external partners.
This thesis furthermore found that in diplomatic negotiation, the role and impact of 
power differences are probably the most important criteria for distinguishing diplomatic 
negotiation from other kinds of negotiation processes. It is, in other words, the political 
aspect of inter-state negotiation, as politics is about the use and distribution of power 
resources. Extra-institutional negotiations are more influenced by power differences than 
intra-institutional processes, and will therefore be much more risky than the latter. In other 
words, organizational structures around channels of negotiation will temper the impact 
of power, although power differences will not disappear completely and will materialize in 
the inclusion or exclusion of actors in the negotiation process.
An example can be found in the real-life case of Pacific Oil in the chapter on 
entrapment. The organizational setting and the change of context allowed the weaker 
party to be more successful than the stronger. The case also illustrated the importance 
of the hierarchical structure within the organizations that are negotiating with each other. 
Their internal organization and power distribution very much influenced their external 
power position, as did the relationships inside and outside the organizational context. The 
case also showed how the contextual factors influenced the direction of the negotiation 
processes in such a way that their flow influenced the power balance. This flow itself also 
had a huge impact on power symmetry. The entrapment process robbed the party with 
most structural power of its alternatives and weakened its position substantially, and, as 
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noted in the first part of this thesis, alternatives are an important ingredient of power. The 
situational power of the weaker party grew at the expense of the structural power of the 
other party. As a consequence, the weaker party became the stronger, for the moment. 
If the context changes again, however, the victor has to fear for its survival, as context 
change will allow its opponent to use the structural power that it still has at its disposal. 
The shadow of the past will influence the present and the future.
Process
The phases in the process are very much influenced by their institutional and cultural 
context. The institutional environment has a huge impact on the way in which negotiations 
will develop. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations in international organizations provide 
for more security and thereby stability than ad-hoc bargaining. Outcomes will be more 
assured than in negotiations outside institutions, but the processes are normally quite 
time-consuming. The exploration phase can be short, as partners often know each other 
quite well, but the decision-making can be very painful, as actors are aware of the binding 
and often legal character of their decision. The consequences are enormous. The post-
negotiation phase, moreover, is hardly problematic.
The real problem of extra-institutional negotiation often lies in the pre- and post-
negotiation phases: how to get the actors around the table; and how to ensure compliance 
and enforcement. To pressure negotiators to come to the negotiation table remains the 
main problem. Context change is often needed, but it might only be the disaster that 
one wishes to avoid which can force parties to start the process. Mediators can be of 
great value, especially if they can be the source of a peaceful change of context through 
threats or diplomacy. As a consequence of insecurity and uncertainty, the exploration 
phase might become very time-consuming, while the selection and decision phases might 
be realized in a relatively speedy way.
Control
An example of the role of control is the observations made in the chapter on simulated 
negotiation processes under the heading ‘synergies’, which discussed the problems 
that the chair will face in controlling negotiators in the meeting. Too much control will 
undermine the chair’s position, as the participants might revolt. Not enough control will 
hinder the chair in the task of coming to closure in a meaningful way. The table-top 
exercises illustrated the problem of control from the perspective of the different situations 
of the inspection team and the inspected state-party. Both try to gain control over the 
other party in order to reach their goals of finding something or hiding something. The 
‘Pentagame’ at the end of the chapter made clear that the institutional structure of the 
negotiation process can facilitate both parties to more or less equal control over the 
situation, thereby fostering predictability and safety for both process and participants.
Control over diplomatic negotiations with other parties is the nucleus of inter-state 
negotiations, as it determines their outcomes. No control means unassured outcomes. 
Even if an outcome will be reached, its implementation is insecure. Incentives for using 
negotiation as a tool in conflict management will thereby be weak. This enhances the 
chances for warfare as an alternative to a peaceful process of conflict resolution. The 
difficulty of reaching assured outcomes and implementation was one of the reasons for 
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strengthening inter-state regimes during the last four centuries. Through these regimes, 
which culminated in international organizations in the twentieth century and supranational 
constructions today, sovereign states are managing their relations in such a way that 
less costly (that is, negotiated) solutions will become a viable instrument in international 
relations. This opens opportunities for more international governance through negotiation 
in the future, with a growing importance for negotiation and how it will be conducted. 
Negotiation will therefore, in this vision, become an increasingly essential part of the 
conduct of internal and external negotiations.
As a downside, there is the danger of gridlock. While states are in need of increasing 
control over internal and external negotiation processes, they need more and more 
bureaucracy to exert control. Bureaucracy and control tend to enhance inflexibility, which 
in turn hampers the negotiation process and thereby its effectiveness as an instrument. 
Bureaucratic barriers will slow down the process, as we already see in the European Union. 
As discussed in the conclusion to the chapter on the European Union, such gridlock can 
be tempered by expanding the informal arena of EU negotiation. It has been noted before 
that progress in negotiations is often to be found ‘in the corridors’. In that sense, more 
informal talks will not only guarantee some freedom from institutional obstacles, but will 
also enhance the chances for successful closure of the negotiation processes. There is 
the importance of informality in reaching deals: too much formality leads to mechanical 
processes, while negotiation is not only about procedures, but very much about creativity. 
Nevertheless, a strong link with the formal side of the process has to remain, as control 
will otherwise be lost and formalization of the outcomes will not be realized, thus making 
them redundant.
There are also other trends diminishing the impact of negotiation on desired outcomes. 
As well as the growing role of the often ‘egotiating’ politicians, there are multitudes of 
national and international civil servants, lobbyists and other non-governmental negotiators 
who are slowly but surely pushing aside the diplomat as an agent in negotiation. This 
obstructs the process in two ways: the sheer growth of actors creates more complexity; 
and although complexity might open new options, it also serves to suffocate the processes. 
More complexity means more formal rules to manage it, and more time to come to closure.
In the conclusions to the second chapter of this thesis, observations were made about 
the future role of the diplomat as a diplomatic negotiator in competition with negotiators of 
other governmental and non-governmental agencies. It was observed that the distinction 
between diplomatic and non-diplomatic negotiators will probably wither away, foremost in 
strong regimes like the European Union. This is an interesting paradox: while the regimes 
allow for successful diplomatic negotiation processes, they will at the same time diminish 
the role and the importance of the diplomatic negotiators.
As a result, miscommunication will also be on the rise because of the erosion of 
diplomatic culture, as fewer and fewer diplomats are allowed to conduct international 
negotiation processes. Professional cultures are bridges between societal cultures. It 
could thus indeed be helpful if negotiators from specialized ministries sit around the table, 
as they do understand each other, which would allow for a smoother negotiation process, 
but they will have to be hacked together for a final and balanced overall outcome. With 
a weakened role for the diplomatic services, whether EU or national, such harmonization 
will become increasingly difficult.
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In sum, there are two trends for the future that will, depending on the situation, 
work against each other or strengthen each other. On the one hand, there is a growing 
institutionalization of the negotiation process, underpinned by a multitude of negotiators 
facilitating these processes and thereby enhancing the chances for effective outcomes. 
This institutionalization will result, on the other hand, in growing complexity, formality and 
transparency, thereby creating inflexibility in the negotiation process, which will obstruct 
it from reaching viable outcomes, as it is further complicated by complexities stemming 
from the nationalization of international negotiations and the internationalization of national 
negotiations. The processes will be more time-consuming, while in the modern world, 
timely closure is of the essence.
It is, of course, difficult to predict how much these two trends in diplomatic negotiation 
will neutralize each other. However, as warfare is so damaging in our globalizing world, 
there seems to be no realistic alternative to negotiation as a global tool in governance 
and conflict resolution. Negotiation is an essential component of the fabric of global 
governance. It is therefore of vital importance to manage the positive and negative trends 
in the effectiveness of negotiation processes in such a way that the positive trend will 
maintain the upper hand.
Recommendations
In order to strengthen diplomatic negotiation as an instrument in international relations, 
a few recommendations might be of value. Diplomats and civil servants should continue 
to play different roles, whereby the diplomats’ role would have the helicopter’s view 
while specializing in certain niches such as conflict management. However, the formal 
difference between diplomats and other civil servants working internationally should 
be diminished and – if possible – disappear. It would be helpful to give both roles the 
same status and – more importantly – to forge a common culture. One of the tools to 
create such a common international negotiation culture is to provide diplomats and 
other civil servants with common education. With the teaching of international relations 
studies – whether political, legal, economical or otherwise – at universities all around the 
world, using English as the lingua franca in both education and negotiation, there seems to 
be no serious obstacle to the rise of an overarching new diplomatic culture in negotiation.
This trend can be further stimulated through early and mid-career training of 
international negotiators through diplomatic academies. Since the 1970s, and for Europe 
since the 1990s, diplomatic academies and schools of foreign service have met to discuss 
enhanced cooperation. However, notwithstanding several attempts to do better, little 
progress in cooperation has been made. The crux is the reform of the organization and 
the programme of these institutions themselves, which can only be done, of course, by 
their respective governments. Little investment is needed to make this materialize.
The organization of the forums facilitating negotiation processes could be made 
more efficient. Again, this would not demand serious investments in money and people, 
but there are serious constraints of a political nature. As long as countries feel that it 
is in their interests to cooperate, but that such cooperation diminishes their options to 
opt out, thereby reducing defence of their vital national interests, such reorganization 
and streamlining will remain a Utopia, at least as far as top-level negotiations like in the 
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United Nations Security Council are concerned. It is questionable, however, as to what 
extent these top institutions really count.
Perhaps the underlying negotiation platforms are of much more importance, as they 
prepare for the highest level strata. International negotiations will seldom start at the 
top. Day-to-day bargaining processes by low-ranking and middle-ranking negotiators 
will prepare the basis for negotiations at the higher bureaucratic and political levels. 
Without this preparatory work, the bureaucratic and political leaders would not be able to 
conclude their treaties. While it is difficult to reform the structures – and even more so the 
negotiation culture – at the highest levels, it seems to be possible at the working levels.
Finally, the issue of internal negotiation processes should not be overlooked, as 
internal processes are often more important and more difficult to manage than external. 
Just as international politics is the reflection of national politics, it might be said that 
international negotiation is the projection of the national negotiation processes on 
regional and world politics. In order to enhance the effectiveness of negotiation as an 
instrument in international politics, internal reforms are needed. On the one hand, this is 
easier than with external reforms, as there is more control over internal processes; on the 
other hand, however, these reforms will immediately affect the positions and interests of 
the bureaucracies and the political systems of a country or an international organization. 
Enhancing the efficiency of negotiation internally is therefore problematic.
As in the international arena, the bottom–up approach might create more chances 
for success than a top–down approximation. The problem remains, however, that the 
decisions to reform the institutions that facilitate the negotiation processes will have to be 
taken at the top, but they might be influenced in a positive way from the bottom. As crises 
are often helpful in changing a context, the current shortage of financial means might 
invoke more streamlining of – and cooperation between – the institutions of the state or 
international organization. This might in turn help to simplify the negotiation process in 
order to keep it manageable.
Diplomatic negotiation will remain a country’s main instrument, both inside and outside 
international organizations, for representing its interests and dealing with the problems 
that it encounters. Diplomatic negotiation will become more important as globalization 
enhances interdependency and provokes regional and global conflicts. Interdependency 
is vital for negotiation. Without it, diplomatic negotiation processes could not function.
Government representatives navigate these processes in order to strengthen national 
interests and/or to manage and solve conflictual situations. Whether chosen or self-
appointed, the negotiators and their superiors manage the power that is mandated to 
them. In that sense they are elite, which automatically distances them from those they 
represent.
Diplomatic negotiation is therefore an elitist affair and it is not easy for those who have 
been represented to be heard. As negotiation is about compromise and compensation, 
the interests of the constituency cannot, by definition, be fully materialized. Moreover, the 
representatives will push for their own interests, being those of their government, their 
international organization, or themselves and their caucus or clique.
Democratizing diplomatic negotiation is therefore hardly possible. Diplomatic 
negotiation is ultimately about an oligarchy deciding for those that it represents: about 
them, but only insufficiently on behalf of them. The negotiators are a ‘negoarchy ’ of mutual 
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understanding, with a more or less common ‘negoculture’, as they could not be effective 
otherwise. By definition, their constituency will be unhappy with the processes and 
outcomes of diplomatic negotiation, while their governments might be suspicious of them 
in cases where they represent international regimes.
As a consequence, governments will keep the international regimes as weak as 
possible, while these regimes are needed to substitute trust for control in order to protect 
the diplomatic negotiation processes and their outcomes. The more diplomatic negotiation 
processes abound, the more complexity arises, the more regimes are needed to enhance 
their effectiveness, and the more governments will attempt to restrict the power of the 
regimes.
This is the Diplomatic Negotiation Loop, which will restrain mankind’s efforts to solve 
its problems in a peaceful way at a time when conflicts are multiplying and the use of 
force is inadequate and harmful for international society. Construction and destruction 
go hand in hand. Diplomatic negotiation remains the most useful tool for dealing with 
it. Increasing our understanding of diplomatic negotiation processes will only serve to 








Dit proefschrift is een studie over diplomatiek onderhandelen. Het Handvest van de 
Verenigde Naties beschouwt onderhandelen als het meest prominente middel om 
conflicten tussen staten te beheersen en, indien mogelijk, tot een oplossing te brengen. 
Daarmee is het een kernpunt van de internationale betrekkingen en één van de 
belangrijkste instrumenten in het diplomatieke verkeer. Het oogmerk van deze studie is 
een beter begrip te krijgen van de betekenis en de evolutie van de onderhandeling tussen 
staten en in internationale organisaties. Om dit doel te bereiken wordt het proces van 
diplomatieke onderhandelingen bezien vanuit de context waarin het zich afspeelt en de 
factoren die het beïnvloeden. Onderhandelen is een moeilijk grijpbaar proces dat in dit 
proefschrift wordt bestudeerd vanuit zoveel mogelijk invalshoeken en over een zo lang 
mogelijke periode teneinde een zo compleet mogelijk beeld te scheppen.
Diplomatiek onderhandelen wordt daarbij gedefinieerd als ‘een uitwisseling van 
concessies en compensaties in de context van de internationale orde zoals deze door 
de soevereine staten aanvaard wordt’. Daarbij wordt met het begrip ‘diplomatiek’ het 
onderhandelen tussen staten en in en door internationale organisaties bedoeld; dit 
om aan te geven dat het in deze studie niet om commerciële of andere niet-statelijke 
onderhandelingen gaat. Hoewel diplomatieke onderhandelingen in de dagelijkse praktijk 
vooral door diplomaten en andere ambtenaren gevoerd worden, zijn het uiteindelijk de 
politici die de beslissingen nemen en daarmee zet de politiek haar stempel op deze vorm 
van internationaal onderhandelen. 
Diplomatiek onderhandelen is dus in sterke mate politiek onderhandelen en politiek 
gaat over het gebruik van macht. Hierin ligt een verschil met onderhandelingen in de private 
sector. Maar ook in andere opzichten onderscheidt de onderhandeling voor de publieke 
zaak zich van het private, bijvoorbeeld omdat zij grotendeels over teksten gaat, waar het 
bedrijfsleven zich vooral bekommert om cijfers. Onderhandelingen over cijfers zijn over het 
algemeen transparanter dan die over woorden. Diplomatieke onderhandelingen worden 
gekenmerkt door ondoorzichtigheid. Het onderhandelen in de publieke sector kan zowel 
een doorlopend proces van besluitvorming, als een ad hoc proces van crisisbeheersing 
zijn. Het verschil tussen beide is gradueel, maar het heeft wel degelijk invloed op de wijze 
van geven en nemen. Daarbij is één van de belangrijkste punten de vraag wanneer een 
situatie rijp is voor een onderhandeling en wanneer een onderhandeling rijp is voor een 
uitkomst.
Uiteindelijk gaat het er bij onderhandelen om dat over en weer toegevingen worden 
gedaan, zodat de betrokken partijen hun problemen kunnen oplossen en tot voor hen 
bevredigende resultaten kunnen komen. Onderhandelen is iets geven om iets te krijgen 
en die verkrijging geschiedt door elkaar tegemoet te komen en de gedane concessies 
te compenseren. Gaat het om twee of drie partijen, dan spreekt men van bilaterale of 
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trilaterale onderhandelingen. Bij meerdere partijen die nog steeds een beperkte groep 
vormen, spreekt men over een plurilaterale onderhandeling. Zodra meer dan vijf partijen 
in het geding zijn, is het gebruikelijk de onderhandeling als multilateraal te karakteriseren. 
Het is interessant te constateren dat het getal vijf kennelijk een effectieve onderhandeling 
mogelijk maakt, getuige het feit dat bij de onderhandelingen te Wenen in 1814–1815 en 
die in Parijs in 1919 vijf landen de dienst uit maakten, terwijl ook heden ten dage de 
Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties uit een pentocratie bestaat.     
In deze studie gaat het om onderhandelen in een internationale context, waarbij 
soevereine eenheden trachten tot onderlinge overeenkomsten te komen. Die internationale 
context is door de deelnemende staten gelegitimeerd, waarbij elke staat in principe 
volledig onafhankelijk van de andere is. Deze onafhankelijkheid wordt in toenemende mate 
geërodeerd door de steeds verder voortschrijdende globalisering. Dit leidt niet alleen tot 
toenemende samenwerking, maar ook tot een steeds groter aantal fricties en daarmee een 
sterk toenemende behoefte aan onderhandelingen leidt. Toch speelt soevereiniteit nog 
steeds een centrale rol in het internationale verkeer. Op zichzelf is het niet onbegrijpelijk 
dat de wereld geordend is in een systeem van onafhankelijke  staten, want zonder dit 
stelsel zou de wereld – bij gebrek aan levensvatbare alternatieven – onbestuurbaar zijn. 
Maar in tussen-statelijke onderhandelingen leidt dit gegeven tot een moeizaam proces 
van convergentie. 
Om onderhandelingsprocessen te vergemakkelijken hebben staten internationale 
regimes tot stand gebracht en internationale organisaties opgericht waarbinnen de 
onderhandelingsprocessen gekanaliseerd kunnen worden en die hen in staat stellen 
nakoming van overeenkomsten af te dwingen. Vertrouwen is een centraal element bij 
onderhandelen. Immers, als dat ontbreekt valt de bodem onder de onderhandeling weg, of 
de onderhandeling zal nooit van de grond komen. Mensen kunnen onderling vertrouwen 
opbouwen, maar staten hebben belangen die hen er soms toe brengen het onderling 
vertrouwen te beschamen. Om die reden kan een interstatelijke onderhandeling slechts 
werkelijk effectief zijn als een mogelijk wegvallen van vertrouwen gecompenseerd wordt 
door controle. Internationale organisaties, en in breder kader internationale afspraken, 
zijn dus een onmisbaar hulpmiddel bij het verhogen van de waarde van diplomatieke 
onderhandelingsprocessen als alternatief voor oorlogvoering. Daarbij blijft onderhandelen 
een strijd, met woorden maar niet met wapens. Diplomatiek onderhandelen zou dus ook 
gekarakteriseerd kunnen worden als ‘oorlog met vreedzame middelen.’ 
Hoe positief de rol van internationale afspraken en internationale organisaties 
ook is, er zitten ook zeker nadelen aan vast. Internationale organisaties mogen de 
onderhandelingsprocessen vooruit helpen en hun resultaten garanderen, in de praktijk is 
het afdwingen van gemaakte afspraken niet altijd even eenvoudig. Daar is minstens een 
controleregime voor nodig. Bovendien hebben internationale organisaties de neiging vast 
te houden aan oude gebruiken, al was het maar omdat landen niet tot nieuwe kunnen 
komen. Daarnaast zijn landen aarzelend om te veel macht over te hevelen en dat kan 
hen onder bepaalde omstandigheden goed uitkomen dat de samenwerkingsorganisaties 
machteloos zijn. Daarbij zullen grote landen eerder afwachtend zijn dan kleine, die 
immers vanwege het machtsverschil behoefte hebben aan bundeling van hun krachten, 
Internationale organisaties worden zelfstandige actoren en hoewel het primaat bij de 
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landen blijft, zal de organisatie zeker haar invloed trachten aan te wenden om haar eigen 
bestaan te rechtvaardigen en te continueren.
Het proefschrift bestaat uit een inleidend hoofdstuk, vervolgens vier hoofdstukken over 
de aard van het diplomatiek onderhandelingsproces en daarna zes hoofdstukken over het 
voeren van de onderhandeling en ten slotte een hoofdstuk ter samenvatting en conclusie. 
In hoofdstuk twee tot en met vijf worden de belangrijkste kenmerken van het diplomatiek 
onderhandelingsproces onder de loep genomen. In hoofdstuk zes tot en met elf worden 
vergelijkende gevalsbeschrijvingen gepresenteerd, waarin elementen uit het eerste deel 
aan een nadere beschouwing worden onderworpen. Voor elke casus wordt een andere 
invalshoek gebruikt, omdat deze verschillende gezichtspunten anders onvoldoende aan 
de orde zouden komen. Vier casussen hebben betrekking op gevallen uit het verleden, 
één is hedendaags en één analyseert het diplomatieke onderhandelen in nagebootste 
vorm. De historische dimensie is gekozen om na te gaan op welke manier de diplomatieke 
onderhandeling zich in de loop der eeuwen  heeft ontwikkeld en welke inzichten daaruit 
voor de komende jaren verkregen kunnen worden. De simulatieve voorbeelden zijn van 
belang omdat daaruit lessen te trekken zijn – voor onderzoekers en studenten – omdat 
toegang tot directe observatie van de werkelijke processen uitermate beperkt is. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk bestaat uit twee delen. In het eerste deel wordt gekeken naar de 
relatie tussen onderhandelingspraktijk, – onderzoek en – onderwijs. Vervolgens worden 
de belangrijkste onderdelen van het diplomatiek onderhandelingsproces besproken, 
zoals onder andere de partijen en hun belangen, de stadia in het onderhandelingsproces 
en de rol van macht, alsmede de vraag of men distributief of integratief kan en moet 
onderhandelen. Onder het eerste wordt verstaan dat partijen de vruchten uit het proces 
zo goed mogelijk proberen te verdelen, in het tweede geval zal men ook trachten de oogst 
te verrijken door nieuwe elementen toe te voegen teneinde voor alle partijen een situatie 
te bereiken waarin ze meer uit het proces verkrijgen dan ze erin geïnvesteerd hebben. Het 
is daarbij interessant op te merken dat de Latijnse wortel van onderhandelen ‘nec otium’ 
is, wat zoveel betekent als ‘niet nietsdoen’. Met andere woorden: de handeling is geen zich 
herhalende arbeid, maar is veeleer een scheppende en waarde toevoegende activiteit. 
Dit sluit aan bij het integratieve begrip van onderhandelen dat raakt aan de vraag waar 
de grens ligt tussen de aangeboren (de kunst) en de aangeleerde vaardigheid van het 
onderhandelen. 
Deel twee van het eerste hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de ideeën omtrent 
diplomatieke onderhandelingsprocessen. Eén van de belangrijkste denktanks op het 
onderhandelingsterrein is het ‘Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program’, dat 
zich in zijn eerste twintig jaar heeft ontwikkeld onder de hoede van het ‘International 
Institute of Applied System Analysis’ in Oostenrijk. Vanaf 2011 is PIN onderdak bij een 
andere denktank: het Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen ‘Clingendael’. 
Het basiswerk van PIN, ‘International Negotiation’, is als uitgangspunt genomen voor het 
overzicht van de verschillende benaderingen van diplomatiek onderhandelen. Vervolgens 
is naar een aantal andere bronnen gekeken. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift, tevens het eerste van het onderdeel over de 
aard van diplomatiek onderhandelen, bestaat eveneens uit twee gedeelten. Allereerst wordt 
een beschouwing gewijd aan de evolutie van het diplomatiek onderhandelingsproces. 
Daarbij wordt het probleem van de relatie tussen proces en uitkomst besproken. In een 
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ideale wereld zou het resultaat van een onderhandeling begrepen moeten worden uit 
het verloop van het proces dat eraan ten grondslag ligt. Gezien de vele factoren die in 
het proces een rol spelen – niet het minst die van de mens met zijn karakter, ervaring, 
vooronderstellingen en doeleinden – is dit vrijwel ondoenlijk. Toch zit er niets anders op 
dan te trachten een zo duidelijk mogelijk beeld te scheppen door de omstandigheden en 
de ontwikkelingen aan een nadere analyse te onderwerpen. Vooral in de periode voor 
Westfalen speelde de onzekerheid in de internationale betrekkingen tussen dynastieën 
en republieken het onderhandelingsproces parten. In de periode na de zeventiende eeuw 
krijgen de heersers en hun diplomaten deze onvoorspelbaarheid enigszins onder controle 
door onderling afdwingbare afspraken te maken. Maar hier waren wel vier eeuwen voor 
nodig en ook heden ten dage blijft dit een zwak punt.
Het tweede gedeelte van het tweede hoofdstuk is een nadere uitwerking van het 
eerste deel: het belang van de staat en de vraag hoe de belangen van staten zich tot 
elkaar verhouden en hoe zij met elkaar verzoend kunnen worden. Indien de belangen van 
staten nauwelijks van elkaar verschillen, is een onderhandelingsproces overbodig, tenzij 
het gaat om de vraag hoe men gemeenschappelijk zal optreden. Wanneer de belangen 
vrijwel volkomen tegengesteld zijn is onderhandelen niet mogelijk, tenzij een verandering 
in de context tot nieuwe kansen leidt. Het gaat er dan om eerst de omgevingsfactoren 
aan te pakken om zo onderhandelbaarheid te scheppen. Niet alle betrokken partijen 
zullen deze onderhandelbaarheid wensen, omdat zij menen dat de uitkomst slechter 
zal zijn dan de situatie waarin zij zich reeds bevinden. Indien er sprake is van zowel 
tegengestelde als gemeenschappelijke belangen, zal het onderhandelingsproces pas 
kans van slagen hebben wanneer er niet alleen sprake is van tegengestelde, maar ook 
van gemeenschappelijke belangen.  De vraag hoe de diplomaat in dit proces navigeert 
is daarbij zeer belangrijk. Daarom wordt aandacht besteed aan onderhandelingsgedrag. 
Hoofdstuk drie gaat nader in op de relatie tussen het diplomatiek onderhandelingsproces 
en zijn context. In het eerste deel van het hoofdstuk wordt betoogd dat het stellen van 
grenzen van groot belang is, wil men tot een relevant en effectief onderhandelingsproces 
geraken. Het proces dient immers een bepaalde kant opgestuurd te worden teneinde 
de doelstellingen te verwezenlijken. Hier wordt de vergelijking gemaakt tussen een 
rivier en zijn oevers: de bedijking leidt het water naar de zee, waarbij het water het 
onderhandelingsproces is. Er worden zes begrenzingen onderscheiden: landsgrenzen, 
de sterkte of zwakte van staten en internationale organisaties, de rol van belangen 
en de invloed van de posities die de partijen innemen, de beschikbare hulpbronnen, 
de aanwezige regelgeving en de heersende normen en waarden alsmede de tijd als 
begrenzende factor in verleden, heden en toekomst. Het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk 
richt zich op de internationale regimes – en speciaal de internationale organisaties – die, 
zo luidt een belangrijke these van deze studie, een bepalende rol spelen bij het vergroten 
van de succesfactor in het diplomatiek onderhandelingsproces. Hierbij wordt gekeken 
naar de positieve en negatieve kanten en komt de vraag aan de orde hoe deze regimes en 
organisaties tot stand komen. 
Het vierde hoofdstuk wil het inzicht in proces en omgeving verdiepen door één 
van de belangrijkste fenomenen te analyseren die staten in een – over het algemeen 
negatieve – richting zuigen: het proces van elkaar opeenvolgende valstrikken. Een ander 
toepasselijk beeld is een fuik die op het eerste gezicht niet in het oog springt, maar die 
uiteindelijk een klemsituatie veroorzaakt waaruit de politiek zich maar met grote moeite 
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los kan maken, namelijk door de oude beleidsbepalers te vervangen door nieuwe. Men 
zou dit de contextverandering in de regerende elite kunnen noemen, maar om deze te 
bewerkstelligen is externe druk onvoldoende, er dient een binnenlandse wending te 
komen. Hiermee wordt het belang van het binnenlandse niveau van het buitenlandse 
onderhandelingsproces onderstreept: de rol van de alternatieve elites en de achterban, 
het volk en de media. Dit hoofdstuk gaat nader in op de karakteristieken van een dergelijk 
verstrikkend proces, de niveaus waarop het zich afspeelt, de belangrijkste factoren en de 
mogelijkheden een dergelijke situatie te vermijden, dan wel er een einde aan de maken. 
Eén en ander wordt geïllustreerd met een casus uit de praktijk. Opgemerkt moet worden 
dat partijen zichzelf soms met opzet laten verstrikken, zoals bij de invoering van de euro, 
omdat die situatie tot verdere integratie  dwingt waarbij de achterban geen keuze wordt 
gelaten dan het volgen van hun beleidsbeslissers.                  
Het laatste hoofdstuk van het eerste deel van deze dissertatie analyseert de relatie 
tussen onderhandelen en zijn belangrijkste alternatief: geweldsgebruik. Ook nu gaat 
het in feite om een beschouwing waarin proces en context ontrafeld worden, zij het 
op een andere wijze. De vraag wordt gesteld wat nu eigenlijk de waarde van oorlog en 
onderhandeling is, waar het om de beheersing en de beëindiging van conflicten gaat. 
Vervolgens worden de historische achtergronden bezien, daarna wordt de vraag gesteld 
wat oorlog en onderhandelen gemeen hebben, waarin ze van elkaar verschillen, waar 
zij in elkaars verlengde liggen en welke rol bemiddeling kan spelen bij het overbruggen 
van de tegenstellingen. Bemiddeling wordt in de context van dit proefschrift als een 
bijzondere vorm van onderhandelen gezien, hetgeen in de sfeer van het onderzoek naar 
internationale diplomatieke onderhandelingsprocessen gebruikelijk is. Dit in tegenstelling 
to bemiddeling in de juridische- of gezinssfeer. 
Deel twee van het proefschrift begint met hoofdstuk zes, dat ingaat op de 
onderhandelingen die in het midden van de zeventiende eeuw tot de Vrede van Westfalen 
hebben geleid. Zoals eerder gezegd, is de keuze van deze casus ingegeven door de 
heersende opvatting dat met deze diplomatieke conferentie een eerste aanzet tot 
regimebouw werd gegeven. In werkelijkheid was de overgang van het tijdvak zonder, naar 
het tijdvak met regimes, natuurlijk vloeiend. De internationale betrekkingen in de huidige 
tijd verkeren nog immer in een zeer gebrekkige situatie van internationale samenwerking, 
al was het maar omdat de geschapen instituties niet optimaal kunnen functioneren. Zoals 
hiervoor betoogd is dit zowel aan de lidstaten, als aan de aard van hun eigen organisatie te 
wijten. In het hoofdstuk ligt de nadruk op de gebeurtenissen te Münster, waar het overgrote 
deel van de internationale onderhandelingen plaats vond. Dit staat in tegenstelling tot 
de onderhandelingen in Osnabrück die vooral de binnenlandse situatie in het Heilige 
Roomse Rijk der Duitse Natie tot onderwerp van bespreking hadden. Opvallend is de 
gemeenschappelijke onderhandelingscultuur  van de afgezanten. Taal en moraal waren 
die van de adel en de vorsten bevonden zich ver weg in hun respectieve hoofdsteden, zodat 
de edellieden en regenten in zekere zin de vrije hand hadden, nauwelijks gestoord door 
hun opdrachtgevers. De kern van het hoofdstuk gaat over de vraag of de onderhandelaars 
het verleden of de toekomst als focus namen. Ze deden veeleer het laatste. Daarmee 
vormt Westfalen de basis van het moderne diplomatieke onderhandelen. 
Hoofdstuk zeven speelt zich in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden af: de Vrede 
van Utrecht aan het begin van de achttiende eeuw die een einde maakte aan de eerste 
wereldwijde oorlog, te weten de Spaanse successieoorlog, maar ook aan de positie van 
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de Republiek als grote mogendheid. De verhandeling concentreert zich op het gedrag van 
de diplomaten en stelt de vraag of de voor Nederland overwegend negatieve vrede een 
positieve wending had kunnen krijgen. Hier komt ook weer de relatie tussen context en 
proces aan de orde. Een oorzaak voor deze – voor de Republiek – vrij onfortuinlijke vrede 
ligt vooral in het onderhandelingsgedrag in de voorfase van de conferentie. Het gedrag van 
de Nederlandse vertegenwoordigiers getuigt van tunnelvisie en besluiteloosheid, factoren 
waar de Fransen en de Britten, de belangrijkste vijand en de belangrijkste bondgenoot, 
niet door gehinderd werden. Te laat werd ingezien dat de Franse uitputting en de Britse 
regeringswisseling tot  verschuivingen in de allianties zouden leiden, waardoor de 
conferentie zelf in feite een gelopen race was. Een dergelijke misrekening heeft zich ook 
later in de Nederlandse geschiedenis voorgedaan en wel bij de onderhandelingen over het 
verdrag van Maastricht. Het hoofdstuk maakt ook een vergelijking met twee voorgaande 
vredesonderhandelingen op Nederlandse bodem: die van Nijmegen en Rijswijk. 
Het achtste hoofdstuk analyseert de onderhandelingen tijdens het Congres van Wenen, 
die aan het begin van de negentiende eeuw een einde maakten aan de Napoleontische 
oorlogen. De onderhandelaars poogden de pre-revolutionaire orde te herstellen en nieuwe 
revoluties te voorkomen door na afloop van het Congres tot duurzame samenwerking 
te komen in de vorm van de Quadruple (1814) en de Quintuple Alliantie (1818), die de 
basis van het ‘Concert van Europa’ vormden. Tijdens de conferentie speelden de vijf grote 
landen de hoofdrol en alle middelgrote en kleine staten werden beziggehouden met 
grootschalig vermaak, zo ook de mandatarissen van de gemandateerden: met uitzondering 
van de Russische Tsaar speelden de vorsten eigenlijk geen doorslaggevende rol. Hoewel 
de diplomaten, die tevens politici waren, in hoge mate de vrije hand hadden, is deze 
conferentie toch ook een voorbode van de verdere ontwikkelingen in de toekomst: de 
groeiende rol van de hoogste besluitvormer in het diplomatieke onderhandelingsproces. 
Bovendien begint de publieke opinie een rol te spelen en komen ook niet-gouvernementele 
groepen, zoals de Joden, hun opwachting maken. Dit onderdeel van de dissertatie beziet 
het effect van uitsluiting van de kleinere mogendheden door de grotere en het belang van 
de deelneming van alle machtige staten aan het vredesproces.        
Hoofdstuk negen trekt de lijn door die in het Weense congres voorzichtig zichtbaar 
gaat worden: de opkomst van de politicus als directe deelnemer aan het diplomatieke 
onderhandelingsproces en de relatieve marginalisering van zijn of haar representanten. 
Er wordt vanuit gegaan dat politici topposities bereiken als zij daartoe en sterke innerlijke 
motivatie hebben en dat deze drijfkracht mede het gevolg is van een krachtig ‘ego’, dat 
op zijn beurt invloed zal hebben op het onderhandelingsproces. ‘Egotiation’ is de term 
die dit proefschrift daarvoor lanceert: een onderhandeling waarbij het behoud van de 
reputatie van de onderhandelaar belangrijker is dan de landsbelangen die hij of zij moet 
dienen. Diplomaten zullen in veel gevallen, teneinde het belang van hun organisatie en 
van hun land te behartigen, hun eigen politieke leider in het gareel moeten houden. Dat 
is geen eenvoudige opgave, aangezien die leider degene is die de instructies geeft (of 
doet opstellen) en deze bovendien – in democratieën – rekening moet houden met partij 
en achterban. Het hoofdstuk behandelt niet één, maar zes onderhandelingen. Drie in de 
eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw en drie in de tweede helft: die van Parijs aan het begin 
van de twintigste eeuw ter beëindiging van de Eerste Wereldoorlog, die van München en 
Yalta aan begin en einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog en drie onderhandelingen tijdens 
de Koude Oorlog. Dit alles speelt zich af in een eeuw waarin de staten zich daadwerkelijk 
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internationaal gaan organiseren en daartoe mondiale, regionale en functionele 
(thematische) organisaties opbouwen.
Hoofdstuk tien gaat verder in op de kwestie van onderhandelen en internationale 
organisatievorming en wel door de Europese integratie als onderwerp te nemen. De 
Europese Unie valt te beschouwen als  de meest geïntegreerde vorm van internationale 
en supranationale samenwerking en is daarom bij uitstek geschikt om naar de relatie 
tussen proces en context te kijken vanuit de vraag hoe deze zich in de toekomst verder zal 
ontwikkelen. Aan de orde komen onderwerpen als de aard van de EU in het algemeen, de 
bijzonderheden van de Unie als een arena voor onderhandelingen, de rol van de lidstaten, 
de procedures, de instituties, de betrekkingen met externe actoren, de gebruikte 
strategieën en tactieken en de toekomst van het EU onderhandelingsproces. Dit proces 
wordt als het hart van de Unie gezien waarbij de institutionele factoren dienstbaar zouden 
moeten zijn aan de processen die de Europese problemen tot een oplossing moeten 
brengen. Diezelfde factoren vormen echter ook een belemmering, zoals eerder in deze 
samenvatting ten aanzien van andere regimes en inter/supranationale organisaties is 
betoogd. Informaliteit kan hier het middel zijn om de verstarrende werking van de formele 
fora in te perken. Maar het nadeel van informele processen is dat zij slecht zichtbaar 
zijn – als ze transparant waren dan zouden ze niet effectief zijn – en daardoor worden ze 
door de publieke opinie en de belangengroepen met wantrouwen bekeken, hetgeen de 
legitimiteit van de EU niet bevordert. 
Het elfde hoofdstuk analyseert drie gesimuleerde gevalsstudies als lessen voor 
onderhandelingsvoorzitters en voor bilaterale en multilaterale onderhandelaars. Het 
eerste onderdeel becommentarieert de rol van voorzitters in de Europese Unie en 
sluit als zodanig aan bij het voorgaande hoofdstuk. De tweede casus gaat diep in op 
onderhandelingen in het veld. Het diplomatiek geven en nemen vindt immers niet alleen 
achter en rond de onderhandelingstafel plaats, maar heeft tevens bij de uitvoering van 
genomen beslissingen een belangrijke controlerende rol. Nakoming is, zoals eerder 
betoogd, van cruciaal belang. Zowel voor het vertrouwen in het onderhandelingsproces 
zelf, als in de verwezenlijking daarvan. De derde casus analyseert een rollenspel door 
gemengde groepen van diplomaten en vakdeskundigen simultaan gespeeld werd en 
trekt daaruit lessen voor de werkelijke onderhandelingen die in de jaren daarna zullen 
plaatsvinden. Daarnaast gaat dit hoofdstuk in op de mogelijkheden en de beperking van 
simulaties voor bestudering en voor onderwijs in diplomatieke onderhandelingsprocessen. 
Hoofdstuk twaalf rondt het proefschrift af. Het vat de hierboven gegeven 
conclusies samen en beziet de actoren, factoren en processen van het diplomatiek 
onderhandelingsproces in onderling verband. Daarenboven geeft het een drietal 
aanbevelingen om de effectiviteit van dit proces te verhogen. In de eerste plaats door 
te streven naar een diplomatiek corps waarin de verschillen tussen diplomaten en 
andere internationaal opererende ambtenaren niet meer ter zake doen. Ten tweede 
door opnieuw te pogen de structuur – en daarmee de effectiviteit van internationale 
organisaties – te verbeteren. Ten derde door meer aandacht te schenken aan het belang 
van nationale onderhandelingen die voor internationale onderhandelingen bepalend zijn. 
Het zou verstandig zijn de processen die van onderop komen meer ruimte te geven dan 
nu het geval is. In die zin is de de facto verkiezing van de voorzitter van de Europese 
Commissie  een stap in de goede richting van een veel breder gedragen – en daardoor 
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